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The decade from 1836 produced major tensions in British-American relations over Canada 
and the role of the United States as a growing regional and maritime power.  American 
citizens added to the danger of the Canadian rebellion of 1837 through frequent border 
disturbances, and there was a real risk of war in the case of McLeod.  The United States 
made spectacular gains of territory in Texas and Oregon, and settled the north-eastern 
boundary controversy.  Disputes with Britain arose, but American continental dominance 
was put beyond doubt.  On the seas, pressure from the United States in the “right of search” 
and Creole incidents ultimately restricted British actions against the slave trade and slavery.    
This thesis examines the impact of international law on British foreign policy towards the 
United States during this period.  It aims to establish that international law provided the 
framework and principles within which British policy worked, and disputes were handled.    
It also intends to show that the conduct of the issues concerned demonstrates that there was a 
shared British-American respect for international law.  These points matter because British 
policy has traditionally been explained mainly in terms of peace being sought for reasons of 
global strategy and economic benefit.  The role of international law has been largely 
overlooked.  As the thesis aims to demonstrate, however, international law was at the heart of 
how Britain responded to the United States.  British policy, and the maintenance of peace, 
cannot, accordingly, be fully understood without an appreciation of this legal context. 
The thesis begins by arguing that international law was able to be influential because it was 
part of the institutional practice of British foreign policy to the United States.  Expert advice 
was available to the Foreign Office and a series of principles was established by which 
policy was to be conducted.  The thesis then shows how treaties and legal principles made an 
important impact.  A combination of treaty law and principles guided British objectives 
towards the United States concerning imperial possessions, commerce, the slave trade, and 
peace.  Crucially, law also influenced the handling of issues in the British-American 
relationship through what was effectively a legal framework shared with the United States.  
The remainder of the thesis then examines in detail the impact of international law within 
these themes on the most contentious issues of the period.  Canada, the American expansion 
into Texas and Oregon, and the disputes over the “right of search” and the Creole are each 
considered separately. 
The thesis does not argue that British foreign policy to the United States can be explained 
entirely by international law.  Without an enforcing authority, the role of international law 
was a question of political choice and power.  Rather, its main underlying contention is that 
the acceptance and use of international law in this decade needs to be seen as an important 
part of the British-American political relationship. 
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1.           Introduction  
On the 12th November, 1840, the New York State authorities arrested Alexander McLeod on 
a ‘charge of murder and arson’, for his alleged part in the ‘capture and destruction’ of the 
steam boat, the Caroline.   McLeod’s apprehension revived the events of some three years 1
earlier, when, on the night of the 29th December, 1837, British forces had crossed the 
Niagara river into American territory, seized the Caroline (killing one person), and released it 
ablaze into the ‘cataract of the River’.   Britain had justified the seizure of the Caroline on 2
the grounds that it had been supplying a ‘hostile assemblage at Navy Island’, but for the 
United States it remained an ‘offensive’ and ‘unwarrantable’ ‘outrage’.   Faced with this 3
unwelcome return of a past dispute, Britain demanded McLeod’s release, but not simply 
because he was a subject of the Crown.  Instead, what Palmerston and Fox, the British 
Minister in Washington, cared about was that the New York authorities had failed to 
recognise that the Caroline incident was a ‘public act of persons in Her Majesty’s service’, 
which, as a matter of international law, could only be dealt with by ‘discussion between the 
two national governments’.   Britain even went so far as to warn the United States of a war 4
of ‘retaliation and vengeance’ if McLeod was convicted and executed, aimed at stopping any 
other ‘nation... from again committing so monstrous a public crime’.    As it happened, the 5
crisis passed after McLeod’s ultimate acquittal in October 1841, but its circumstances 
nevertheless show how far Britain acted by reference to its understanding of how the United 
States should have responded under international law.  Britain saw McLeod’s indictment as a 
problem because it considered that a legal principle made him immune from personal 
responsibility, and it expected respect for its arguments from the United States.  Strikingly, 
Britain also threatened to fight over the principle it believed to be at stake.   
This incident matters because it suggests a British-American relationship in the period in 
which, at the least, international law was taken seriously as a set of rules that could influence 
 Fox to Forsyth, 13 December 1840, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. III, 1533.1
 Stevenson to Palmerston, 22 May 1838, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. III, 1445; the Caroline 2
was American-owned and moored for the night at Schlosser in New York State.
 Arthur to Sydenham, 1/2/41, FO 5/371, fols. 166-192 at fols. 170-171; Stevenson to Palmerston, 22 3
May 1838, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1445, Vol. III; Navy Island was an island in the Niagara river 
that was British territory.
 Fox to Forsyth, 13 December 1840, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. III, 1533.4
 Fox to Aberdeen, 12 October 1841, Confidential, British Documents, Vol. 1, 156.5
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government conduct on specific issues.  More widely, it also potentially indicates that there 
was a shared culture of respect for international law permeating the whole conduct of British 
foreign policy to the United States, albeit that initially Britain and the United States had 
differing views in the McLeod case.  Moreover, the validity or otherwise of these 
possibilities carried clear implications for the understanding of Britain’s policy to the United 
States, and the wider British-American relationship.  Was British policy guided by legal 
principles, and to what extent were Britain and the United States handling issues within what 
might now be termed a ‘rules-based system’?  If so, what was the effect?  This thesis arose 
from the fact that, despite its possible significance, the problem of the role of international 
law has not been sufficiently addressed in previous works covering British policy to the 
United States.  Thus it seemed worthwhile to ask how typical was the McLeod incident, and 
to examine how international law was used in British-American disputes in this period. 
The decade from 1836 presents the ideal period for research into this problem as it contained 
several diverse challenges for British policy to the United States.  The Canadian Revolt of 
1837 sparked border instability, and the associated incidents concerning the Caroline and 
McLeod.  The unresolved Maine boundary dispute gave rise to skirmishes and threats of 
military intervention from the late 1830s.  Furthermore, the United States expanded hugely 
into Texas and Oregon, and began a war that would see it take California.  There were 
problems too away from the North American continent.  The United States threatened the 
effectiveness of British action to suppress the African slave trade, with its defence of 
American shipping from the alleged interference of the Royal Navy.  Isolated controversies, 
such as the Creole, also laid bare the chasm between the two nations over slavery.  Yet, 
distinct as these matters were, all of them also appeared to involve international law.  Britain 
pursued legal claims in the Maine boundary and Oregon disputes.   The United States alleged 
that British actions in Texas, the Atlantic, and the Creole were in breach of legal principles 
providing for, respectively, ‘non-interference’, the freedom of the seas, and the ‘comity of 
nations’.   The McLeod and Caroline cases both centred on accusations that international law 
had been broken.  The problem then is to understand how far Britain’s approach may actually 
have been affected by law in these particular instances.  
This thesis aims to establish that British foreign policy to the United States in the period did 
indeed work within a framework of international law.  It contends that law influenced both 
what Britain sought to achieve, and how it managed the problems in the British-American 
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relationship.  Its central point is that international law adds an important extra dimension to 
the way in which the main incidents in the British-American relationship of the period have 
traditionally been understood.  The thesis begins by arguing that international law was able 
to have this influence because it was part of the institutional practice of British policy.  
Expert advice was available to the Foreign Office, and a series of settled principles instructed 
the conduct of policy.  It then sets out the main ways in which international law actually 
made an impact on British policy.  Treaty law and legal principles guided British objectives 
towards the United States concerning imperial possessions, commerce, the slave trade, and 
peace.  Crucially, law also influenced the handling of issues in the British-American 
relationship, through what was effectively a legal framework shared with the United States.  
The remainder of the thesis then examines the effects of international law on the direction 
and operation of British policy in relation to Canada, American expansion, and maritime 
rights.  In the Northeast, legal principles defending sovereignty and territory helped to 
maintain workable relations with the United States during the Canadian rebellions.  Legal 
terms were used to define and resolve the critical McLeod and Caroline issues.   Legal 
process and argument restricted the scope of the Maine boundary dispute, justifying perfectly 
Webster’s gibe that it was a ‘tedious matter’.    Similarly, in the West and South, historic 6
rights, and the presence of common legal principles, gave Britain a greater interest in the 
future of Oregon than that of Texas, and shaped the course of policy to both.  Lastly, in the 
Atlantic, existing law produced a new updated set of rules for ‘visit’ to American ships in the 
seeming conflict over maritime rights and the slave trade.  
Thus the thesis claims that the acceptance and use of international law was an important part 
of the political relationship between Britain and the United States in the period.  The British-
American relationship was unique: an imperial ruler and its now independent former colony.  
Initially, the process of separation, and the several related treaties, generated legal issues.  
Others then arose from the fact that the ‘new’ United States was able to expand on the North 
American continent, and defend its shipping in the Atlantic Ocean, further challenging 
British regional power in both cases.  International law provided a structure and language for 
resolving these issues peacefully, and this was appreciated by the politicians in Britain and 
the United States.  Ministers and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic personally deployed 
its principles.  Furthermore, the role of international law also allows for a re-evaluation to be 
made of the nature of British-American ‘political’ relations.  For treaty law and legal 
 Webster to Everett, 31 May 1842, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. III, 1288.6
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principles were more than just a structure for defining, and resolving, disputes.  They were 
also a unifying force revealing agreement on political choice at a deep level between Britain 
and the United States.  The principles behind the ownership of unoccupied land are one 
example; another would be the main rights and obligations associated with the ‘freedom of 
the seas’, so crucial for the trading interests of both powers.  There were, of course, 
differences in the detail, but international law extended a commonality of mindset to foreign 
policy discussion.   Historical attention should not, therefore, be given just to the facts of the 
conflicts.  Legal disputes need ‘rules’, and the ‘rules’, not the disputes, are, ultimately, the 
foundation of a relationship.     
The thesis is concerned with the way in which international law permeated the objectives 
and practice of British foreign policy to the United States in the period.  It is interested in 
how international law was perceived, and used, by British politicians; it is not a history of 
international law.  The main sources used, therefore, are British diplomatic papers related to 
the United States, private correspondence of British politicians, parliamentary reports of 
debates, and articles in a range of contemporary periodicals.  The remainder of this 
Introduction has three main purposes.  Primarily, it defines what is meant in the thesis by 
international law, and argues why it provided a system of rules that could in principle  
influence British foreign policy to the United States.  Next, it considers how far the current 
historiography of British-American relations requires reassessment as a result.  It then 
concludes with a chapter summary.      
International Law 
The international law - or the law of nations - in the early to mid-nineteenth century was a 
combination of law said to derive from reason - or natural law, and law from agreement in 
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the form of treaties or custom - or positive law.    It provided a framework of principles for 7
the conduct of states, and for the international relations between states, and covered war and 
peace, land and sea.    It was set out in the work of jurists, but they did not always agree and 8
there was no independent enforcing authority for its rules.  The main author referred to in 
this period within Britain and the United States was Emmerich de Vattel, although other 
writers, particularly Hugo Grotius, were also influential.    Importantly, Vattel extended the 9
purview of international law beyond the position of a nation ‘in its relation to others’, or 
 The term 'international law’ will be used in the thesis.  Contemporary statesmen also referred to the 7
‘law of nations’ as well as ‘international law’, and this term will, therefore, also be found in the thesis 
in quotations.  The use of ‘international law’ is not to deny that the terms ‘international law’ and ‘law 
of nations’ have distinct derivations.  In particular, the ‘law of nations’ is the older term, used, for 
example, in the works of the eighteenth century, and which was gradually replaced by ‘international 
law’ in the nineteenth century.  The ‘law of nations’ can also be seen as historically a wider term, 
encompassing domestic governance in addition to international relations.  Such differences are not, 
however, material for present purposes.   No consistent distinctions in meaning between the two terms 
were made in the period by statesmen, or in foreign policy practice; in other words, whatever their 
distinct original derivations, they were generally used in these contexts in the 1830s and 1840s to 
mean the same thing, or for similar purposes.  Furthermore, the thesis is concerned, in any event, with 
the impact of principles within international law or the ‘law of nations’ in the widest sense, and 
‘international law’ is used simply for convenience as an appropriate single term.
 Some historians maintain, though, that this traditional range needs to be extended.  For example, 8
Koskenniemi contends that the ‘nineteenth-century sensibility [of international law] excluded large 
chunks of power from its compass, namely that exercised through private law, property and contract’: 
M. Koskenniemi, ''Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity', p. 
23, (International  Relations, 2011, E.H. Carr Lecture); and Benton and Ford argue that the ‘origins of 
international law’ can also be found in the ‘redesign of British imperial law’ in the early nineteenth-
century: L. A. Benton, and Ford, L., Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of 
International Law, 1800-1850, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), p. 1.
 In the research for this thesis, there were more references to Vattel than other jurists in the diplomatic 9
correspondence and parliamentary debates reviewed, although direct mention of any particular writer 
in such sources was rare.  References occurred as follows: by the American lawyers for McLeod, to 
Vattel and Chitty’s Notes: Sydenham to Russell, 25 February 1841, FO 5/371, fols. 236-245; by 
Commander Jones, in his justification of 23 October 1842 relating to his unauthorised invasion of 
Mexico at Monterey, to Chitty's Vattel, 4th American edition: Fox to Aberdeen, No. 44, 24 March 
1843, FO 5/391, fols. 232-300 at 283; by Grattan, British Consul at Boston, in referring to a recent 
case in the U.S. Supreme Court, to Webster’s reliance on Vattel and Blackstone: Grattan to 
Palmerston, 29 March 1841, British Documents, Vol. 1, 92; by the Texan envoy in London, Smith, in 
respect of an alleged British breach of neutrality, to Vattel and Wolf: Smith to Aberdeen, 10 October 
1842, FO 75/5, fols. 58-65 at 61; by Hume, in the House of Commons in a debate on Canada, to 
Vattel: 29 January 1838, Vol. XL, 627; and by Falkland, the Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia, in 
respect of fishing rights, to Grotius and Chitty’s Commercial Law: Falkland to Russell, Copy, 8 May 
1841, FO 5/373, fols. 16-36 at 20.  Further, Jennifer Pitts noted that Vattel’s Law of Nations, as 
published in 1834, edited by Jospeh Chitty, was used within the British Empire, albeit that, she then 
added, Vattel’s popularity in Britain began to decline after the opium war with China: Jennifer Pitts, 
‘Method’( Paper) at ‘History, Law, Politics’ Conference, University of Cambridge, 16 May 2016. 
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matters of war and peace, to that of  ‘nations considered in themselves’.    He, therefore, 10
included within the Law of Nations, a state’s duties to itself in areas such as self-
preservation, cultivation of the soil, government, commerce, territory, and the sea, many of 
which, as will be seen, were reflected in British practice.   In addition to Vattel, Henry 11
Wheaton, an American diplomat, also emerged as a ‘modern’ codifier of international law in 
the 1830s and 1840s, along with, to a lesser extent, his fellow countryman, James Kent.    In 12
Britain, Robert Phillimore was the first writer of similar standing, with his major work on 
international law being published in the 1850s.    The mixed genealogy of international law 13
is reflected in the work of these writers.   Vattel favoured natural law, but saw Grotius as 
having tended towards a general system based instead on the ‘common consent of nations’.    14
Wheaton and Kent, encompassed both traditions, supporting the idea of both natural law, and 
that of consent.         15
The British and American governments of the period undoubtedly considered themselves as 
participants in a system of international law.   Leading statesmen in Britain and the United 
States, therefore, frequently indicated that they were acting within a set of rules formed by 
treaties and general principles.    Chapters 2 and 3 will explore further the political support 16
for international law within Britain and the United States, but the respect for it can be 
 E. Vattel, (edited by J. Chitty), The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to 10
the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, (London: S. Sweet... Stevens & Sons... and A. 
Maxwell, 1834).  The quotations are from the headings in Book 1 and Book II.  Vattel’s work was 
originally published in 1758.
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I.11
 Wheaton was an American diplomat based in Berlin; Kent was a former Chancellor of New York.12
 Robert Phillimore was a future Queens’s Advocate, and his Commentaries upon International Law 13
was published from 1854. There were other writers before Phillimore; for example, William Manning 
produced a general work in 1839, Commentaries on the Law of Nations, and Joseph Chitty, one of 
Britain’s then leading lawyers edited Vattel, Law of Nations, in 1834. 
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Preface, p. vii, p. viii.14
 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law, Vol. I (New York, 1836), Part I, pp. 3-4; H. Wheaton, The 15
Elements of International Law, with a sketch of the History of Science (London: B. Fellowes, 1836), 
Advertisement; see also in the British context: W. O. Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations, 
(London: S. Sweet [etc., etc.],1839), Book I, pp. 3-4; and J. Chitty, in Vattel, Law of Nations, Note 1 to 
S3, Preliminaries.
 This is also consistent with Kennedy’s point that the obligation to observe international law was 16
generally assumed by rulers in the period: D. Kennedy, 'International Law and the Nineteenth 
Century: History of an Illusion’, in Quinnipiac Law Review, Spring 1997, pp. 99-138, at p. 110, and 
pp. 116-117.
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illustrated for present purposes by two examples.  In 1843, Peel argued that following 
international law would make it easier for Britain to suppress the slave trade, noting that he 
was ‘perfectly certain, that if you transgress the law of nations, your efforts, however well 
intended, will be less effectual than if you respect the rights of other countries’.   Similarly, 17
Webster commented that the President felt it important to keep ‘the high character which the 
United States now possess for the observance of those rules which govern the intercourse of 
nations’.    The bilateral diplomatic despatches make clear too that both Britain and the 18
United States also considered the other to be liable to international law.    British-American 19
relations were, therefore, unaffected by the wider question of which states were within the 
law’s ambit, which can be seen, for example, in the nineteenth-century debate over whether 
international law was only for the ‘civilised’ state.    Indeed,  Phillimore simply assumed 20
that both Britain and the United States were within its scope in his 1842 public letter 
concerning ‘the questions of international law, raised in the message of the American 
President’.   For him, the point to cherish, rather, was that it was ‘the glory of the age in 21
which we live, that the principles of international law have acquired the precision and 
stability of positive enactment.’  22
There is scope for scepticism about some of the ways in which international law was 
conceived and used at this time.  Was it simply an expression of state power, or a selection of 
favourable interpretations?  In a letter from 1840, Sir James Stephen, Under-Secretary of 
 Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252.17
 Webster to Spencer, 6 August 41, Webster Papers, pp. 100-101.18
 Sydenham did, though, once comment that it was ‘difficult’ to ‘satisfy’ people in Europe that the 19
‘nature’ of the American government and the ‘state’ of American society were ‘such as to render the 
ordinary rules and conduct observed between the Civilised Governments of Europe in their 
international relations, inapplicable to them’, but this was an isolated comment at the height of the 
McLeod matter: Sydenham to Fox, Confidential, 3 August 1841, as enclosed within CO to FO, 2 
September 1841, FO 5/374, fols. 158-159.
 Grewe, for example, argues that the notion that international law was for ‘civilised’ states became 20
more prominent in the nineteenth century, and that this was ‘essentially a product of British policy and 
theory concerning international law’: W. G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, translated and 
revised by Byers, M. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), pp. 445-446, pp. 450-453, and pp. 465-466.  
See further, J. Pitts, ‘Boundaries of Victorian International Law’, in D. Bell, (ed.), Victorian Visions of 
Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), chapter 4. 
 R. Phillimore, A Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Ashburton suggested by The Questions of 21
International Law, raised in the Message of the American President (London: J. Hatchard, 1842).
 Phillimore, A Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Ashburton, p. 4.22
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State for the Colonies, certainly appeared to view the international law of the time as being 
the servant of the state: 
Whatever may be the ground occupied by international jurists they never forget the policy 
and interests of their own Country. Their business is to give to rapacity and injustice, the 
most decorous veil which legal ingenuity can weave. Selden, in the interest of England 
maintained the doctrine of what was called mare clausum.  Vattel in the interest of 
Holland laid down the principle of open fisheries.  Mr Marshall great as he was, was still 
an American, and adjudicated against the rights of Indians.  All such law is good, just so 
long as there is power to enforce it, and no longer.  23
Benton and Ford have recently argued that ‘in the early nineteenth century... the law of 
nations comprised little more than a series of flexible rules about state comportment in war 
and treaty’.   As Fassbender and Peters comment, ‘law might be considered as completely 24
ancillary to political power or on the contrary as a normative power shaping the events.’   In 25
a recent work on the First World War, Hull identifies Carl Schmitt as providing the ‘classic 
account of law as a cover for Allied imperialism’, whilst setting out that one of her aims was, 
conversely, ‘to restore international law to its rightful place in the conflict’.    26
Two specific arguments might be made to try to minimise the practical significance of 
international law for foreign policy in this period.   Most importantly, it was not enforced by 
any supervisory body or entity.  Indeed, in Britain, the sense that this was perceived as an 
issue is, perhaps, also reflected by what Sylvest describes as the attempt by scholars, in the 
years after 1835, to answer John Austin’s argument that international law was not proper 
 Stephen, Minute to Vernon Smith, 28 July 1840, CO 209/4, fols. 343-344, as referred to in P. G. 23
McHugh, 'A Comporting Sovereign, Tribes and the Ordering of Imperial Authority in Colonial Upper 
Canada of the 1830s’, note 37, pp. 9-10, as read in final draft.  This is now published in M. 
Koskenniemi, W. Rech, and M. Fonseca, (eds.), International Law and Empire: Historical 
Explorations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), chapter 10.
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, pp. 4-5.24
 B. Fassbender, and A. Peters, (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law 25
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 12.
 I. V. Hull, I., A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War 26
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), p. 3, p. 13.  There is also a recent discussion of the problem 
of power and law in the context of the Declaration of Paris, 1856, in ‘Introduction: Power, Law and 
the Declaration of Paris’, in J. Lemnitzer,  Power, Law, and the End of Privateering (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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binding law, but, rather, a set of moral principles ‘ “imposed by general opinion” ’.    This, 27
Sylvest observes, involved writers, such as Whewell and Phillimore, using religion ‘to 
legitimate the existence and explain the growing acceptance of international law’.   28
Secondly, there was no clear boundary between international law and state interests.  
Koskenniemi observes, the ‘natural starting point was always the existence of States, treated 
by analogy as individuals, self-sufficient, independent, and free’.    Furthermore, there was 29
also no serious challenge to the dominant position of states from any other body or idea.     
The argument of the thesis is that both these objections can be exaggerated.  The power of 
states to act freely was certainly fundamental in the 1830s and 1840s, but this did not mean 
that they could not choose to respect international law as ‘law’ in some, or all, situations - as 
a free act.   International law could, therefore, be, as Orakhelashvili puts it, both “a tool for 
Realpolitik, as well as a check on it”.     Indeed, the very ‘ideas’ that the ‘ “international” 30
constitutes a separate zone of political life, with its own rules, norms, and institutions’, and 
that it was ‘in some sense governable ... by men’, have been traced by Mazower to the period 
of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and their aftermath.   In this way, as per 31
Orakhelashvili, historians of international law have perceived a close relationship between 
state power and international law, but do not, thereby, seek to deny its impact.  The structure 
of Grewe’s The Epochs of International Law into various ages characterised by different 
states suggests, for example, a connection between a state’s power and the ‘international 
legal order’, not that there was no legal order.    Furthermore, the fact that states would 32
 C. Sylvest, 'The foundations of Victorian international law’, in D. Bell, (ed.), Victorian Visions of 27
Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 48-51.
 Sylvest, ‘The foundations’, p. 51; see also C. Sylvest, ‘International Law in the Nineteenth 28
Century’, in The British Yearbook of International Law (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2005), pp.
9-70, at pp. 22-24, and p. 28. 
 See generally, M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 29
Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 19-20.  Koskenniemi was 
commenting on Von Martens' Précis du droit des gens moderne de l’Europe (noted as the 1864 edition 
by Verge, and the 1821 edition revised from the original). 
 A. Orakhelashvili, ‘The 19th Century Life of International Law’, in A. Orakhelashvili, (ed.), 30
Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2011), chapter 15, p. 454. 
 M. Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (London: Allen Lane, 2012), p. 15.31
 Grewe, The Epochs, pp. 443-444; see also Fassbender and Peters, The Oxford Handbook, p. 12, p.  32
21.
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necessarily use the inherent flexibility of law to pursue their political interests does not mean 
that the law was devoid of effect.  Indeed, Koskenniemi’s description of international law ‘as 
a structure of argumentative moves and positions’, is useful in indicating the complex 
relationship between law and self-advantage.   What this means, in practice, for present 33
purposes, is that the international law of the period was a system, or framework, that could 
be used to govern or guide international relations, either between two states, or between a 
larger group.  Whether particular states did so use international law, in any given case, 
though, can only be ascertained by examining the facts of the relevant relationship. 
This thesis does not seek to contend that international law affected British policy simply 
because it was ‘law’, and was followed for that reason independent of state choice.   Indeed, 
it assumes that the use of international law in the British-American relationship was a matter 
within the power of each state, and was, in theory, not binding on them.  Rather, the thesis 
starts by examining how international law was actually part of the practice of British foreign 
policy in the 1830s and 1840s, and how this affected Britain’s approach to the United States.  
It then aims to demonstrate that there was a shared legal framework with the United States, 
and considers how, in fact, this was used as a viable medium for handling problems.  
Significantly, as will be seen, points of law were deployed for, and against, British positions, 
and it is hard to deny that this would have mattered when they were part, as they were in this 
case, of a real bilateral exchange.  In this way, then, even though international law was 
always, in one sense, under the respective ‘control’ of Britain and the United States, it can 
nevertheless be seen as having made a practical difference to British policy.  At the same 
time, however, it is important to understand that its deployment was consistent with wider 
British interests to the United States, as can now be established from an examination of 
current writing on British policy to that country.  
Historiography 
The main historiographical approaches to British foreign policy towards the United States in 
the period centre on the questions of why Britain aimed for peace and how war was avoided.  
British policy is most commonly interpreted as favouring peace because of its importance for 
 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations, p. 1, (referring to his book From Apology to Utopia: 33
The Structure of International Legal Argument (1989)).
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Britain’s wider global strategy, Atlantic trading connections, and American cultural links.   
Some works draw attention too to the potential role of wider structural forces.   Through 
looking at the most common explanations that historians have devised for British strategy, a 
clearer understanding of the utility of international law for policy-makers can be obtained.  
The first of the main approaches positions Britain’s aim for peace with the United States 
within the constraints of a wider strategy for maintaining global power.  Most historians have 
worked on the uncontroversial basis that Britain saw Europe, with the possible exception of 
Canada, as more important than the United States and North America.  Chamberlain, Bourne, 
and Lambert, for example, all argue that Britain pursued a general strategy in foreign policy 
in the nineteenth century aimed at the maintenance of the ‘balance of power’ through the 
‘equilibrium of Europe’.   Similarly, Clarke places wider British policy within the context of 34
a worldwide balance of power struggle with France, in which restricting French power in 
North and South America was a key concern.   Jones and Chamberlain additionally reflect 35
that Britain wanted to avoid France and the United States coming together in a hostile 
combination.   Under such interpretations, a war with the United States was to be eluded 36
because it would have put at risk strategic objectives that were all, broadly, focused on 
preserving British power relative to other European states, especially France.  As Lambert 
puts it, if Cuba remained Spanish and Canada was safe, Britain was ‘unlikely’ to want an 
American war, as that could ‘weaken its ability to support more significant interests in 
Europe’.    Bernstein even considers that the United States was simply not within the 37
balance of power system in Europe at all, and that this reduced British interests on the North 
 M. E. Chamberlain, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Palmerston (London: Longman, 1980), p. 34
90;  M. E. Chamberlain, Pax Britannica? British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914  (London: Longman, 
1988), p. 13; K. Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1970), pp. 7-11; A. Lambert, 'Winning Without Fighting: British Grand Strategy and its 
Application to the United States, 1815-1865’, in B. A. Lee and K-F. Walling, (eds.), Strategic Logic 
and Political Rationality: Essays in Honour of Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 
chapter 8, pp. 165-6.
 J. Clarke, British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, 1782-1865: The National Interest (London: 35
Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 109, p. 119, p. 154, p. 160, p. 166, and p. 209.
 W. D. Jones, The American Problem in British Diplomacy 1841-1861 (London, Macmillan, 1974), 36
‘Diplomacy of Menace’, chapter 1; W. D. Jones, Lord Aberdeen and the Americas (Athens, GA: 
University of Georgia Press, 1958), in which keeping peace with France and the United States is 
presented as a consistent theme of Aberdeen's policy; M. E. Chamberlain, Lord Aberdeen: A Political 
Biography, (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 301-305.
 Lambert, ‘Winning Without Fighting’, p. 177.37
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American continent.   Historians have, though, generally recognised the special case of 38
Canada, albeit that the resulting British policy, as widely perceived, was not inconsistent 
with the overall aim for peace arising from European considerations.    For, as Bourne 39
notes, the desire to retain Canada also pushed Britain to seek to ‘improve... relations’ with 
the United States.    40
The work of many historians suggests too that the British objective for peace with the United 
States may also have been linked to perceived new opportunities elsewhere in the world.  
Darwin, for example, sees the 1830s and 1840s as the decades when ‘most of the favourable 
conditions’ behind British power until the 1940s began to ‘converge’.   For him, these were 41
the defeat of China in the war of 1839-42, instability in the Ottoman and Iranian empires, 
new countries being open for trade in South America, and industrialisation leading to an 
increased dependence on colonies (other than ‘settler’ ones).    In this new world situation, 42
he continues, concerns over France, the limits of sea power, and the futile nature of any 
conflict were ‘powerful constraints’ against any conflict with the United States.   Others, as 43
Chamberlain notes, emphasise that the United States and the North American continent 
simply assumed a position of lower importance compared to other parts of the world 
following independence.     Sexton and Hopkins by contrast argue that the United States still 44
remained to some extent within the influence of the British Empire.  Even in these works, 
however, peace still appears to have been an important British consideration.  For Sexton, 
Britain used peace and cooperation to its advantage, and ‘outsourced the job of Imperial 
expansion in North America’, with the result that it gained ‘the economic benefits of an 
 G. Bernstein, 'Special Relationship or Appeasement: Liberal Policy To America in the Age of 38
Palmerston’, Historical Journal (1998), pp. 725-751 at p. 726.
 The position of Canada is discussed further in chapter 4.39
 K. Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815-1908, (London: Longmans, 40
1967), pp. 57-58.
 J. Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830-1970, 41
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 18-19.
 Darwin, The Empire Project, pp. 18-19.42
 Darwin, The Empire Project, p. 32.43
 Chamberlain notes that for historians, such as Harlow, Marshall, Hyam, Mackesey, ‘the loss of the 44
American colonies only confirmed and accelerated changes in British development which were 
already under way’, and  ‘colonies of settlement in the west were becoming less important than 
trading opportunities in the east’: Chamberlain, Pax Britannica?, p. 22.
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expanding United States without the overhead costs of imperial wars and administration’.   45
Conversely, Hopkins’s primary focus was the question of the effective independence of the 
United States, but his argument that the United States relied on the Royal Navy and British 
capital in the first half of the nineteenth century also indicates a strong ongoing relationship 
that would have been best preserved through peace.   46
The historiographical consensus that Britain wanted to avoid war for reasons of strategy does 
not, however, imply that there was transatlantic agreement on all matters, and some 
historians contend that British opposition to the expansion of the United States also required 
the pursuit of a containment policy, albeit one that was to be followed within an overarching 
objective of maintaining peace.  A  classic early example of this is Dunning’s 1914 review of 
one hundred years of the British-American relationship.   Dunning points to what was an 47
initial period of cooperation under Castlereagh following the War of 1812, which resulted in 
agreements such as the 1815 Convention on commerce, or the 1817 Exchange of Notes on 
naval strength in the Great Lakes.    He then, however, gives a differing slant to British 48
policy as it developed under Canning, arguing that it ‘only remained to oppose at every point 
the ambition of the United States, and to be increasingly watchful of the development of her 
claims’.    For Dunning, this general line of policy then continued, under both Palmerston 49
and Aberdeen, through to 1846.  Thus, he contends that, in 1841, as Palmerston left office, 
the ‘relations of the English-speaking peoples with one another could scarcely have been 
more unpleasant’, and that, whilst the ‘tone’ improved under Aberdeen, the British ‘position’ 
was that the ‘interests of Great Britain required that the expansion of the American Republic 
be opposed by every peaceful influence’.    Others too have identified the significance of 50
 J. Sexton, 'The United States in the British Empire’ in S. Foster, (ed.), British North America in the 45
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 333-4.
 A. Hopkins, 'The United States, 1783-1861: Britain's Honorary Dominion?’, Britain and the World, 46
IV, (2011), pp. 232-46, at p. 238.
 W. A. Dunning, The British Empire and the United States; a Review of their Relations during the 47
Century of Peace Following the Treaty of Ghent (New York: C Scribner’s Sons, 1914).
 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, p.17, and p.41; see also Chamberlain, British 48
Foreign Policy in the Age of Palmerston, p. 18.
 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, p. 55.49
 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, pp. 105-106, and p. 136.50
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Canning, who, they argue, had responded in this way, in particular, to avoid the prospect of 
the new South American republics associating too closely with the United States.   51
Although less common than work emphasising other British objectives, containment is 
reflected in the views of some more recent historians on British-American relations in the 
period.  Jones and Rakestraw’s analysis of the 1840s judges British policy against an 
objective of containment, with the comment that whilst ‘the Crown had not forsaken hopes 
of restraining American expansion ..., the British concessions along the US-Canada boundary 
and subsequent neutrality in the Mexican War indicated acceptance of a continental United 
States and the failure of containment’.   More widely, Haynes and Brauer observe the then 52
American concerns over continued British imperial ambitions.  Haynes, for example, 
contends that the United States saw a continued risk of British territorial expansion or 
influence in North America, and that the western expansion up to 1846 ‘stemmed from 
geopolitical considerations’.   Against this background, he continues, ‘resentment’ of Britain 53
‘provided an ideological scaffolding from which a national sense of self could be 
constructed’.   Similarly, Brauer notes the continued British imperial expansion in the 54
period, and the fact that there was an American policy response to concerns over Britain’s 
 Bourne, K., Britain and the Balance of Power, pp. 58-61, and pp. 64-66; Bourne refers to Canning’s 51
analysis of the  ‘ “great danger of the time ... [as] ... a division of the World into European and 
American, Republican and Monarchical; a league of worn-out Govts, on the one hand, and of youthful 
and stirring nations with the Un. States at their head, on the other” ’, as cited in Bourne, Ibid., p.66, 
and note 1, p. 66, as from Canning to Frere, 8 January 1825, G. Festing, John Hookham Frere and his 
Friends (1899).  On Canning, see also Clarke, British Diplomacy, p. 119, p. 160, and p. 166.
 H. Jones and D. Rakestraw, Prologue to Manifest Destiny: Anglo-American Relations in the 1840s 52
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1997), p. 267. 
 S. Haynes, Unfinished Revolution:The Early American Republic in a British World (Charlottesville: 53
University of Virginia Press, c2010), pp. 224-226. 
 Haynes, Unfinished Revolution, p. 294; for a contrasting analysis in a different context, see E., 54
Tamarkin, Anglophilia: Deference, Devotion, and Antebellum America (London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008).  It is important to acknowledge that historians have emphasised many other 
factors in relation to the expansion of the United States.  Whilst beyond the scope of this thesis,  
examples from recent works include: Howe, who argues that there was an 'imperialist program’ on the 
North American continent led by the Jacksonian Democrats in D. W. Howe, What Hath God Wrought: 
The Transformation of America, 1815-1848, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 852-85; 
Sexton, who comments on how Polk adapted the Monroe doctrine to Western expansion in J., Sexton, 
The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2011), pp. 95-108; and Guyatt, who observes the role of ‘providential arguments’: N. Guyatt,, 
Providence and the Invention of the United States, 1607-1876, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 219.
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ability to hurt the United States economically and over slavery.   Neither of these latter 55
works are, of course, necessarily contending that there was an actual policy of ‘containment’, 
but their analysis of American views keeps the questions of Britain’s ambitions and 
‘containment’ firmly within the narrative of British policy. 
In addition to considerations of global strategy, there is also an important historiographical 
approach which views Britain’s aim for peace with the United States as being caused, at least 
to a significant extent, by a desire not to disrupt trade, or cause damage to other domestic 
economic circumstances.   Britain certainly benefited greatly from what Potter describes as a 
‘single, integrated Atlantic economy’.    The response of many historians to the growing 56
commercial relationship with the United States has, therefore, been to conclude that trade 
was a significant factor behind British policy.   Chamberlain, for example, considers that 
Castlereagh, Canning, Palmerston, and Aberdeen all regarded trade as a ‘vital interest’, 
Bourne refers to the ‘pacifying factors of Anglo-American trade’, and Dunning describes the 
trading link as a ‘powerful influence against war’ in Britain.   Similarly, Dykstra argues that 57
Aberdeen perceived that ‘Britain might have to accept a reorientation of power in North 
 K. Brauer, 'The United States and British Imperial Expansion, 1815-60’, Diplomatic History, 12, 55
(1988), pp. 19-37.
 J. Potter, 'Atlantic Economy, 1815-60: The USA and the Industrial Revolution in Britain’, in A. W. 56
Coats and R. M. Robertson, (eds.), Essays in American Economic History (London: Edward Arnold, 
1969), pp. 14-48 at p. 16; see also F. Thistlethwaite, The Anglo-American Connection in the Early 
Nineteenth Century (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1959), p. 3.  The extent of the 
British-American relationship can be gauged from the following brief outline.  Potter details imports 
from the United States as representing between 20 to 25 per cent. of total imports into the United 
Kingdom by value in rolling five year periods between 1836 and 1855, Potter, Ibid., Table 1, p. 19; 
similarly, in terms of exports to the United States, as a percentage of the total exports from the United 
Kingdom by value, Potter's figures range from 16 per cent. in 1836-40, before dropping to 11 per cent. 
in 1841-45, and then rising again to 18 and 21 per cent. respectively for the periods 1846-50 and 
1851-55, Potter, Ibid., Table 8, pp. 22-23.  Conversely, Buck shows imports from the United Kingdom 
as representing between approximately 37 and 40 per cent. of total imports of merchandise by value 
into the United States in rolling five year periods between 1836 and 1850, and, in terms of exports to 
the United Kingdom, as a percentage of total exports by value from the United States his numbers 
range from approximately 43 to 50 per cent. over the same periods: N. S. Buck, The Development of 
the Organisation of Anglo-American Trade 1800-1850 (New Haven, 1925), Table, p. 2.
 Chamberlain, British Foreign Policy, p. 93, Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, p. 50, 57
and Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, p. 140. See also: J. B. Brebner, The North 
Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1968), p. 144 (in the context of the position in 1840); P. E. Myers, Caution and Co-
operation: The American Civil War in British-American Relations (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University 
Press, 2008), p. 8; and C. S. Campbell, From Revolution to Rapprochement: the United States and 
Great Britain 1783-1900 (London: Wiley, 1974), p. 52 (in the context of the Canadian border 
disputes).
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America’ in order to ‘reap the benefits’ of the United States from an economic perspective.         58
Sexton too has also recently broadened the traditional emphasis on trade by pointing out the 
significant investment of British capital in the United States.  For him, this meant that ‘the 
creditor-debtor relationship of Britain and the United States bonded the two nations 
together’, and that war became ‘nearly unthinkable to leaders on both sides of the Atlantic’.    59
Some historians also consider that broader financial and economic constraints limited the 
aims of British policy to the United States.   Myers, for example, refers to ‘minimalism’ as an 
important influence, arguing that, in circumstances where British defence spending against 
the ongoing threat of France was being questioned, ‘it would probably have taken a severe 
jolt to get Britain to fight the United States’.   Dykstra also mentions matters such as the 60
demands of the Royal Navy, and labour and agricultural problems.  61
Further historiographical approaches then deploy military or cultural factors, or broader 
structural forces, to explain the British objective of peace, or how war was avoided in 
practice.   Bourne, Lambert and Matzke all emphasise the importance of the Royal Navy to 
the peaceful defence of both Canada and Britain’s other possessions in North America.   On 62
a different tack, Bernstein contends that British supporters of the Liberal party ‘perceived a 
“special relationship” between the two countries, based on blood, religion, liberal traditions 
and trade’.   For him, this resulted in peace, through what was effectively ‘appeasement’, 63
because these supporters ‘would not contemplate the threat of war with the United States, 
and since no important British interest was involved, the British government usually gave 
way’.   There is certainly support for American connections in ways suggested by Bernstein.  64
 D. L. Dykstra, The Shifting Balance of Power: American-British Diplomacy in North America, 58
1842-48 (Oxford: University Press of America, c1999), p. 66. See also ‘Conclusion’, Ibid., p. 178.
 J. Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, 59
1837-1873 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 7, and p. 242.
 Myers, Caution and Co-operation, p.9, p.19; Myers argues generally that there was a growth in ‘co-60
operation’ after 1815, ibid, p. 8.
 Dykstra, The Shifting Balance, ‘Conclusion’.61
 As Bourne notes, the military advantage on land was felt to be with the United States, and on sea 62
with Britain: Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power, p. 102; R. Matzke, 'Britain Gets Its Way: 
Power and Peace in Anglo-American Relations, 1838-1846’, in War in History, 8, No. 1, (2001), pp.
19-46; and Lambert, ‘Winning Without Fighting’, especially pp. 166-167, and pp. 173-176. 
 Bernstein, ‘Special Relationship’. p. 725.63
 Bernstein, ‘Special Relationship’, p. 725.64
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Carwardine, for example, notes that ‘British and American evangelicals constituted a lively 
transatlantic community’, who ‘saw themselves as branches of the same closely knit 
family’.    The association with the United States also extended to some social and 65
economic beliefs, for, as Crook notes, the ‘Benthamites, the liberal Whigs and liberal Tories, 
the manufacturers and free traders, and the dissenters remained essentially pro-American’.    66
Bernstein’s argument that peace was based on an overall ‘special relationship’ has not, 
however, been supported to any material extent by other historians.   Indeed, on the contrary, 
Thistlethwaite has questioned the real impact of these relationships and groups.  As he puts 
it: ‘The Atlantic connection concerned minority opinion and its ineffectiveness in moderating 
diplomatic friction between the two countries, from the War of 1812 to the Oregon crisis, 
needs no further comment’.     67
Finally, others have provided an explanation for the peaceful British-American relationship 
in the period within surveys pointing to wider movements of historical forces.  Two 
important recent examples are the works of Belich and Go.  Belich, broadly, points to a 
‘rhythm’, based on a ‘settler revolution’, of ‘explosive colonisation’, ‘bust’, and 
‘recolonisation’ (through ‘export rescue’) in new frontiers, including the American West.   68
Answering Bayly's question as to why Britain and America came together over the 
nineteenth century, Belich suggests, accordingly, that he ‘would answer this question in 
terms of the partial recolonisation of the United States by Great Britain’.    For him, this was 69
a matter of ‘economics and culture’ rather than ‘political hegemony’ or ‘alliance’, with 
Britain providing ‘money, migrants and manufactured goods’.   In contrast, Go considers 70
 R. Carwardine, Trans-Atlantic Revivalism: Popular Evangelicalism in Britain and America, 65
1790-1865 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 198.
 D. P. Crook, American Democracy in British Politics, 1815-60 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p.66
202.
 Thistlethwaite, The Anglo-American Connection, p. 174.67
 J. Belich, Replenishing the Earth:The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World (Oxford: 68
Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 221.
 Belich., Replenishing the Earth,,p. 479; as Belich puts it: ‘After each spasm of explosive 69
colonisation, busted Wests sought export rescue, and it was Britain, as well as the American Northeast, 
that provided it’. 
 Belich, Replenishing the Earth, p. 479; Belich’s work is also, broadly consistent with the work of 70
Van Vugt, who concluded that the emigration to the United States from Britain was generally not 
caused by ‘distress’: W. E. Van Vugt, Britain to America: Mid-nineteenth century Immigrants to the 
United States (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), p. 3, p. 153.
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the British and American ‘imperial formations’ through their activities in the ‘ascent’, 
‘maturity’, and ‘decline’ ‘phases of global power’.   In the years 1836 to 1846, in Go's 71
terms, Britain was in its ‘mature’ phase, characterised by a preference for ‘indirect non-
territorial rule’, and ‘open’ trade, whilst America was in that of ‘ascent’, identified, 
conversely, by ‘territorial expansion’ and the creation of ‘ideological self-conceptions’.   72
For him, thus, in the period covered by the thesis, Britain ‘had an interest in maintaining the 
status quo, which in turn meant influencing other states through hidden and subtle exercises 
of power rather than bold, direct, and provocative imperialism that might mobilise 
opposition’.   Go would, therefore, presumably, place relations between Britain and the 73
United States within the wider context of global empires, and see the conciliation of Britain, 
and the expansion of the United States, in this period as better explained by these structural 
‘phases’.           74
By comparison, there is a very limited historiography on the potential role of international 
law in the relationship between Britain and the United States in the period, despite its 
seemingly consistent place in the issues between them.   Indeed, Stevens is the only historian 
reviewed who has even commented in any substantive way on the possibility of a wider 
systematic place for international law in the problems of the decade.  He, helpfully, considers 
the international law aspects of some of the events related to the issues around the Canadian-
American border, (in particular, the Caroline and McLeod affairs), but nevertheless states 
that in ‘the nineteenth century, the act came first; then the diplomats searched for 
justification’.    Similarly, when noting the important role of Webster in promoting the 75
concept of self-defence within international law following the Caroline case, he comments 
as follows in respect of the position up to that point:  
 J. Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires 1688 to the Present (New York: 71
Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 13, and p. 24.
 Go, Patterns of Empire, pp. 24-25.72
 Go, Patterns of Empire, p. 229.73
 An interesting older work that also relates to British-American relations is Semmel, who argues that 74
the movement from an ‘entrepreneurial’ to ‘bourgeois’ economic stage around 1843 meant that a 
‘liberal nation’ challenged the traditional strategy of using ‘sea power’ in a ‘commercial war’ (and 
even against the slave trade), and there was also a greater support for neutral rights: B. Semmel, 
Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 10. 
 K. R. Stevens, Border Diplomacy: The Caroline and McLeod Affairs in Anglo-American-Canadian 75
Relations, 1837-42 (London: University of Alabama Press, 1989), pp. 25-26.
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When questions arose, statesmen turned to such authorities as Grotius, Pufendorf, and 
Vattel, or to latter-day interpreters, among them the American Henry Wheaton.  In no way 
was international law binding on any country.  Nations studied it and applied or ignored 
its principles as they chose.           76
International law is not, however, Stevens's main theme, and, understandably, the book does 
not consider in any depth the effects of international law's framework of principles and treaty 
law in the context of the wider relationship between Britain and the United States.  Apart 
from this work, international law is referred to by other writers considering the period only 
in relation to specific matters, such as, for example, by Semmel on the slave trade.  77
The thesis is, however, able to draw on four areas of the wider historiography related to 
Britain, law, and international relations in the period.  Primarily, the thesis is supported by 
work showing how law generally permeated the way in which British politics approached 
imperial and domestic problems.  Benton and Ford’s The Rage for Order, for example, 
considers what the authors term ‘a sprawling attempt to reorder the early nineteenth-century 
world through the redesign of British imperial law’.   Benton and Ford’s central theme 78
concerns the role of empire as a source of international law, which they suggest has not been 
sufficiently emphasised.   The book is nevertheless highly relevant for the thesis because it 79
shows that the British state used law to resolve what in the broadest sense were 
‘international’ problems within the empire.  Benton and Ford set out, for example, how the 
empire’s ‘centre’ and ‘peripheries’ attempted to control ‘despotic dominions’ through ‘a 
layered system of rule by law’, the ‘British discourse of protection used the term in new 
ways’ affecting ‘the legitimacy of British imperial jurisdiction’ , and the Royal Navy relied 
on ‘regionally specific jigsaw puzzles of law’ to curtail the slave trade.   The given 80
examples -  of the responses of British ‘imperial agents and their interlocutors’ in ‘many 
small and scattered legal conflicts’ - are different from the state-to-state discussions in the 
thesis, but the key point of relevance is the centrality of law to issues of governance.    81
 Stevens, Border Diplomacy, p. 166.76
 Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy, chapter 3.77
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, p. 1.78
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, p. 21.79
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, Chapter 2 and p. 55, pp. 89-90, and p.121.80
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, pp. 196-197.81
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Moreover, law and legality have also been identified as being important to the wider conduct 
of British politics.  Parry, for example, considers that ‘law, authority and public-spirited 
leadership were crucial elements of early Victorian Liberalism’, and Boyd Hilton that ‘liberal 
Tories wanted the State to operate neutrally according to rule’.   Similarly, Kostal argues for 82
‘the centrality of law in the world-view of the British political class of the 1860s’ in his work 
on the Morant Bay uprising in Jamaica in 1865.   ‘Constitutionalism’ too is a significant 83
feature of research into the period, which implicitly places law into politics through its 
emphasis on the ‘rules’ of governing.  Parry, Kostal, Gibson, and Colley, for example, all set 
out differing ways in which the ‘constitution’ or ‘constitutionalism’ was important to British 
politics.   The  presence of such a general respect for ‘law’ within British political culture 84
bolsters the thesis because it indicates that the recognition of international law was not 
exceptional.  Indeed, Chitty’s comment, that his 1834 edition of Vattel ‘ought to be studied 
by every gentleman of liberal education, and by youth’ , is illustrative of a prevailing culture 
 J. P. Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, national identity and Europe, 1830-1886 82
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 edn), p. 53, and A. J. Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & 
Dangerous People? England 1783-1846, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 316. Respect for 
law is also consistent with what Boyd Hilton observes as the increasing ‘professionalisation’ of 
lawyers in the early- to mid- nineteenth century, albeit that Hoppen suggests that the relative numbers 
practising may have not been going up after 1850: Boyd Hilton, Ibid., pp. 144-146, and K. Hoppen, 
The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846-1886, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 41-42.  
 R. W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law, (Oxford: Oxford 83
University Press, 2005), p.1. 
 See: Parry, The Politics, p. 43 and chapter 1 on Liberalism and the constitution; Kostal, A 84
Jurisprudence of Power, p. 463, referring to the comment of James Vernon on the then view in British 
politics of the English constitution as ‘the best in the world’ (cited in note 14, p. 463, as from  J. 
Vernon, Politics and the People: A Study in English Political Culture, c.1815-1867, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 298);  J. Gibson, ‘The Chartists and the Constitution: 
Revisiting British Popular Constitutionalism’, in The Journal of British Studies, 56, (2017), pp. 70-90, 
on Chartist arguments for a reading of the British constitution in the light of ‘a strand of English legal 
theory that joined natural law ... with English common law’ (pp. 73-74); and L. Colley, ‘Empires of 
Writing: Britain, America and Constitutions, 1776-1848’, Law and History Review, (2014), Vol. 32, 
pp. 237-266.
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of legality by showing how he, at least, considered that the British political class would be 
receptive to the notion that legal rules - international law - could be a guide to conduct.  85
Second, the thesis builds on work suggesting that European states generally respected and 
used international law to a greater extent following the end of the Napoleonic Wars.  The key 
contention here is Schroeder’s assessment that there was a ‘transformation’ in ‘European 
international politics’ through which ‘a competitive balance-of-power struggle gave way to 
an international system of political equilibrium based on benign shared hegemony and the 
mutual recognition of rights underpinned by law’.    For Schroeder, crucially, this 86
‘transformation’ was one of ‘system’, by which he meant ‘the understandings, assumptions, 
learned skills and responses, rules, norms, procedures, etc. which agents acquire and use in 
pursuing their individual divergent aims within the framework of a shared practice’.   87
International law was, thus, a part, albeit not the whole, of this new ‘system’.    Others 88
perceive too that there were corresponding developments in international law itself.  Keene, 
for example, observes that there was a significant rise in the use of treaties in the nineteenth 
century, including a ‘spike’ in the 1810s.   Lev maintains that one result from the Congress 89
of Vienna in 1815 was a new ‘interstate sphere’ in Europe in which ‘state interests’ were not 
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Preface by J. Chitty.  This is perhaps unsurprising in the light of Bayly’s 85
observation that the period between 1763 and 1842 saw ‘an epochal change in the nature of popular 
“claim making” and in the wider construction of political thought’, which amongst other impacts, 
‘transformed understandings of ... the nature of international order’, and which included, for example, 
the ‘hardening of ideas about the rights of peoples, states, and nations’: C. A. Bayly, ‘The Age of 
Revolutions in Global Context: An Afterword’, in D. R. Armitage and S. Subrahmanyam (eds.), The 
Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840,  (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 
209-217 at pp. 212-214. 
 P. W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 86
1994), Preface and p. 580.  For Schroeder, ‘political equilibrium’ meant ‘a balance in rights, security, 
and independence - between all states ... despite the existence of permanent, unavoidable imbalances 
of power among them’ [emphasis added]: Ibid., p. 482. 
 Schroeder, The Transformation, pp. xii-xiii.87
 The change Schroeder envisaged embraced not only legal concepts, such as ‘mutual rules and 88
restraints’, but also other wider notions such as a ‘sense of inherent limits’, ‘common responsibility to 
certain standards of conduct’ and ‘loyalty to something beyond the aims of one’s own state’: 
Schroeder, The Transformation, p. 802.
 E. Keene, ‘The Treaty-Making Revolution of the Nineteenth Century’, The International History 89
Review, (2012), Vol. 34, pp. 475-500. 
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ignored, but ‘translated... into another domain in which they could not be articulated except 
through law’.    90
The thesis is certainly consistent with the main theme of such research.  The Treaty of Ghent, 
1814 aimed at ‘restoring upon principles of perfect reciprocity, Peace, Friendship, and good 
Understanding’ between Britain and the United States, and, importantly, it was settled at the 
time of the negotiations ending the Napoleonic Wars in Europe.  Thus, this treaty, a second 
phase of treaties between Britain and the United States up to 1818, and the ongoing attempts 
thereafter in the period to resolve outstanding issues within a framework of international law, 
were all undoubtedly in line with the perceived then prevailing trend.  Nevertheless, it needs 
to be acknowledged too that the British-American relationship does not fit neatly into the 
suggested model for European change.  American independence, the Treaty of 1783, and the 
Jay Treaty, 1794 were all self-evidently in the eighteenth century.  In terms, therefore, for 
example, of what Schroeder sees as the key development in Europe - namely ‘political 
equilibrium’ based on ‘a balance in rights, security and independence’ - arguably this began 
in 1783 and 1794 when Britain and the United States mutually recognised each other’s 
sovereignty.   The War of 1812, of course, pushes against such an analysis, but this was 91
predominantly about maritime rights not security.  Moreover, the circumstances of 
independence in themselves produced a unique range of legal issues, meaning that, to an 
extent, the legal relationship between Britain and the United States necessarily stood apart 
from Europe.        
Third, the thesis is supported by research demonstrating the relevance of international law to 
the development of the United States.  The most important aspect of this work for present 
purposes is that related to the American respect for international law as a framework of rules 
 A. Lev, 'The transformation of international law in the nineteenth century’, in A. Orakhelashvili, 90
(ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2011), pp. 126-127.  For Lev, this ‘interstate sphere’ was based on a ‘cultural community’, such 
as the European ‘family of nations’, or ‘civilised’ states, and ‘legal construction’ within the ‘interstate 
sphere’ relied on the ‘introduction of an already given community into legal construction’, as this 
‘dissolves’ the ‘opposition of international obligation and sovereignty’: Ibid., p. 112, pp. 129-132. See, 
however, Koskenniemi, who argues, broadly, that the international law of that period was ‘static’, and 
‘procedural’ with ‘no progress or improvement - apart from the narrow sense of universal reason 
being sometimes less, sometimes better observed’: Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civiliser of Nations, pp. 
19-21.  
 Schroeder, The Transformation, p. 482.  The mutual recognition of sovereignty will be discussed 91
further in chapter 3.
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for relations between states, which is considered further in chapter 3.   It is, however, also 92
significant that historians have demonstrated too that international law shaped wider 
domestic questions in the United States, thereby reinforcing the contention that it was 
respected sufficiently for it to make an impact on American foreign policy.  The full range of 
the research concerned is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the point can be briefly 
illustrated.  Rosen, for example, examines ‘how the United States used the occasion of the 
Seminole War [in 1818] to advance its own vision of its national identity and approach to 
law’, within the context of ‘domestic constitutional law and the law of nations as described 
by Europeans’.   In a similar vein, Peter Onuf notes that the ‘discourse’ on ‘the definition of 93
the federal union’ was frequently ‘refreshed by referring to its natural law (law of nations) 
sources’.   Others too contend that principles of international law and treaties also partially 94
shaped such diverse matters as worldwide American trade and the character of the frontiers 
of the United States.  Thus, for Shoemaker, the notion of ‘protection’ - from Vattel - ‘was 
fundamental to ...  American global commerce in the age of sail’.   Conversely, Adelman 95
and Aron observe the important effects of ‘border fixing’ in guiding ‘the peculiar and 
contingent character of frontier relations’.  96
Finally, it is important to observe that the thesis is consistent with work pointing to other 
significant intellectual influences on British foreign policy in the early- to mid- nineteenth 
century.  Perhaps most significantly, a framework of international law is accordant with what 
historians have noted as broad differences in the ways of thinking through which the main 
governing parties approached policy.  Brettle, for example, summarises the ‘two competing 
 Chapter 3 focuses mainly on the period covered by the thesis.  For the importance of international 92
law to the foreign policy of the United States in the period up to the Monroe Doctrine, see, for 
example, D. Lang, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of Nations and the Balance of 
Power, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), E. H. Gould, Among the Powers of the 
Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire (London: Harvard 
University Press, 2014), and W. Oosterveld, The Law of Nations in Early American Foreign Policy 
(Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2016). 
 D. Rosen, Border Law: The First Seminole War and American Nationhood (London: Harvard 93
University Press, 2015), p. 9.
 P. Onuf, ‘A Declaration of Independence for Diplomatic Historians’, Diplomatic History, 22, 94
(1998), pp. 71-83 at p.79.
 N. Shoemaker, ‘The Extraterritorial United States to 1860’, Diplomatic History, 42, (2018), pp. 95
36-54 at p. 51.
 J. Adelman and S, Aron, ‘From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States and the Peoples in 96
Between in North American History’, American History Review, Vol. 104, No. 3, (1999), pp. 814-841 
at pp. 816-817. 
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foreign policy ideologies’ of the 1840s as the ‘Whig view’ on the ‘need for eternal vigilance 
in the protection of the hard-won liberties of the English people’ (using ‘public approval’), 
and a Conservative attitude which ‘stressed the “Blue Water” global role of Britain’ and the 
‘need to act in concert with the principles of the European balance of power’.   For present 97
purposes, the key practical result from this split was that the Whig governments of the period 
tended to be more inclined towards foreign intervention than Tory ones.    This, in turn, 98
meant that the question of when to intervene in foreign states came to be a frequent matter 
for British political debate.   Crucially, this then drew international law (and American views 
on international law) directly into British politics because, as will be shown in chapter 2, the 
issue of interference was directly related to the legal principle of sovereignty.  
Liberal Toryism, diplomatic openness, and free trade were also each compatible with 
international law.  Boyd Hilton comments that liberal Tories ‘wanted the State to operate 
neutrally according to rule’, whereas high Tories favoured ‘constant management, 
interference, and discretion’ in ‘government functions’.   Hence, Canning, for example, he 99
notes, stated that ‘foreign policy should be a scheme of policy regulated by fixed principles 
of action, and operating to produce definite and foreseen results’.   Such a ‘rules’ based 100
approach certainly accords, on the face of it, with a legal structure for international conduct.   
Alternatively, Parry notes Canning’s desire to get the support of public opinion on foreign 
affairs, and observes how he contrasted ‘the openness of his own policy’ with ‘the secrecy of 
traditional diplomacy’.    Historians widely perceive too that Palmerston similarly sought 101
 A. Brettle, ‘The Enduring Importance of Foreign Policy Dominance in Mid-Nineteenth Century 97
Politics’, in W. Mulligan and B. Simms (eds.), The Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 
1660-2000: How Strategic Concerns Shaped Modern Britain, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), pp. 155-156.  See also Parry, The Politics, pp. 145-157; Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & 
Dangerous People?, pp. 558-565. 
 Indeed, Parry observes that the foreign policy of the Tory governments of the period was ‘non-98
interventionist’ under Wellington, and ‘deliberately low-key and low-cost’ under Peel: J. P. Parry, The 
Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain, (London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 
55 and p.157.  See also, Parry, The Politics, p.150.
 Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People?, pp. 315-316.  See also A. J. Boyd Hilton, ‘Peel: A 99
Reappraisal’, Historical Journal, Vol. 22, (1979), pp. 585-614 at pp. 606-611. 
 Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People?, pp. 316-317, citing in note 35, R. Therry (ed.), 100
The Speeches of George Canning, (1828).
 Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government, pp. 39-40.  See also Boyd Hilton, A, Mad, Bad, & 101
Dangerous People?, pp. 289-295.
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public approval for foreign policy.   The ‘public’ sphere for international law to be 102
discussed in chapter 2 is at the very least consistent with this courting of the public.  Lastly, 
what Howe terms ‘Britain’s mid-century adoption and promotion of free trade’ also 
reinforced the ongoing importance of international law with its attacks on protection.   103
Moreover, as Tully observes, legally-based argument was used too to justify foreign 
intervention in ‘non-western societies’ to ensure free trade.   Arbitration clauses in 104
international treaties were also promoted by those who, conversely, emphasised the positive 
implications of free trade for peace.      105
This thesis, therefore, aims to fill the resulting gap in knowledge around the influence of 
international law on British policy to the United States in the period.  In doing so, it both 
gains assistance from, and supplements, this current historiography.   The argument of the 
thesis is certainly consistent with the historiographical approaches discussed above, which 
seek to explain the British policy of peace.  Law, clearly, will operate better, as a means of 
regulating the interests of different states, within stable circumstances.   Interpretations, 
therefore, which see British policy as primarily motivated towards peace for reasons of 
global strategy, trade, and culture reinforce the rationale of Britain using international law as 
 See, for example: Brettle, ‘The Enduring Importance’, pp. 155-156 and Parry, The Politics, pp. 102
150-151.  On the related point of the relationship between Palmerston and the Press, see, for example: 
L. Fenton, Palmerston and The Times: Foreign Policy, the Press and Public Opinion in mid-Victorian 
Britain, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013), and D. Brown, ‘Diplomacy and the Fourth Estate: The Role of 
the Press in British Foreign Policy in the Age of Palmerston’, in J. Fisher, and A. Best, (eds.), On the 
Fringes of Diplomacy: Influences on British Foreign Policy, 1800-1945, (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2011), pp. 35-51. 
 The quoted words are from A. Howe, ‘Radicalism, Free Trade, and Foreign Policy in Mid-103
Nineteenth-Century Britain’ in Mulligan and Simms, The Primacy of Foreign Policy, p. 168.  
Chapters 2 and 3 will point out how far principles of international law supporting protection guided 
British practice in the period, especially in the use of commercial treaties.
 For the discussion of such legal argument in relation to ‘non-western societies’, see J. Tully, 104
‘Lineages of Informal Imperialism’, in D. Kelly (ed.), Lineages of Empire: The Historical Roots of 
British Imperial Thought, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 10-14.  It is to be noted, 
however, that such argument was contrary to the traditional general legal principle that commerce 
could be declined; as will be discussed in chapter 2, Vattel considered that a state possessed the right 
to decline trade.  For the contrast between, for example, Palmerston and Cobden in their respective 
approaches to securing ‘ “free” trade by means of force’, see Howe, ‘Radicalism, Free Trade, and 
Foreign Policy’, p. 173.
 See, for example: Parry, The Politics, p. 160; D, Nicholas, ‘Richard Cobden and the International 105
Peace Congress Movement, 1848-53’, Journal of British Studies, Vol. 30, (1991), pp. 351-376;  A. 
Tyrell, ‘Marking the millennium: the mid-nineteenth century peace movement’, Historical Journal, 
Vol. XXI, pp. 75-95; and M. Caedel, ‘Cobden and Peace’ in A. Howe, and S. Morgan, Rethinking 
Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicentenary Essays, (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, 2006), pp. 189-207. 
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a major tool for resolving conflicts with the United States - particularly when, as here, the 
respect for it is reciprocated.   British policy, and the maintenance of peace, cannot really be 
fully understood in the absence of this legal context.   International law permeated the 
culture of policy to the United States.   Questions of legal interpretation created their own 
disputes.   The mechanics of peace relied on the use of legal principles.  
This thesis also seeks to qualify some specific historiographical interpretations.  Most 
importantly, it counters interpretations of ‘containment’ which see British policy as 
inherently hostile to American growth.  Chapter 5 argues instead that treaty law and legal 
principles guided Britain towards a policy that was, broadly, permissive towards American 
expansion.  The thesis also suggests that historiographical arguments giving prominence to 
the individual influence of the Earl of Aberdeen, Foreign Secretary 1841-6, on the direction 
of British policy should not be exaggerated.  Many historians have claimed that Aberdeen 
was associated with a turn towards a pacific policy towards the United States.    Jones, for 106
example, perceives him as wanting Britain to have an amicable relationship with the United 
States, with an aim of forestalling a closer Franco-American connection.    Similarly, 107
Chamberlain considers that Aberdeen wanted a policy of better relations with both the 
United States and France.    Bourne also notes that Aberdeen (and Peel) considered ‘the 108
pacifying factors of Anglo-American trade’ to be ‘so much more important than squabble 
over frontiers or even national honour’.    Bernstein, though, is, perhaps, the most 109
forthright, describing Aberdeen as the ‘architect of the policy of appeasing America’.   The 110
implicit contrast throughout all these contentions is undoubtedly with Palmerston, Foreign 
Secretary for nearly all the1830s, who is often considered as having been more hostile to the 
United States.   The thesis establishes, however, that there was often continuity between 111
Aberdeen and Palmerston, and that treaty law and legal principles guided British policy in a 
 This reflects a generally positive analysis of Aberdeen’s policy to the United States. For example, 106
Clarke considers that: ‘By far the most successful feature of Aberdeen’s policy was the resolution of 
disputes with the United States’: Clarke, British Diplomacy, p. 211. 
 Jones, The American Problem, chapters 1 and 2, and Jones, Lord Aberdeen and the Americas, p. 7.107
 Chamberlain, Lord Aberdeen, p. 301, p. 305. 108
 Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, p. 50.109
 Bernstien, G., ‘Special Relationship’, p. 727.110
 Chamberlain comments that ‘Aberdeen was more successful than Palmerston in coming to terms 111
with the United States’, Chamberlain, British Foreign Policy, pp. 92-93.
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consistent direction.  There was, for example, as will be seen, policy conformity in the 
McLeod and Caroline cases, and over maritime rights, which were all matters that were 
active at the time of the Aberdeen/Palmerston swap in 1841.  Furthermore, even in the Maine 
boundary dispute, which was the subject of Palmerston’s greatest criticism of Aberdeen’s 
American policy, there was also, again as will be seen, a hidden constancy. 
The thesis indicates too that the strand of comment in some works that British policy was a 
failure, or weak is unwarranted.  The main contemporary source for this is Palmerston’s 
fierce criticism of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 1842, which he famously described as ‘one 
of the worst and most disgraceful treaties that England ever concluded’, a ‘humiliation’, and 
a ‘sacrifice of real interests and established rights’.   Much subsequent historiography has 112
been coloured by this allegation of British weakness.  British policy is defended by some 
historians, such as Chamberlain and Clarke, who point to the long term sense of the 
compromises involved.    Many, though, are more critical.  Bernstein argues that ‘the 113
British government usually gave way’, Dykstra comments that, by the 1830s and 1840s, 
‘London seemed to capitulate in almost every dispute’, and Jones and Rakestraw refer to the 
‘failure of containment’.    Even Chamberlain observes that ‘the United States became 114
aware that Aberdeen wanted a settlement and was usually indifferent to detail’, and ‘took 
advantage of the fact.’.   Similar analyses have also been applied to specific issues.   115
Bourne, for example, notes that, on the Maine boundary, ‘Ashburton and Aberdeen accepted 
substantially less than what had been offered by the earlier Dutch award’, and, more 
stridently, as will be seen, Galbraith and Merk refer, respectively, to the Oregon settlement as 
a ‘surrender’ and a ‘capitulation’.    An understanding of the impact of international law 116
suggests, however, that these characterisations of British policy are unfair, as chapters 4 and 
5 will show. 
 Palmerston to Russell, 24 September 1842, PRO 30/22/4C, fols. 15-19; see also Palmerston, HC, 112
21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1162-1218.
 See, for example, Chamberlain, Pax Britannica?, p.91, and Clarke, British Diplomacy, p. 211.113
 Bernstein, ‘Special Relationship’, p. 725; Dykstra, The Shifting Balance, ‘Introduction’; and Jones 114
and Rakestraw, Prologue to Manifest Destiny, p. 267.
 Chamberlain, Lord Aberdeen, pp. 305-6.115
 Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, p. 50; the references to Merk and Galbraith are 116
in  chapter 5.  Van Alstyne also refers to the Oregon settlement as a ‘surrender’ for Britain: R. Van 
Alstyne, ‘International Rivalries in the Pacific Northwest’, Oregon Historical Quarterly, XLVI (Sep. 
1945), p. 249.
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Structure of the thesis          
The thesis comprises five main chapters.  
Chapter 2 considers the place of international law as part of the institutional practice of 
British foreign policy to the United States in the period.  It argues that international law was 
able to make an impact because it was part of the process through which British policy to the 
United States was developed.  It begins by demonstrating that there was political support for 
international law in Britain.  It then broadens out into an examination of how law also 
affected the business and practice of the Foreign Office.  It shows how advice on 
international law was needed and provided.  It then concludes by arguing that key legal 
principles, built into British policy over time, provided a framework for policy to the United 
States.          
Chapter 3 establishes the two main ways in which international law was then able to make an 
impact on British foreign policy to the United States.  It first looks at how international law 
shaped British policy objectives towards the United States concerning imperial possessions, 
commerce, the slave trade and peace.  It contends that a combination of treaty rights and 
obligations, and the legal principles within British practice, guided policy aims and 
implementation.  It then argues that international law was at the centre of how disputes were 
dealt with between Britain and the United States in routine business as well as high-profile 
cases, and illustrates this with the example of law’s role in commercial relations.  It ends by 
contending that participation in the same treaties, and American respect for similar legal 
principles, meant that British policy necessarily worked within a framework of law shared 
with the United States. 
Chapter 4 examines the way international law influenced British policy in relation to the 
issues and tensions with the United States arising from the question of border security in 
Canada.  It argues that the principles of self-preservation and protection guided Britain’s 
objective of retaining Canada in the face of rebellion, and presented a public justification for 
British action that helped to ease tensions with the United States.  It also aims to show how 
use of the shared principles around sovereignty and neutrality encouraged security 
cooperation along the border.  The chapter then considers how alleged breaches of legal 
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principles were nevertheless central to the acute tensions with the United States that arose in 
the cases of the Caroline and McLeod, and from Britain’s concern that it may need to enter 
American territory in extreme security situations.  It establishes that policy, in these 
instances, necessarily worked by reference to legal argument, and solutions were reached 
(after McLeod’s acquittal) using shared principles.   Finally, the chapter demonstrates how 
international law was fundamental to the territorial issues over the Maine Boundary and 
Nova Scotian fishing rights.  Both were technical disputes on interpretation that were set by 
previous treaty agreements, rather than fresh disputes.  It argues that treaty law and legal 
principles, therefore, guided policy expectation, and the process and arguments adopted. 
Chapter 5 considers the way international law affected the British policy response to 
American expansion, and the tensions with the United States over Oregon, California and 
Texas.   The first section looks at the broad direction of British policy.  It argues that prior 
treaty agreements envisaged American westward expansion and legal principles encouraged 
the maintenance of peace, with the result that the British were willing to accept American 
growth.  Within that overarching approach, however, legal considerations nevertheless still 
guided how Britain acted.  Historic legal rights meant that Oregon was more of a priority 
than Texas or California.  Respect for the principles associated with sovereignty influenced 
Britain’s decision to accept Texas joining the United States, despite the British preference for 
it to remain independent.  The second section then considers the tensions that nevertheless 
arose over Oregon and Texas.  It argues that Britain handled the issues concerned within the 
shared framework of international law.  A compromise was ultimately achieved in Oregon 
that was consistent with the applicable legal principles, but importantly the fluctuations in 
the process of the dispute can also be explained by the way Britain felt the legal principles 
needed to be applied at given points.  British respect for non-interference and neutrality 
helped to avoid a serious confrontation with the United States over the alleged British 
support for the abolition of slavery in Texas, and the sale of two ‘armed’ ships to Mexico. 
Chapter 6, finally, examines the way that Britain worked within shared legal principles to 
produce workable solutions to the main practical problems presented by the conflict between 
the desire of the United States to protect American ships from interference by the Royal 
Navy, and British objectives aimed at suppressing the slave trade and defending the abolition 
of slavery in the Empire.  It argues that there was no fundamental disagreement with the 
United States over the ‘right of search’.   Instead, British policy worked within the existing 
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principles associated with the ‘freedom of the seas’, and its treaty rights with other states, in 
developing instructions for when the Royal Navy could ‘visit’ American ships.   Indeed, once 
the policy was fully explained to the United States, a new updated shared framework 
covering the issue was effectively produced, which then served as the understanding behind 
the agreement for joint cruising in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 1842.  Similarly, common 
ground within the ‘comity of nations’ was used to produce an arrangement that was aimed at 
avoiding tensions arising, in the aftermath of the Creole, over the position of any slaves on 
board American ships forced in the future into British ports.  
Note on key figures and terms 
Palmerston and Aberdeen, were the British Foreign Secretaries in the period with Aberdeen 
taking over in September, 1841.  Melbourne and Peel were the corresponding British Prime 
Ministers.  Fox was the British Minister in Washington from 1836 to 1843, and he was 
followed by Pakenham.  Ashburton was the special envoy sent to negotiate the treaty that 
became the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 1842.  On the American side, there were five 
appointed (as opposed to acting) Secretaries of State in the period.  They were Forsyth (until 
1841), Webster (1841-43), Upshur (1843-44), Calhoun (1844-45), and Buchanan (1845 
onwards).  Similarly, there were five Presidents,  Jackson (until 1837), Van Buren (1837-41), 
Harrison (1841), Tyler (1841-45), and Polk (1845 onwards).  Stevenson was the American 
Minister in London from 1836 to 1841, followed by Everett until 1845, and then McLane 
until 1846.  
‘Britain’ is used to mean Britain as representing the whole of the British Empire when 
referring to matters of foreign policy with the United States, and ‘British’ should be read 
accordingly in this context.  This in no way, however, should be taken as implying that there 
were no complexities within the Empire which affected policy to the United States.  It is 
simply a recognition of the fact that the thesis is a study of British foreign policy to the 
United States, and that, formally, the ‘British’ state involved encompassed the Empire.  
‘Canada’, ‘Lower Canada’, ‘Upper Canada’ and the names of other British possessions are 
adopted instead when mention is made to the specific entity or entities concerned. 
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2.    International Law as part of the Institutional Practice of British Foreign Policy to 
the United States 
As made clear in the Introduction, this thesis does not contend that international law can 
fully explain British policy towards the United States in the period.  The role of international 
law in the exercise of power is too complex for such a straightforward analysis.  Self-
evidently, Britain did not decide policy in every situation concerning America by a simple 
reference to what the law was, and, in any event, many circumstances would have presented 
two or more lawful options.  ‘Grey’ areas within the law were also open to exploitation.     
Rather, the thesis argues that the acceptance and use of international law needs instead to be 
appreciated as being a fundamental part of the British-American political relationship.     
Viewed from this perspective, international law can, then, be seen to have made an impact 
because it provided the framework and principles within which British policy worked and 
disputes were handled.  The purpose of this chapter is to establish how international law was 
able to have this effect by examining its role in the practical operation of foreign policy to 
the United States.    
The central contention of the chapter is that international law matters because it was integral 
to the making of British foreign policy towards the United States - or, in other words, 
because it was part of its institutional practice.  Most obviously, this position was founded on 
political support in Britain for international law.  British governments of the period worked 
on the basis that Britain’s relations with the United States operated within an international 
legal system.  This affected practice, gave policy a ‘public’ sphere, and sanctified treaties.      
Britain’s role in enforcement also enmeshed law into political debate.  Equally important, 
however, was the role of international law behind the immediate political arena.     
International law was involved in the business and practice of the Foreign Office, providing 
the necessary backup for this political support to have real meaning.  Expertise in 
international law to guide policy was not only needed, but, vitally, it was also sought and 
available within an established process.  The crucial end result was that principles of 
international law provided a framework for British foreign policy to the United States.  This 
structure was made up of ‘cornerstone’ principles built into British foreign policy as a 
consequence of the role of international law over time within the practice of the Foreign 
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Office.  They did not make the policy themselves, but they were the building blocks on 
which it was based and help to explain its trajectory. 
Political support and politics 
British foreign policy to the United States in the period operated on the premise that Britain 
was within a system of international law.  Whig and Tory ministers alike publicly 
acknowledged its presence in comments concerning American matters.  Palmerston, for 
example, spoke of what he termed ‘a doctrine of international law’ and ‘the principles of 
international law’ when considering how nations ‘dealt with each other’.   Similarly, Peel 1
had occasion to exhort Parliament not to ‘disregard the great principles of public law to 
which all nations alike are subject’.    Whilst such specific mentions of international law by 2
ministers were infrequent, they are nevertheless significant as hallmarks of its wider impact.  
British ministers also tended towards a positivist conception of international law when 
dealing with the United States, as opposed to one driven by natural law.  Palmerston referred 
on different occasions to ‘established usages’, ‘universal practice’, and the ‘strict rules of 
international practice’.   Peel, in turn, mentioned a ‘usage of public law’ when in the process 3
of ratifying the Texan treaties.   Conversely, there was scarcely even a brief express glance 4
made to an international law based on any wider notion of universal ‘justice’.  Palmerston 
did once propound the view that Britain should act on ‘just grounds’ in international matters 
in a speech on general foreign policy, but this comment did not relate specifically to 
international law.  5
 Palmerston, HC, 26 August 1841, Vol. LVIII, 265-270.1
 Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol, LXVII, 1218-1252.2
 Palmerston to Fox, 19 January 1841, British Documents, Vol. 1, 65, pp. 114-115; Palmerston to Fox, 3
9 February 1841, British Documents, Vol. 1, 66, pp. 115-116;  Palmerston, HC, 2 May 1843, Vol. 
LXVIII, 1225-1238.
 Peel, HC, 30 June 1842, Vol. LXIV, 787-788. The context was the duty to ratify the treaties agreed 4
by the  previous government with Texas.
 Palmerston, HC, 7 August 1844, Vol. LXXVI, 1870-1885 at 1874.5
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British governments also embraced the idea that Britain was within this framework of 
international law as a member of the ‘family’ of ‘civilised states’.   Ministers, unsurprisingly, 6
pondered little on the theoretical aspects of international law, but they did nevertheless make 
frequent references to the notion of ‘civilised’ states in the context of international law and 
policy to the United States.  Palmerston, for example, referred to ‘the established usages of 
civilised nations’ and ‘the universal practice of civilised nations’ in the McLeod matter.      7
Similarly, Aberdeen wanted to make sure, in the Oregon question, that he was able to ‘secure 
the approbation also of every state in Europe, and of the whole civilised world’.   Peel too 8
made clear that he believed Britain to be one of a group of ‘civilised governments’.   British 9
ministers appear to have made a much stronger public link between international law and the 
‘civilised’, than they did with Christianity.   For example, in the matters reviewed pertaining 10
to the United States, only Palmerston mentioned the latter, justifying the principle of state 
responsibility as preventing war practice ‘banished’ by ‘civilisation and Christianity’.  11
The understanding that British foreign policy to the United States operated within a system 
of international law was reflected too by more general discussions in the major political 
quarterlies.  The Edinburgh Review, from a Liberal and Whig perspective, ran the most 
significant article of the period on the place of international law, with a piece by Nassau 
Senior reviewing Wheaton's ‘History of the Progress of the Law Of Nations'.    Senior set 12
out a broad conception of international law with naturalist and positivist principles.   The 
former, which he termed ‘international morality’, were the ‘rules of international conduct 
which we believe to be commanded by the Deity’, whilst the latter were ‘the rules of conduct 
 For example, see the reference to the ‘family of civilised nations’, Edinburgh Review, Vol. LXXIII, 6
(1841), Article X, ‘The Republic of Texas’, pp. 241-271, at p. 267.
 Palmerston to Fox, 19 January 1841, British Documents, Vol. 1, 65, pp. 114-115; Palmerston to Fox, 7
9 February 1841, British Documents, Vol. 1, 66, pp. 115-116. 
 Aberdeen, HL, 17 March 1846, Vol. LLXXXIV, 1118. 8
 Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252.9
 This lack of public emphasis on Christianity contrasts with what Sylvest describes as an increasing 10
emphasis on religion and international law by legal writers in the period from 1835: see chapter 1.
 Palmerston to Fox, 9 February 1841, British Documents, Vol. 1, 66, pp. 115-116.11
 'History of the Progress of the Law of Nations in Europe from the Peace of Westphalia to the 12
Congress of Vienna’, by H. Wheaton’, Edinburgh Review, Vol. LXXVII, (1843), Article I, pp. 
303-372. The letter, Nassau Senior to Macvey Napier, 20 February 1843, indicates that this article was 
written by Nassau Senior: M. Napier, (ed.), Selection from the Correspondence of the late Mackey 
Napier, esq., (London: Macmillan, 1879), p. 423, note 1. 
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which are dictated or permitted by the public opinion of nations’.   Whilst the tenor of the 13
article was sceptical of the notion of ‘progress’ in international law, it nevertheless assumed 
that Britain was still firmly within its ambit.  Picking out for special attention the right of one 
state to interfere in the affairs of another, it drew ‘some comfort’ that Britain ‘denied that any 
general right of interference against revolutionary movements in independent states was 
sanctioned by the Law of Nations’.    Further, it contended for an expansive interpretation of 14
international law in the context of the slave trade, arguing, contrary to the position of the 
United States and others, that there was a right of search for ‘inquiry’ - or ‘right of visit’ - 
against vessels suspected of slave trading.   15
Other political quarterlies also shared the approach of assuming Britain's place within a 
system of international law, even if they sometimes took different positions on the same legal 
questions.  The Quarterly Review, from a Tory viewpoint, for example, criticised Palmerston 
for his failure to respect international law on the question of intervention in the domestic 
affairs of other states.  It attacked, in particular, Palmerston's support for the Spanish 
government in the 1830s, noting that ‘failure or success does not affect the principle of 
intervention while the matter is in dispute; such statesmen as now hold the British helm 
know little and care less about Grotius and Puffendorf’.   It then returned to this theme in a 16
later article on foreign policy, accusing Palmerston of being ‘so mischievously active in 
violating the old law of nations and disorganising the political, moral, and social condition of 
the Peninsular monarchies’.   Similarly, The Westminster Review, a radical periodical, 17
argued strongly that international law should govern Britain's approach to the slave trade.  
Echoing a famous judgement of Lord Stowell, its view was that: ‘we have no right to force 
our convictions upon others.  The end we propose is good, but that does not justify us in 
arriving at it by unlawful means’.  18
 Edinburgh Review, 'History of the Progress of the Law of Nations’, pp. 304-306.13
 Edinburgh Review,‘History of the Progress of the Law of Nations’, pp. 357-358.   14
 Edinburgh Review, 'History of the Progress of the Law of Nations’, pp. 369-372.15
 ‘Texas’, Quarterly Review, Vol. 61, No. CXXII, (1838), Article III, pp. 326-362, at pp. 327-328.16
 ‘Foreign Policy’, Quarterly Review, Vol. 67, No. CXXXIII, (1840-1841), Article VIII, pp. 253-302 17
at p. 257.
 ‘The African Slave Trade’, The Westminster Review, Vol. 34, (1840), Article IV, pp. 125-165 at pp. 18
155-156.
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This political acceptance that Britain participated in a system of international law mattered 
for policy towards the United States because it meant that issues were handled in a manner 
that embraced legal principles and concepts.  There were several aspects to this evident from 
the British-American relationship in the period.  The simplest manifestation can be seen in 
the way that ministers argued so many disputed points in legal terms, as will be observed in 
the examples given throughout the thesis.  Much more fundamental, however, was the fact 
that international law was by the 1830s embedded within the practice of the Foreign Office.  
Expert advice on international law was both required by, and available to, ministers. 
Principles of international law were adopted for the conduct of policy.    Both of these latter 
contentions are so central to the thesis that they are each examined separately in further 
detail in the next sections of the chapter.   For present purposes, however, the key points are 
that British governments were able to be informed consistently on questions of international 
law, and that policy was made within a framework derived from legal principles.  These were 
important pre-conditions for international law to able to have any meaningful influence on 
the development of policy towards the United States. 
A further effect of British involvement in the international legal system was the idea that 
foreign relations took place in a ‘public’ sphere, and were as a result liable to the opinion of 
the ‘world’, or at least the ‘civilised’ world.   British ministers at the time, particularly Peel 
and Aberdeen, certainly spoke of international law as ‘public’ law.  Aberdeen, for example,  
referred to ‘public justice’ and ‘public laws’, and Peel, as already noted, proclaimed ‘the 
great principles of public law to which all nations alike are subject’.   What this meant, in 19
practice, was that ministers tended to place importance on the question of how Britain's 
actions would be ‘publicly’ viewed in the light of international law.  This increased the 
significance given to international law in political debate.  Peel, for example, was concerned 
in the dispute over Britain’s alleged ‘right of visit’, and the consequent risk of war, by the 
question as to ‘which party has the public law on its side?’    Similarly, Aberdeen was keen 20
that the instructions to naval commanders, arising from his 1842 ‘commission’ on the slave 
trade, should be based, first, on the ‘law of nations’, and ‘be such as may be published, if 
 Aberdeen, HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 654-661, and HL, 17 May 1844, Vol. LXXIII, 19
1228-1229; Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252.
 Peel to Aberdeen, 25 October 1841, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 297-301.20
 36
necessary, to the whole world’.   Palmerston too was keen not to disclose the view that the 21
British involvement in the blockades in the dispute between Monte Video and Buenos Aires 
from 1845 had been in breach of international law.  22
The ‘public’ sphere for foreign policy also had a further aspect in the manner by which 
British ‘honour’ became linked, at times, to the upholding of international law.  ‘Honour’ 
was, undoubtedly, a central ongoing concern of British foreign policy in the period, a point 
exemplified by Brougham's 1843 evocation of Charles Fox’s comment that: ‘the sacrifice of 
national honour must lead to the downfall of the country’.   Indeed, as Otte observes for the 23
Victorian period from 1865, this was based in ‘the acknowledgement that ...  “honour” and 
“prestige” were a form of “soft power”, and a currency readily convertible into real 
influence’.    Whilst, as a concept, ‘honour’ certainly embraced much more than issues of 24
international law, the British approach to the United States was clearly impacted by the 
perception of ministers that the ‘public’ upholding of Britain's rights and obligations under 
the ‘public’ international law was one aspect of it.  Again, this increased the potential for 
international law to influence policy.  Peel, for instance, saw the obligations to defend 
Canada and uphold British rights in Oregon as being ones of ‘honour’.   As he asked 25
Aberdeen, when concerned by a possible breach of treaty by the United States over Oregon:  
‘What shall we do, in order to be on our guard against infraction or palpable evasion of the 
treaty - or some act [implying] insult and defiance?’   Another example is the consistent 26
British support for arbitration to settle disputes with the United States on what ministers 
regarded as ‘points of honour’.      27
 Aberdeen to Lushington, Bandinel, Denman, and Rothery, 14 December 1842,  Peel Papers, Add. 21
MS 40453, fols. 277-290.
 As noted in Grewe, The Epochs, p. 528, referring to a letter from Palmerston to Normanby in 1846, 22
citing in Note 14, Dalling, Life of Palmerston, Vol. 3, p. 327.  
 Brougham, HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 599-641.  For further examples of references to 23
‘honour’, see: Palmerston, HC, 7 August 1844, Vol. LXXVI, 1870-1885 at 1870-1871;  Peel, HC, 7 
August 1844, Vol. LXXVI, 1877; and Melbourne, HL, 18 January 1838, Vol. XL, 223.
 T. G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge: 24
Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 396-397.
 Peel to Aberdeen, 16 May 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43062, fols. 48-54; Peel to Aberdeen, 25
23 January 1845, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43064, fols. 178-181.
 Peel to Aberdeen, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43064, 23 January 1845, fols. 178-181.26
 The boundary disputes concerning Maine and Oregon are examples of this approach.  These are 27
discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
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The acceptance that Britain was within an international legal system also meant that British 
foreign policy placed great emphasis on the upholding of treaties.  British ministers accepted 
that international treaties entered into by Britain provided rules of international law from 
which the state gained binding rights and obligations.    In an immediate sense, this is, of 28
course, a commonplace.  Treaties were agreements which, unsurprisingly, bound Britain 
when it entered into them.   Palmerston, accordingly, referred in 1843 to the agreement on 
the location of the river St Croix, following a commission set up under the Jay Treaty, 1794, 
as something on which ‘the faith of the country having been pledged, there was no 
possibility of retracting the acquiescence thus given’.   For him, ‘a treaty does bind, and 29
would bind’.    Peel even made clear that Britain was bound from signing and not 30
ratification.  Faced on coming into office in 1841 with unratified treaties with Texas, for him, 
therefore, ‘it was not necessary... to state whether he considered those treaties wisely 
conceived’.   The position rather was simply that ‘the present Government ... had felt it their 31
duty ... to ratify those treaties’.   Whilst such attitudes are predictable in themselves, they 32
did, however, have the important wider consequence that ongoing British foreign policy 
needed to be made subject to the specific terms of the treaties to which the Britain was 
already a party.  This was highly significant in the treaty-rich British-American relationship, 
as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Finally, the need for political action to be taken in order to enforce principles within the 
international legal system also gave law an extra influence over policy.  This requirement 
was the result of the fact that there was no superior body able to undertake such a role.  The 
basis for John Austin's theoretical question as to the status of international law as ‘law’ was, 
thus, demonstrated by this practical situation.   States had to demand compensation, or even 33
take military action, themselves in response to breaches of international law.  Such methods 
of enforcement were also often combined with a consideration of the position of ‘public’ 
 For a statement of the general principle, see Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, S221.28
 Palmerston, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1162-1218.29
 Palmerston to Melbourne, 12 January 1836, Palmerston Papers, ME/518.30
 Peel, HC, 13 June 1842, Vol. LXIII, 1490-1491.31
 Peel, HC, 30 June 1842, Vol. LXIV, 787-788. 32
 John Austin’s position is discussed briefly in chapter 1.33
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opinion.  Like other states, Britain could take measures itself to enforce international law, or 
it could have similar action taken against it by other states.  One area, for instance, in which 
Britain both used and faced extensive enforcement action was that of maritime rights, 
particularly in the context of the slave trade.  Again, ever the practical politician, Peel 
explained in the course of a parliamentary speech, partly on the slave trade that: ‘if you 
attempt to exercise your power with a disregard of the obligations of the law of nations, you 
will be called upon for compensation for any acts unwarranted by that law’.   It is important 34
to recognise, however, that British military power, especially that derived from the Royal 
Navy, nevertheless gave Britain a practical ability to effect enforcement to a greater extent 
than that enjoyed by many other states.  The role of international law was not, however, 
merely a question of the availability of such direct power.  Legal questions aside, Britain, for 
example, could have enforced its will to a greater extent in respect of the ‘right of search’ 
and the slave trade.  35
British foreign policy was, though, drawn closer to international law because of the nature of 
this method of enforcement.  The lack of a central authority meant that ministers were more 
able, as a practical matter, to weigh the international law consequences in the balance with 
other factors in any given set of circumstances.  International law, in this sense, then became 
one of the factors in the political choices involved in foreign policy.  This did not appear to 
manifest itself in any systematic habit for policy to override specific advice when taken on a 
matter of international law, a point which will be considered further below.  On the contrary, 
British governments, as argued above, respected Britain's position as part of an international 
legal framework.  Rather, it showed itself more in a willingness, where necessary or 
desirable, to take or defend contentious positions within the system.  ‘Grey’ areas could be 
exploited, as, for example, in the British interpretations of some maritime rights.   In other, 36
usually weaker, cases, cover could be sought by seeking to reduce the risk of other states 
taking enforcement action against Britain.  An instance of the latter is provided by Peel's 
 Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252.34
 Indeed Martinez notes: ‘Over time ... Britain found it could not rely on its military power alone but 35
instead had to utilise that power in conjunction with co-operative legal action to achieve its goal’: 
Martinez, J. S., The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, c2012), p. 14.
 A further example would be Aberdeen’s comment that it would be ‘desirable to attempt to obtain 36
from the Chinese government some [assurance] or pledge which would give me a better right to act’ in 
the case of Chusan in 1845: Aberdeen to Peel, 18 October 1845, Peel Papers, Add MSS 40455, fols. 
249-250. 
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reflections on wanting to intervene in the battle between Buenos Aires and Monte Video in 
1843.  He knew that, in that case, ‘interference’ was ‘opposed to principle’, but wanted 
action to avert ‘a great present evil’.   His solution was to consider intervention, but only ‘in 37
concert’ with France and Brazil.   38
International law in this way became part of broader British domestic political strategies.  
Governments and oppositions used it to support or supplement arguments in favour of a 
particular foreign policy position.  A good example of this is provided by the question of the 
right of interference in another state in the context of Palmerston’s foreign policy.   Parry 39
identifies the ‘centrality of patriotic themes to the identity of the Victorian Liberal party’, and 
contrasts this with the fact that from ‘Wellington onwards, the Conservative Party seemed 
too feeble and passive in foreign and domestic policy’.    Palmerston certainly attacked the 40
Conservatives for adopting a ‘system’ which would not promote British ‘interests’ or 
‘honour’, arguing that ministers ‘appear to shape their policy... from a consideration of the 
effect... upon the position of foreign governments’.   There were certainly substantive 41
debates about the merits of actual policies behind this assault.  Peel, however, chose, in part 
of his reply, to criticise Palmerston for interfering overseas too much, implicitly raising the 
question in doing so of whether he had any such right: 
I perfectly admit that we have not pursued that course which the noble Lord was inclined 
to pursue, namely - that while he disclaimed all intervention or right of interference in the 
domestic affairs of other countries, he should so intervene more actively than any of his 
predecessors,  Our intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign states may have been 
less than that of the noble Lord, but not less, I contend, than was required to effect any 
object rendered necessary by the interests of England or the world.  42
 Peel to Aberdeen, 26 November 1843, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43063, fols. 80-86. 37
 Peel to Aberdeen, 26 November 1843, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43063, fols. 80-86.38
 The words ‘intervention’ and ‘interference’ were both used in political discussion of this question at 39
the time without clear distinction.  Bourne notes that Palmerston’s ’strictures on the use of 
“intervention” instead of ”interference” are famous’: K. Bourne, Palmerston: the Early Years, 
1784-1841 (London: Allen Lane, 1982), p. 424.  Nevertheless, Palmerston’s preference is not 
considered further, as both terms were clearly used by contemporaries, and it is not relevant to the 
point being made on the political debate relating to ‘interference’ or ‘intervention’.
 J. P. Parry, The Politics, pp. 388-389. 40
 Palmerston, HC, 7 August 1844, Vol. LXXVI, 1870-1874.41
 Peel, HC, 7 August 1844, Vol. LXXVI, 1881-1882. 42
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Peel here was cleverly raising the legal point as a precursor to his further argument that 
Conservative policy had in any event been more effective without such interference.   
Another example of international law being raised in a similar manner to support a political 
position is that of the opposition of some Radicals to certain of the measures discussed for 
taking action against the slave trade.   43
Most political debate around the extent to which a given policy was operating in accordance 
with international law was not, however, the result of a serious difference between the 
participants as to the role of international law.  Both the Melbourne and Peel governments 
worked on the basis that Britain was within a system of international law, as has been argued 
earlier in the chapter.  International law was instead brought into British political debates 
because of its availability as a body of principles with both wide recognition and political 
effect.  Peel's deployment of such an argument, in the debate mentioned above, reflected the 
fact that the international law question around interference was one of the main methods 
used to attack Palmerston's foreign policy, as indeed has already been seen earlier in the 
chapter.   It was not a rejection of interference, as such, in all circumstances, and indeed the 
Conservatives also showed themselves willing to interfere in difficult legal circumstances, 
such as those involving Monte Video.   International law was, then, used as a political 44
weapon as well as being accepted as a method of regulation.  
 Radicals were generally more sceptical than Whigs or Liberals about the cost of the British 43
measures against the slave trade.  For example, see the arguments in The Westminster Review, a 
radical quarterly, in 1840 against Macaulay's strong proposals for eradicating the slave trade, partly on 
the grounds of the maintenance of international law: The Westminster Review, 'The African Slave 
Trade’, at pp. 153-156.
 See for example, Peel to Aberdeen,  26 November 1843, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43063, fols.44
80-86.
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Foreign Office practice 
The support of British governments for the system of international law was backed up by the 
institutional practice of the Foreign Office.    This is a critical point because the impact of 45
international law would necessarily have been limited without a realistic ability to influence 
policy, whether in matters related to the United States or more generally.   The practical role 46
of international law in British foreign policy developed from the fact that it touched several 
branches of the business of the Foreign Office, resulting in a regular need for advice.  A 
process thereby arose under which the Foreign Secretary requested legal advice when he 
considered it was required.   Crucially, this advice was then delivered by experts in 
international law, who also had available to them extensive and suitable research facilities.  
Whilst the advice given may not always have represented internationally ‘agreed’ legal 
principles, what matters is that the system of international law was integral to the serious 
business whereby Britain acted in the world.  This form of practice potentially covered, of 
course, the whole range of Britain's global foreign interests and not just the United States, 
but, throughout, it ensured that international law was able to function as a moving reality, 
that is as a part of day-to day business.  In other words, it allowed British policy to work 
within a framework of international law in both theory and practice.  47
 This chapter draws heavily on three works relating to the provision of legal advice to the Foreign 45
Office, and, although reference is made to these as appropriate, my general debt to the authors 
involved needs to be acknowledged at the start.  The works are: A. D. (Lord) McNair, International 
Law Opinions, Vols. I, II and III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), which summarises 
law officers' opinions on international law from approximately 1782 to 1902; C. Parry, (ed.), Law 
Officers’ Opinions to the Foreign Office, 1793-1860, Vols. 1-97, (Farnborough: Gregg International 
Publishers Limited, 1970-1973), which reproduces, and provides commentary on, the opinions 
referred to; and, C. Parry, (ed.), A British Digest of International Law, Vol. VII (Organs of State), 
(London: Stevens, 1965).
 This section is concerned with the methods by which the British state involved international law in 46
the practical process of foreign policy. This is a distinct point from the fact that the resulting actual 
British practice was itself, of course, a source of international law - as evidence of state practice.
 British foreign policy falls, thus, to be considered within the context of international law for, as 47
McNair comments: ‘It is a delusion affecting the minds of many laymen and not a few lawyers that 
governments in the conduct of foreign affairs act independently and capriciously and without 
reference to legal principle.  Those who have worked in, or the archives of, the Foreign Offices of 
well-established States realise that the ordinary, routine, non-political business of the world is carried 
on by Ministers of Foreign Affairs and their diplomatic agents against a background of law, slowly 
built up in Western Europe during the past three or four centuries and in the United States since they 
became independent, and gradually spreading throughout the civilised world’, McNair, International 
Law Opinions, Vol. I, Preface, p. xvii.
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The starting point for this institutional role was that international law was central to the work 
of the Foreign Office in the early to mid-nineteenth century.  The Foreign Secretary 
exercised, in practice, the prerogative power of the Crown in foreign relations.  The Crown's 
role in foreign affairs, as described by the British Digest for 1965, was that, amongst other 
things, it ‘accords recognition to foreign States and Governments’, ‘declares war and makes 
peace and both authorises the negotiation of treaties and ratifies them’, and ‘annexes’ and 
‘cedes territory’.    As the British Digest also sets out, the Crown acted in these, and other 48
similar matters, ‘through’ the Foreign Secretary, and ‘subject always to the collective advice 
of the Cabinet’.    International law mattered in the discharge of these functions because it 49
was made up by treaties, rules, and customs which were concerned with the intercourse of 
states on such issues.  International law was also unique in its ostensible relevance in 
regulating the business of the Foreign Office.  There was no such other body or system even 
purporting to have such a role.   As again noted in the British Digest, Parliament possessed 
no direct powers over the Foreign Secretary, and domestic courts could not then interfere 
with ‘acts of state’.  50
The Foreign Secretary's practical need to be informed about international law in exercising 
the Crown's powers arose in several ways.  Certainly, the Foreign Secretary required advice 
for political reasons.  As has been noted, international law was an international system, and 
contemporary diplomatic and parliamentary exchanges made frequent references to it.  In 
 Parry, British Digest, p. 17.  British Digest (in this volume) was published in 1965 and is 48
commenting, therefore, on the legal position of the Crown as developed at that time. It is nevertheless 
a suitable point of reference for the brief general constitutional points being made in this paragraph 
and below on the position of the Crown in the period 1836 to 1846.  There is no suggestion in British 
Digest, or any of the other works reviewed, that the Crown’s powers on these basic constitutional 
points, had been in a process of material change in the period from the nineteenth century up to 1965.  
See also the description of the business of the Foreign Secretary by Jeremy Sneyd, Chief Clerk of the 
Foreign Office, to the Commission on Fees, 1785, as referred to in The Records of the Foreign Office, 
1782-1939 (London, HMSO, 1969), p. 3.
 Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, Vol. 2, The Crown (4th edn, 1935), Part II, p. 131, as 49
cited in Parry, British Digest,  p. 18.  See also The Records of the Foreign Office, pp. 51-52, which 
indicates that important despatches and drafts were circulated to the Prime Minister and sovereign, 
and available, or circulated, for the Cabinet.
 Most importantly, Parliament had no direct means of declaring or ending a war: Parry, British 50
Digest, p. 26.  Parliament also, crucially, did not have a constitutional role as respects the Crown's 
treaty-making powers, subject to the over-arching ‘constitutional principle’ that ‘the Crown alone may 
not alter the law of the land’, Ibid., p. 39.  As to ‘acts of state’, in ‘terms of domestic law an act of the 
Crown in relation to foreign affairs is an “act of state”... .  Such an act, as “an exercise of sovereign 
power... cannot be challenged, controlled, or interfered with by municipal courts.  Its sanction is not 
that of law, but that of sovereign power, and, whatever it be, municipal courts must accept it, as it is, 
without question.” ’, Ibid., p. 25, referring to Salaman v. Sec. of State for India [1906] 1 KB.
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this political context, the question of international law's nature in legal theory as true ‘law’ or 
not was irrelevant.  An example of the type of political need which could arise can be seen in 
a speech of Peel in the House of Commons in 1843, in circumstances where he was required 
to respond to criticism of the government's policy of caution in intercepting American 
vessels in the context of the slave trade.  Peel argued: 
I am perfectly certain, that if you transgress the law of nations, your efforts, however well 
intended, will be less effectual than if you respect the rights of other countries. This is all 
I contend for.  I say, employ all your naval power, and let no consideration of expense 
prevent you from enforcing the rights of humanity, but do not disregard, if your 
intervention is to be ultimately effectual, if you wish to conciliate the good opinion of 
other countries and induce them to co-operate with you, do not disregard the great 
principles of public law to which all nations alike are subject.  51
Information on the relevant international law would have been clearly needed in this case, 
both to respond to the United States (on the ‘rights of other countries’), and to deal with 
Parliament (on the question of ‘your [ie Parliament's] intervention’). 
The Foreign Office also required assistance in relation to international law for legal reasons.     
Advice may have been sought to determine the legality of a given action, or to respond to a 
diplomatic note.  Although, as the British Digest notes in the context of the period 1860 to 
1914, the Foreign Secretary was, in theory, not ‘bound’ by international law in deciding 
policy, there seems to have developed a practice near to having such effect: 
There is not, it would seem, any absolute constitutional duty upon H. M. Government, or 
upon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to follow the advice of the Law 
Officers .... Nevertheless, as this work must abundantly testify, the Foreign Office or 
H.M. Government has consistently considered itself in practice precluded from ordering 
'policy’ otherwise than as the 'law’, or rather the exposition of it the Law Officers have 
given, dictates.  52
There is no definitive similar comment on the period covered by this thesis, but the 
previously mentioned circumstances surrounding Britain's relations with the United States 
regarding the slave trade provide a revealing example of how, at least, Aberdeen saw his role 
in such terms.  Facing discussion in the House of Lords on his instructions to the Royal Navy 
following the advice of the law officers in the context of the capture of American ships, 
 Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252. 51
 Parry, British Digest, p. 271. 52
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Aberdeen commented that: ‘having had statements from the law officers of the Crown, 
warning me that such proceedings could not be maintained by the law of nations, of course it 
was my duty to apprise the captains of our cruisers of such an intimation’.   This does not 53
mean, however, that the Britain always acted in accordance with international law.    Many 
actions of the British state would necessarily have been undertaken without specific legal 
advice, and some undoubtedly would have been in breach of international law.     Rather, it is 
noting that the practice was nevertheless for such actions not to be part of ‘ordered’ policy.    
Three types of court also potentially gave the Foreign Secretary legal reasons to be informed 
about international law in the early to mid-nineteenth century, and to an extent they can be 
seen as providing additional enforcement mechanisms for it.    Prize courts only became 54
active in the period in war by specific commission adding to the jurisdiction of the admiralty 
courts.   They nevertheless had a potentially crucial role in those circumstances in enforcing 55
what could or could not be seized as ‘prize’ by a belligerent according to international law.   56
Other countries also operated prize courts.  The question of ‘prize’ was fundamental to the 
operation of British foreign and security policy at the time in that it could affect either the 
war effort if Britain was a belligerent, or trade if it was a neutral.   Two references by the 
prize judge, Stephen Lushington, in the context of the Crimean War, highlighted by 
Waddams, illustrate Britain’s dual interests.    Britain’s war effort was helped, Lushington 57
stated, by the right in the ‘law of Nations’ to ‘the capture of the mercantile navy of the 
enemy’.   Conversely, he added in a different case, the ‘Court of Prize’ aimed to ‘ preserve, 58
 Aberdeen, HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 654-661. 53
 A broad distinction is made here between courts of law and equity, which applied English law, and 54
courts, such as prize, which applied international law.  In the former, international law could, in 
certain circumstances, such as, broadly, where there was no conflict with common law or statute, ‘be 
part of English law’, but such courts would, nevertheless, still be applying English law: see generally  
W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. XIV (London, 1964), pp. 24-33.  The jurisdiction of 
these courts of law and equity, applying English law (whether or not international law was a ‘part’ of 
that law), was, though, largely irrelevant to the business of the Foreign Secretary and is not considered 
further.
 W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. I, (3rd edn, 1922), p. 564.55
 Waddams nevertheless comments that Lushington tended to favour British interests: S. M. 56
Waddams, Law, Politics, and the Church of England: the Career of Stephen Lushington 1782-1873, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 223-224.
 Waddams, Stephen Lushington, p. 224. 57
 The quote is from the decision of Lushington in The Baltica (1855), as cited in Waddams, Stephen 58
Lushington, p. 224.
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undiminished, the rights of the subjects of neutral states’.   Even if Britain was at peace, 59
thus, the nature of prize law, meant that it had the potential to affect British shipping and 
trade in military conflicts around the world, both then and in the future.  The Foreign 
Secretary can be reasonably supposed on this basis to have retained a standing interest in 
many international situations with potential prize ramifications.  
The role of ‘mixed commissions’ in enforcing the slave trade treaties entered into by Britain 
in the nineteenth century has also been emphasised by Martinez.   As she comments: 60
‘Called the “Mixed Commissions” because they consisted of judges from different countries, 
the slave tribunals sat on a permanent, continuing basis, and they applied international 
law’.   Benton and Ford have recently questioned Martinez’s wider argument in relation to 61
the role of the action against the slave trade in the history of human rights law, but this does 
not detract from her point that the mixed commissions used international law.   The main 62
commissions referred to by Martinez were under the British slave trade treaties with Spain, 
Portugal and the Netherlands, and they sat in Sierra Leone, Cuba, Brazil and Suriname.    63
They were also not redundant, for, as Martinez continues, ‘the Sierra Leone courts’, for 
example ‘emancipated approximately 65,000 slaves between 1819 and 1846’ according to 
‘British logbooks’.    For present purposes, however, what is particularly relevant is that 64
Martinez's work also reveals that the Foreign Secretary became involved in matters 
concerning international law and these courts.  For example, she points to instances of the 
Foreign Secretary sending opinions of the King’s Advocate on points requested by the 
 The quote is from the decision of Lushington in The Leucade (1855), as cited in Waddams, Stephen 59
Lushington, p. 224
 See generally, Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law.60
 Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law, p. 6.61
 See generally, Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, pp. 4-5, p. 20, and chapter 5.62
 Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human  Rights Law, p. 69. 63
 Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law, p. 79.64
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judges.   She also gives an example of Palmerston commenting on the correctness or 65
otherwise of the commission's decision under principles of international law.  66
The admiralty courts may also have had some relevance for the business of the Foreign 
Office in this period as they too concerned international law, although not as directly as those 
of prize and the slave trade commissions.  The Court of Admiralty in London was, as 
Wiswall observes, ‘an instrument of the office of the Lord High Admiral’, and it was distinct 
from the courts of common law and equity.   It applied admiralty law, which the Report of 67
the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission in 1835 noted was ‘founded’ on ‘the principles of the 
Civil Law’.    Wiswall comments on how the views of its judges changed over the course of 68
the nineteenth century as to whether it was, in fact, a court of international law, as opposed to 
“municipal” law, in its ‘instance’ jurisdiction.   Routine ‘instance’ business was not, 69
however, likely to have been of concern to the Foreign Office.  More important, for present 
purposes, was the Slave Trade Act 1824, which, as Wiswall further points out, gave the 
Admiralty Court the power of jurisdiction in cases of bounty payments concerning the slave 
trade.    The business of the admiralty courts was also potentially material to the Foreign 70
Secretary because of their extensive range across the world.   In addition to the Court of 
Admiralty in London, there were the vice-admiralty courts in many overseas British 
 Palmerston to Commissioners to Rio de Janeiro, 26 March 1836, as cited in Martinez, The Slave 65
Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law, note 75, p. 209, which refers, in turn, to 
the Correspondence with British Commissioners Relating to the Slave Trade.., Class A, 314, in B.P.P. 
Vol. 14.
 Palmerston to Commissioners to Rio de Janeiro, 8 October 1834, as cited in Martinez, The Slave 66
Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law, note 74, pp. 208-9, which refers, in turn, to 
the Correspondence with British Commissioners Relating to the Slave Trade..., Class A, 147, in B.P.P. 
Vol. 14.
 F. L., Wiswall, The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice since 1800: an English 67
study with American comparisons, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 4.
 Waddams, Stephen Lushington, p. 17, citing The Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission 68
1835, p. 65. 
 For Wiswall, Stowell and Sir John Nicholl considered ‘the Court of Admiralty in instance was a 69
court of International Law’, whereas Lushington did not: Wiswall, The Development of Admiralty 
Jurisdiction, p. 69. See also Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. I, (3rd edn, 1922), p. 559.  
Wiswall notes that Browne's Law of Admiralty (published in 1802) listed the court's 'instance’ 
jurisdiction as including matters such as salvage, maritime contracts made upon the sea, wages, torts 
at sea, and possession and restraint. Thus, as Wiswall notes, this ‘instance’ jurisdiction was distinct 
from those related to prize and certain other specific jurisdictional powers: Wiswall, The Development 
of Admiralty Jurisdiction, pp. 7-11.
 Wiswall, The Development of Admiralty Jurisdiction, p. 23.70
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possessions.    Many of these courts did not sit regularly, but equally, on the other hand, 71
some, like Halifax, were in major maritime centres.  72
The extensive requirement for advice on matters of international law within the Foreign 
Office is, in any event, evidenced by the huge numbers of legal opinions that were in fact 
provided to that department.  McNair, in presenting his magisterial three volume 
‘representative selection’ of the written opinions of the law officers of the Crown concerning 
international law, comments that ‘the number of the opinions on questions of international 
law so obtained... runs into many thousands’.    Similarly, the British Digest refers to a letter 73
from Sir John Harding (then, Advocate-General) to Russell in 1854, in which he estimated 
that the number of law officers' opinions since 1793 concerning international law ‘would 
probably not fall much short of 7,000’.   The British Digest identifies a letter of Lord 74
Westbury which sets out the purpose of these opinions.  They were, as put by him, designed 
to produce ‘a clear rule of action’ for the government.    This was, Westbury continued, 75
because ‘the opinion is not to convince; it is to guide, conduct and relieve from 
responsibility’.   Apart from their use in indicating the role of international law in specific 76
matters, the opinions also, as the British Digest makes clear, need to be considered as part of 
 A record of appointments to the vice-admiralties between 1832 and 1865 demonstrates the sheer 71
breadth of this legal framework.   There were vice-admiralty courts in this period, for example, in 
Antigua, Barbados, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Bombay, Calcutta, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, 
Gibraltar, Halifax, Jamaica, Madras, Malta, Mauritius, Newfoundland, New South Wales, Sierra 
Leone, Tortola, British Guiana, St Helena, Canada, South Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, 
Vancouver Island, and Victoria!  See HCA 30/1010, List of Appointments by place in Vice-
Admiralties (1832-65), The National Archives.
 See, for example, the entry for Samuel Archibald concerning the vice-admiralty court at Halifax: 72
Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol. VII, pp. 21-25.
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Preface, p. xix.73
 Parry, British Digest, p. 269, referring to Harding to Russell, 13 September 1854, in FO 83/2280.  74
As further evidence, Parry's edited reproduction of the law officers' opinions to the Foreign Office 
from 1793 to 1860, as referred to above, runs to 95 volumes, with two further volumes containing an 
index and commentary. Within this work, there are, for example, 78 opinions listed as concerning the 
United States alone between 1838 and 1845, and a further 86 for the period 1846 to 1853. 
 Parry, British Digest, p. 265, referring to a letter from Lord Westbury, then Lord Chancellor, to Sir 75
Robert Phillimore on his becoming Queen's Advocate in 1862, Westbury to Phillimore, 22 September 
1862, as cited in Nash, Life of Lord Westbury, Vol. II, p. 48.
 Parry, British Digest, p. 265.76
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the British practice of foreign policy, which was itself a ‘source of the law’.   The demand 77
for legal involvement is also indicated by the fact that, in addition to the written opinions, 
some advice on international law appears to have been given orally in meetings.  78
The regular need for advice on international law also resulted in a process within the Foreign 
Office for opinions to be requested and delivered.  The two Undersecretaries of State were 
the individuals, as a matter of record, who instructed the law officers (by letter), but the 
decision on whether to take such legal advice was nevertheless it appears that of the Foreign 
Secretary.   In the case of the Caroline, for example, Palmerston instructed: ‘Send these 79
papers and all others received on the same subject to the Law Officers of the Crown for their 
early consideration and report with reference to the points adverted to in Col Off letter of 17 
February’.   There does not, however, seem to have been any special method used by the 80
Foreign Office for giving instructions to the law officers once it was decided to take advice.  
On the contrary, the evidence from the British Digest from a slightly later time indicates that 
probably the papers on relevant matters would simply have been sent to the law officers with 
a request for their opinion.   This is also consistent with Sir William Harcourt’s comment 81
from the 1870s that ‘anything that was not very clear was put into a big canvas bag at the 
 Parry, British Digest, p. 243.  As Parry states: ‘They are produced, usually with full reference to a 77
precise factual situation, in the full knowledge on the part of their authors that the State may, and very 
probably will, act on them.  And they are produced by persons who are, normally, officers of State, 
and thus participate in the process whereby States act in the law.  If their opinions do not represent the 
actual practice of States, which is a source of the law, they are thus nevertheless an element, or an 
element in the expression, of that practice’.
 The fee notes held in the records of the Treasury Solicitor from 1844 to 1846 indicate that advice 78
was given in meetings, at least in that period.  See for example, the following entries: TS 7/1, p. 12, 
and TS 7/3, p. 1, The National Archives.  
 This is indicated by the descriptions of Bourne of the way that the Foreign Office dealt with 79
incoming papers in this period: Bourne, Palmerston: the Early Years, pp. 417-418. See also the 
summary of a draft report into the business of the Foreign Office from 1850 and general description in 
The Records of the Foreign Office, pp. 4-5, pp. 47-48. 
 FO 96/19/22, p. 834. See also McNair, in International Law Opinions, Vol. 1, p. 268, who gives a 80
further example in which Palmerston, in a note of 15 August 1832, gives instructions to ask the King’s 
Advocate ‘whether we should not be entitled to treat as Pirates or as Enemies any Guarda Costa which 
captured British vessels beyond a certain distance from the Spanish coast’.
 Parry, British Digest, p. 259, referring to evidence of the Chief Clerk of the Foreign Office to the 81
Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Diplomatic and Consular Services 1870, Report, 
1870, Minutes of Evidence, 138 (C.382) (Mr Alston).
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Foreign Office and sent to the law officers’.   On the other hand, not all instances where 82
international law was concerned would necessarily have required specific legal advice, as 
opposed to instructions being issued by the Foreign Secretary based on his general 
knowledge of international law.  83
The vital factor in the establishment of a serious institutional process to take account of 
international law was, however, that the Foreign Secretary was able to call upon 
professionals with suitable expertise in international law to provide legal assistance.  As 
McNair makes clear, the Queen's Advocate (or Advocate-General) was the law officer of the 
Crown who provided the Foreign Secretary with the most advice on matters of international 
law in the early to mid-nineteenth century.   McNair summarises the background to the 84
office as being that: 
in the sixteenth century the Crown developed the practice of consulting groups of 
civilians, members of Doctors' Commons, upon questions of international law which 
arose in the conduct of foreign affairs ....  From about 1600 until the retirement of the last 
holder of the office, Sir Travers Twiss, QC, in 1872, the Crown's standing adviser on 
these questions was the Queen's (or King's) Advocate, who was always (or with rare 
exceptions) a civilian and member of Doctors' Commons.   85
This specific role for the Queen’s Advocate was probably also assisted by the fact that the 
office tended to be held by the same person for several or many years, as the post did not 
change with ministries.   Apart from the fact that many opinions were produced, the real 86
depth of the Queen’s Advocate’s role in the period is indicated too by the high number of 
consultations revealed in accounting records of fees paid within the archives of the Treasury 
Solicitor.  In three (roughly) quarterly periods from 1844 to 1846, the Queen's Advocate was 
 Parry, British Digest, pp. 262-263, referring to, and quoting from, evidence of Sir W. Harcourt to the 82
Departmental Committee on the Legal Business of the Government, 1875, Report, 1877 (C.199) 
Minutes of Evidence, 460, 471-2.
 See, for example, a minute of Palmerston in February, 1838 instructing the Royal Navy as to what 83
to say if they came across sealers from the United States in terms of ‘the full assertion of all rights 
which by the Law of Nations attach to sovereignty’: Palmerston 23 February 1838, FO 96/19/22, p. 
1188.
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, Preface, pp. xvii-xviii.84
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, Preface, pp. xvii- xviii.85
 Sir John Dodson, for example, was the Queen's Advocate from 1834 to 1852, thereby holding the 86
position throughout the whole period covered by this thesis: McNair, International  Law Opinions, 
Vol. III, Appendix, pp. 402-406.
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consulted a total of 190, 189, and 192 times respectively, of which 76, 67, and 36 of these 
‘attendances’ appear to be on matters which originated from the Foreign Office.    These 87
periods may, of course, not be representative, but what they suggest is consistent with the 
impression gained from the volume of the opinions, namely that the Queen’s Advocate was 
regularly consulted as part of the ordinary business of the Foreign Office.   The central part 
played by the Queen’s Advocate in providing such advice is also perhaps unsurprising in 
light of the fact the Foreign Office had a relatively small total staff in the period.   Indeed, it 88
did not obtain its own internal legal adviser until 1876.        89
Importantly too, the Queen's Advocate was a specialist.  As indicated by McNair above, the 
person holding the office was drawn from the members of what was then the College of 
Advocates, based physically in an area of London known as Doctors' Commons.    The 90
members of this college were known as ‘civilians’, and were required to have a doctorate.   91
They practised mainly in the areas in which they had exclusive rights, which were those 
relating to admiralty and ecclesiastical law.   Some also became experts in international law, 92
which was closely related to admiralty law.  ‘Civilians’ were distinct from barristers, who, by 
contrast, worked in the courts of common law and equity.   The civilian advocates were also 93
very few in number.  For example, the College admitted only 66 members in the 76 years 
 The periods of account which have been examined are those from the 6th November, 1844 to the 87
31st March, 1845, 30th June, 1845 to 30th September, 1845, and 31st December, 1845 to 31st March, 
1846. See generally, The National Archives, Kew, TS 7/1, pp. 1-75, TS 7/2 pp. 1-76, TS 7/3 pp. 1-69.
 The total staff of the Foreign Office, excluding the Foreign Secretary and the two under-secretaries, 88
is given as 30 in 1822, and 64 in 1854: The Records of the Foreign Office, p. 7.  
 Sir Julian Pauncefote was appointed Legal Assistant Under Secretary in 1876: The Records of the 89
Foreign Office, p. 11, and S. Gaselee and J. A. C.  Tilley, The Foreign Office (London: G. P. Putnam’s, 
1933), p.115.
 As to the history of the College generally see G. D. Squibb, Doctors’ Commons: A History of the 90
College of Advocates and Doctors of Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).  
 See generally, D. R. Coquillette, The Civilian Writers of Doctors’ Commons, London: three 91
centuries of juristic innovation in comparative, commercial and international law, (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humbolt, c1988), and Squibb, Doctors' Commons, p. 54. 
 See: D. R. Coquillette, The Anglo-American Legal Heritage: introductory materials (Durham, 92
N.C.,: Carolina Academic Press c2004), p.209; Waddams, Stephen Lushington, p. 17, referring to p. 
65 of the Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission 1835 on the connection between admiralty 
and ecclesiastical law; and Squibb, Doctors' Commons, chapter VIII, for a discussion of when the 
exclusive rights of the ‘civilians’ were removed.
 Some members of the College were also barristers, but being called to the Bar and being admitted to 93
the College of Advocates were separate matters giving different practising rights.
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from William Scott, (the future Lord Stowell, and the brother of Lord Eldon), in 1779, to that 
of the last member in 1855.   The members of the College undoubtedly derived much work 94
from ecclesiastical matters, which was, by nature, unconnected with international law.  
Nevertheless, McNair argues that the link between the ‘civilians’ and the provision of advice 
to government on international law was established early.  95
      
The Queen's Advocate also advised the Foreign Secretary in some cases jointly with the 
Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General.    Evidence given to the Select Committee of 96
the House of Commons on the Diplomatic and Consular Service in 1870 indicates that these 
tended to be the more important matters, or ones which also involved points of English law.    97
The Attorneys- and Solicitors- General were generally MPs and in the government, unlike 
the Queen’s Advocate.    Due to changes in ministries and promotions within them, there 98
could be a relatively quick turnover in these positions.  There were, for example, eight 
different Attorneys-General, and ten Solicitors-General, in the period from 1834 to 1852, the 
years marking Sir John Dodson's period as the Queen's Advocate.    Again, in contrast to the 99
civilian background of the Queen’s Advocate, the Attorneys- and Solicitors- General were 
barristers, with backgrounds in the courts of common law and equity.   The Lord Chancellor 
and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were also available, at least in theory, to 
give advice on international law.   100
 Appendix III, Squibb, Doctors' Commons.  Squibb also makes clear in chapter VIII that effectively 94
the end for the College came after the members lost their exclusive practising rights in 1857 and 1859, 
with the final meeting of the fellows being in 1865, albeit that technically the College continued until 
the death of its final member in 1912.
 See generally, A. D. (Lord) McNair, 'The Debt of International Law in Britain to the Civil Law and 95
the Civilians’, in McNair, International  Law Opinions, Vol. III, Appendix, pp. 407-430.
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, Preface, p. xvii -xviii.96
 Parry, British Digest, p. 259, referring to the testimony of the Chief Clerk of the Foreign Office to 97
the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Diplomatic and Consular Services in 1870.
 See generally, Parry, British Digest, pp. 249-252.98
 Computed from the information in McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. III, Appendix, pp. 99
402-406. These are the number of individuals (i.e. a  person holding the same office twice in the 
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 Parry, British Digest, pp. 248-249.100
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The Foreign Office also made use of other members of the College of Advocates on matters 
involving international law.   Sir Stephen Lushington (admitted 1808) was appointed as the 101
judge of the Admiralty Court from 1838.    Lushington was an anti-slavery campaigner, 102
and assisted the government by ‘presiding over a committee in 1842 to draw up a code of 
instructions for British naval officers, and negotiating a treaty with France on this question in 
1845’.   Joseph Phillimore (admitted 1804) was the King’s and Queen's Advocate in the 103
Admiralty Court from 1834 to 1855.   The British Digest notes that the Foreign Office 104
sometimes consulted the holder of this office when the Queen's Advocate was unavailable.   105
Other members of the College who performed services include William Adams (admitted 
1799), who assisted with treaty negotiations with the United States in 1814 and 1815, and Sir 
James Parker Deane (admitted 1840), who wrote on the law of blockade and became external 
legal adviser to the Foreign Office in 1872.   Finally, Sir Robert Phillimore (admitted 1839) 106
and Sir Travers Twiss (admitted 1841), both of whom ultimately served as Queen’s 
Advocate, also wrote on matters concerning international law and the United States in the 
1840s, as will be seen in later chapters.  107
Lastly, it can also be reasonably inferred that the law officers would have had the satisfactory 
research facilities necessary for them to give the requisite specialist opinions.  Advice on 
international law was at the time based on treaties, evidence of past practice, and major 
works by noted authorities.   Apart from any private library, the Queen’s Advocate would 
have had the use of the extensive library of Doctors' Commons.   The Catalogue of the Books 
in the Library of the College of Advocates in Doctors' Commons (London, 1818) shows that, 
 The members of the College of Advocates referred to in this paragraph were identified from 101
Appendix III, Squibb, Doctors' Commons. 
 DNB, Vol. 34 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 792-794.102
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 Parry, British Digest, p. 253.105
 DNB Vol. 1 (Oxford, 2004), p. 272 for Adams; DNB Vol. 15 (Oxford, 2004), p. 636 for Parker 106
Deane.
 DNB Vol. 44 (Oxford, 2004), pp. 78-80 for Sir Robert Phillimore, and DNB Vol. 55 (Oxford, 107
2004), pp. 736-739 for Sir Travers Twiss.  Their relevant publications are discussed later in the thesis.
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in 1818, the library contained many books on international law.   These included works by 108
Bynkershock, Gentilis, Grotius, Heinecci, Pufendorf, Seldenus, Vattel, and Zouch, as well as 
66 volumes on cases on appeal in prize from 1780 to 1817.    The research position for the 109
Attorney- and Solicitor- General is not so clear, but Lord Campbell’s comment that he had 
given an opinion on a matter of international law after ‘reading all that is to be found upon 
the subject’ would indicate that he, at any rate, was able to access satisfactory resources 
when needed.   The law officers do not, however, appear to have been assisted by any 110
regular system of formalised records or archives relating to their offices.   Copies of their 111
reports were nevertheless retained in the relevant files of the Foreign Office, where they 
would have been available for departmental research.  112
Moreover, the Foreign Office itself also contained research materials on matters of 
international law.  It would appear from the first catalogue of printed books in the Foreign 
Office in 1864 that the Foreign Office Library was well-stocked with relevant works.   The 113
subject index of this book listed 105 works under ‘International Law’, although it is not 
 Catalogue of the Books in the Library of the College of Advocates in Doctors' Commons (London, 108
1818), reviewed in the Guildhall Library, London.  The reference for this work was obtained from 
Squibb, Doctors' Commons, p. 91. 
 Catalogue of the Books in the Library of the College of Advocates in Doctors' Commons (London, 109
1818), reviewed in the Guildhall Library, London.  Interestingly, it appears from the Catalogue that 
the library did not then include works by von Martens, Kant, Kluber, Mackintosh or Wolf, though they 
could, of course, have been added before or during the period covered by the thesis.
 Mrs Hardcastle, (ed), The Life of Lord Campbell, Vol. II (London: John Murray, 1881), p.119. 110
Campbell was the Attorney-General from 1834 to 1841. 
 Although it concerned a somewhat later period than that covered by this thesis, see the amusing 111
account by Sir William Harcourt of the problems he faced in terms of departmental records: ‘What 
happened when I was Solicitor-General [1873] was, that two cabs arrived filled with a great number 
of miscellaneous odd volumes, which were tumbled out into the street, and were ultimately brought up 
into my room; these were called the archives of the Solicitor-General.  Instead of there being, as you 
would naturally suppose, some office where the opinions of the former law officers would be 
filed...the whole thing was in the greatest confusion’, Parry, British Digest, p. 267, quoting Sir 
William Harcourt's testimony to the Departmental Committee of 1875, Report etc., Minutes of 
Evidence, 453-4.
 See G. Marston, ‘Law Officers’ Opinions to the Foreign Office 1793-1860 - The History of the 112
F.O. 83 Series’, in Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol 96, pp. xxi to xxviii though, for a summary of 
the process under which the law officers’ opinions were removed from the relevant Foreign Office 
files in the early twentieth century. 
 Catalogue of Printed Books in the Library of the Foreign Office, 31st December, 1864, (London, 113
1864). A telephone discussion on 22/3/16 with Foyle's Special Collection Library at King's College, 
London, which houses the historic Foreign Office Library, confirmed that this 1864 publication was, 
as far as they were aware, the first printed catalogue.
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possible to know when these were acquired.  The works possessed by the library at that point 
included, for example, works by Pardessus, Grotius, Selden, Pufendorff, Vattel, von Martens, 
Kluber, Manning, Wheaton, Phillimore and Twiss.  It is nevertheless unclear, however, to 
what extent the books in the library were actually used, in practice, for researching 
international law in this period.  The majority of such advice was, as seen, provided 
externally by the Queen's Advocate.  More fundamentally, later comments, by Edward 
Hertslet (Librarian of the Foreign Office from 1857 to 1896) and Lord Hammond 
(Permanent Under-Secretary of State of the Foreign Office from 1854 to 1873), suggest that 
there was no adequate classification system in the library, which may have prevented it being 
used in any event for serious research.  114
The Foreign Office was able, however, to provide internal research into treaties and past 
correspondence on matters involving international law.  Lewis Hertslet, the Librarian from 
1810-1857, introduced the publication of two series, British Foreign and State Papers, and 
Hertslet's Commercial and Slave Trade Treaties.    As Hertslet's Recollections of the Old 115
Foreign Office reports, this seems to have led, in turn, to a research role for Lewis Hertslet 
himself: 
In consequence of this deep research into treaties, Lewis Hertslet soon became the 
standing authority on all subjects involving international, historical, or geographical 
points which affected British interests, and the numerous reports... are carefully preserved 
in the archives of the Foreign Office, and fully indexed.  116
This type of internal research could also, on occasion, involve others more widely across the 
Foreign Office.  Bourne, for example, notes Hertslet as recalling that, at the time of the Don 
Pacifico matter in 1850, ‘they all had to search through some two or three thousand volumes 
of manuscripts’.    Thus, as the British Digest notes, ‘much that was in reality legal work 117
 See E. Hertslet, Recollections of the Old Foreign Office, (London: J. Murray, 1901, pp. 27-28, and 114
citing Lord Hammond, in evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons on Diplomatic 
and Consular Services, 1878.
 Hertslet, Recollections, pp. 145-146.  The dates for the start of these publications are given in The 115
Records of the Foreign Office 1782-1939, p.20, as 1824 and 1820 respectively.
 Hertslet, Recollections, p. 147.116
 Bourne, Palmerston: The Early Years, p. 419.117
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was done in the Librarian's Department, as the numerous Library Memoranda reproduced in 
every volume of this work must abundantly show’.  118
‘Cornerstone’ principles 
The combination of the political acceptance of the system of international law, and the 
associated workings of the Foreign Office, also had one vital further consequence.   This was 
the emergence of a framework of legal principles upon which British foreign policy practice 
to the United States was based.   These principles arose naturally from the process of 
ministers requesting advice over time on international law in respect of a wide range of 
international situations.   The resulting opinions matter because they were grounded upon the 
principles of international law accepted by the law officers of the British state.  Taken 
together, therefore, they gave rise to a legal framework for British policy, albeit that 
particular ministers may not have acknowledged, or even been aware of, the origins of the 
legal structure within which Britain was operating.  Significantly, the core principles 
involved were also not just those consistent with the current positivist-leaning conception of 
international law of the then British ministers.   They were instead based on the long-term 
application to the facts by the Foreign Office of the ‘law of nations’, and they, thereby, also 
contained natural law elements concerning the duties of one's own state, as well those 
applicable to the relations between states.    As will be seen, this point was to be very 119
material for policy concerning the United States. 
This section sets out the ‘cornerstone’ principles which are considered to form the 
framework for the ‘institutional practice’ of Britain within the British-American relationship.     
For ease of analysis, these have been placed into six themes.   The themes are not original in 
themselves.   They are formulated, in the light of the primary sources reviewed, from the 
subject categorisations and selected extracts in McNair.   Rather, the aim is to take the work 
of McNair from a legal discipline, and put it into into a form which can then be used in 
political history to consider the influence of international law upon foreign policy.   A further 
intention of the section is also to demonstrate the link between the main principles in each 
 Parry, British Digest, p. 174.118
 For example, the principles considered in British foreign policy to govern the ownership of 119
territory in the North American continent were derived from natural law, as discussed below.
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theme and the work of Vattel.   The purpose of this is to show that British practice was, at 120
the very least, reflective of ideas within wider international law, even if the positions taken in 
Britain were not always internationally agreed.   The actual manner in which these principles 
impacted on the particular objectives of British foreign policy to the United States will then 
be considered in the next chapter.    
First, is the notion of the ‘state’.   British foreign policy worked from the basic principle that 
international law applied to states, at least when a state was, as in the case of the United 
States, a member of the family of ‘civilised’ nations.    This in itself was uncontroversial, 121
and was consistent with Vattel's comment in his Preliminaries that: ‘The Law of Nations is 
the science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations 
correspondent to those rights’.    The British ‘state’, for the purposes of foreign policy, 122
encompassed the territory of Britain together, broadly, with its empire.   Similarly, the 123
territory within a federation, such as the United States, was also regarded as being within a 
single ‘state’.    There was also, though, an idea of the state in the abstract as a ‘legal 124
person’ separate from territory, ruler, or people, but nevertheless in what was, from a 
practical viewpoint, a necessary relationship to them.    Marriott, the King's Advocate in 
1764, expressed the distinction in an opinion by arguing that ‘Sovereigns’ were ‘Heads of a 
 Vattel was selected because, as noted in footnote 9 of the Introduction, he was the main jurist of 120
international law referred to in the diplomatic correspondence etc. reviewed for this thesis.  Chitty’s 
1834 edition of Vattel has been used for this purpose: it was a British edition close in time to the 
period, it also contained practical notes by Chitty, and it was recommended at the time by Manning, in 
Commentaries on the Law of Nations, p. 36.  See also footnote 9 of the Introduction. 
 See the discussion above in the section 'Political support and politics’ on the issue of the 121
‘civilised’.
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Preliminaries, S3.122
 British possessions overseas (except India) were described for the period 1860-1914 as being ‘ 123
regarded both internationally and internally as forming part of the State’: Anson, Law and Custom of 
the Constitution, Vol. 2, The Crown (4th edn, 1935), Part II, p. 131, as referred to in Parry, British 
Digest, p. 16.  This was the formal practice by which Britain conducted its international relations, and, 
as such, is distinct from the argument of Benton and Ford that viewing empires as simply single 
‘states’ misses the significance of their role in the development of international law: Benton and Ford, 
Rage for Order, pp. 20-21.
 McNair refers to the McLeod case, discussed below, in chapter 4, and an opinion of Dodson 124
concerning claims against the government of Brazil in 1839, which assumed that Monte Video was 
part of the Brazilian Empire, Dodson, 17 December 1839, FO 83//2237 [Brazil]: McNair, 
International Law Opinions,  Vol. I, p. 36.
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general Body of whose National Rights committed to their Trust by Providence they are the 
sacred Depositories and perpetual Guardians’.    125
This idea of the state as a ‘general Body’ was consistent with two further related principles, 
which were important for British foreign policy to the United States.   The first was that it 
allowed a legal analysis that obligations entered into at any time by a state were ‘national’ to 
that state, as opposed to ‘personal’ to an individual ruler or government.    Marriott argued, 126
in the same opinion as just referred to,  that this was necessary both for ‘confidence’ in 
international relations and ‘security of property’ in commercial treaties.  He wrote: 
[Personal obligations] were rejected.  Because it cannot fail to place on the most unstable 
Foundations the repose of Europe and to destroy that Confidence among all Orders of 
Mankind which is necessary to the Glory of Sovereigns, and the Intercourse of Nations. 
And Treaties of Commerce would become Engagements of the most uncertain Nature 
possible; thereby destroying that which is the Foundation or rather the very Life and Soul 
of all Commercial Connections, Security of Property.  127
This principle was particularly relevant for Britain in the Western Hemisphere, given the 
plethora of new states and changes of constitution following the breakdown of the Spanish 
Empire in the early nineteenth century.  It allowed Britain to forge with confidence trading 
relations with new states in the Americas.   As Dodson later argued in the context of a British 
dispute with Mexico in 1847: ‘A Nation cannot by a change of constitution, or form of 
government, shake off its liabilities, pecuniary or otherwise’.    128
The second principle related to the idea of the state as a ‘general Body’ was that the state 
itself had a duty of self-preservation.  This notion only made real sense in the context of a 
state which was a ‘legal person’, or, in other words, an entity free from life and death.    
Jenner, the then King's Advocate, wrote, in an 1829 opinion, that ‘the first and paramount 
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, pp. 4-5, referring to the report of Marriott, 30 125
November 1764.
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 4.126
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 4-5, referring to the report of Marriott, 30 127
November 1764.
 Dodson, FO 83/2304 [Mexico], as referred to in McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 128
6-7.
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duty of every nation is that of self-preservation’.   This had clear implications for the 129
remaining British possessions in the Western Hemisphere.   Again, British practice here was 
consistent with Vattel, who also linked the duty of self-preservation to the state's duty of 
protection to its members by stating that: ‘If a nation is obliged to preserve itself, it is no less 
obliged carefully to preserve all its members’.    Indeed, for Vattel, a state could not 130
‘abandon a province, a town, or even a single individual’, except on grounds of ‘necessity’ or 
‘public safety’.    The ‘due return’ for this protection in Britain, according to Chitty in his 131
1834 edition of Vattel, was the British concept of the permanent allegiance of the subject.   132
British practice also recognised that the duty of self-preservation could itself justify action by 
the state which would otherwise be unlawful under international law.  Jenner made this clear, 
when he continued in the above opinion, that ‘the law of nations will sanction the adoption 
of any measure, which may be necessary to secure this great object [self-preservation], 
although it may in some degree infringe upon the rights of others’.    Indeed, McNair 133
identifies the justifications of ‘self-defence or self-preservation or state necessity’ as being 
present in British practice.     134
Second, is the ‘sovereign’, or independent, nature of the state.  The principle that a state had 
the sole right to conduct affairs on its territory was an important influence on British foreign 
policy in this period.   Its chief consequence, in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere, was 
in the respect considered as due to British territory by others, or, conversely, by Britain to the 
territory of another state.  This was highly relevant in the disputed border areas between the 
United States and Canada.  McNair sets out extracts from the legal opinions provided to the 
Foreign Office, which make it clear that British practice was that no state possessed the right 
to take ‘executive’, ‘administrative’ or ‘judicial’ ‘action’ in the territory (or jurisdiction) of 
 Jenner, 31 October 1829, FO 83/2302, [Mexico], as referred to in McNair, International Law 129
Opinions, Vol. II, p. 231.
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S17.130
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S17.131
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, Note 15, S17.132
 Jenner, 31 October 1829, FO  83/2302, [Mexico], as referred to in McNair, International Law 133
Opinions, Vol. II, p. 231.
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. II, p. 221.134
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another.   This practice was consistent with Vattel's idea of ‘empire’, in which the ‘empire’ 135
or ‘right of sovereign command’ was that ‘by which the nation directs and regulates at its 
pleasure everything that passes in the country’.   For Vattel, ‘empire’ was integral to the 136
establishment of the state, which was itself justified by the necessity of land appropriation 
for cultivation, and where the duty of cultivation itself was ‘an obligation imposed by nature 
on mankind’.   ‘Respect’ for territory, and the related ‘empire‘, were central to Vattel, and, 137
accordingly, he called on all to ‘abstain from every act contrary to the rights of the 
sovereign’, bearing in mind that ‘there is nothing more generally acknowledged as an injury 
that ought to be vigorously repelled by every state that would not suffer itself to be 
oppressed’ than ‘a violation of territory’.  138
British practice also recognised the associated principle that ‘sovereignty’ meant that one 
state should not interfere in the internal affairs of another.  Jenner, the King's Advocate, 
expressly referred to Vattel when he set out one aspect of the principle in an 1831 opinion.  
He wrote:   
'Foreign Nations’ says Vattel (Book III, c.18, s296) 'are not to interfere in the 
constitutional Government of an independent State.  It is not for them to judge between 
contending citizens - nor between the Prince and his subjects - to them the two parties are 
equally independent of their authority.’    139
Indeed, Vattel saw the right to govern without foreign interference as ’an evident 
consequence of the liberty and independence of nations’, and for him, thus, ‘no state has the 
smallest right to interfere in the government of another’.    The principle, known as one of 140
‘non-interference’ became a central tenet of British foreign policy in this period.     141
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, pp. 69-88.  McNair’s full list of categories is: 135
‘legislative function’, ‘executive and administrative action’, ‘judicial action’, ‘action by armed 
forces... and public ships’, and action by ‘diplomatic agents’.
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S204. 136
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S81, S203, S204. The references to ‘nature’ in S81 indicate the 137
natural law origins of Vattel’s thinking on this point. 
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, S93.138
 Jenner, 18 May 1831, FO 83/2230 [Austria],  as quoted by McNair, A., International Law 139
Opinions, Vol. II, p337-338.
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, S54.140
 Castlereagh’s State Paper of May, 1820 is one example.141
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Palmerston was, therefore, simply expressing in political terms the legal analysis of Jenner 
and Vattel when he wrote in 1836 that:     
The despotic powers contend that they have a right to proscribe to other nations what 
shall and shall not be their form of government.  In England to the contrary, it has always 
been maintained by all with few exceptions, that every nation has a right to choose its 
own form of government and institutions, provided always that it abstained from 
attacking its neighbours.  142
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, the principle of ‘non-interference’ became controversial 
in British politics because, despite its apparent clarity, it was always considered subject to 
‘the universal exception, that every state has a right to protect itself against great mischief, or 
even imminent danger, arising out of the domestic affairs of another’.   A further additional 143
difficulty was the question of what did and what did not constitute ‘interference’, which, as 
will be seen, was to be particularly relevant in policy to the United States concerning Texas.  
Whilst these points did not destroy the general principle, they gave great scope for political 
argument on the facts and circumstances of particular situations. 
Third, is the ownership of ‘unoccupied’ land.    The principle that the territory of a state 144
could be added to through the ‘effective occupation’ of unoccupied land was an important 
part of the practice of British foreign policy.   It provided a distinct and extra right to that 145
of the gaining of territory by treaties of ‘cession on conquest’, or as part of wider 
agreements.   It was of global significance to Britain because it both underpinned the 146
British ownership of existing possessions, and allowed for further expansion, at a time when 
much land in the world was, of course, still considered as unoccupied.  The principle was 
also of central importance in the dispute with the United States over Oregon.   The main 
defining position in British practice in this period was that ‘effective occupation’ was 
necessary to secure the ownership of unoccupied land, as opposed to the mere ‘discovery’ of 
 Palmerston to Melbourne, 24 May 1836, Palmerston Papers, ME/523.142
 Edinburgh Review, 'History of the Progress of the Law of Nations’, pp. 364-366.143
 ‘Unoccupied’ can be taken as meaning, for present purposes, not under the sovereignty of a state 144
recognised by Britain. 
 See generally, McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 285; Grewe, The Epochs, p. 545.145
 See generally, McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 289.146
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it.     Dodson, the then Queen's Advocate, for example, argued this in the context of 147
Kerguelen Island, which was the subject of discussion between Britain and France in 
1842.   Placing his analysis on the authority of Vattel, he stated: 148
The French, it is true, were the first to discover and take formal possession of Kerguelen; 
and if they had followed this up by a real occupation of it, within any reasonable space of 
time, there could be no doubt that their title would have been good and valid; but 
inasmuch as the Island was unoccupied when visited and surveyed by the English 
Commander (Captain Cook) in 1777, and has remained so ever since, I conceive that it is 
now open to any nation to appropriate the Island to itself by actually occupying the same 
(Vattel,  liv, I, c.18, ss207,208).  149
British practice also worked on the premise that the ownership of unoccupied land could, 
under international law, be taken from indigenous peoples.  This appears simply to have been 
assumed. 
British practice on unoccupied land was consistent with Vattel, as suggested by Dodson's 
opinion on Kerguelen Island.  Vattel, again, appears to have grounded his ideas in natural 
law, as with the ‘right of empire‘.  He saw ‘the cultivation of the soil’ as ‘an obligation 
imposed by nature on mankind’, and from which arose the rights of ‘property’ and 
‘dominion’ over ‘portions of land’.    For him, thus, it was the use of the land which 150
justified the ‘property’ and ‘dominion’, and this, in turn, also then formed the basis of his 
positions on effective occupation and indigenous peoples.   In the section referred to by 
Dodson on Kerguelen, Vattel, accordingly, emphasised the requirement for ‘use’, stating that: 
it is questioned whether a nation can, by the bare act of taking possession, appropriate to 
itself countries which it does not really occupy ... .  It is not difficult to determine that 
such a pretension would be an absolute infringement of the natural rights of men, and 
repugnant to the views of nature, which ... gives no nation a right to appropriate to itself a 
 McNair summarises the position as follows: ‘The Reports by the Law Officers are surprisingly 147
scanty.  They may be said to reflect or support the general opinion that discovery in itself is not a root 
of title but merely creates a right, which perishes after the lapse of a reasonable time, to establish a 
title to sovereignty by means of an effective occupation; and that effective occupation involves some 
course of administrative action of a permanent or frequently repeated character and, where it is 
humanly possible, a permanent settlement’, McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 285.
 Kerguelen Island is in the southern Indian Ocean.148
 Dodson, 27 April 1842, FO 83/2269, as referred to in McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, 149
p. 285-286.
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I, S81, S203. 150
 62
country, except for the purpose of making use of it... .  The law of nations will, therefore, 
not acknowledge the property and sovereignty of a nation over any uninhabited countries, 
except those of which it has really taken actual possession, in which it has formed 
settlements, or of which it makes actual use.  151
Similarly, Vattel placed ‘use’ at the centre of his defence of the taking of land from 
indigenous peoples, arguing that: 
Those who still pursue this idle mode of life, usurp more extensive territories than, with a 
reasonable share of labour, they would have occasion for, and have, therefore, no reason 
to complain, if other nations, more industrious and too closely confined, come to take 
possession of a part of those lands.  152
Thus, for him, there was a clear conclusion that: ‘the people of Europe, ... finding land of 
which the savages stood in no particular need, and of which they made no actual and 
constant use, were lawfully entitled to take possession of it, and settle it with colonies’.   153
Fourth, is the system of international commerce.  Britain was a maritime power, and this, 
therefore, mattered throughout the world.   The leading principle was that states possessed 
the right to decide whether or not to allow their subjects or citizens to trade with those of a 
foreign state.   This was so central a point of international law in the period that it appears 154
to have been assumed in British foreign policy practice.   Chitty, at least, nevertheless 
expressly confirmed his recognition of the principle by stating in his 1834 edition of Vattel 
that ‘in truth each state has a right, when so disposed, to decline any commercial intercourse 
with other states’.    British acceptance of the point can also be inferred from the system 155
operated by Britain in its own empire, under which British possessions were not able to trade 
freely with foreign states.    Similarly, international law did not restrict, through general 156
principles, the right of a state to regulate its trade with other states through the use of duties 
or other stipulations, as well as by direct prohibition.  This position again reflected Vattel, 
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S208.151
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I,  S81.152
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S209.153
 There was, however, as noted in the Introduction, a contrary argument in the context of British 154
policy to ‘non-western societies’: see footnote 104 of the Introduction and the associated discussion.
 Chitty, note 36, Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, following S87.   155
 Chitty, note 37, Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, following S92. 156
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who considered that, whilst there was a ‘general obligation incumbent on nations 
reciprocally to cultivate commerce’, the obligation on one state to trade with another was 
merely ‘imperfect’, meaning, in turn, that the corresponding trading right of the other state 
was also ‘imperfect’.    For him, therefore, it was up to an individual state ‘to permit... 157
[trade with another ]... under such conditions as she shall think proper’.    It is important to 158
recognise, however, that this only concerned a state's own trading position.  International law 
did not, in peace, permit one state to restrict or prevent any trade between other states, a 
point termed by Chitty as ‘freedom of trade’.   Consistently with this, the slave trade was 159
not unlawful under the general principles of international law.   160
The principles of international law underlying this commercial system gave rise to two 
further associated features of British foreign policy practice.   The first of these was that 
Britain used commercial treaties with other states as a way of securing trading rights, which 
were not otherwise available under general international law.   This was a common 161
international practice in the period, and the use of such treaties was considered to be one way 
in which ‘perfect’ trading rights could acquired.    The result was that the negotiation and 162
operation of such treaties came, in many instances, to be at the heart of British foreign 
policy.   As will be seen in the next chapter, these agreements included ones between Britain 
and the United States.   The other feature was that Britain was largely unconcerned by the 
commercial position undertaken by those investing or trading overseas.  There was certainly 
no general protection under international law for ordinary commercial risk, and the British 
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, S21-S25.157
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S92.158
 Chitty, note 98, Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, re S24. 159
 An example of a Report carrying the British view is that of Dodson, Campbell, and Rolfe, 9 160
September 1837: ‘There is no occasion to deny that slavery may be a lawful status, or to contend that 
the transport of slaves from one state to another according to the municipal law of the state is contrary 
to the law of nations’, re the Enterprise, as quoted by McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. II, pp. 
83-84.  
 Commercial treaties were popular because, ‘the principles on which commercial treaties ought to 161
be framed’ were ‘to remove restraints, to ensure a reciprocity as relates to shipping, to promote 
exchanges, to give to foreigners the means of selling in our ports that they may have inducements and 
means to buy’: ‘Foreign Policy of the Government’, Edinburgh Review, Vol. LXXI, (1840), Article 
VIII, pp. 545-593 at p. 569.
 Vattel, Book 1, Law of Nations, S93.162
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state, accordingly, generally accepted no responsibility for this type of commercial loss.   163
Vattel, though, as Miles observes, did provide the basis for a potential right for the state to 
intervene in certain cases if someone ‘uses a citizen ill’.  164
Fifth, is the freedom of the high seas.  British practice supported the principle of 
international law that the high seas were available for use by the vessels of all states, which 
was clearly of global importance to a commercial maritime state such as Britain.  This notion 
of free use was grounded on the view, in turn, that the high seas were not subject to 
ownership by any state.   As Nicholl, the then King's Advocate, stated in an opinion from 
1806: ‘The general principle is that the High Seas are extra-territorial.  There is no 
occupancy and possession of them, which is the basis of territorial dominion’.    British 165
practice here was reflecting what Bederman sets out as the result, in favour of the freedom of 
the seas, of the seventeenth-century conflict between the ideas of, in particular, Grotius in 
Mare liberum and Selden in Mare Clausum.   It was also again, consistent with Vattel, who 166
viewed the use of the high seas as being for navigation and fishing, and who stated that: 
It is manifest that the use of the open sea ... is innocent and inexhaustible.... No nation, 
therefore has the right to take possession of the open sea, or claim the sole use of it, to the 
exclusion of other nations.  167
British practice, however, also supported the associated principle that the seas within three 
nautical miles of a coast were, generally, as an exception, to be regarded as ‘territorial’ 
waters, with only the seas beyond thereby being the ‘high seas’.    Again, this was a 168
 For example, see the comment by Palmerston in respect of those with losses on Mississippi State 163
bonds: ‘Persons who buy Foreign Securities do is at their own risk and must abide the consequences’: 
Palmerston note, 23 May 1841, FO 5/372, fol. 198.  See also, Jenner, 27 July, 1831, McNair, 
International Law Opinions, Vol. II, p. 201.
 Miles, K., Paper presented in the ‘Legal Histories beyond the State’ series, Lauterpacht Centre, 164
University of Cambridge, 29 November 2017, ‘Constructing International Law: Property, Commerce, 
and “Expectations” ’, referring to Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, S71.
 Nicholl, 17 November 1806, as referred to in McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, p. 331.   165
 D. Bederman, 'The Sea’, in Fassbender and Peters, The Oxford Handbook, Part II, chapter 15, pp. 166
365-369.
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S281, S282.167
 McNair refers to an opinion of Dodson, in the context of relations with Russia, which asserts the 168
three mile limit: Dodson, 28 November 1836, FO 83/2332: McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. 
I, pp. 230-231.   
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position which reflected Vattel, who considered that coastal waters could be treated as within 
the ‘dominion’ of the adjacent state up to the range of a ‘cannon shot’, justified on the 
grounds of ‘safety’ and it being ‘as far... as her power is able to assert it [the dominion]’.   169
Importantly, the law officers of the Crown also appear to have, broadly, defended the 
principles behind the ‘freedom of the seas’ in two contentious situations in the early to mid-
nineteenth century.  The most important example, for present purposes, concerned the so-
called British claim for a ‘right of visit’ in order to check the nationality of a ship suspected 
of raising American colours falsely, which arose in the context of the slave trade.  The 
developments on this issue concerning the United States, and the role of international law 
within them, are discussed further in chapter 6.  For present purposes, however, it suffices to 
say that British policy to the United States followed the principle that, as put by Dodson, the 
then King's Advocate, in 1836: ‘the right of visitation and search upon the high seas does not 
exist in time of peace unless specifically conceded by treaty’.   Thus, when Lambert rightly 170
comments that ‘Britain refused to compromise’ on the question of ‘legal control’ of the seas, 
this must nevertheless be seen within the context that, at least in this case, the British state 
did nevertheless conform its practice to legal advice.   A further instance is provided by the 171
concept of ‘piracy’.  ‘Piracy’ was significant because, as Harding later confirmed in an 
opinion, British practice recognised that the ships of pirates could be seized by the forces of 
any state on the grounds that piracy under international law was ‘an offence against all 
nations, and punishable by all nations’.   Indeed, Grewe comments that the British used the 172
concept of piracy to ‘adopt the role of an international maritime police force’.   173
Nevertheless, the law officers of the Crown do not appear, from the examples set out in 
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book 1, S289.169
 Dodson, 18 June 1836, FO 83/2286, as referred to in McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, 170
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 66
McNair, automatically to have given the term an expansive meaning.   Chapter 4 also gives 174
a further example of rejection in the context of the Canadian border disturbances.       
Sixth, and finally, is the effect of war on trade.  British practice supported the principle 
within international law that trade was illegal between the subjects of the particular states at 
war.    Nicholl, the then King's Advocate, stated the British view of the position in an 1806 175
opinion:  
By the rule of the law of nations, to which I refer, all commercial intercourse between 
subjects of belligerent states becomes interdicted immediately on the existence of war... .  
Any subject, carrying on such an intercourse, violates his own allegiance to his own 
sovereign, and his duty to his own state.  176
This provided, self-evidently, a strong reason for avoiding war if at all possible with any 
states throughout the world with whom Britain had a strong trading relationship.  British 
practice nevertheless, conversely, also supported other legal principles which gave 
significant additional rights to states at war, all of which had the potential to disrupt the trade 
of an enemy.   Lambert highlights the importance of blockade, commenting that it ‘enabled 
the British to sweep the seas of enemy commerce, capture their seamen and destroy their 
economies’.    McNair also includes a summary of the ‘principles and practice followed by 177
British prize courts’, as sent to Jay of the United States, by Scott and Nicholl, on the 10 
September 1794.   These make clear that British practice was that war gave a belligerent 178
the right to seize the ships of enemies and the property onboard as prize (excluding the 
property of neutrals unless it was contraband).  Significantly, the principles also included a 
 McNair gives three examples of the law officers stating that matters were not piracy: from 1832 174
concerning a query by Palmerston to treat Spanish Guarda Costa as pirates, from 1847 concerning 
persons guilty of robbery in rivers in Turkey, and from 1848 regarding a ‘rebel Venezuelan warship’: 
McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. I, pp. 268-271. 
 Grewe comments that the British-American conception of war ‘was guided by the idea of a 175
maritime war aimed at exerting economic pressure’, which ‘also affected legal relations between 
individuals’, and contrasts this to a continental conception of war as a ‘dispute between states’, which 
did not ‘affect legal relations between the individual subjects of the belligerent parties’: Grewe, The 
Epochs, pp. 534-535.
 Nicholl, 9 November 1806, FO 83/2332, as referred to in McNair, International Law Opinions, 176
Vol. III, pp. 17-18. See also Chitty, note 147, Vattel, Law of Nations, Book III, in respect of chapter 5.
 Lambert, A., 'Winning without Fighting’, p. 167.177
 McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. III, pp. 64-66.178
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right for belligerents in war to search the ships of neutrals for contraband or, in this period 
(prior to the 1856 Paris agreement) other enemy property.        
British practice also supported the related principles of international law concerning the 
position of neutrals during war.  These were of particular relevance for Britain in the period 
under consideration, as this was a time when it was not involved in a war with a major 
power.  There were two principles of particular relevance for present purposes.  The basic 
position was that a state not involved in a particular war was considered to have duties of 
neutrality between the belligerents.  Jenner, the then King's Advocate, referred to this in an 
1829 opinion when he stated that: 
Now one of the first duties which the law of nations imposes upon a neutral power is, that 
it shall carry itself equally between both belligerents, and that it shall not permit its 
territory to be made use of by either party for the purposes of war against the other.  179
The second point is that, as Jenner also highlighted in a further opinion, this principle was 
not, however, considered as preventing ‘the subjects of the neutral nations’ from nevertheless 
being allowed to trade with parties within both belligerent states.    This, Jenner made 180
clear, applied equally to trade in contraband and non-contraband goods, on the grounds that 
the ‘remedy’ within the ‘law of Nations’ for any supply of contraband was instead the right 
of the belligerent to search for, and seize, it.  181
Conclusion  
This chapter has established that international law was part of the institutional practice of 
British foreign policy to the United States in the period.  Ministers supported the use of 
international law.   The Queen’s Advocate and other law officers advised the Foreign Office 
regularly on points of international law.   British foreign policy practice drew on a settled 
framework of legal principles established over time.   Undoubtedly, thus, international law 
 Jenner, 18 March 1829, (FO 83/2322), as referred to in McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. 179
II, pp. 340-349.
 Jenner, 19 July 1832, (FO 83/2323), as referred to in McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. III, 180
pp. 136-137
 Jenner, 19 July 1832, (FO 83/2323), as referred to in McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. III, 181
pp. 136-137.
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occupied a position within the British state that meant that it was capable of making an 
impact on policy to the United States.   How it made that impact will be examined in the next 
chapter, but this role at least makes clear why Chitty envisaged in the Preface to his 1834 
edition of Vattel that international law would form part of the ‘study of sovereigns and 
statesmen’.    182
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Preface.182
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3.   The Ways in which International Law made an Impact on British Foreign Policy to 
the United States 
When British governments of the period encountered the United States, they met within the 
bounds of a relationship framed by international law.  Treaties governed how Britain and the 
United States interacted on many of the practical issues arising from American 
independence.  Indeed, the agreements made after the War of 1812 had even effectively 
refreshed the aim in 1783 for a ‘beneficial and satisfactory intercourse’.   Furthermore, 1
principles of international law effectively circumscribed how Britain could act in its relations 
with the United States.   Britain’s overall support for the system of international law placed 
inevitable constraints on policy derived from the legal rules within its practice.  Lastly, 
British diplomatic records make clear that Britain faced, in disputes with the United States, 
an adversary respectful of international law.  The United States was, of course, necessarily a 
party to the treaties it had entered into with Britain, but it also regularly raised points of legal 
principle in contentious matters within the British-American relationship.   The purpose of 
this chapter, then, is to examine how, from this widely-based level of presence, international 
law made its impact on British policy.    
The chapter develops two main arguments.  The first contends that international law 
influenced the nature of British objectives towards the United States - or, in other words, 
shaped the way in which Britain sought to relate to American issues.  A combination of 
Britain’s treaty rights and obligations, and the principles of law within British practice, 
guided both the direction of the policy aims, and how practically they could be achieved.        2
British objectives concerning imperial possessions, commerce, the slave trade, and peace, 
operated, as a result, within broadly defined limits - simply because so much had already 
been decided or become established within British practice.  Importantly, British objectives 
also had to accommodate the aspiration to resolve technical disputes over the interpretation 
of several treaty provisions, which were points entirely derived from international law.  The 
second argues that international law also affected policy - in the way it operated - because it 
was at the heart of how disputes were handled in the British-American relationship.   
Reciprocal treaty rights and obligations, and American support for similar key legal 
 Preamble to the Definitive Treaty of Peace, 1783.1
 The main principles of international law concerned within British practice were summarised in the 2
last section of chapter 2.
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principles, resulted in British policy working within what was effectively a legal framework 
shared with the United States.  Law and legal rights found themselves, therefore, at the 
centre of the way Britain dealt practically with the United States on a day to day basis. 
Introductory Points 
Before developing these contentions further in the main sections, there are, however, three 
brief general points on the nature of the arguments in the chapter which can usefully be made 
by way of introduction. 
First, the chapter uses a four-way categorisation of the main British objectives towards the 
United States in the period.   In the order of presentation, these are the maintenance of the 
British possessions in North America, the expansion of commerce, the suppression of the 
slave trade, and the keeping of peace.  This list of objectives is not intended to be novel, but 
is, rather, simply a broad summary of the principal policy aims apparent from the British 
diplomatic papers concerning the United States and the relevant historiography.  Indeed, why 
these objectives mattered to Britain is well-covered ground.  The retention of Canada and the 
Maritime Provinces was viewed as essential to the British control of the Atlantic Ocean, as 
well as being important in its own right.   Trade was at the heart of British action in the 3
Western Hemisphere.   The suppression of the Atlantic slave trade was a wider British 4
policy, which only affected British-American relations because the United States was 
perceived to be blocking its success through disputes over maritime rights.    Lastly, as an 5
overall objective, peace gave greater security to the British possessions on the North 
American continent, favoured trade, and was more likely than war to preserve a favourable 
 On the perceived importance of Canada and the Maritime Provinces: Lambert points out that the 3
British government wanted to retain Canada for, amongst other things, its wood and food resources, 
and commercial marine, ‘Winning without Fighting’, p. 172; Bourne notes the ‘very special attention’ 
given to Halifax and Bermuda, and the view that Canada and the Maritime Provinces were important 
for British naval power, Britain and the Balance of Power, p. 47, p. 54, and p. 57. 
 British trading and investment interests involved both the United States and the newly independent 4
states in central and southern America formed after the collapse of Spanish America.
 On the British-American dispute over the slave trade, see the further discussion in chapter 6, and on 5
the wider British policy against the slave trade, see Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of 
International Human Rights Law.
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status quo.    Others may, of course, present British objectives differently for distinct 6
purposes, but the chapter is not concerned with possible varying classifications.  The 
objectives are merely a convenient and reasonable means through which the influence of 
international law can be demonstrated.                                      
Second, the chapter brings out the twofold impact on policy of the treaties between Britain 
and the United States.   Primarily, of course, the agreements constructed a British-American 
relationship that was both initially established, and then largely defined, by treaty law.  In 
total, eight major aspects of the British-American relationship were covered in the seven 
main agreements.   The matters dealt with included mutual recognition, territory, trade, 7
indigenous peoples, slavery, defence, fishing, and arbitration, with many clauses providing 
for the practical effects of separating the United States from the British Empire.  In effect, 
therefore, the treaties created an enormous ‘contract’ governing how Britain and the United 
States were to relate to each other.  British policy objectives going forward, necessarily, also 
needed to be developed around all the resulting treaty rights and obligations.  In this way, the 
wide scope of the treaties highlights, too, the significant level of agreement that was 
embedded within the British-American relationship.  The other impact was more subtle.  It 
can be seen in the fact that some of the ongoing important disputes between Britain and the 
United States in the period were centred on the meaning of particular articles or words in the 
various agreements.   Thus, whilst the central issue at hand was meant to have been covered 8
by the treaty, the argument had turned instead to what was the right interpretation of the 
relevant words in the circumstances.  Policy, as a result, became directed towards what were 
fundamentally technical disputes of a ‘legal’ nature.   
 The favourable status quo was that Britain was the only European power with major territory in the 6
Western Hemisphere by the 1830s.  This dominant situation had arisen following the French loss of 
territory during and after the French revolutionary wars, the collapse of Spanish America, and the 
effective withdrawal of Russia from the North American continent.  The one important exception was 
Cuba, which remained a Spanish possession.  
 The seven agreements are: The Definitive Treaty of Peace, 1783 (the ‘1783 Treaty’), the Treaty of 7
Amity Commerce and Navigation, 1794 (the ‘Jay Treaty, 1794’), the Treaty of Peace and Amity, 1814 
(the ‘Treaty of Ghent, 1814’), A Convention to regulate the Commerce between the Territories of the 
United States and of his Britannick Majesty, 1815 (the ‘1815 Convention’), the Exchange of Notes 
Relative to Naval Forces on the American Lakes, 1817 (the ‘Exchange of Notes, 1817’), the 
Convention of 1818 (the ‘1818 Convention’), and the Conventions of 1827 (the ‘1827 Convention’).
 The main examples to be discussed in the thesis are the disputes over the Northeastern boundary, 8
fishing off the coast of Nova Scotia, and rough rice.
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Finally, third, the chapter allows British foreign policy to the United States to be better 
understood through a greater appreciation of the role of international law.  Fundamentally, 
international law draws out that there was a greater level of political agreement between 
Britain and the United States than has been traditionally acknowledged.  Treaties and legal 
principles encouraged the development of objectives - on British possessions, commerce, 
and the slave trade - which were based on a premise of Britain working with, rather than 
against, the United States.  Key principles were also shared, reflecting political agreement at 
a deep, underlying level.  The overall British objective of peace captures and reflects this 
trend.   International law also, however, resulted in a long-term continuity to British policy 
objectives, which can be overlooked by focusing on the disputes in isolation.  Palmerston 
and Aberdeen were, ultimately, bound by the same treaties and worked within the same legal 
principles.  Thus, whilst their styles may have differed, the influence of international law 
helped to give a consistency to their policies on the central issues on which they directly 
overlapped.  This chapter demonstrates that international law had an even influence on 
British objectives over the period.   Furthermore, as will be seen in the later chapters, 
Palmerston and Aberdeen shared the same approach to McLeod, and worked within the same 
constraints on the slave trade.   The objectives of both were also set within the limits 
permitted by legal argument on the Northeastern boundary.  Significantly, from their public 
comments, they additionally do not appear to have differed greatly on the other major 
problems of the period concerning the Canadian rebellion, Texas, and Oregon, where their 
policies were, in any event, less entwined. 
The Objectives of British Foreign Policy to the United States 
There were several legal principles from within British practice which provided the basic 
framework for policy towards the United States in relation to the objective of maintaining 
Britain’s possessions on the North American continent.   The principle of the self-
preservation of a state was, of course, central, and indeed is mirrored in the description of the 
objective itself.   It also mattered that the duty to preserve the state extended under 
international law to the whole empire, meaning, in Britain’s case, that all of its existing 
imperial possessions fell within its ambit.  The principles involving the ownership and 
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occupation of land were also clearly relevant to claims for new territory.  Policy was guided 
too by those principles associated with sovereignty which emphasised territorial 
independence and ‘non-interference’ in foreign states.  These principles did not always 
provide absolute rules, but they set a structure for policy to operate within.   Importantly, 
they both shielded sovereign territories from foreign incursions and meddling, and restricted 
what a state itself could do in foreign countries.   Furthermore, the role of international law 
was heightened by the fact that ministers and a broader group of politicians also appeared to 
associate the upholding of British legal rights concerning imperial possessions with wider 
perceptions of British power and honour.  9
Taken together, these general principles influenced both the overall direction, and specific 
choices, of British policy towards the United States in relation to imperial problems 
concerning the North American continent.   Most importantly, Britain used principles 
associated with sovereignty, and the relations between independent sovereign states, to 
encourage the United States to remain out of Canada following the revolt of 1837.   
Furthermore, Britain embraced Canada within its duty of protection, and politicians used 
reasoning derived from legal principles to justify the defence of the provinces.   Indeed, this 10
conception of British duty had a long trajectory of being applied to Canada, as can be seen 
from the jurist, Sir James Macintosh’s use of it in a parliamentary debate in 1828.     11
Elsewhere on the continent, Britain took a deep interest in the future of Oregon because it 
possessed legal rights there, which it wanted to be seen to uphold, and the Oregon question 
itself became centred on the principles around occupation and ownership.   In contrast, 
Britain gave a lower priority to Texas, where it possessed no territorial claims, and was 
ultimately limited in what it could do by the legal principles of ‘non-interference’ and 
neutrality.   These themes are examined further, in relation to Canada, Texas, and Oregon, in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 See the discussion in the first section of chapter 2.9
 This reasoning also worked as a counter to those British politicians arguing at this time against 10
empire. For an example of the debate, see ‘An Essay on the Government of Dependencies’ by G. 
Cornewall Lewis, Edinburgh Review, Vol. LXXXIII, (1846), Article X, pp. 512-554.
 Sir James Mackintosh said,, after noting Huskisson’s term for the Empire as the ‘Great British 11
Confederacy’: ‘I hold ... that all the different portions of that Confederacy are integral parts of the 
British Empire, and as such entitled to the fullest protection’, HC, 2 May 1828, as referred to in R. J. 
Mackintosh, (ed.), The Miscellaneous Works of the Right Honourable Sir James Mackintosh (London: 
Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1851), p. 769.
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Treaties also made three important contributions to the way in which Britain sought to 
maintain its existing possessions on the North American continent.   The most fundamental 
of these arose from the fact that it was the treaties that contained the actual mutual 
recognition by Britain and the United States of each other’s sovereignty.  The key agreement 
was, of course, the acceptance by Britain of the independence and sovereignty of the United 
States in the 1783 Treaty.  Here, it was provided that: Britain [through the Crown] 
‘acknowledges’ [the thirteen original states] ‘to be free sovereign and independent states’ and 
‘relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety, and territorial rights’ of them.  12
Significantly, however, the United States also, effectively, recognised British sovereignty in 
Britain’s North American possessions.   This was not really done expressly in the 1783 
Treaty, which merely referred to a peace between the Crown and the United States, and their 
subjects and citizens respectively.   Rather, the clearer references were in the Jay Treaty, 13
1794, the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, and the 1815 Convention.    The Jay Treaty and the Treaty 14
of Ghent both refer to a peace between the Crown and the United States, and also ‘between 
their respective Countries, Territories, Cities, Towns and People of every Degree’.    More 15
definitively, The Jay Treaty makes express reference to the British ‘territories’ on the 
‘continent of America’.         16
This mutual recognition of sovereignty was central to the operation of British and American 
policy in the period - largely because, as seen, sovereignty was at the heart of so many of the 
general principles associated with dealing with the problems of the North American 
continent.   British policy was also affected, however, by a highly technical point relating to 
the manner in which sovereignty had been recognised.  This arose from the position that 
Britain and the United States had not specified in the 1783 Treaty any formal basis for their 
separation.   Instead, Britain had merely ‘acknowledged’ the independence and sovereignty 
 Article 1, 1783 Treaty, accessed through Project Avalon, Yale Law School, on 19/05/16; all 12
references to the 1783 Treaty are to this version.
 Article 7, 1783 Treaty. Indeed, only Newfoundland can, from the 1783 Treaty, be inferred definitely 13
to constitute a British ‘dominion’ in America, for, although reference is made to ‘all other of his 
Britannic Majesty’s dominions in America’, they are not named and the definite article is not used: 
Article 3, 1783 Treaty. 
 The Jay Treaty, 1794, and the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, accessed through Project Avalon, Yale Law 14
School, on 19/05/16, and the 1815 Convention, accessed through Project Avalon, Yale Law school, on 
23/05/16; all references to these agreements are to these versions.
 Article 1, Jay Treaty, 1794; Article 1, Treaty of Ghent, 1814.15
 Article 3, Jay Treaty, 1794.16
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of the United States.  The crucial question that this masked was whether or not the 1783 
Treaty was, as later contended by Britain, a treaty of cession, in which Britain ‘ceded’ the 
‘United States’, or, conversely, as argued by the United States, a treaty of partition between 
already sovereign states.  This was not just a matter of legal theory with constitutional 
significance in relation to the foundation of the United States.  It also became a point of real 
practical relevance in the disputed territory around the Northeastern boundary, because, as 
will be discussed further in chapter 4, Britain argued that, in cessions, sovereignty remained 
with the ceding party until any dispute was resolved.   Britain’s approach to the ‘disputed 17
territory’ was, accordingly, directed to the formal maintenance of sovereignty until a final 
agreement was reached. 
Importantly, the treaties also pushed Britain towards a policy that was accepting of continued 
American westward expansion on the North American continent.  The treaties did not do this 
expressly, but they nevertheless implicitly embedded the prospect of material American 
growth.  In the 1783 Treaty, Britain, as noted, gave up all the ‘territorial rights’ of the thirteen 
states.   This mattered because it ensured that any rights held by the states to further territory 
would not also be claimed by Britain.   Crucially, these included the claims for territory west 
of the original states on the principle of ‘continuity’ in international law.   Furthermore, the 18
‘boundaries’ of the United States in the 1783 Treaty were defined as those of the ‘United 
States’ taken as a whole.    This was significant because these boundaries, as will be seen, 19
extended significantly beyond the actual land within the thirteen states as they were then 
formed.   Britain had, thus, in effect, accepted from 1783 that the ‘United States’ of the 20
 See, for example, the correspondence between Aberdeen and Lawrence in 1828, in ‘Memorandum, 17
shewing what has passed between the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, upon the 
Question of the Occupation, Sovereignty, and Jurisdiction, of the disputed Territory on the North-
Eastern Boundary of the United States’, Foreign Office, April, 1839, British Documents, Vol. 1 
(hereafter ‘Northeastern Memorandum’), pp. 45-52.
 ‘Continuity’ is discussed in chapter 5. 18
 Article 2, 1783 Treaty.19
 Indeed, Chalmers asked in 1814: ‘Why relinquish, under the pretence of settling boundaries, 20
countries larger than Great Britain, to which the United States had no pretensions?’, ’Opinion of Mr 
Chalmers on the legal effects resulting from the acknowledgement of the Independence of the United 
States’ in W. Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law and various points of English 
Jurisprudence (London, 1869), pp. 279-280.
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treaty was of a significantly larger size than the thirteen states.   Finally, Britain agreed in 21
the 1818 Convention both to a border across to the Rocky Mountains and a joint occupation 
of Oregon, and showed itself willing, in the negotiations over Oregon, to accept a partition 
extending the United States to the Pacific Ocean.   In the light of these treaty provisions, 22
British policy was, thus, unlikely to oppose American expansion simply for its own sake.  
Nor does a British policy objective of the containment of the United States in a simple, 
unqualified form make sense.   On the contrary, the treaties show a Britain that appears 
tolerant of the growth of the United States, provided that existing British possessions and 
rights were protected and upheld.   In practice, this was most evident in the British approach 
to the problems of Oregon and Texas, as to be discussed in chapter 5. 
This shaping of British policy to be permissive of American expansion is also supported by 
the treaty provisions on the approach of Britain and the United States to the position of the 
indigenous peoples of the North American continent.  The first major provisions expressly 
concerning indigenous peoples following independence were, in fact, in the Jay Treaty, 1794, 
but these simply conferred travel, navigation, and trading rights corresponding to those given 
to the citizens and subjects of the United States and the British Empire respectively.      23
Much more fundamental were those in the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 by which the United States 
and Britain agreed, respectively, to end ‘hostilities’ with the ‘tribes’ or ‘nations’ of ‘Indians’, 
and to return their ‘possessions, rights and privileges’ to the position as of 1811 before the 
‘hostilities’.    Whilst this was first and foremost dealing with the aftermath of the War of 24
1812, indigenous peoples were nevertheless, as a result, being drawn out of the British-
 The Jay Treaty, 1794 also confirmed the right of the United States to extend its settlements within 21
these boundaries: Article 2, Jay Treaty, 1794.  This is an interesting provision in the light of Marshall’s 
comment that Britain initially assumed after 1783 that western settlement would favour it: P. J. 
Marshall, Remaking the British Atlantic: the United States and the British Empire after American 
Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 56, p. 132. 
 Memorandum relative to the Territorial Rights claimed by Great Britain in the Oregon Territory; 22
and of the Negotiations between Great Britain and the United States which led to the conclusion of the 
Convention of the 15th June, 1846, Foreign Office, 1872, (hereafter, “Northwestern Memorandum”), 
British Documents, Vol. 2, pp 61-76. 
 Article 3 confirmed, from the perspectives of Britain and the United States, the ability for ‘Indians’ 23
to pass between the territories and countries of each (excluding the Hudson's Bay Company) on the 
North American continent; similarly, it also made clear, for indigenous peoples, the rights of inland 
navigation, and to trade with each other and the other inhabitants of the United States and the British 
Empire: Article 3, Jay Treaty, 1794.
  Article 9, Treaty of Ghent, 1814.24
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American conflict.  This, in turn, made it less likely that Britain would seek to use the 
position of the indigenous peoples to block American expansion. 
Finally, the territorial settlement in the treaties resulted in the objective of maintaining the 
British possessions being concentrated on very specific disputes within an otherwise, 
broadly, accepted geographical framework.  Overall, the British-American boundary was 
provided for in all of the seven major treaties, other than the 1815 Convention and the 
Exchange of Notes, 1817.    As a result, Britain and the United States had agreed, 25
effectively, on the northern, western, and southern boundaries of America, subject only to 
defined technical disputes over the Northeastern border, Oregon, and territorial fishing 
rights.   British policy, as a consequence, was not directed towards recovering major territory 
from the United States, and there was a stable division of territory.  Furthermore, the 
remaining disputes were of a legal nature, and heavily influenced by the precise treaty 
provisions.  Except in Oregon, what was being contended was the meaning of what had 
already been ‘agreed’.  Policy, as a result, became centred on legal argument.  This does not 
mean that the issues concerned were not informed by what suited British and American 
wider interests, but rather that the matters were contested within a legal framework.  
Furthermore, even in Oregon, the treaties also still made a decisive impact by providing, in 
that case, the process to which policy had to respond.                
It is important, first, to appreciate the scale of what had already been agreed in the treaties 
and was uncontested.   The northern boundary was settled through the agreements of 1783 
and 1818.  The 1783 Treaty set out originally that the boundary was to go ‘from thence [the 
northwesternmost point of the Lake of the Woods] on a due west course to the river 
Mississippi’.   This could not, however, stand as the final agreement because it was 26
premised on the incorrect assumption that the source of the river Mississippi was north of the 
‘northwesternmost point’ of the Lake of the Woods.  Before long, there was, therefore, 
uncertainty as to whether the river Mississippi was, in fact, ‘due west’ from the 
 The agreements were only between Britain and the United States, and any rights of other states 25
were, thereby, formally unaffected by them.  The provisions of Article 1, Treaty of Ghent, 1814, 
expressly restored the territorial position to what it was before the War of 1812, which meant that 
none of the then known territorial disputes were changed by that peace.  See also, Bourne, Britain and 
the Balance of Power, p. 11.
 Article 2, 1783 Treaty.  The river Mississippi was the original western border as discussed below. 26
The Louisiana Purchase had not occurred at the time of the 1783 Treaty.  The 1783 Treaty also 
provided that Britain would have free navigation of the river Mississippi, presumably on the basis that 
its source was assumed to be in British territory to the north of the border: Article 8, 1783 Treaty.
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‘northwesternmost point’ of the Lake of the Woods, and a joint survey to establish the facts 
was allowed for under the Jay Treaty, 1794.   In the end, the matter was only formally 27
resolved in the 1818 Convention.  Significantly, though, this convention was entered into 
after the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, under which the United States had acquired the 
possession of Louisiana from France and, thus, extended its territory westwards from the 
river Mississippi.  An extended northern boundary was, accordingly, needed, in any event, on 
account of the fact that the precise extent of Louisiana northwards was uncertain.   The 28
1818 Convention settled the matter by agreeing that the 49th parallel of latitude was to be the 
new ‘line of demarcation’ between the territories of the United States and Britain from the 
‘most North Western Point of the Lake of the Woods’ to the Rocky Mountains.     29
The western and southern boundaries of the United States were also agreed without giving 
rise to major subsequent dispute.  The 1783 Treaty had defined the western boundary of the 
United States as the middle of the river Mississippi until it reached the 31st degree of 
latitude.    The Louisiana Purchase, however, meant that the territory of the United States 30
extended west at least to the Rocky Mountains, and as far north as the territory of Louisiana 
rightfully went.   This part of the 1783 Treaty definition, therefore, only remained relevant, 
from a British perspective, for any territory that was west of the river Mississippi and within 
the claim of the Hudson’s Bay Company.   This gave rise to a potential conflict as any such 
territory could also conceivably have been within the claim of the United States from its 
possession of Louisiana.   Ultimately, the issue was removed, in practice, by the agreement 
in the 1818 Convention to adopt the 49th parallel as the northern boundary.  The southern 
boundary in the 1783 Treaty simply took account of the then boundaries of Louisiana and 
Florida until the Atlantic Ocean was reached.  31
 Article 4, Jay Treaty, 1794.27
 A northern boundary was needed because the claim of Louisiana over territory northwards clashed 28
potentially with the claim of the Hudson’s Bay Company to territory southwards.
 Article II, 1818 Convention; 1818 Convention, accessed through Project Avalon, Yale Law School, 29
on 23/05/16, and all references to the 1818 Convention are to this version. This article also made it 
clear that, if the ‘northwesternmost point’ of the Lake of the Woods was not, in fact, on the 49th 
parallel, then the boundary was to be due north or south from that point until the 49th parallel was 
met, and then along the 49th parallel westwards as intended. 
 Article 2, 1783 Treaty.30
 At this point in 1783, Louisiana was a Spanish possession having been transferred to Spain from 31
France in 1764, and Florida was also a Spanish possession, having been transferred from Britain to 
Spain in 1783.
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British policy, accordingly, became drawn to what was not accepted as agreed from the 
treaties, which, in practice, meant the issues of the Northeastern boundary, Oregon and 
fishing rights.  In each of these instances, treaty law either constructed, or changed, the 
nature of the dispute.  The most long-running matter was the question of the Northeastern 
boundary, which, for present purposes, can be taken, broadly, as spanning from the river St 
Croix to the Lake of the Woods.   Despite having been defined in the 1783 Treaty, large 32
sections of this boundary were nevertheless still the subject of major disagreement at the 
start of the period.   This was not, however, for want of an enormous amount of trying.      33
Following initial disagreements, the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 had contained provisions 
allowing for determinations of the contested parts of the boundary to be made by 
commissioners.   As nothing was, however, settled by 1827, use had then been made of the 34
fact that the Treaty of Ghent also allowed for a ‘friendly sovereign or state’ to be appointed 
as arbitrator.   Again, however, there was no resolution - in this instance because the 35
proposed compromise of the chosen arbitrator, the King of the Netherlands was rejected by 
the United States.    By 1836, therefore, British policy was firmly focused on resolving what 36
was an enormous legal problem.     
Crucially, however, British policy objectives within the resulting dispute were nevertheless 
still framed by the 1783 Treaty provision.  Chapter 4 will consider the process leading to the 
settlement of the issue in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 in more detail, but, for 
present purposes, what matters is the point that the existing words of the 1783 Treaty were 
important, not only, obviously, to the attempts to find their meaning, but also in the 
negotiations for a new compromise.  This is because the words not only created the issues at 
 The river St Croix river is on the eastern coast of the United States, and the Lake of the Woods is 32
split between the present day U.S. state of Minnesota and Canada.  At the time of the 1783 Treaty, this 
section of the United States boundary provided part of the borders for the then states of Massachusetts 
Bay, New York, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania.  Subsequently, Massachusetts Bay joined the 
United States under the 1787 Constitution as Massachusetts.  The territory of Maine then became a 
separate state of the United States in 1820, from being part of Massachusetts.  Vermont also joined the 
United States as a state in 1791, and is situated geographically between the states of New York and 
New Hampshire. Further land to the south of the remainder of the boundary westwards fell within 
what was to become the Northwest Territory, which was formed under the Northwest Ordinance, 
1787. 
 The Northeastern boundary was defined in Article 2, 1783 Treaty. 33
 Articles 5, 6, and 7, Treaty of Ghent, 1814.34
 See, for example, Article 5, Treaty of Ghent, 1814.35
 Northeastern Memorandum, British Documents, p. 45, pp. 57-58.36
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stake through their ambiguity, but also limited the extent of the solutions to those that were  
possible within their realistic meanings.  As a consequence, the 1783 Treaty made a 
fundamental impact on the dispute because it provided the entire structure through which 
Britain approached the problem.  Wider British and American interests, of course, mattered, 
as to why and how particular arguments were pursued, but policy was developed within a 
context driven by what had inescapably already been agreed.      What ultimately counted 
was where, at the extremes, Britain and the United States felt they could be under the 1783 
Treaty.  
The way in which the words in the 1783 Treaty constructed the nature of the dispute can be 
illustrated, briefly, by reference to the most contested parts of the definition.  The core issue 
was over the section of the boundary from what was described as the ‘northwest angle of 
Nova Scotia’ to the ‘northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River’.  Here, the 1783 
Treaty provided as follows: 
From the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn 
due north from the source of the St.Croix River to the highlands; along the said highlands 
which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those 
which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut 
River.  37
In this instance, both the issue itself, and the possible boundary limits, were set by the 
ambiguity, and the realistic meanings, respectively, of the words ‘the highlands’, the 
‘northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River’, and the answers to the questions of which 
rivers were ‘St. Lawrence’ or ‘Atlantic’ rivers.   Similar considerations then applied to the 
part of the definition taking the boundary from the river Connecticut to Lake Superior.  This, 
broadly, provided that, from the river St. Lawrence, the boundary was to be along the middle 
of that river until Lake Ontario, and, from there, through the middles of the Lakes Ontario, 
Erie, Huron, and the ‘water communication [s]’ between them, until Lake Superior.   Here, 38
what was meant by the ‘middle’ in the appropriate contexts, allowed disputes to develop over 
which side of the boundary some - but importantly, given the realistic meaning of the word 
‘middle’, not all - islands fell.   39
 Article 2, 1783 Treaty.37
 Article 2, 1783 Treaty.38
 The contested meaning of ‘middle’ is referred to in Article 6, Treaty of Ghent, 1814. 39
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Lastly, the inexactness of the words used also caused a further issue around meaning in the 
final section of the Northeastern boundary passing from Lake Superior to the Lake of the 
Woods.  In this instance, the 1783 Treaty provided that the border was to go:  
thence through Lake Superior northward of the Isles Royal and Phelipeaux to the Long 
Lake; thence through the middle of the said Long Lake, and the water communication 
between it and the Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods, thence through the 
said Lake to the most northwesternmost point thereof.  40
The key words which became disputed here were the opening ones, ‘thence through Lake 
Superior northward of the Isles Royal and Phelipeaux to the Long Lake’.  As the matter 
developed, the question became where the boundary went after passing north of the ‘Isles’ on 
its way to the Long Lake.   Britain’s case was that it stayed in Lake Superior - ‘thence 
through Lake Superior’ - until it reached the furthest point west, before then finding its way 
to the Long Lake.  This meant a boundary that would have gone south-west through the lake 
to then go north-west once land was arrived at back to the Long Lake.   Conversely, the 
claim of the United States was for a boundary that, once north of the ‘Isles’, broadly, stayed 
around the same parallel of latitude and went simply, thereafter, westwards to the Long Lake.        
The limits of the claims were set, accordingly, and the dispute, as framed by the treaty, came 
to be about a triangular area of territory. 
The other main territorial question between Britain and the United States concerned the area 
west of the Rocky Mountains known as Oregon.   Importantly, in this instance, the main 
claims for ownership by both Britain and the United States were based on general principles 
of international law rather than the meaning of a definition of a boundary in a treaty.       
Nevertheless, treaty law still had an important influence on the shape of the dispute.     
Following the failed attempt to negotiate a settlement for Oregon, the 1818 Convention had 
provided for a temporary holding position amounting, in effect, to a joint occupation.  Under 
this, Oregon (including its harbours and rivers) was to be ‘free and open’ to the ‘vessels, 
citizens, and subjects’ of both Britain and the United States for a ten year period, with 
existing claims preserved.    A further convention in 1827 had then extended this 41
indefinitely, subject to a notice period of one year.    These features gave rise to two 42
important consequences.  Treaty law made clear that all settlers from the United States and 
 Article 2, 1783 Treaty.40
 Article III, 1818 Convention.41
 Northwestern Memorandum, British Documents, p. 76.42
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Britain had a legal right to come to all of Oregon.   As will be seen, the arrival of large 
numbers of American settlers in Oregon in the early 1840s was to prove a crucial turning 
point in the dispute.   Whilst it cannot be known what would have happened in its absence, 
having the legal right to settle under a treaty at least effectively removed the potential 
question of legality of settlement from British policy.  More fundamentally, the dispute also 
ultimately became centred on whether or not the United States would trigger the one year 
treaty notice period, and, if it did, the implications of that.  An act in a legal process, thus, 
became in itself a matter for policy to interpret.                
The last of the territorial disputes, over fishing rights, again turned on the technical 
interpretation of treaty provisions.   The issue following independence, in the case of fishing, 
was not the right of American fishermen to fish in the ‘high seas’, as this was a general right 
under international law.   Rather, it was concerned with the fishing that American fisherman 
had traditionally undertaken within what were then (to them) the foreign coastal territorial 
limits of the Maritime Provinces, as well as the general use their vessels had previously 
made of that coastline to dry fish, get water and provisions, and perform repairs.  The 1783 
Treaty had dealt with these activities, but, crucially, the fishing provisions in it had been 
annulled by the War of 1812.   What was being contested, therefore, were the rights within 43
the 1818 Convention - and, importantly, these were generally much more restrictive than the 
earlier ones.   Thus, the main tensions in the period were over the effect of the introduction 44
of a three mile coastal water exclusion in 1818 to American fishing rights off Nova Scotia, 
and the dispute concerned the meaning of the exact words of the treaty when applied to the 
facts of the coastline concerned.   Again, therefore, policy became pushed towards an 45
argument over the meaning of what had already been agreed.  The dispute over fishing rights 
is considered further as part of chapter 4. 
International law also had a significant impact on the way in which Britain pursued its 
objective of growing trade in relation to the United States.   As with the previous objective of 
 The provision on fishing rights was Article 3, 1783 Treaty.  On  its annulment by the War of 1812, 43
see Dodson and Wilde to Palmerston, 30 August 1841, FO 83/2207, fols. 181-186.
  The provision on fishing rights was Article 1 of the 1818 Convention.44
 Interestingly, Falkland noted, referring to Rush’s Memoirs, p. 400, that the United States seemed to 45
have mistakenly believed in 1818, when agreeing to the three mile limit, that fishing could be 
undertaken beyond the three mile limit, whereas, in practice, mackerel and herring could not be fished 
that far out: Falkland to Russell, 8 May 1841, as contained in Stephen to Backhouse, 18 June 1841, 
FO 5/373, fols. 14-61 at fol. 34.
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maintaining the British possessions on the North American continent, the main overall legal 
influence came from general principles accepted within British practice.  This had the crucial 
effect that policy to the United States operated, as a result, within a framework which 
permitted protection.   Commercial treaties between Britain and the United States, however, 
then also played an important role in defining the various bases upon which British-
American trading relations could operate within this context.    As well as representing past 46
policy in the form of legal provisions, these treaties necessarily guided future British 
commercial policy towards the United States by setting rules for how trade was to be 
conducted.   Importantly, the treaties also provided a legal basis for Britain or the United 
States, respectively, to challenge policy in the other which was perceived to be inconsistent 
with the rights and obligations contained within them.  Finally, as will be commented on in 
the next section, Britain also used other general principles of international law as a means of 
regulating its wider global commercial relationship with the United States.   
British policy in relation to trade with the United States was, of course, formed against the 
backdrop of a starting position radically changed by the independence of the United States.      
From then, the vital difference was that Britain and the United States traded with each other 
as foreign states, as opposed to constituent parts of the British Empire with the benefit of any 
applicable colonial preferences.  Under the general legal principles of the global trading 
system, therefore, both Britain and the United States were able to regulate their respective 
sides of any British-American trade in a manner of their choosing.  Tariffs were, accordingly, 
a major tool available to both for the protection of their domestic trades from foreign 
competition.  Further, the then applicable British Navigation Laws also meant that trade from 
the United States to the British territories in the West Indies was, in effect, restricted to that 
being conducted in British vessels.   Finally, the United States became free to trade as it 47
wished with the rest of the world without the restrictions imposed on it from being part of the 
British Empire.  This made American vessels and trade potentially available to British 
enemies, at a time when Britain was at war, in a way that they simply had not been before 
independence.  
British foreign policy to the United States was, therefore, necessarily influenced by a global 
system which permitted protection and placed domestic tariffs outside the jurisdiction of 
 These were: The Jay Treaty, 1794, the 1815 Convention, and the 1818 Convention.46
 For early attempts to mitigate this following independence, see Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad and 47
Dangerous People?, p.87, p. 189.
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international law.   Whilst the details of the economic and other factors as to why a particular 
policy may have been chosen are outside the scope of this thesis, it is at least, accordingly, 
relevant to record that a British objective aimed at a reduction in American tariffs was built 
upon the legal principles associated with protection.  Simply put, British foreign policy 
needed to take account of the fact that the United States had the basic freedom under 
international law to set its own trade - and tariff - policy.  Indeed, this was to become a 
particularly important issue in British-American relations in the period from 1841 when the 
Peel government began on a policy of its own widespread domestic tariff reform.    It is 48
unsurprising, therefore, that there is evidence that policy towards the United States was 
affected by the perceived potential impact of a course of action on tariffs.   Britain, for 
example, appears to have rejected an enhanced trade treaty with Texas in the early 1840s, at 
least partly on the basis of expected American objections.               49
Undoubtedly, however, the more direct influence of international law on British policy to the 
United States concerning trade was through treaty law.  Commercial treaties were, as seen, 
used within British practice as a means of modifying the operation of the global trading 
system.    In the case of British trade with the United States, this was especially significant 50
given the restrictions and complications arising from American independence.  By the start 
of the period in 1836, the course for future policy had been set, first, by the Jay Treaty, 1794, 
and, then, the Convention of 1815, both of which provided basic terms for the conduct of 
British-American trade in many of the main regions of the world.    Indeed, the fact that it 51
was self-evidently deemed important enough to replace the expired Jay Treaty with the 1815 
Convention is in itself an indication that the commercial agreements made in the treaties 
mattered.  Importantly, as well, the treaties contained more than just scant references to trade.   
They were, instead, an attempt to provide a comprehensive basis for where, and how, Britons 
 It may also have been relevant that this period coincided with the presence of a strand of thought in 48
the United States that favoured domestic policy, as opposed to commercial treaties, as a means of 
implementing tariff policy: see, for example, Webster, copy of speech by Webster, 18 May 1843, FO 
5/398, fols. 40-45, where Webster argued that such a role for domestic policy gave a role to the House 
of Representatives in tariff policy.
 This is referred to further in chapter 5.49
 Britain was also clearly aware that the United States also used commercial treaties as part of its 50
foreign policy.  For example, Fox sent a copy of the newly negotiated U.S./Portuguese Treaty on 
navigation and commerce in 1841 to the Foreign Office: 21 July 1841, FO 5/373, fols. 204-205.
 The commercial provisions within the Jay Treaty, 1794 expired without renewal. The commercial 51
provisions within the 1815 Convention were renewed by the 1818 and 1827 Conventions, in the latter 
case indefinitely, subject to notice. 
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and Americans could trade in Europe, the North American continent, the West Indies and the 
East Indies.  In this way, then, they prescribed the foundation upon which British policy 
aimed at increasing trade with the United States needed to operate.               
The most important of the commercial treaty provisions concerned trade between the British 
mainland and the United States.    Both the Jay Treaty, 1794 and the 1815 Convention 52
provided for a ‘reciprocal’ ‘liberty of commerce’.    In the 1815 Convention, this, broadly, 53
confirmed the ‘liberty’ of the inhabitants of Britain and the United States, respectively, ‘to 
come with their ships and cargoes’ to ports in the other to which ‘other foreigners’ could 
come, and to ‘remain and reside there’, and that ‘generally’ the ‘merchants’ of each ‘shall 
enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce’, subject to relevant 
domestic laws.    This was not immaterial in a global system where the freedom to trade 54
with any state was not, as seen, absolute under international law.  More significantly, 
perhaps, the Jay Treaty, 1794, and then the 1815 Convention, also gave some protection to 
Britain and the United States against the effect of the other’s domestic laws in the form of a 
‘Most Favoured Nation’ clause.   In the terms of Article 2 of the 1815 Convention, which 55
was the agreement being applied in the period, this was designed to ensure that ‘articles the 
growth, produce or manufacture’ of Britain or the United States, respectively, would not, 
when imported into the other, be subject to ‘higher’ or ‘other’ duties than the duties paid on 
the ‘like articles’ of any other foreign state.   This clause proved to be important, and was 56
used as a means of regulation by both Britain and the United States - as the rough rice 
dispute to be discussed in the next section will demonstrate. 
Britain was, additionally, also prepared to use the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ clause pre-
emptively within its policy aims as a means, in turn, of influencing future American policy.  
This is shown by the British action on the occasion of the United States signing a 
commercial treaty with the Zollverein in 1844.  In this instance, the British concern was that 
‘articles the growth, produce, or manufacture’ of the Zollverein were to be allowed into the 
 The provisions formally covered the British territories in Europe.52
  Article 14, Jay Treaty, 1794; Article 1, 1815 Convention.53
  Article 1, 1815 Convention.54
  Article 15, Jay Treaty, 1794; Article 2, 1815 Convention.55
  Article 2, 1815 Convention.56
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United States under the new treaty at a lower duty than ‘like articles’ from Britain.   In a 57
move which also illustrates the role of legal advice within the Foreign Office, an opinion was 
taken from the Queens’ Advocate on the effect of the Zollverein treaty in relation to Article 2 
of the 1815 Convention.  As it turned out, Dodson’s view on the point appears to have been 
cautious, probably reflecting the fact that he seems to have been sent (at this stage anyway) 
only the ‘heads’ of the Zollverein treaty.     If, he opined, the provision was limited to 
‘articles the growth, produce, or manufacture’ of the countries within the Zollverein, then 
Britain would have a valid claim for the ‘same rate of duties for British commerce in the 
ports of the United States’.   Conversely, he continued, if, however, the provision was 58
‘extended to importations’ from the Zollverein into the United States of ‘articles the growth, 
produce, or manufacture’ of other ‘foreign countries’, the ‘question might be open to very 
great doubt’.     59
What matters, though, for present purposes, is that Aberdeen appears to have been happy to 
use the stronger of Dodson’s possible interpretations as a means of trying to affect American 
policy.  The basic British idea appears to have been to make Dodson’s view of the legal 
position known in the United States, and then try to move American policy from there in the 
way best suited for Britain.   Aberdeen, accordingly, informed Pakenham that Dodson had 
advised that Britain would have a valid claim under Article 2 of the 1815 Convention for 
lower duties should the Zollverein treaty be ratified, and told him to ‘immediately claim’ 
‘parity’ of treatment for Britain with German goods in that event.   Crucially, however, 60
Aberdeen also specified that Pakenham was, in the meantime, to pass on the British view, ‘in 
a private manner’, to the American government and ‘influential members of Congress’.   61
Aberdeen’s suggestion was, then, that Pakenham should encourage adoption of the treaty by 
the Senate if he thought it likely that Britain would get the desired parity, but, conversely, 
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No 17, Confidential, May, 1844, FO 5/390, fols. 39-42. The matter 57
was also raised in Parliament: Bowring, HC, 23 April 1844, Vol. LXXIV, 212-214; and Peel, HC, 23 
April 1844, Vol. LXXIV, 212-214. 
 Dodson to Aberdeen, 2 May 1844, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 4, pp. 228-230.58
 Dodson to Aberdeen, 2 May 1844, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 4, pp. 228-230.59
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 17, Confidential, May, 1844, FO 5/390, fols. 39-42. There is no 60
evidence from the the law officers’ opinions that further advice was given by Dodson, so Aberdeen 
may have satisfied himself on the point or taken unrecorded oral advice. 
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 17, Confidential, May, 1844, FO 5/390, fols. 39-42.61
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push for its rejection if he doubted this.   As it happened, Pakenham later advised Aberdeen 62
of reports that the Senate would reject the Zollverein treaty.   Whatever the role played by 63
the British position in the United States in the period up to Pakenham’s despatch, though, 
international law, at least, had made an impact on Aberdeen’s policy.        
Treaty law also affected British policy in relation to trade between the United States and the 
rest of the British Empire outside Europe, albeit that the position was different for each of 
the significant global geographical areas.   The most immediate points of contact were those 
on the North American continent itself, and here the Jay Treaty, 1794 affirmed the future 
policy course as being permissive of inland trading.   Citizens and subjects, of the United 64
States and the British possessions, respectively, were, broadly, confirmed as free to move 
between the two states, and also to trade inland with each other using all lakes and rivers.   65
Similarly, the trade in goods on the North American continent was allowed  - provided it was 
on, broadly, non-discriminatory terms.   Accordingly, citizens of the United States were able 66
to import goods and merchandise into the British possessions on the payment of duties that 
were no higher than if they had been imported from Europe, and British subjects could 
import goods and merchandise into the United States on payment of duties no higher than if 
they had been imported in American vessels.  These provisions may have merely regularised 
an already existing position, but they were nevertheless still important in setting a clear 
framework for future British policy.  67
The other main areas dealt with were the East and West Indies, where treaty law affected 
British-American trading interests differently.  The 1815 Convention followed the Jay Treaty, 
1794 in giving citizens of the United States certain rights to trade with British possessions in 
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 17, Confidential, May, 1844, FO 5/390, fols. 39-42.62
 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 51, 29 May 1844, FO 5/ 405, fols. 121-129.63
 Article 3, Jay Treaty, 1794 was stated to be permanent: Article 28, Jay Treaty, 1794.64
 Article 3, Jay Treaty, 1794.65
 Article 3, Jay Treaty, 1794.66
 On what may have been the limited immediate practical effect of this provision, note Brebner’s 67
comment that the ‘restrictive British laws of trade and navigation had never amounted to much west of 
the Richelieu’, Brebner, The North Atlantic Triangle, p. 148.
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the East Indies.   Important restrictions applied, such as, for example, the requirement that 68
exports from the East Indies were only for direct import into the United States, but the treaty 
nevertheless gave a direction for British policy that was favourable to American trade in the 
East.    In contrast, treaty law gave no guide for British-American trade in the West Indies 69
by the start of the period in 1836.   The Jay Treaty, 1794 had introduced some limited relief 
against the restrictions on American shipping arising from independence, but that agreement 
only ran for a limited period, and it had not been renewed.   In contrast, the 1815 70
Convention made no special provision for trade between the United States and the British 
possessions in the West Indies, stating merely that both parties were to keep their respective 
rights.    In practice, this removed the issue of whether to ease restrictions to the domestic 71
law of Britain and the United States respectively.  72
A final commerce-related issue which treaty law did not, however, succeed in dealing with 
was the new problem mentioned earlier of American ships being free to trade with the rest of 
the world at a time when Britain was at war.   As seen in chapter 2, Britain claimed the legal 
rights, in war, to intercept neutral shipping and to seize both enemy goods and contraband.   
The Jay Treaty, 1794 had provided for Britain and the United States to reach a future 
agreement on certain related contested points in its article dealing with trade involving the 
West Indies.   It had also tried to deal with ongoing issues through other provisions covering 73
enemy property and prize, contraband of war and blockade, privateering, pirates, letters of 
 Article 3, 1815 Convention. The provision in the 1815 Convention was itself only originally 68
applicable for four years, but this was extended for a further ten years by the 1818 Convention, and 
then again indefinitely by the 1827 Convention.  The previous (expired) provision was in  Article 13, 
Jay Treaty, 1794.
 Article 3, 1815 Convention.69
 Articles 12, 28, Jay Treaty, 1794.  The relief affected American ships up to 70 tonnes.70
  Article 2, 1815 Convention.71
 Bourne notes, for example, the difficulties of the 1820s following the British Orders in Council of 72
1826, which ‘closed the West Indian ports absolutely to American ships’: Bourne, Britain and the 
Balance of Power, p. 28.  Overall, the situation appears to have been eased from 1830 through a 
proclamation of President Andrew Jackson Oct. 5, 1830 (4 Stat. 817), and a British Order in Council 
of Nov. 5, 1830 (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 17, P. 893), as cited in tcc.export.gov, 
(accessed on 25/4/18), in its copy of the 1815 Convention. 
 Article 12, The Jay Treaty, 1794.73
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marque and reprisals.    These articles had, however, expired, and no further agreements 74
were subsequently reached.    British policy was, as a result, left relying on what were 75
disputed general legal principles in the absence of any applicable treaty law.   This meant, in 
turn, that American trade with neutral countries continued to possess the potential to cause 
conflict whenever Britain was at war, and indeed maritime rights were a cause of the War of 
1812.   Concern over the impact of the law in this area was to be one of the main factors 76
behind the British objective for peace, as will be seen later in the section. 
International law also guided British policy objectives to the United States in relation to 
slavery and the eradication of the slave trade.   Core principles within British practice around 
which policy needed to work included those that neither slavery nor the slave trade were 
unlawful under the general rules of international law, and that interference was generally not 
permitted in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states.    Britain certainly appears to 77
have accepted that it had no rights to interfere in the domestic laws of the United States 
concerning slavery.   When, therefore, for example, Louisiana introduced a statute stopping 
entry for ‘free persons of colour’, Dodson told Aberdeen that ‘it cannot be denied that every 
independent State or nation is entitled to admit or exclude from its territories’ such foreigners 
as it wanted.    International law was also at the centre of the British aims in the Creole 78
incident in 1841, which followed from the arrival in the Bahamas of an American ship on 
which the slaves had revolted and taken control.   The main legal issue at stake in that 
instance was how far international law required Britain to respect the American domestic law 
on slavery when a ship found itself in British territorial waters in such circumstances.     
Given its importance, the Creole is examined separately in chapter 6. 
 For example, Articles 17 to 25, The Jay Treaty, 1794. McNair notes that a summary of the 74
‘principles and practice followed by British prize courts’ was sent to Jay, by Scott and Nicholl, on 10 
September 1794, McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. III, pp. 64-66. 
 No further agreements were reached, either in the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, following the War of 75
1812, or subsequently up to the end of the period being considered in 1846. McNair notes that Britain 
and the United States corresponded on the subject of the seizure of enemy private property at sea 
during war in 1827 as part of the then negotiations for a convention: McNair, International Law 
Opinions, Vol. III, p. 9.  No agreement, though, appears to have been reached.
 Chamberlain, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Palmerston, p. 17.76
 See the discussion of British practice in the final section of chapter 2.77
 Dodson to Aberdeen, 4 August 1843, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 4, p. 192, where Dodson 78
also observed that this was subject to any applicable treaty.   For parliamentary statements also 
illustrating British acceptance of the principle that it could not interfere in the domestic affairs of the 
United States, see Brougham, HL, 4 March 1844, Vol. LXXIII, 491-492, and Denman, HL, 18 March 
1844, Vol. LXXIII, 1156-1159.
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International law was even more directly involved, however, in British policy to the United 
States in relation to the suppression of the slave trade.  The point at the core of the tensions 
with the United States in the period was that Britain possessed no peacetime ‘right of search’ 
over American ships.   No such right existed under the general principles of international 
law, and Britain did not have a bilateral treaty with the United States giving mutual ‘rights of 
search’.  A series of of high-profile incidents, in which the Royal Navy had stopped 
American ships, therefore, led inextricably to a technical dispute with the United States 
about the extent of the applicable international law on the ‘right of search’.   Crucially, 
however, Britain, was mindful of the restrictions of international law throughout.  Again, 
given its significance, chapter 6 explores further the intricate relationship between legal 
principle and policy objectives in this case.  Importantly, though, British policy was also 
made within the overall context of a joint obligation in the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 for Britain 
and the United States to ‘use their best endeavours’ to achieve the ‘entire abolition’ of the 
slave trade.     Whilst the article concerned required no particular action to be taken, it can 79
nevertheless be reasonably assumed that it did provide some loose incentive for something 
ultimately to be agreed.   This is certainly consistent with both the reference to it in the 
Preamble to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 1842, and Palmerston’s subsequent contention 
that the ‘best endeavours’ obligation had not, in any event, been fulfilled by the joint cruising 
provisions of that treaty.  80
Finally, international law also certainly contributed to the keeping of peace with the United 
States becoming an overall objective embracing British policy.  Indeed, the aim of 
maintaining peace is a theme of British policy that is apparent throughout all the tensions 
covered in the later chapters, and it is, therefore, important that the role of international law 
in this is appreciated.   Britain was, of course, formally in amicable relations with the United 
States under the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, following the end of the War of 1812.  Two further 
features of treaty law, however, were significant in pushing policy into the direction of peace.       
Primarily, treaty law, had defined, as seen, a relatively stable, broad, division of territory on 
the North American continent, albeit that there were, as seen, some outstanding technical 
disputes.    Crucially, this settlement had also been reaffirmed after the War of 1812 in the 
Treaty of Ghent, 1814, when the territorial  position had been restored to what had been 
before the war.  This effectively renewed and refreshed the sanctity of the 1783 settlement.     
 Article 10, Treaty of Ghent, 1814. 79
 Preamble, Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 1842; Palmerston, HC, 2 May 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 1225-1238. 80
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The other influence was that, again, as noted, the treaties implicitly acknowledged the 
process of American expansion.  Whilst this did not mean that Britain could not oppose 
American expansion on the North American continent, it made it less likely that they would 
use force to do so - because in effect, the principle of territorial growth had been conceded in 
1783 and followed in later agreements.        
General principles of international law are also, however, important in explaining why peace 
was such a central objective of British policy.  Most significantly, British practice included 
the principle that trade with an enemy state was unlawful.  War with the United States would, 
thus, have had an immense effect on Britain given the growing size of British-American 
trade.  Whilst trade is often acknowledged as a motive for peace between Britain and the 
United States, the role of international law in explaining why this was the case is not 
generally emphasised.  International law was, however, one of the key reasons why war was 
so disruptive to trade.  The other main principles which pushed British policy towards peace 
were those associated with the maritime rights claimed by Britain in war.   By the 1840s, 
Britain was aware of French concerns that a British war with the United States would result 
in France joining the American side of the conflict over the issue of maritime claims.        81
Fear of such a result would certainly have been a further motive for peace with the United 
States given the general British concern about the United States and France becoming more 
closely associated.   Indeed, Aberdeen made the British aim of detaching the United States 
from France strikingly clear when he wrote to Peel about the potential impact of President 
Polk's December, 1845 message for ‘the separation of France in feeling and interest from the 
United States’.  82
The presence of an underlying role for international law in making peace a key objective is, 
at the least, also consistent with the similar approaches of the Melbourne and Peel 
governments to the prospect of a war with the United States.   Both certainly regarded the 
overall possibility very badly.   Palmerston commented on war with the United States that: 
‘for sure I am that nothing could be more calamitous to both countries’.    Similarly, Peel 83
 For the French concern, see Cass to Webster, 15 March 1841, Webster Papers, pp. 44-45.  Aberdeen 81
seems to have been aware of the issues given the presence in his papers of a copy of a further letter 
from Cass to Webster: Cass to Webster, 12 March 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43123, fols. 
97-105.
 Aberdeen to Peel, 30 December 1845, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43065, fols. 129-130.82
 Palmerston, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1162-1218.83
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wrote of the ‘manifold evils of war with the United States’.    Russell even told Ellice that 84
he was ‘for peace with America, beyond any other nation’.    Significantly, however, 85
consistency is also apparent in the way that both governments also accepted that peace with 
the United States could not, however, be preserved in all circumstances.  The closest 
occasion to war in the period was over the McLeod matter, where the problem, as it 
happened, was centred on the application of international law.  Crucially, as will be seen, the 
British approach to the real prospect of war in McLeod remained the same over the transition 
from Palmerston to Aberdeen.   The McLeod tensions are themselves considered further in 
chapter 4. 
This similar approach, however, matters because much has traditionally been made of the 
difference between Palmerston and Aberdeen in terms of their respective attitudes to peace. 
Undoubtedly, such a distinction would tend to downplay any real influence for international 
law to the extent that it had had a major effect on the British policy objective of peace to the 
United States, as the same legal framework and influences would have affected both men.   
In terms of their approach to peace, however, the distinction was more one of method.       
Aberdeen and Peel prioritised peace as the way to achieve all their objectives concerning the 
United States.   Peel made this apparent when he said to Aberdeen in 1841 that ‘the only 
question we have to consider is - what instrument will be most calculated to effect our object 
- the conciliatory adjustment of unsettled differences with the United States’.   Aberdeen, in 86
turn, made it clear that he wanted to settle all outstanding issues with the United States in 
order ‘to secure the lasting union and friendship of the two countries’.    By contrast, 87
Palmerston desired peace, but was prepared to go through more to get it.  As he put it: 
With such cunning fellows as these Yankees it never answers to give way ... and what we 
dignify by the names of moderation and conciliation, they naturally enough call fear ... 
they will give way when in the wrong, if they are firmly and perseveringly pressed.  88
 Peel to Aberdeen, 16 May 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43062, fols. 48-54. 84
 Russell to Ellice, 11 October 1842, as referred to in J. Prest, Lord John Russell, (London: 85
Macmillan, 1972), p. 192, Note 97.
 Peel to Aberdeen, Private, 17 November 1841, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 343-344.  86
The immediate context was the position of Fox, the incumbent British minister in Washington.
 Aberdeen to Fox, British Documents, Vol. I, 18 November 1841, 161.87
 Palmerston to Russell, 19 January 1841, PRO 30/22/4A, fols. 63-66. The context was the Maine 88
boundary.
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Furthermore, Palmerston’s approach also needs to be seen in the context that he did not 
consider the risk of the United States declaring war on Britain to be a serious one.   As he 
wrote to Monteagle in 1842: ‘the question was not between peace and war; for the 
Americans had neither the intention desire nor means to make war, being bankrupt in finance 
and having no navy that could be put to sea - not above 10 or 12 sail of the line altogether’.  89
Working Within a Framework of International Law Shared with the United States 
International law made its most immediately obvious impact on British policy to the United 
States through the handling of disputes.   Britain was affected by international law in this 
way simply because every major American problem in the period was either conducted using 
legal principles or involved technical argument on a narrow point of treaty interpretation.       
International law, however, permeated wider and deeper into the British-American 
relationship than just high-profile issues.    Importantly, it was also used for routine business.        
From a British perspective, this involvement, of course, followed naturally from the 
institutional role of international law.    If treaties and principles provided rules and 
influenced objectives, this made it more likely, in turn, that international law would steer 
disputes.   In terms of contact with the United States, however, the vital additional factor that 
made it possible for international law to have such an impact, in practice, was that the 
British-American relationship operated within what was effectively a shared legal 
framework.   The United States, too, supported international law, and adopted many of the 
same key principles as Britain.   International law, as a result, was able to be at the heart of 
how Britain interacted with the United States, and British support for it was much more 
meaningful than it would otherwise have been. 
The key direct influence of international law on British policy arose, then, from the way in 
which problems with the United States were approached, argued, and resolved in legal terms.        
Within the conduct of the disputes themselves, it also mattered that Britain valued the 
upholding of its rights under international law.   The resulting relationship between policy 
and international law in the significant issues presented by Canada, Texas, Oregon, and the 
 Palmerston to Monteagle, 28 October 1842, Palmerston Papers, MO/131.  Palmerston had initiated 89
inquiries to British consuls in the United States as to the state of the U.S. Navy in, at least, 1838 and 
1841: Palmerston to Fox, 4 April 1838, Draft, FO 5/321, fols. 20-21, and Palmerston note and Bidwell 
circular, February, 1841, FO 5/368, fols. 120-122.  There is some support for Palmerston’s analysis in 
Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power, pp. 50-51, p. 102. 
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slave trade is, thus, at the centre of thesis and will be examined in the later chapters.   It is 
important, however, to be clear initially that, whilst, understandably, the main focus will be 
on such fundamental issues, the influence of international law on policy also went beyond 
them.   Crucially, international law had a wide reach in the British-American relationship, 
and mundane matters too were within its ambit.   The role of law, therefore, was more 
extensive than simply being ‘brought in’ for special matters - it was systemic, ranging across 
the various ways within which Britain and the United States interacted.  As a result, the 
British-American relationship as a whole effectively operated within a framework of 
international law. 
The broad scope and real depth of this legal framework can both be illustrated, briefly, for 
present purposes, by reference to Britain’s extensive commercial relations with the United 
States.  Trade was undoubtedly a major context for relations between Britain and the United 
States, and British trading activities around the world brought frequent contact with 
corresponding American interests.  It is, therefore, significant that international law worked 
in this broad global context as a set of principles through which the resulting commercial 
competition could, to some extent, be regulated.   An article in The Quarterly Review gives 
one example of how international law was deployed.   This noted that the ‘short blockade of 90
two or three days of the Canton river’ by the British ship the Volage resulted in a complaint 
from twelve 'free and independent citizens’ of the United States.   The article then quoted 91
the complaint as stating that:  
‘the right of such a blockade cannot be recognised by the undersigned; and, if attempted 
to be carried into effect to their injury, or the injury of American shipping and interests, 
will be considered by the undersigned, and by their countrymen, an infringement of their 
legal and just rights; it being contrary to the laws of nations, existing treaties, illegal, and 
without precedent’.  92
International law was, thus, central to the the issue being contested here, with British practice 
being questioned against the ‘laws of nations’.  Conversely, in a further case, it was Britain 
that was concerned by allegations that the trading interests of British subjects were being 
 ‘Chinese Affairs’, Quarterly Review, Vol. 65, No. CXXX, (1839-40), pp. 537-581.90
 Quarterly Review, ‘Chinese Affairs’, p. 575. 91
 Quarterly Review, ‘Chinese Affairs’, p. 575.92
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detrimentally affected, this time by the actions of American settlers in Liberia.   Subsequent 93
British enquiries to the United States were directed to the matter of the legal status of 
Liberia, which was considered relevant to the issue of how Britain could respond.  Again, 
international law was perceived as being involved, with legal advice being taken following a 
letter from the United States, and Dodson advising that the American settlers were ‘in the 
position of a mere private association’ and had no ‘rights’ or ‘powers’ over ‘other previous 
settlers’.    Other examples from the period involving international law and British-94
American global trading interests include matters concerning Cuba, New Zealand, and 
Monte Video.      95
In contrast, the depth of the role of international law is evident from the way British policy 
dealt with disputes over the impact of the Most Favoured Nation clause in the 1815 
Convention.   These involved generally relatively small-scale routine matters, but policy was 
nevertheless conducted so that the detail conformed to British treaty obligations.   In other 
words, the framework of international law was being applied, on a day to day basis, to the 
complexity of facts on minor matters, as well as issues of grand strategy.   A good example 
from the period is provided by the way international law clearly influenced the British 
response in the long-running dispute over American rough rice.    This case concerned the 96
low duty of 1 penny per quarter applied to ‘rough rice imported ... from the West Coast of 
 FO to CO, Draft, 16 September 1841, FO 5/374, fols. 182-183. See generally: Palmerston to Fox, 93
30 November 1840, FO 5/347, fols. 205-206, Stephen to Canning, 2 October 1841, FO 5/374, fols. 
253-256, Aberdeen to Fox, 20 August 1842, FO 5/376, fols. 70-73, Aberdeen to Fox, 18 July 1843, FO 
5/390, fols. 83-84.
 Dodson to Aberdeen, 23 March 1844, FO 83/2207, fols. 305-308.94
 In Cuba, the United States complained that a British ship had plundered an American ship off the 95
coast, but a British investigation found that the British ship was not guilty of plundering or of 
‘infringing the Laws of humanity or the Laws of Nations as subsisting between friendly powers’: 
Report and documents, FO 5/372, fols. 96-160.  In New Zealand, the United States had expressed 
concern about the position of American citizens undertaking fishing and commercial activities there, 
following its acquisition by Britain in 1840, but Britain considered that they will ‘… find the 
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the American government to take action against the perceived interference of Brent, the American 
chargé d’affaires in Buenos Aires, in making an unauthorised offer of mediation: Aberdeen to 
Pakenham, 3 October 1845, Draft, FO 5/423, fols. 142-147. 
 The political significance of rough rice in the United States at the time can be seen from the fact that 96
Tyler made reference to the dispute in his December, 1841 Presidential Message to Congress: Tyler, 
Presidential Message, 7 December 1841, as contained in Fox to Aberdeen, No 142, 12 December 
1841, FO 5/364, fols. 262-285. 
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Africa’, as compared to the duty of 20 shillings per quarter on rough rice admitted into 
Britain from the United States.     The dispute arose when the United States then contended 97
that the West African rate resulted in a breach of the Most Favoured Nation clause in the 
1815 Convention.    Ultimately, the main point was resolved when Britain confirmed in 98
1841 that the duties on American rough rice would be charged in the future at the same rate 
as that for Africa.    A further stage also then, however, followed Everett’s subsequent call 99
for the duty ‘overpaid’ in the past to be repaid.   This later claim was settled in 1845.  100 101
What is important, for present purposes, however, is the way that international law was 
fundamental to British policy in resolving both stages of this dispute.   Most significantly, 
policy can clearly be seen to have responded to the legal advice received from the law 
officers of the Crown.    On the main issue, Britain appears originally to have maintained a 102
highly technical defence based on the distinction between the states from where items were 
imported and the states of which such items were the produce.  As Stevenson described it, 
the argument went that, as the British statute applied to ‘rough rice imported... from the West 
Coast of Africa’, it applied not just to rice grown in West Africa, but to any rough rice, 
whether grown in the United States or elsewhere, provided that it was imported from West 
Africa.    The conclusion intended to be drawn from this, presumably, then, was that the 103
low duty for West Africa did not breach the Most Favoured Nation clause in the 1815 
 Everett to Aberdeen, 2 April 1842, FO 5/385, fols. 61-74.97
 See, for example, Stevenson to Palmerston, 1 February 1841, FO 5/369, fols. 21-26, which, in turn, 98
referred to similar points made in February, 1839.
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Backhouse, 21 June 1841, FO 5/373, fols. 62-63. 
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Convention as rough rice grown in the United States could also benefit from it!       
Unsurprisingly, the United States disagreed with this construction, and argued that treaties 
needed to be interpreted in line with the ‘spirit and intention of the whole instrument’.      104
The crucial point, however, is that the advice of the Queen’s Advocate supported the position 
of the United States, and Britain backed down in 1841.   105
The role of legal advice in the settlement of the later stage of the dispute is even clearer.      
Following the change in British policy in 1841, Everett then claimed, as mentioned, that the 
duty already paid should be refunded - on the basis that it had been ‘wrongfully’ charged, 
observing, as well, that the prospective change to the duty had been ‘an act of justice’ rather 
than a ‘gratuitous favour’.    Aberdeen’s initial response appears to have been to reject this 106
American contention, arguing that ‘it would have a prejudicial effect upon commercial 
arrangements between friendly states’ if back duty needed to be paid following ‘concessions’ 
after differences of interpretation, but this argument was, in turn, strongly rejected by the 
United States.      Aberdeen then privately supported the American view when forwarding 107
Everett’s letter of October, 1843 to the Treasury, but nevertheless still took legal advice on 
the point in 1845 following a further letter from Everett.    In the event, Dodson, Follett, 108
and Thesiger gave a clear joint opinion that the West African low rate ‘was not consistent’ 
with Article 2 of the 1815 Convention.    From there, the path to the final agreement that 109
the duty already paid should be refunded was clear, and, indeed, Aberdeen told Peel that he 
 Stevenson to Palmerston, 1 February 1841, FO 5/369, fols. 21-26.104
 Dodson to Palmerston, 15 May 1839, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 4, pp. 36-39.  Dodson 105
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‘felt quite ashamed to continue the discussion in direct opposition to the provision of the 
treaty, and the explicit declaration of opinion by the three law officers’.      110
The other important feature of the rough rice case was in the way that international law can 
be seen to have influenced policy by providing a clear shield for keeping current politics out 
of the resolution of the issues involved.   In this instance, this worked against Britain, but the 
principle was important for the long term ability of British-American disputes to be settled 
through legal argument within a legal framework.   The point is evident from the American 
response to Britain’s appeal for an ‘equitable interpretation’ of the 1815 Convention, in 
which the British claim was that ‘no injury’ was intended to the United States by the low 
duty applied from a ‘motive’ of ‘humanity to the negro race’.    Everett, however, rejected 111
this contention, noting that ‘no argument can be of a higher character, than that which 
proceeds on the inviolable obligation of public compacts between nations’, and that British 
motivation ‘cannot justify the infraction’.    As he grandly put it: ‘It is the object of treaties 112
to place the matters secured by them beyond the control of either party’.    For Everett, 113
therefore, law not politics was to be the determining factor.   As seen, Britain in the end 
dropped its opposition, and the case was settled without account being taken of British 
motivation.  Whilst it may seem a commonplace, evidence that disputes were settled by 
reference to the law is, though, important for establishing the reality of a legal framework. 
International law, though, was only able to influence British policy through the conduct of 
disputes in this way because the United States also respected and used international law.  In 
other words, it mattered not only that there was a legal framework for the handling of 
British-American tensions, but that it was also truly a shared framework.   Undoubtedly, the 
foundation for this positive American approach was an overall wide level of support for 
international law in the United States.   Most importantly, political recognition from 
American governments in the period at least mirrored, if not exceeded, the position in 
Britain.  Presidents and Secretaries of State alike gave similar public and consistent approval 
to there being a role for international law.   The most prominent of these was Daniel Webster, 
Secretary of State from 1841 to 1843, for Presidents Harrison and Tyler.  Webster believed in 
 Aberdeen to Peel, 25 July 45, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40455, fols. 114-115.110
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international law, a point clearly illustrated by his description of a system of international 
relations based on ‘rules’, ‘usages’, and ‘prescriptions’ in a letter to Everett in 1842: 
At the present day, no State is so high as that the principles of its intercourse with other 
Nations are above question or its conduct above scrutiny. On the contrary, the whole 
civilised world, now vastly better informed on such subjects than in former ages, and 
alive and sensible to the principles adopted, and the purposes avowed, by the leading 
States, necessarily constitutes a tribunal, august in character and formidable in its 
decisions.  And it is before this tribunal, and upon the rules of natural justice, moral 
propriety, the usages of modern times, and the prescriptions of public law, that 
Governments which respect themselves, and respect their neighbours, must be prepared to 
discuss with candour and with dignity, any topics which may have caused differences to 
spring up between them.  114
This elevated view was shared by others.   Van Buren, President from 1837 to 1841, spoke of 
the ‘great principles of international justice, the maintenance of which is alike indispensable 
to the preservation of social order and the peace of the world’.   Similarly, Forsyth, his 115
Secretary of State, valued the importance of observing treaties, and referred to the ‘respect 
for the integrity and character by which the United States have sought to distinguish 
themselves since the establishment of their right to claim a place in the great family of 
nations’.      116
There is also evidence for a broader embrace of international law within the United States in 
recent work covering the period.  The prominence of the American jurist, Henry Wheaton, in 
matters of international law, was, in fact, observed by his contemporaries in Britain.        117
Within modern research, this has been picked up on, in particular, by Onuf and Onuf, in 
Nations, Markets and War.    Here, the authors draw out what they see as the key 118
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contribution of Wheaton in establishing international law as a guide for the actions of states 
in the early to mid-nineteenth century.  They comment that: 
Wheaton followed Vattel in arguing that European nations constituted a society, and thus 
a moral world, within which nations are equally free to pursue their interests within the 
limits set by international law ... .  He took for granted that the rules of international law 
confer rights and duties on states.    119
Indeed, for Onuf and Onuf, ‘no one writing about international law exceeded [Wheaton] in 
influence for at least three decades’, and he was important because he ‘helped make liberal 
international society a conceptually distinct domain’.   In addition, they argue, Wheaton 120
‘gave practical primacy to positive law’, and (originally) set out in the third edition of 
Elements in 1846 ‘a specifically juridical basis for a distinctly European international 
law’.  121
Others focus instead on what they see as the part played by international law in giving more 
credibility to the United States as a new nation of the world.  Janis picks out the role of 
Wheaton, alongside Kent, in deploying international law to increase the global standing of 
the United States.   As he puts it, Wheaton and Kent were both ‘anxious to use the law of 
nations to secure the recently-won independence and sovereignty of the United States’.       122
Gould’s Among the Powers of the Earth, where he refers to ‘the drive [of the United States] 
to be accepted as a treaty-worth nation in Europe’, also fits well with Janis’ contention as to 
how Kent and Wheaton saw the law of nations in the context of American independence.   123
The specific use of international law as part of the founding of the United States was also 
certainly something that was observed in Britain at the time.  Roebuck, for example, 
significantly remarked in the House of Commons in 1841 that:  ‘It should always be 
recollected... that on the establishment of the government of the United States, very early in 
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the history of those states, that they declared, that they considered themselves amenable to 
the international laws established among nations’.         124
  
Finally, Janis makes a link between religion and international law in the United States.  In 
terms of public politics, he argues that a climate of widespread support for international law 
in the United States was influenced by religion and an associated desire to resolve disputes 
peacefully.    He also identifies, in particular, the association between Christian peace 125
movements and international law, highlighting both William Ladd's 1840 'Essay on a 
Congress of Nations’ and the work of Elihu Burritt in organising peace conferences in 
Europe in the 1840s.   Janis also, however, emphasises the way American jurists used 126
religion.  Kent, he comments, pointed to the Christian ‘community of nations’, and aimed to 
use ‘religious commonalities to link America to the longer-established European polities’.    127
Both Kent and Wheaton, he observes, considered that  ‘Christianity was important … as a 
sanction for international law, a crucial element in affirming the efficacy of the law of 
nations’.  128
Whilst this level of presence for international law was an important pre-condition, the crucial 
point, however, for the practical operation of the shared framework on a day to day basis was 
that the United States also acknowledged the same broad legal rules as Britain.   A basic 
level of conformity was, of course, ensured by the fact that the United States was on the 
other side of the seven main treaties which defined the main characteristics of the British-
American relationship.   It also mattered that, like Britain, the United States placed a high 
value on observing treaties, as is illustrated, for example, by this extract from a Circular to 
Collectors and Naval Officers from the Department of Treasury in 1844: ‘The most 
scrupulous good faith is due to the stipulations of treaties. The public faith of the United 
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States is above money and above price’.   More importantly, however, it is clear from the 129
British diplomatic papers of the period that the United States also relied in its relationship 
with Britain on principles of international law similar to those within the main themes of the 
Foreign Office practice.   This meant that there was, as a result, generally a set of rules 
within which Britain and the United States were each able to base their respective positions 
on points of tension.   The effect was not, of course, that Britain and the United States agreed 
on every specific point of law, or on its application.   They did not, but it did mean that law 
could operate as a reference point and guide.  In other words, even when they disagreed, 
Britain and the United States nevertheless agreed that law was relevant to how they moved 
forward.   The remainder of the section briefly considers the American position on the main 
aspects of this shared legal framework. 
In the British-American relationship, the most prominent principles, in practice, were those 
related to the independence and sovereignty of the state.   For reasons of its own history, the 
United States would, of course, have been expected to defend the notions of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.    There was also, however, a strong level of support expressed by its 130
leaders for the associated principle of ‘non-interference’.  Jackson, for example, regarded 
‘non-interference’ as a basic tenet of American policy, saying simply that the United States 
‘never interferes with the policy of other Powers, nor can it permit any on the part of others 
with its internal policy’.   Webster similarly noted that ‘each nation should be left, without 131
interference or annoyance, direct or indirect, to its undoubted right of exercising its own 
judgement, in regard to all things belonging to its domestic interests and domestic duties’.  132
Indeed, Webster also considered that adherence to the ‘doctrine of non-interference’ was vital 
for the maintenance of peace between Britain and the United States given, in particular, their 
differing domestic law positions on slavery.    Others too, such as Calhoun, Secretary of 133
State from 1844 to1845, also sought to rely on ‘non-interference’ to keep foreigners out of 
American affairs.   As will be seen in the later chapters, sovereignty and ‘non-interference’ 
 Circular to Collectors and Naval Officers, Dept. Of Treasury, as contained in FO 5/408, fols. 129
221-222. 
 Gould observes that the United States also used international law to protect its own effective 130
independence: Gould, Among the Powers, p. 218. 
 Jackson to Santa Anna, 4 September 1836, as referred to in Fox to Palmerston, No. 2, 20 January 131
1837, FO 5/314, fols. 4-12.
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.132
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.133
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were to be important lines of argument used by the United States in relation, in particular, to 
Canada and Texas. 
The United States also shared with Britain the legal principles associated with the ownership 
of territory on the North American continent.  The United States accepted, alongside Britain, 
that the principles around discovery and occupation were important in establishing title to the 
ownership of unoccupied land.   Indeed, the application of the facts to these principles was 134
to form one of the main bases for the dispute between Britain and the United States over 
Oregon.    What matters, for present purposes, though, is not the detail of that dispute itself, 135
but rather the general point that it was conducted using legal argument around common 
principles.  Equally important, however, was the shared British-American justification for 
the right of settlers to own territory, which allowed Oregon to be contested in the first place.  
British practice here, as seen, derived from natural law and Vattel, and a similar basis can 
also be seen in that of the United States.  For example, the reference to the indigenous 
peoples as ‘mere temporary occupants of the soil’ in the 1842 decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Martin v Waddell clearly reflected Vattel’s reasoning:  
For, according to the principles of international law, as understood by the then civilised 
powers of Europe, the Indian tribes in the new world were regarded as mere temporary 
occupants of the soil, and the absolute rights of property and dominion were held to 
belong to the European nation by which any particular portion of the country was first 
discovered.  136
Given that the United States had emerged from such a ‘European nation’, there was, as a 
result, a reliance on the same legal argument for the ownership of land in the British and 
American states on the North American continent.   This gave Britain and the United States 137
an important joint vested interest in the established framework of international law.       
 See, for example, the 1826 negotiations over Oregon, as referred to in the Northwestern 134
Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, p. 8, referring to the positions of Huskisson and Addington, 
the British Commissioners for the settlement of the North-West Boundary, 1826, and, of Gallatin, the 
American Commissioner; and Calhoun’s statement on Oregon, as contained in Pakenham to 
Aberdeen, No. 103, 12 September, 1844, FO 5/408, fols. 23-49.
 The Oregon question is discussed in chapter 5.135
 Martin v Waddell (1842), 16 Peters 370, as referred to in L. H. Laing and N. Mackenzie, (eds.), 136
Canada and the Law of Nations; a selection of cases in international law, affecting Canada or 
Canadians (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 30.
 The right to unoccupied land was also fundamental to American expansion.  As Howe argues: ‘As 137
its most ardent exponent, the Jacksonian Democrats, conceived it, this imperialist program included ... 
the expropriation of Native Americans and Mexicans’: Howe, What Hath God Wrought, p. 852.
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Further, it was a hugely significant point of political agreement going to the heart of the 
nature of the state.  Put bluntly, the American Revolution, national sovereignty, and the 
distinctions in the form of government between republican and monarchical, were only 
possible if there was a right to the territory over which authority was to be exercised. 
Importantly, Britain and the United States also had an effectively shared approach in the 
period to the related question of whether ‘nations’ of indigenous peoples could own land on 
the North American continent as sovereign bodies under international law.   By the 1830s, at 
least, it appears clear that neither Britain nor the United States conducted policy on the basis 
that they could.  McHugh has written on the loss of tribal status by the late 1830s in Upper 
Canada, arguing that it was replaced by a regime of British subject-hood and Crown 
protection.    Conversely, but with a similar effect for their practical ability to be 138
independent sovereign states, ‘nations’ of indigenous peoples were considered to be 
‘domestic, dependent nations’ in the domestic law of the United States.    As will be seen, 139
this unified approach mattered greatly for the territorial dispute over Oregon in that neither 
Britain nor the United States appeared concerned in their arguments by the position of the 
indigenous peoples living in the territory.   Furthermore, it is also consistent with evidence of 
British-American cooperation from the time aimed at reducing the risk of an ‘independent ’ 
nation of indigenous peoples from being established.   Palmerston, for example, wanted 
Forsyth warned in 1837 of the potentially ‘calamitous results’ of a possible attempt by a 
party of men to ‘incite the Indian Tribes… to resist the supposed encroachments of the 
Governments of Great Britain and of the United States, upon their territory; and to induce 
them … to form themselves into an independent nation’.   140
The other principles common to Britain and the United States covered the remainder of those 
discussed earlier as being mainly involved in British practice and more.  The republican form 
of government in the United States matched the British concept of the state as a ‘general 
body’.  The United States clearly also accepted the same broad legal framework for 
international commerce as Britain.  This is illustrated by its use of protective duties and its 
 McHugh, 'A comporting sovereign’, p. 6.138
 See the legal references in Laing and Mackenzie, Canada and the Law of Nations, pp. 180-182 and 139
p. 199.  See also Grewe, The Epochs, pp. 549-550. 
 Palmerston to Fox, No. 1, 6 February 1837, FO 5/313, fols. 1-2.140
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agreement of commercial treaties.   Further, whilst it differed from British practice on 141
specific points of law, the United States also clearly accepted the main principles associated 
with the freedom of the seas and the legal implications of war and peace on the seas.  This is 
evident, for example, from the attempt, mentioned earlier, in the Jay Treaty, 1794 to reach a 
comprehensive agreement on what constituted contraband and other matters associated with 
maritime rights in war, and then the later negotiations around the ‘right of search’ and the 
slave trade.   In these cases, the key point is that, even whilst they were contesting points, 
Britain and the United States were nevertheless arguing from within the same set of basic 
rules.  Grewe also highlights the ‘leadership role’ of the United States in furthering the idea 
of neutrality.   Lastly, it is clear that the framework extended, when needed, beyond these 142
key principles.  This will be exemplified throughout the remainder of the thesis, and, in 
particular, by the further issues of international law involved in the McLeod and Creole 
matters. 
A final element in the legal framework for handling disputes can be seen in a willingness by 
Britain and the United States to use and contemplate arbitration as a means of settling 
international claims.  Janis identifies the adoption of arbitration within the Jay Treaty, 1794 
as an important precedent for the further use of arbitration.    In that instance, claims for 143
compensation arising from three categories of past events were covered, with the cases 
concerned being decided by commissioners, having regard to their ‘merits’, ‘equity’, 
‘justice’, and, in the case of the shipping claims, ‘the laws of nations’.   In terms of the use 144
of arbitration in direct British-American ‘state to state’ disputes, however, the key 
development was the provision for the use of arbitration in the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 as a 
 Project Avalon, Yale Law School, (accessed on 10/5/18), lists that the United States entered 141
commercial treaties in the 1830s and 1840s with, for example, the following: Chile (1832), Venezuela 
(1836), and Belgium (1845). 
 Grewe, W., The Epochs, pp. 538-539.142
  Janis, ‘North America: American Exceptionalism in International Law’, p. 536.143
 The relevant provisions are in Articles 6 and 7 of the Jay Treaty, 1794. The cases covered were: 144
first, American compensation for pre-independence ‘debts’ of British subjects, which were unable to 
be recovered in the ‘ordinary course of justice’; second, British compensation for losses of American 
citizens resulting from the ‘irregular or illegal captures or condemnations’ of their ships or property 
under British ‘authority’ or ‘commissions’ in the then war with France, and which were unable to be 
received in the ‘ordinary course’; and, finally, American compensation for losses of British merchants 
in the same war resulting from the capture of their ‘vessels and merchandise’ within the limits of the 
United States, or by vessels ‘originally armed’ in the United States. 
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means of settling the Northeastern boundary dispute.   Whilst, as seen, the resulting actual 145
reference to arbitration was unsuccessful in that case, it still proved to be an important 
precedent, as will be discussed in chapter 4.  Arbitration was contemplated, thereafter, by 
both Britain and the United States at different points as one potential method for settling the 
Northeastern and Oregon boundary matters.  This represented a significant measure of 
confidence in legal process, as well as being suggestive of a similar approach to the role of 
international law. 
Conclusion 
International law made much of its impact on British policy to the United States because it 
was used, and used regularly, in American relations.  Agreement as well as discord was at the 
heart of British policy to the United States.  Treaties and legal principles moulded British 
objectives so that they conformed to past agreements and the requirements of legal 
principles.   In doing so, they had wide effect, shaping policies as distinct as those that were 
tolerant of the broad expansion of the United States, and those focused instead on narrow 
territorial disputes.  They also helped and hindered, as can be seen in their influence on the 
objectives that guided the lofty British ambitions for American trade, as compared to those 
that restricted what could be done to suppress the slave trade.  Ultimately, though, it was a 
shared legal framework that made international law that much more effective in the British-
American relationship.   Built on a mutual respect for international law and a set of common 
principles, this allowed issues within the British-American relationship in the period to be 
handled within a broad structure of common rules.   Perhaps the most striking piece of 
evidence for its operation comes from a comment of Gallatin in 1840.    Gallatin was an 
American diplomat who had been involved in many negotiations with Britain over the years.   
Crucially, from that experience, he expressed a belief in ‘justice’ in British-American 
relations.   For him, Britain was a reliable negotiator on international issues, and he had seen 
‘nothing at any time that could shake my confidence in the sincerity and good faith of that 
  Article 5, Treaty of Ghent, 1814. 145
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government’.    He was, thus, able to add: ‘And I do believe that it would do justice, if it 146
was once satisfied that justice was due’.  147
 A. Gallatin, The Right of the United States to the North-Eastern Boundary claimed by them, (New 146
York, 1840), as revised by A. Gallatin, Preface by A. Gallatin, pp. ix-x, as quoted in 'North American 
Boundary Question’, The Quarterly Review, Vol. 67, No. CXXXIV, (1840-1841), pp. 501-540 at p. 
501.
 Quarterly Review, ‘North American Boundary Question’, p. 501, citing Gallatin.147
 108
4.      Canada and the Northeastern Border 
In his Report on the Affairs of British North America, Lord Durham urged that it be 
‘recollected that the natural ties of sympathy between the English population of the Canadas 
and the inhabitants of the frontier States of the Union are peculiarly strong’.   Durham was 1
here concerned specifically with the way ‘common wants beget an interest in the politics of 
each country’, and the level of danger he saw presented to Canada by ‘sympathisers’ in the 
United States.   His point, however, is also a perfect illustration of a wider truth, which is that 
it was issues concerning the border and border populations that were central to the British-
American relationship over Canada and the Northeast in the period.  The Canadian rebellions 
brought the risk of frontier insurgency.  The Caroline and McLeod affairs both had their 
origins in an attack driven by individuals from across the border.  The Northeastern boundary 
dispute, and the conflict over fishing rights, were given urgency by locals pushing the limits 
of territorial rights.  This chapter is concerned with how international law influenced the way 
British policy navigated these problems around border security.  Its central contention is that 
Britain worked with the United States by reference to rules within a shared legal framework.  
Policy, as a result, was filtered through principles associated with self-preservation and 
sovereignty, and guided by the sanctity of treaty law.  As well as providing an underlying 
level of agreement to the British-American relationship, this also had the crucial effect of 
helping to separate the making of policy from the circumstances of the immediate tensions. 
The chapter makes three main arguments.  It begins by establishing how international law 
helped Britain to maintain workable relations with the United States and deal with border 
instability during the Canadian rebellions.  The key factor was the emphasis on the duty of 
protection in Britain’s explanations of its actions, which ensured that British policy related to 
the United States within the ambit of international law.   Foreign intervention from the 
United States was, as a result, less likely.   Britain was then able to use principles of 
international law associated with sovereignty and self-preservation to call for greater security 
co-operation along the border.   Whilst the United States did not respond by adopting exactly 
the same legal reasoning as Britain, it, nevertheless, did take some serious action aimed at 
reducing tensions.  Importantly, it also used principles of international law, albeit different 
ones to Britain, to justify the basis for its actions.   The second section then shows how 
 This quotation and the others in this paragraph are by Lord Durham in Durham, Earl of, Report on 1
the Affairs of British North America (London, 1839), p. 96
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international law was central to the way British policy handled the acute tensions with the 
United States which nevertheless arose from Britain’s Canadian policy.  Whilst the Caroline 
and McLeod affairs resulted from alleged breaches of legal principles, international law, 
however, also guided their ultimate resolution.    Furthermore, international law was used 
successfully by the United States to resist British policy aimed at entering American territory 
for security reasons in extreme circumstances.   Finally, the third section contends that 
international law was at the heart of the outstanding British-American territorial issues in 
relation to Canada.   The agreements in previous treaties meant that the main focus of British 
policy, outside of the Canadian rebellions, was on the disputes over the Northeastern 
boundary and fishing rights.   These were technical, legal disputes aimed at working out the 
meaning of what had already been agreed, rather than fighting fresh strategic contests.  Law 
was, thus, critical in setting the policy expectations, process, and arguments. 
Protecting Canada and co-operation over ongoing border disturbances 
The most important  stages of the Canadian rebellions, and the nature of the related concern 
over Britain’s relations with the United States, can be summarised briefly for present 
purposes.   From the perspective of the government in London, the main British involvement 
in the period undoubtedly began with the impasse in the province of Lower Canada over the 
refusal of the local Assembly to agree to the necessary ‘supply’ votes to pay for the salaries 
of judges and other officials.  In response, Parliament passed ten resolutions in the spring of 
1837 aimed at providing the required funds, albeit that such a direct intervention into 
Canadian affairs was controversial.    This was then followed by the rebellions proper, which 2
began in Lower Canada, in late 1837, before spreading to Upper Canada shortly thereafter.   
The British government reacted to this by suspending the constitution in Lower Canada, and 
 The House of Commons ordered that the resolutions be communicated to the House of Lords in a 2
conference on 28 April 1837: HC, 28 April 1837, Vol. XXXVIII, 359.  The House of Lords supported 
the resolutions following a debate on 9 May 1837: HL, 9 May 1837, Vol. XXXVIII, 707-750. 
Crucially, however, the British government, in turn, also rejected at this time any idea of making the 
government in Lower Canada more accountable, either by means of an Executive Council 
‘responsible’ to the Assembly or a Legislative Council elected by the people. The structure of the then 
‘government’ in Lower Canada was, broadly, that there was a Governor, an Executive Council (with 
the Executive Council being viewed in the British parliamentary debates, as an appointed ‘cabinet’), a 
Legislative Council (which was also appointed, and had been originally introduced in an attempt to 
provide a ‘Canadian House of Lords’ to balance the Assembly), and, finally, an Assembly, which was 
elected. 
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appointing Lord Durham as Governor-General, with both extensive personal powers and a 
mandate to report with proposals for the future government of the Canadas.    In the event, 3
these, and some additional revolts in late 1838, were quashed by the provincial authorities 
relatively quickly.   It was in these better overall circumstances that the British government 
then accepted Durham's proposals for a legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada in 
1839, whilst also rejecting his other main idea for ‘responsible’ government.    Nevertheless, 4
importantly, despite an improving general position, Britain was also faced throughout by the 
problem of a significant residual level of border disturbances, involving both Americans and 
Canadians living in the United States. 
The main concern for British policy towards the United States from these events was that 
Americans would,  in some way, become involved in Canadian affairs and that this could 
cause a rupture with Britain.   On the face of it, there should not have been any particular 
problem from American intervention.   Britain was, of course, in friendly relations with the 
United States following the Treaty of Ghent, 1814, and, as seen, the United States shared a 
framework of international law which valued the principle of ‘non-interference’.   In reality, 
however, there was a potential danger arising from the sympathy many Americans felt for the 
Canadians involved in a fight with imperial Britain.   There was, in the words of Lord 
Durham, a natural level of support for the Canadian rebels among many Americans because 
the ‘contest bore some resemblance to that great struggle of their own forefathers, which 
they regard with the highest pride’.     Radical MPs, too, had similarly warned British 5
ministers regularly about the risk to Canada posed by American citizens.    Roebuck, for 
example, cautioned, at the time of the ten resolutions, that ‘thousands of Americans will re-
cross the frontier, and the history of Texas, will tell the tale of Canadian revolt’.    Others, 6
such as Leader and Molesworth, predicted, during the rebellions, the intervention of the 
American people in support of the Canadians, irrespective of the wishes of the United States 
federal government.   There was even a lingering suspicion in the British government that 7
 Russell, HC, 16 and 17 January 1838, Vol. XL, 8 et seq., and 96 et seq. .3
 Message from the Crown, 3 May 1839, HL, Vol. LXVII, 756; Russell, HC, 3 June 1839, Vol. LXVII, 4
1260-1274.  A bill for the legislative union was introduced in 1840, following a year for consultation 
in the Canadas: Russell, HC, 23 March 1840, Vol. LII, 1323-1342.
 Durham, Report on the Affairs of North America, pp. 96.5
 Roebuck, HC, 6 March 1837, Vol. XXXVI, 1353-1354.6
 Leader, HC, 22 December 1837, Vol. XXXIX, 1436-1445, Molesworth, HC, 22 December 1837, 7
Vol. XXXIX, 1465-1467.
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many in the United States wanted to see ‘the British name and power expelled for ever from 
this continent’.  8
Furthermore, the risk of a conflict with the United States was made more of a concern by the 
seriousness with which Britain was determined to keep Canada.   It was, as seen in chapter 3, 
a main objective of British policy to maintain Britain’s remaining possessions on the North 
American continent.     British ministers certainly strongly reflected this in their public 9
statements during the period of the Canadian rebellions.   The continuation of the link 
between Canada and the Empire was an underlying theme of the government’s ten 
resolutions aimed at dealing with failures in Canadian governance in early 1837.   The 
objective, however, became much more explicit during the revolts themselves.   Russell 
offered government ‘support’ for ‘legal efforts to secure the allegiance’ of Lower Canada, 
and ‘to retain it in obedience to Her Majesty’, almost immediately on first hearing of the 
rebellions.    Furthermore, Parliament itself then swiftly backed ‘the efforts ... for the 10
suppression of revolt’, and expressed ‘deep concern’ at a ‘rebellion’ aimed at ending 
‘allegiance to the Crown’.    Crucially, too, the government also received the backing of 11
Peel, the then leader of the main opposition in the House of Commons, who commented that 
‘it would be the greatest folly on the part of England to allow the connection [with Canada] 
to be lightly broken’.      12
International law made on impact on British policy to the United States in these 
circumstances because legal principles were influential in how Britain publicly justified its 
objectives in Canada.   As seen in chapters 2 and 3, Britain’s aim of maintaining its 
possessions on the North American continent was shaped by the general legal duties to 
preserve and protect the state and its subjects, which were in turn, accepted parts of British 
 Fox to Aberdeen, FO/5/364, No. 137, 5 December 1841, fols. 208-210.  Palmerston even referred to 8
this as a motive for why the United States pursued the disputed territory in the Northeast: Palmerston 
to Monteagle, 28 October 1842, Palmerston Papers, MO/131.
 The five main British provinces were Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 9
and Prince Edward’s Island.  For background on their history within the British Empire, see generally, 
‘Notes’ upon the Northeast Boundary, The Westminster Review, Vol. 34, (1840), Article VII,  pp. 
202-237, and ‘North American Boundary Question’, Quarterly Review, (1841), No. CXXXIV, pp. 
501-540. 
 Russell, HC, 22 December 1837, Vol. XXXIX, 1430.10
 Russell proposing the Address: HC, 16 January 1838, Vol. XL, 42, and Address agreed to, 93.11
 Peel, HC, 16 January 1838, Vol. XL, 73.12
 112
practice.   British policy in Canada was, as a result, explained at the time by government in 
language which was consistent with the international law principle of protection, as well as 
direct British power interests.   Several instances from the associated parliamentary debates 
illustrate how this was done.   Russell, taking the lead for the government in the House of 
Commons, rhetorically asked whether Britain would leave ‘the subjects of the Crown 
unprotected’ when introducing the ten resolutions.    Again, after the revolts began, Russell 13
emphasised ‘protection to British subjects.’     Similarly, Peel, leading for the Tories, saw 14
the protection of Canada as central to any British response, observing that Britain ‘might at 
any moment be called upon to defend that colony from all comers ... from a point of honour 
involving our character as its protector’.    Wellington, too, considered deep into 1839 that 15
further defence strengthening was needed in order to provide the necessary ‘protection’ to 
British subjects.  16
This explanation in the terms of protection mattered for policy towards the United States 
because it brought British policy towards Canada within the principles of international law, 
and, thereby, reduced the risk that circumstances would arise which would justify foreign 
interference.   Three factors combined to produce this effect.   Most importantly, the 
principle of protection permitted a strong defence of Canada within international law, which 
would itself deter intervention.   Russell put this clearly when he said: 
But if this country took a timid and pusillanimous tone - if we sacrificed those who 
looked to us for protection, deserted British subjects who had always been steady and 
loyal to their allegiance, and withdrew our troops, that they may be overpowered - if we 
follow so weak and cowardly a course, then we should invite the aggression of foreign 
Powers.   17
 Russell, HC, 6 March 1837, Vol. XXXVI, 1292-93.13
 Russell, HC, 22 December 1837, Vol. XXXIX, 1497. Sydenham, the Governor-General, told 14
Russell in 1841 that Canadians felt ‘that they may rely with confidence upon the entire support and 
protection of the British Crown’: Sydenham to Russell, Confidential, 10 April 1841, FO 5/372, fols. 
165-166. 
 Peel, HC 14 April 1837, Vol. XXXVII, 1283-1284.15
 Wellington, HL 26 July 1839, Vol. LIX, 872.16
 Russell, HC, 22 December 1837, Vol. XXXIX, 1501.17
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It was also significant, however, that ‘protection’ explained British policy in a way that could 
counter potential accusations of tyranny or arbitrary rule from London.    Such attacks 18
mattered because international law, as conceived, for example, by Vattel, gave a right of 
foreign intervention to help an ‘oppressed people’ against ‘tyranny’.    Whilst British policy 19
countered this accusation mainly through its declared intention to search for a new ‘free’ 
constitution, protection helped to reduce the risk by, crucially, allowing the British state to 
act in Canada wearing a cloak of supervisory disinterest within the terms of international 
law.    Apart from the general notions of ‘protection’ from danger as used by Russell and 20
others, British rule was, accordingly, also described as being necessary for the protection of  
the ‘British’ and ‘French’ inhabitants in the Canadas.   As, Stanley observed, if Canada was 
given up, ‘they cast off in Lower Canada alone 150,000 of their British fellow-subjects, who 
clung to them for protection against a tyrannical majority’.   Conversely, he added, the ‘only 21
security [for the French Canadians] for the absolute laws and feudal customs to which they 
clung was in the protecting power of this empire’.    Consistently with this, Durham saw his 22
duty in Canada as being ‘to extend protection to all.’ [emphasis added].    This use of 23
‘protection’, therefore, also appears partly to qualify Benton and Ford’s view that, within 
‘the British discourse of protection’, ‘protection came to mean both the protection of the 
Crown ... and protection from the exercise of arbitrary power - even by those authorised to 
 Hume, for example, sought to characterise the Canadian rebellion as a just response within 18
international law to an ‘arbitrary’ British state, commenting that: ‘Vattel was an author very much 
quoted now-a-days, and Vattel had said that the people had a right to be well-governed, and at as 
cheap a rate as possible; and that if the people were deprived of these their inalienable rights by force 
or fraud, they would be justified in using every means in their power to recover them’: Hume  HC, 29 
January 1838, Vol. XL, 627.  Others made similar attacks; Leader, for example appealed for support 
from ‘every man who prefers free institutions to arbitrary rule’, and O' Connell declared that 
‘necessity was the constant plea of tyrants’: Leader, HC, 6 March 1837, Vol. XXXVI, 1314; O' 
Connell, HC, 6 March 1837, Vol. XXXVI, 1325.
 Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, S56. 19
 The ‘despotic’ power enjoyed by Durham and his successors was considered to have only a 20
temporary place: Russell, HC, 16 January 1838, Vol. XL, 8; Peel, HC 25 January 1838, Vol. XL, 504.  
The ‘free’ constitution envisaged in the 1830s was, however, distinct from the notion of ‘responsible’ 
government put forward in the Durham Report of 1839, as British parliamentarians generally 
struggled in this period with ‘responsible’ government within an imperial context.  See, for example, 
Russell, HC, 6 March 1837, Vol. XXXVI, 1295; Russell, HC, 3 June 1839, Vol. LXVII, 1260-1274; 
Melbourne, HL, 2 February 1838, Vol. XL, 687; and  Stanley, HC, 8 March 1837, Vol. XXXVII, 118. 
 Stanley, HC, 8 March 1837, Vol. XXXVII, 125. See also Peel, HC, 14 April 1837, Vol. XXXVII, 21
1283-1284.
 Stanley, HC, 8 March 1837, Vol. XXXVII, 125-126.22
 Durham, HL, 18 January 1838, Vol. XL, 241.23
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act for the Crown’ - in that it was the actions of the British government in London giving the 
‘protection’ of the Crown in Canada that were themselves attacked in Parliament for being 
‘arbitrary’.   24
Lastly, protection was often combined with the related notion of allegiance, which then 
allowed British rule to be presented as, effectively, being the fulfilment of an obligation 
owed for the loyalty of the Canadians.   Chitty certainly made an explicit connection 
between the protection due from a state under international law, and the allegiance owed by a 
subject as a matter of British domestic law, in his note on Vattel’s section on the duty of self-
preservation in his 1834 edition of the Law of Nations: 
This principle is in every respect recognised and acted upon by our municipal law. It is in 
respect of, and as a due return for, the protection every natural born subject is entitled to, 
and actually does, by law, receive from the instant of his birth, that all the obligations of 
allegiance attach upon him, and from which he cannot by any act of his own emancipate 
himself.  25
The link between protection and allegiance was also consistent with the way that British 
politicians tended to indicate that Canada was to remain a British possession because that is 
what its people wanted.   Russell, for example, made clear that he ‘did not look forward to 
the maintenance of British authority and British dominion contrary to the express wish of the 
Canadian people’.    Similarly, Peel later considered that Canada had ‘to be protected at all 26
risks and against all parties’, in part because ‘the people of the two Canadas had ... declared 
their intention to stand by that union’.        27
Explanations of British action in Canada in terms of protection and allegiance mattered for 
policy to the United States because they placed the future of Canada into a context in which 
the separation of a colony could, at least, be contemplated within international law.  Many 
ministers and other parliamentarians gave credence to this by alluding to the possibility of a 
peaceful separation of Britain from the Canadas, albeit often in the future.   These included, 
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, pp. 87-90.24
 Chitty, Note 15, Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I, S17.25
 Russell, HC, 22 December 1837, Vol. XXXIX, 1500.  See also Melbourne, HL, 8 February 1838, 26
Vol. XL, 882-883, who stated that Britain ‘should be able to maintain’ its possessions ‘ not merely by 
force of arms, but by the good will, the friendly feelings of the inhabitants of those countries’. 
 Peel, HC, 12 June 1840, Vol. LIV, 1121. 27
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for example, Russell, Labouchere, Gladstone, Lansdowne, and Aberdeen.    This was 28
important as it implicitly, at least, took account of the American ‘contest’ and the foundation, 
more recently, of the South American republics, albeit that, as observed by Fisch, in the latter 
case there had been a contention for ‘an unconditional right to independence for all colonies’ 
[emphasis added].    It was also significant that others, following Russell’s lead, even made 29
an express link between British rule, and the Canadian wish for allegiance.  Peel, for 
example, wanted to be ‘assured that there is a disposition existing in it [Canada] to cultivate 
our connection’ before being ‘expected’ to ‘undertake a charge of defending the colony in 
time of war’.   Similarly, Ashburton thought it ‘well’ that Canada stayed in the Empire if 30
that is what it wanted, but, if ‘they demanded to be separated’, then it was ‘most consistent 
with sound policy to shake hands with them, and let them join with the North Americans, if 
they so thought fit.’    Within the framework contemplated by the British explanation of 31
protection, therefore, the future of Canada could be seen as being in the hands of the 
Canadians, and the United States did not need to step in. 
International law also made an important contribution to the way Britain was able to handle 
the issue of border security with the United States during and after the Canadian rebellions.  
Although, as will be seen, some serious incidents still occurred, legal principles nevertheless 
justified a significant level of British-American cooperation.   International law’s main 
impact was in providing the basis for Britain to be able to call for the American government 
to perform its duty and, thereby, take steps to prevent citizens of the United States from 
attacking a power with which it was at peace.   This ability to demand action to restrain 
American citizens was hugely significant given the widespread British concern about the 
 Russell, HC, 16 January 1838, Vol. XL, 41; Labouchere, HC, 23 January 1838, Vol. XL, 417; 28
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possible consequences of serious intervention from them.   As Sir Francis Head told Fox, it 
was ‘unfair and unjust’ that the rebellion ‘should be renewed and rendered formidable by the 
direct and active encouragement of the American people’.   Indeed, the importance of the 32
‘duty’ to Britain can be seen by the way Fox emphasised it in his reports to Palmerston.   Fox 
wrote, initially, of the willingness of the United States government ‘to do their duty towards 
Great Britain, and to restrain the shameful excesses of their citizens’    Similarly, although 33
worried by the practical ability of the armed forces of the United States to make an impact on 
the ground, he nevertheless reported later that ‘they are doing their duty, to the utmost extent 
of their means; under circumstances of the most extraordinary difficulty and 
embarrassment.’    The other main effect was that Britain was not prevented by any 34
principle of international law from treating any American citizens captured in Canada as 
ordinary criminals.   As will be seen, this was also to have material consequences. 
Britain and the United States were able to co-operate around border security in this way 
because both perceived that they had the same broad rights and obligations within a shared 
framework of law.   Sovereignty was the key common principle for the way both states 
considered that there was an American duty to prevent damaging interference from citizens, 
albeit that the exact basis for that obligation was expressed differently.  Britain appears to 
have relied on principles of international law applicable to the relations between independent 
sovereign states.   British policy, thus, assumed that there was an obligation - Fox’s ‘duty’ in 
the above quotations - on one sovereign state to try to prevent its citizens from damaging the 
interests of another state with whom it was in friendly relations.   Britain did not express this 
as a duty of neutrality, so the implication is that it was conceived, rather, as a general duty 
owed by the United States in the circumstances.  Whilst the derivation of Britain’s ‘duty’ was 
not specified in the diplomatic exchanges, such a general ‘duty’ was, however, consistent 
with the principle stated by Vattel that ‘the nation or sovereign ought not to suffer the 
citizens to do an injury to the subjects of another state, much less to offend that state itself’.   35
By demanding general action, British policy also conformed to Vattel’s notion that the duty 
 Head to Fox, 23 December 1837, in Fox to Stevenson, 4 January 1838, Diplomatic 32
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of a state was merely to mitigate the overall risk of such actions, and that it was not generally 
to be held liable for the specific activities of unauthorised individuals.   36
In contrast, the United States acknowledged a duty to Britain, but it did so, rather, in the 
terms of the principles of neutrality and ‘non-interference’ owed between friendly sovereign 
states.   This particular language was consistent with the domestic law of the United States, 37
which contained legislation to reinforce its policy of neutrality in the conflicts of states with 
which it was at peace.    It also accorded with the principles within the shared framework, as 38
seen in chapter 3.  Stevenson, accordingly, referred to the ‘obligations of neutrality’ when 
telling Palmerston in 1838 that ‘everything’ had been done which Britain ‘had a right to 
expect’.    Indeed, he even claimed that the ‘cessation of hostilities’ in Canada was ‘in a 39
great measure’ to be ‘attributed’ to the ‘prompt and vigorous measures adopted by the United 
States’.    Similarly, Webster expressed the basis of any obligations of the United States in 40
the duties of neutrality under international law.   For Webster, ‘the just interpretation of the 
modern law of Nations’ was ‘that neutral States are bound to be strictly neutral’, which, in 
turn, meant that it was ‘a manifest and gross impropriety for individuals to engage in the 
civil conflicts of other States, and thus to be at war, while their Government is at peace’.        41
More generally, Webster, also linked the duty to take action against citizens to the principle 
of ‘non-interference’, on the basis that that  ‘salutary doctrine...is liable to be essentially 
impaired if, while Government refrains from interference, interference is still allowed to its 
subjects, individually or in masses.’   The United States also appears to have accepted that 42
international law did not prevent Britain from having the right to prosecute Americans 
involved in the Canadian disturbances under its domestic criminal law, provided they were 
caught within British jurisdiction.  This will be discussed further below, but the principle, 
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was certainly, broadly, consistent with Vattel, who considered that the affected state in such 
circumstances ‘may without scruple bring [the offender] to justice and punish him.’     43
From a British perspective, however, not much turned, in practice, on whether or not there 
were fine distinctions between Britain and the United States in their respective legal 
justifications for the American ‘duty’.  The critical point is that Britain got the cooperation 
sought by its policy.    Indeed, in the circumstance, the overall level of support from the 
United States was remarkable.  The federal government was, clearly, not in support of its 
citizens getting involved in Canada, with Forsyth, for example, going so far as to comment 
to Stevenson, in November, 1838, that the ‘disturbances’ in Canada were now ‘happily 
suppressed’.   Britain also benefited from the continued attempts made by the United States 44
to prevent attacks by American citizens throughout, and after, the period of the Canadian 
rebellions, as will be seen.  It is, therefore, unsurprising that there is no suggestion from 
diplomatic papers and parliamentary exchanges that Britain considered the United States to 
be in breach of its obligations to aid security under international law.   Within parliament, 
Russell, for example, assured the House of Commons that ‘the conduct of the United States 
Government since the commencement of the disturbances in Canada strongly tends to 
convince us, that from the United States the Canadian rebels will meet with neither sympathy 
nor assistance’.   Others similarly supportive of the position adopted by the United States at 45
that time included Melbourne, Palmerston, Glenelg, Labouchere, Ellice, and Evans.  46
Three examples of action taken by the United States in the period serve to illustrate the 
importance of this security assistance.  The United States took its first serious action to 
restrict the ability of its citizens to attack Canada following the outbreak of revolts in 1837.   
Most importantly at this time, Van Buren introduced a further Neutrality bill early in 1838 
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with the aim of enhancing border security.       This made a significant contribution, with 47
Fox describing ‘the most important provisions’ of the bill as being those which ‘empower the 
Federal Government to prevent the collecting of arms and ammunition, within the United 
States, for the purposes of hostile aggression against conterminous countries’.    The United 48
States also took steps to place troops in the border region.    Again, this move made an 
impact, with Fox thus, able to report in March, 1838 of three instances where forces under 
Wool, Worth, Scott and Brady had ‘disarmed’ and ‘dispersed’ ‘rebels and pirates’, an 
‘armament’, and ‘piratical bands’ in areas near Lake Champlain, Lake Erie, and Detroit 
respectively.    Similar vigilance also continued until, at least, June, 1838, when Forsyth 49
informed Fox of the ‘measures’ that were at that point ‘in progress, under the President’s 
directions, to maintain the peace of the frontier’.    These included the use of ‘unarmed 50
steamers’ on Lakes Erie and Ontario, the placing of a ‘force’ in Sackett's Harbour , and the 51
sending of General Macomb, the Commander-In-Chief of the U.S. Army, to the ‘northern 
frontier to conduct operations there’.    52
The second instance occurred late in 1838 when the United States provided perhaps its most 
critical intelligence during the period of the renewed disturbances in Canada.  In this 
instance, Forsyth passed on to Fox the concern of American officials at Rochester and 
Oswego that there was a ‘secret combination’ of up to 40,000 men along the border ‘for the 
purpose of again invading Her Majesty’s Provinces’.    Significantly, Fox later confirmed to 53
Palmerston the veracity of this information from investigations on the Canadian side of the 
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border.   In line with the British policy approach of demanding the American government 54
fulfil its duty, Britain confirmed that it expected appropriate action from the United States.       
Writing to Vail, the Acting Secretary of State, Fox, thus, said that he relied ‘confidently upon 
the friendship and honour of the United States themselves, to exert the necessary powers’, on 
the grounds that British subjects were ‘exposed’ to ‘the hazard and suffering of a state of war 
while they are precluded from retaliating or making just reprisal upon their enemy’.  55
Crucially, Forsyth accepted, in response, that it was ‘the duty of the United States’ [emphasis 
added] to ‘suppress’ any ‘organised combination’ against Britain within the United States.    56
Britain and the United States also further cooperated around the time of these renewed 
disturbances on the issue of the treatment of American citizens caught participating in hostile 
actions against the Canadian provinces.  Fox’s despatches to Palmerston from late 1838 refer 
to disturbances or plotting in Montreal, Prescott (in Upper Canada), Detroit, Lockport and 
Buffalo.    The actions of the United States make it clear that it accepted that American 57
citizens captured in Canada taking part in such rebellious operations could be tried and 
punished by the Canadian authorities as private citizens without any protection from the 
American government.   Van Buren's important proclamation of the 21st November, 1838 
dealt expressly with the position of those taking part in such ‘criminal enterprises’ in Canada, 
and said that they ‘must not expect the interference of this Government, in any form, on their 
behalf’.    The link to international law was also evident as the proclamation explicitly 58
encouraged American citizens to assist with the ‘arrest’ of American citizens breaching laws 
‘providing for the performance of our obligations to the other Powers of the world’.     They 59
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should do this, it declared, not also for the sake of the United States, but also from a ‘love of 
order and respect for that sacred code of laws by which national intercourse is regulated’.   60
Lastly, the United States also continued to take action during the period of renewed border 
tension following the arrest of McLeod in late 1840.   Webster was clearly concerned at this 61
time by the risk of American citizens provoking or joining disturbances in Canada.        62
Accordingly, he warned Tyler, in April, 1841, of around 10,000 individuals in Hunters 
Lodges and Patriotic Societies from Maine to Wisconsin, who ‘desire [war between Britain 
and the United States] above all things’, and who intended ‘to unite themselves to the 
disaffected in Canada, declare the provinces free, and set up another government’.   As the 63
date of McLeod’s trial approached, Tyler then issued a proclamation, on the 25th September, 
1841, threatening punishment for ‘illegal acts’ aimed at the ‘Territories of a Power with 
which the United States are at peace’.    The proclamation also made it clear, again, that the 64
British authorities would be allowed by the United States to prosecute any individuals 
concerned as a matter of local criminal law.    Significantly, Webster also passed to the 65
British copies of the reports of United States agents concerning the Patriot groups along the 
Canadian border, and reported that Tyler was to renew the Neutrality Law.  66
In addition to this important contribution from the general principles of international law, it 
should, also, be acknowledged that treaty law was relevant to the issue of border security.   
The Exchange of Notes, 1817 limited the number of American and British naval ships that 
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could be positioned on the Great Lakes.    This was, however, a problem for Britain in the 67
context of the border disturbances, where the focus was on stopping incursions from 
American citizens, as opposed to preventing the build up of a force of the U. S. Navy.   
Britain, as a result, undoubtedly breached the limits of the Exchange of Notes following the 
the Canadian rebellions, which raises the question of whether or not there was, in this 
instance, a breakdown in international law.   This would, not, however, be a fair 
characterisation, as the situation did not, in substance, involve a failure of international law.   
On the contrary, the British breach needs to be seen in light of the fact that Britain had an 
unconditional right to terminate the Exchange of Notes, and yet still sought to maintain the 
overall principle of maintaining a regulatory agreement.   Fox, thus, informed the United 
States in 1838 that British increases in naval vessels on the Great Lakes were for the 
purposes of defence and intended to be temporary.    This position then remained 68
unchallenged by the United States until Webster raised it in the autumn of 1841.    Aberdeen 69
then again expressed the self-defensive nature of the British forces, but asserted a wish to 
retain the Exchange of Notes as ‘one of the most valuable existing securities for the 
preservation of that peace and harmony between Great Britain and the United States’.    70
Britain, thus, clearly considered that the treaty law in the Exchange of Notes was important 
Exchange of Notes, 1817, accessed through Project Avalon, Yale Law School, on 23/05/16; all 67
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to long-term British security, albeit that it was to be interpreted flexibly according to 
circumstance.  71
  
McLeod, the Caroline, and the Question of Territorial Incursions 
International law was also fundamental to the way in which British policy dealt with the 
tensions arising from border security during the period.   Britain and the United States 
worked, as seen, under the influence of legal principles to prevent American citizens from 
getting involved in Canadian affairs.   Whilst this produced some definite results, it was also, 
unsurprisingly, unable to restrain all the activities of all the inhabitants along the frontier all 
of the time.   Two particular problems remained.   The main risk was of a relatively minor 
incident escalating unintentionally into a wider conflict between Britain and the United 
States.    This occurred in the important associated cases of the Caroline and McLeod, as to 72
be considered immediately below.   The other concerned the British desire, after the 
Caroline, to be able to enter American territory to pursue rebels considered to be significant 
for the position in Canada.    International law was central to both issues because each 
involved perceived British or American rights and obligations.  The Caroline, McLeod, and 
the question of territorial intrusions were, at heart, legal disputes, albeit ones that derived 
their significance from the surrounding circumstances.   Law, legal argument, and the shared 
framework, as a result, played a leading role in the process of their resolution.   This did not 
in itself, of course, mean that there would always be a solution.   In particular, in the case of 
McLeod, this was only achieved after his acquittal by a New York jury in October, 1841.       
It did, however, serve to reduce the tensions between the two governments, and, thereby, 
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paved the way for many of the underlying concerns to be addressed in the negotiations 
around the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.       
The Caroline and McLeod incidents were both, then, matters that were defined and shaped 
by principles of international law.  To reiterate, briefly, the Caroline, broadly, consisted of 
the capture in December, 1837 by British forces of a privately owned steamboat in the 
territory of the United States, involving the boat's ultimate destruction, one death, and some 
injuries.   Britain alleged that the Caroline was being used to transport people, ammunition, 73
and supplies from the United States to Navy Island (itself a British possession in the Niagara 
River), from where attacks on British territory were being planned.   Nevertheless, the 74
presence of British forces on American soil made an immediate impact in the United States, 
with Fox reporting that the first news of the Caroline was received in Washington on the 5th 
January, 1838, and that it was ‘occasioning a very great uproar throughout the whole 
country’.    At its core, the Caroline affair was a legal dispute because it concerned the legal 75
question of whether or not the principle of territorial inviolability could be defeated, in such 
circumstances, by the further principle of self-preservation.   The United States, accordingly, 
made a prompt official complaint to Britain on the 6th January, 1838, in response to which 
Fox justified the British action ‘in destroying that vessel’ mainly on grounds of the ‘necessity 
of self defence and self preservation’.    Fox nevertheless also told Palmerston that he 76
expected a ‘formal demand for redress’ would be made by Stevenson in London.  77
The influence of international law in guiding British policy in relation to the Caroline is also 
underlined by the important role of legal advice.   Britain acted, as seen, on the premise that 
the attack on the Caroline was lawful under international law.  Crucially, this line was also 
supported by legal advice from the three main law officers of the Crown in February, 1838.        
In a joint opinion, the officers advised that the destruction of the Caroline was ‘under the 
circumstances, perfectly justifiable by the law of nations’, and ‘that the British forces, with a 
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view of self-preservation, were fully justified in attacking the “Caroline” and treating her as 
a belligerent vessel’.    Campbell, the Attorney-General at the time, later confirmed his 78
perception of the significance of this report for the making of British policy, commenting 
that he ‘wrote a long justification of our Government, and this supplied the arguments used 
by our Foreign Secretary till the Ashburton Treaty hushed up the dispute’.   Of course, the 79
fact that the law officers of the Crown considered the British action lawful did not mean that 
this analysis was agreed by the United States.   Indeed, Stevenson duly made a formal 
complaint on behalf of the United States which argued that it was ‘forbidden’ to ‘commence 
or continue any act of violence against enemies’ ships, within the limits and jurisdiction of a 
Neutral Nation’.    The advice of the law officers does, however, mean that law influenced 80
the way Britain handled the Caroline.   In the event, Palmerston made no immediate reply to 
the substance of Stevenson's letter, and instead simply acknowledged it, leaving it 
unanswered through the remainder of the period of the Canadian rebellions.  81
The Caroline incident then subsequently came back into the immediate limelight after the 
associated arrest of McLeod, which itself raised further questions of international law.  The 
State of New York arrested Alexander McLeod in November, 1840, and charged him with 
murder on the grounds that he had been one of the party attacking the Caroline.   Again, to 82
reiterate, briefly, Britain’s issue with McLeod’s arrest was based entirely on its analysis of 
how international law applied to the situation, which was considered to preclude such action 
being taken against an individual.   Fox, therefore, promptly demanded that McLeod be freed 
on the basis of the principle of international law that there was no individual responsibility 
for ‘public’ acts.   The Caroline incident, he argued, was a subject only for state to state 83
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discussion ‘according to the usages of nations’ as it was ‘a publick act of persons in Her 
Majesty’s service, obeying the order of their superior authorities’.   This also represented 84
the considered British response, with Palmerston subsequently approving Fox’s initial  
analysis.   Importantly, legal advice was indirectly involved in the British approach to 85
McLeod.  Fox relied, in being able to act so quickly, on the same words he had received from 
Palmerston in 1838 in the context of a similar case, involving an individual called Christie 
from Upper Canada, who, too, had been alleged to have been involved in the Caroline.   86
Crucially, the text in Palmerston’s despatch to Fox from 1838 about Christie was, it appears, 
approved by the Queen’s Advocate.  87
International law came to be at the heart of the resulting McLeod dispute because the United 
States did not, however, initially accept this British position.  British policy on McLeod was 
following a principle of international law consistent with the British practice of considering 
the state to be a ‘general body’, separate from territory, ruler, or people, as discussed in 
chapter 2.   Whilst the further principle that individuals, such as McLeod, could not be held 
responsible for actions properly attributable to the state, was not itself described earlier as 
one of the key principles within British practice, it was nevertheless clearly present in Vattel, 
who, for example, stated that: 
if a nation ... approves and ratifies the act of the individual, it then becomes a public 
concern; and the injured party is to consider the nation as the real author of the injury, of 
which the citizen was perhaps only the instrument.    88
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Crucially, however, the United States rejected this legal analysis in the immediate aftermath 
of McLeod’s arrest in their diplomatic exchanges with Britain.   Instead, Forsyth stated that 
the President (van Buren) was ‘not aware of any principle of international Law’ which gave 
an offender ‘impunity before the legal tribunals when coming voluntarily within their 
independent and undoubted jurisdiction’, on the grounds that he ‘acted in obedience to their 
superior authorities’, or because his ‘acts have become the subject of diplomatic discussion 
between the two governments’.   Forsyth also added that the public nature of the Caroline 89
incident had not in any event been ‘communicated to the government of the United States by 
a person authorised to make such admission’.   Finally, Britain and the United States also 90
disagreed about whether the federal government had, in any event, the right to interfere in 
such state matters, with Palmerston rejecting any notion that it was not responsible under 
international law.    91
British policy was also forced by the case of McLeod to return to the issue of the Caroline.  
This was because the status of the attack on the Caroline, as a ‘public act’ of the British state, 
was central to McLeod’s position under international law.  A further consequence, however, 
was the inevitable renewed attention on the question of whether, even if the Caroline was 
such a public act, it was a lawful one.  International law, though, remained central to the 
British case on the Caroline, with the main points from the earlier legal analysis simply 
being reiterated.  Fox, thus, told Forsyth that ‘the act [involved in the Caroline] was one in 
the strictest sense of self defence, rendered absolutely necessary, by the circumstances of the 
occasion, for the safety and protection of Her Majesty’s subjects’.      Interestingly, Bradley 92
and Gardner, the American lawyers now acting for McLeod, took the slightly different line 
that the taking of Navy Island by the rebels was itself war, and, therefore, was also a cause of 
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war.   They quoted Vattel as authority, referring to his sections on the right to security, 93
which produces the right of resistance and of reparation (II, SS 49-51), the just causes of war 
(III, Chapter 3), and the obligations of neutrality, including one that a neutral country was 
‘not to afford a retreat to troops, that they may again attack their enemies’ (III, SS 103, 104, 
and 133).    Whilst there may not, as a result, have been absolute legal unanimity on the 94
British side, the contending legal analyses do, however, again underline the centrality of 
international law to the Caroline.   
The huge impact of international law on British policy, however, is demonstrated not only by 
its role in the specifics of the issues themselves, but also by the fact that Britain seriously 
contemplated war over McLeod.   McLeod, and the connected Caroline matter, were, after 
all, diplomatic issues that gained their prominence from the respect paid to the relevant rules 
of international law, as opposed to the intrinsic serious nature of the incidents themselves.       
The arrest, trial, and possible conviction of one man only mattered to Britain because 
international law gave his actions a public character.   The destruction, death and injuries in 
the Caroline, were mainly important to the United States because they took place just in 
American territory, which international law considered inviolable.  Yet, despite their 
importance being derived from international law, Britain prepared for war over them.      
Furthermore, the British threat of war appears to have been genuine from the outset.     
Palmerston gave Fox notice early in 1841 to leave Washington in the event of McLeod being 
‘tried, convicted and executed’, and told him that, if he did so depart, to inform the naval 
officers in the Atlantic.   Fox made several references to war in his correspondence.       95 96
Palmerston also requested information from British consuls in the United States concerning 
 Gardner and Bradley to A-G of Upper Canada, 13 February 1841, as contained in Stephen, CO, to 93
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any American naval preparations.    The feeling that war was a risk is reflected, too, in 97
comments from the American side.  Stevenson told Webster in March, 1841 that, whilst he 
had ‘no reason to believe’ this was the view of the British government, there ‘seems to be a 
general impression that War is inevitable’.   More directly, Webster wrote to Tyler in April, 98
1841 that war was ‘inevitable, in ten days’ if a mob attack resulted in the death of McLeod 
(who was at this point in custody in the State of  New York).    99
Importantly, British policy also continued to anticipate the possibility of war following the 
change of government in Britain in September, 1841, which suggests that the point of law 
involved was given a consistently high relative weighting by both the Whigs and the Tories.      
On taking over as Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen, thus, repeated Palmerston's earlier 
instruction for Fox to leave Washington if McLeod was convicted and executed.   British 100
ministers, too, as noted by Chamberlain, met to discuss war preparations on the 18th 
October, 1841.   Stanley, the new Colonial Secretary, shared the concern over war at the 101
time, telling Russell that ‘my fears predominate over my hopes as to a peaceable termination 
of our differences with the United States’.    As again was the case in the spring, the United 102
States, too, was aware of British intentions.   Fox reported that he told Tyler, at a meeting in 
September, 1841, that Britain could not permit ‘sacrificing the life of a British subject, or 
submitting to a shameful national outrage’, and that ‘the object of the war would be to strike 
so terrible an example as should prevent any nation in the world from again committing so 
monstrous a public crime’.   The British threat was also known more widely in 103
Washington.  As Clay, perhaps the pre-eminent American Whig politician, put it, he was 
happy, after McLeod’s acquittal, ‘at the disappearance of all cause at least of immediate 
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hostilities with G. Britain’ because he had understood that, otherwise, the ‘event of a War, if 
not desired was expected by the Executive’.  104
The most important impact of international law on British policy, however, came from the 
way that it provided a structure of rules to guide Britain’s handling of the Caroline and 
McLeod disputes.  Consistent with the legal nature of the issues, Britain and the United 
States worked within a shared framework of international law to reach a diplomatic 
resolution of both the McLeod and Caroline matters.  The key development was the 
appointment of Webster as Secretary of State in the administrations of Presidents Harrison 
and Tyler from March, 1841.  This mattered because Webster’s crucial contribution was to 
align the American view of the international law concerning the McLeod case with that of 
the British government.  Whilst this did not mean that McLeod was released from custody in 
New York, or that the risk of war was removed, British-American relations were 
undoubtedly assisted by this change of emphasis by the federal government.   It also meant 105
that Britain and the United States were in a better position to work together to resolve the 
McLeod and Caroline matters, both before, and after, the acquittal of McLeod in October, 
1841.  As will be seen, whilst they did not always agree on the legal analysis to be applied to 
the circumstances, Britain and the United States were now, at least, starting from a basis of 
the same broad principles of international law in both problems.  In the Caroline, the 
principles of territorial inviolability and self-preservation had, of course, always been part of 
the shared framework, but Webster’s input extended the joint acceptance of the same basic 
rules to McLeod.  
British policy quickly accommodated the change of approach and emphasis brought by 
Webster to both McLeod and the Caroline.  In the case of McLeod, Fox immediately 
recognised the significance of the development, telling Palmerston in March, 1841 that the 
new government was ‘prepared to take an entirely different view of the question from that 
taken by the last Government’.    To this end, Webster’s first step in implementing the new 106
American position was to seek the ‘formal recognition’ by the British government of the 
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Caroline incident ‘as an act of public force, done under its authority’.   Fox formally made 107
such a statement in his despatch responding to Webster of the 12th March, 1841.   Webster 108
then made it clear that the United States and Britain shared the same view of the relevant 
international law.  Crucially, Crittenden, the American Attorney-General, was told that 
McLeod’s defence at his next hearing should be on the basis that McLeod himself was ‘not 
to be held answerable’ as an individual, and that this was ‘a principle of public law, 
sanctioned by the usages of all civilised Nations, and which the Government of the United 
States has no inclination to dispute’.   This new, effectively joint, approach was reflected in 109
Clay’s comment from April, 1841 that: ‘GB has made herself responsible for the Capture of 
the Caroline; and justice and national dignity both prompt us to look to her for national 
reparation, and not to consider the individual amenable to our Courts’.  110
Britain was also, however, simultaneously, faced with a renewed demand for an answer on 
the Caroline as a result of  Webster’s attention on McLeod.   The main American contention 
remained that the Caroline incident involved a breach of international law because the 
territory of the United States was not open to British forces.  As Webster asserted, the United 
States was ‘jealous of its rights, and among others, and most especially, of the right of the 
absolute immunity of its territory, against aggression from abroad’.   Webster, though, also 111
picked up the British justification of self-defence, and, whilst accepting it as a principle, 
questioned whether it actually helped Britain on the facts of the Caroline.  For him, the 
application of the principle would require ‘that Government [the British] to show a necessity 
of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation’.   Applying this test, Webster told Fox that the government of the United 112
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States did ‘not think that that transaction [the Caroline] can be justified by any reasonable 
application or construction of the right of self-defence under the laws of Nations’.   113
Webster was, thus, in this way using the principles of international law both to establish 
common ground (within the shared framework) and to make the case for the United States.  
Britain did not, however, respond immediately.  
This new approach brought by Webster failed in the short term to resolve either of the 
McLeod or Caroline disputes.   McLeod was not instantly freed on the grounds that 
international law precluded his being individually charged for the alleged offence.  A hearing 
was held in May 1841, where his release on the basis of the public law defence was 
demanded.    The decision of the New York court, however, was given in July, 1841 against 114
McLeod, who was then ordered to be tried later in the year.    Tension with Britain, as a 115
result, remained high.   Whilst, therefore, the immediate problem in McLeod remained, there 
is nevertheless some evidence that Webster may, at least, have been influencing, or 
reflecting, wider opinion in the United States with his stance.   Seward, the Governor of New 
York, commented before the July verdict that ‘if the assumption of the responsibility by the 
British government is a legal defence for him, I shall cheerfully submit to the decision of the 
Court’.    Furthermore, the decision itself received some criticism in the United States from 116
a legal perspective.    Such a wider acknowledgement of the international law principle 117
behind the British position can only have been helpful for the ultimate settlement of the 
issue.   The delay in the McLeod case did also inevitably mean, however, that there was no 
progress in the associated Caroline dispute.   As put by Palmerston, writing to Stevenson in 
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August, 1841, Britains’s ‘opinion’ remained that ‘the capture and destruction of the Caroline 
was a justifiable act of self defence’.       118
The shared framework, and Webster’s use of it, were, however, fundamental to the final 
settling of both McLeod and the Caroline disputes.  The key event which allowed this 
process to occur, and which removed the immediate threat of war, was the acquittal of 
McLeod after a trial in October, 1841.   The acquittal itself was not the result of arguments 119
based on international law, but rather a lack of evidence linking McLeod to the Caroline 
incident.    Principles of international law were, however, the basis of the subsequent 120
British and American positions on how the original perceived respective breaches of 
international law needed to be remedied.  In the case of McLeod, British policy was to 
request that the United States changed its constitution to ensure that future similar instances 
involving public acts, such as McLeod, could not be prosecuted at an individual state level.   
Aberdeen, thus, requested Fox to point out that Britain expected a solution for the 
constitutional issue at the centre of the McLeod matter.    Britain asked for this because, as 121
put by Peel, that, ‘the acquittal is no reparation for the public wrong’.   Unsurprisingly, 122
given that Webster’s views on the issue were consistent with Britain’s, a bill was 
subsequently introduced into Congress in April, 1842 allowing for cases, such as that of 
McLeod, to be removed from state to federal courts.  The new law finally passed Congress in 
August 1842, with Fox commenting that he viewed ‘the passage of this law as a very 
important point gained, with a view to the future maintenance of peace between the Two 
Countries’.  123
The Caroline was also settled on the basis of shared principles of international law.      
Ashburton and Webster reached an agreement in July, 1842 in which the relevant legal 
principles were reaffirmed - mainly with an eye to the future - whilst the question as to 
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whether or not the British action in the Caroline was actually justified on the facts was left 
open.   Ashburton's formal response for the British government, thus, confirmed that ‘we are 
perfectly agreed as to the general principles of international law applicable to this 
unfortunate case’.    Britain was under a ‘duty’, he accepted, to respect the principle of 124
territorial sovereignty, commenting that ‘respect for the inviolable character of the territory 
of independent nations is the most essential foundation of civilisation’.    Nevertheless, 125
Ashburton emphasised that there was also the right of self-defence (‘the first law of our 
nature’) under international law which could supersede territorial rights.    The reply of the 126
United States placed the agreement of these applicable principles of international law at its 
centre.   Webster reported that President Tyler was satisfied that Britain ‘fully admits those 
great principles of public law’, and stated that Britain and the United States understood 
‘these principles alike’.    What, thus, remained outstanding, of course, was the issue of 127
how these principles applied, in practice, to the Caroline.   Ashburton maintained that the test 
of self-defence was satisfied, albeit that Britain should have handled the matter more 
sensitively at the time.   Webster, on the contrary, contended that ‘the difference between 128
the two Governments’ was ‘only, whether the facts ... make out a case of such necessity for 
the purpose of self-defence’.   In light of the overall respectful tone of the British letter, this 129
disagreement was evidently not enough, however, to prevent the United States from 
confirming that it was prepared to move on.   The resolution of the Caroline was, thus, 130
based on the agreement of the shared framework of law and not the facts of the case itself.   
International law also influenced the handling of the other main outstanding problem for 
Britain related to border security, namely the question of what to do about the ongoing 
problem of rebels sheltering in the United States.   The United States accepted, as seen, the 
British treatment of any of its citizens involved in the Canadian revolts as criminals if they 
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were arrested in Canada.   Britain was, however, also concerned (following the Caroline) 
about the risk of its forces undertaking further temporary incursions into the territory of the 
United States for the purposes of dealing with insurgents.   International law was naturally 
considered  as a possible means by which such future British action could be justified.  
Britain’s primary position was that the principle of self-preservation could, in certain 
circumstances, take priority over territorial sovereignty in the unstable circumstances which 
the border was now in.  This, therefore, followed the British line in the Caroline itself.   Fox 
and Palmerston also, however, made an attempt to justify British action against such 
individuals in the territory of the United States, including in the Caroline, on the additional 
basis that the border was, in a loose sense, a ‘piratical’ area.   The United States, however, 
resisted both arguments, championing its right to territorial sovereignty.   Britain appears, 
from its actions, to have yielded to the position of the United States.  Its approach to the 
remaining problems of border security was, thus, dealt with within the shared legal 
framework.       
Britain’s main justification for any potential entry of British forces into American territory in 
pursuit of rebels remained self defence.  The practical question of what would happen in any 
future incidents, after the Caroline, seems to have arisen when Sir George Arthur asked Fox 
whether he thought some sort of advance permission for entry into American territory could 
be obtained.    Fox considered this ‘wholly impractical’, but did raise with Forsyth the 131
possibility of arguing in the future the ‘right of self defence’ when questioning whether, in 
the state of the border, British forces would ‘always have the forbearance to respect the 
American boundary’.   Forsyth, however, insisted that the United States expected that 132
‘under no pretext whatever’ would British forces ‘permit a violation of the territory of the 
United States’, and dismissed the question of self-defence as being ‘in reference to 
circumstances that have not happened, and which it is hoped will never occur’.    Britain‘s 133
response was pragmatic, with the question of international law involved seemingly being left 
to the facts and circumstances of any relevant future case.   As Fox told Palmerston, ‘such 
acts [of incursion] must I think be left to be justified afterwards, by the paramount and 
overruling necessity of self defence, and the force of irresistible and excessive 
 Fox to Palmerston, 19 November 1838, No. 34, FO 5/323, fols. 193-261.131
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provocation’.   Palmerston was more cautious, requesting still that the United States be 134
warned that ‘some little overstepping of the boundary’ may be undertaken in response to 
‘acts of positive war against Great Britain committed by individual citizens of the Union’.   135
He did, however, also observe that he was ‘persuaded’ that the American government ‘will 
see in the circumstances of the moment a sufficient excuse for the irregularity’.  136
Whatever the theoretical opening left by Fox and Palmerston, British policy, in practice, 
however, appears to have been to respect American territorial rights under international law 
following these exchanges.  This can be seen in two subsequent important examples.  In the 
first, in 1839, the Foreign Office requested legal advice on the circumstances surrounding the 
entry of British forces into American territory in pursuit of a man called Kelly.  The law 
officers of the Crown rejected any argument that this could be justified under the ‘general 
law of nations’ or on the same legal basis as that used by the United States to explain its 
attacks into Florida (then part of the Spanish Empire) in 1818.    The second is the case of 137
James Grogan, who was arrested by British forces in Vermont on the 19th September, 1841.  
President Tyler protested to Britain against ‘this most extraordinary transaction’.   Despite 138
the fact that Grogan was a sought after individual for ‘atrocities’ in Lower Canada in 1838, 
the British authorities released him as having been ‘wrongfully arrested’.   Stanley, the then 139
Colonial Secretary, considered the matter as ‘wholly indefensible’, and ‘an unjustifiable 
aggression upon the territory of a friendly power’.   Aberdeen, too, was concerned, telling 140
Fox to make it clear that Britain was prepared to pay ‘any reasonable indemnity’ for the 
‘unauthorised capture and detention of this individual’.  141
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Britain also made an attempt to characterise the border area as a refuge for ‘pirates’ when 
considering British action more generally against insurgents.  This was not developed into a 
formal line of policy, but was a recurrent theme of British diplomatic exchanges with the 
United States from the time of the Caroline.  Fox, in particular, used the terms ‘piratical’ and 
‘pirates’ when he was seeking to bolster British claims for self-preservation or self-defence 
against insurgents.  Although unexplained by him, the deployment of these descriptions was 
presumably designed to convey the notion that any British response to the actions of such 
individuals would be justified because they were outside the law or control of any one 
state.   International law was necessarily involved as an influence because ‘piracy’ and 142
‘pirates’ were terms with legal meaning.   Indeed, it was the main consequence of ‘piracy’ 
under international law - that ‘pirates’ could be apprehended by any state - that made the use 
of the terms especially sensitive to the United States.   Britain was, it seems, tentatively, then, 
trying to introduce a notion that a British response, even on American territory, would be 
justified because it was dealing with a special class of international outlaw against whom any 
state could lawfully take action.   Similar British attempts to widen the context for the use of 
‘piracy’ were also not uncommon, as noted in chapter 2.  
British references to ‘pirates’ developed after the Caroline, with Fox and Palmerston both 
drawing on ideas of ‘piracy’ when commenting on the problem of border security.  Fox, for 
example, linked the loss of the right to the inviolability of American territory in the Caroline 
to the actions of ‘pirates’ in stealing arms.  As he told Palmerston: ‘if they cannot even 
prevent the national artillery of the United States from being carried away publickly at mid-
day by pirates, ... they have no right to expect that the soil of the United States will be 
respected’.   Importantly, though, he then also pursued the same reasoning with Forsyth 143
directly, referring on separate occasions to the ‘piratical character of the steam boat 
“Caroline” ’, and more widely the ‘unlawful and piratical acts of hostility’ faced by the 
British provinces.   Furthermore, Fox returned to these themes after the arrest of McLeod 144
 ‘Piracy’ appears, therefore, to have been a development of the idea of a lawless border area, which 142
Fox had referred to earlier in 1837 in a letter concerning an attack in Lower Canada on a British 
magistrate in 1835: see Fox to Palmerston, No. 3, 25 January 1837, FO 5/314, fols. 13-115.
 Fox to Palmerston, No. 3, 13 January 1838, FO 5/322, fols. 3-12.  Fox made further references to 143
‘piracy’ in: Fox to Palmerston, No. 4, 21 January 1838, FO 5/322, fols. 13-22; and Fox to Palmerston, 
No. 13, 5 March 1838, FO 5/322, fols. 77-87.
 Fox to Forsyth, 6 February 1838, FO 5/322, fols. 51-52; Fox to Forsyth, 25 November 1838, FO 144
5/323, fols. 273-274. 
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in 1840, telling Forsyth that ‘[the] steam boat “Caroline” was a hostile vessel, engaged in 
piratical war against Her Majesty’s people’ and the ‘place where the vessel was destroyed ... 
had been deprived through overbearing piratical violence, of the use of its proper authority 
over that portion of territory’.    Palmerston, too, instructed Fox to remonstrate with the 145
United States, after the Caroline, about the ‘direct encouragement’ being given to ‘Pirates’ to 
take arms through the ‘insecure and unguarded state’ of American military stores.    He also 146
approved of Fox’s later dealings with Forsyth about McLeod, and referred to ‘American 
pirates’ as being involved in the Caroline.    Whilst many of these comments were in the 147
context of the Caroline, the principles involved would certainly have been applicable to 
other similar circumstances.  
Legal advice, however, resulted in Britain dropping the question of ‘piracy’ and the Canadian 
border in 1841.   The United States certainly firmly rejected from the outset any contention 
that its citizens were involved in ‘piracy’.   As put by Stevenson to Palmerston in 1838, ‘aid 
and succour ... from Foreigners, to persons conspiring to subvert or change their 
Government’ was not ‘regarded as Piracy’, and the Caroline  ‘was not piratical, nor could 
those on board of her be punished as Pirates or Outlaws’.    Similarly, Webster objected in 148
1841 to the description of ‘American Pirates’ for those citizens of the United States who 
were involved in the Caroline, stating simply that ‘their offence whatever it was had no 
analogy to cases of Piracy’.    Britain ultimately abandoned the point after Dodson, the 149
Queens’ Advocate, confirmed that the position of the United States was correct:       
Pirates are defined to be ‘Common Sea Rovers who acknowledge no Sovereign, and no 
Law, and support themselves by pillage and depredations at sea’.  The term, therefore, is 
not strictly applicable to the citizens of the United States, who took part with the 
Canadian insurgents.    150
 Fox to Forsyth, 29 December 1840, FO 5/349, fols. 318-323.145
 Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No. 20, 15 December 1838, FO 5/321, fols. 55-62.146
 Palmerston to Fox, 9 February 1841, British Documents, Vol. 1, 66.147
 Stevenson to Palmerston, 22 May 1838, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. III, 1445.148
 Extract of a note from Webster to Fox, 24 April 1841, FO 5/372, fols. 185-190. Sydenham agreed 149
with Webster: Sydenham to Russell, 25 May 1841, PRO 30/22/4A. 
 Dodson to Palmerston, 18 May 1841, FO 83/2207, fol. 167.150
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Whilst, therefore, relatively short-lived, the episode is nevertheless helpful in understanding 
the role of international law in the British-American relationship.   As with any legal code, 
practical situations tested the rules.  In this instance, the view of the United States on the 
meaning of ‘pirates’ prevailed.  The fact, however, that the United States argued over the use 
of piracy-related terms in this context, irrespective of how tangentially the point had been 
made by Britain, indicates that the deployment of words with meaning in international law 
was perceived to matter.  Law was, therefore, viewed as being able to shape the direction of 
policy.  Furthermore, the acceptance by Britain of the legal advice received is additional 
evidence of its respect for international law and the operation of the shared framework.  151
The Disputes over the Northeastern Boundary and Fishing Rights 
International law was at the centre of the Northeastern boundary dispute.  The central issue 
was that, whilst Article 2 of the 1783 Treaty set out the border from the the river St. Croix to 
the Lake of the Woods, Britain and the United States could not, in practice, agree where the 
frontier was actually positioned on the ground from the definition.   British policy to the 
problem at the beginning of the period was, as a result, shaped by both the ambiguity and 
realistic meanings of the words in the 1783 Treaty, as argued in chapter 3.  Ultimately, 
however, the border was eventually agreed in 1842 on a completely new basis, a so-called 
‘conventional’ line, in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty.   Such a fresh redrawing of the 152
border definition could, at first glance, suggest that previous agreements and law were 
unimportant to British policy.  This section, however, argues that international law was, 
nevertheless, still fundamental to the conduct of the dispute and its ultimate resolution.  It 
makes three main points.  Primarily, it argues that British policy operated within a legal 
framework more than is often appreciated.  This gave rise to significant effects on how the 
dispute developed.  It then aims to establish how Britain used legal argument as a means of 
pursing its policy aims.  This not only shows the centrality of law to the dispute, but also 
 This is especially the case given that there is some suggestion that Palmerston was unhappy with 151
the advice from Dodson.  In a note headed ‘ON Qu A’s Report of May 18, 1841’, he asks ‘Was this 
term “Pirate” used by the Law officers in their opinions’: FO 83/2207, fol. 168.
 The agreement of the boundary on such a new basis is often referred to as a ‘conventional’ 152
agreement or line in both the original documents and the historiography, presumably on the basis that 
it required a new ‘convention’ (i.e. agreement) to achieve it, as opposed to being a determination of 
what the boundary actually was, as already defined in Article 2 of the 1783 Treaty.
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reveals a meaningful level of  continuity in British policy.   Lastly, it contends that policy 
was specifically influenced by the principles of international law relating to sovereignty and 
the ownership of unoccupied land, both of which were within British practice as summarised 
in chapter 2 above.    
Before turning to the substance of these arguments, however, four brief general points need 
to be made in order to provide the necessary background for the role of international law to 
be fully explained.  
First, the key factual development that the section is concerned with is the new boundary 
agreement made in 1842.  To summarise the relevant part of chapter 3, the issues in the 
dispute were over the meaning of the words in the 1783 Treaty definition within four main 
areas: the territory from the river St. Croix to the river Connecticut, the land from the river 
Connecticut to Lake Ontario, the lakes Ontario, Erie, and Huron, and the border from Lake 
Superior to the Lake of the Woods .   The most heavily contested area, however, was the 
first, and this is shown in more detail on the map in the Appendix (the ‘Map’), with the 
American and British claims shown in blue and pink, respectively.   The new ‘conventional’ 
line defined in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 managed to resolve the problems in all 
four of the areas concerned.   The central agreement was that in the first.  From a British 
perspective, the new border here ensured that possession was retained of the military road 
from Halifax to Quebec (broadly along the north and east side of the valley of the river St 
John via Madawaska), but conceded the part of Madawaska south of the river St John, and 
an area of the highlands between the river St. John and Quebec.    The position of 153
Madawaska is shown on the Map.   The agreements relating to the other areas were, broadly, 
in favour of the United States    Most importantly, the wrongly-positioned ‘45th parallel’ 154
was confirmed as part of the new border between the river Connecticut and Lake Ontario, 
and the new boundary from north of Ile Royale in Lake Superior was defined so that a 
disputed triangular area of territory was given up to the United States.         155
 The relevant agreement is in Article 1, Webster-Ashburton Treaty 1842.153
 The relevant agreements are in Articles 1 and 2, Webster-Ashburton Treaty 1842.  The position of 154
the 45th parallel is discussed in the next paragraph. 
 The disputed area is discussed in chapter 3. The alleged mineral resources in the area were referred 155
to by Palmerston in parliament: HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1162-1218.  The level of the actual 
knowledge of the mineral resources as known at the time is, however, questioned in T. Le Duc, ‘The 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty and the Minnesota Iron Ranges’, Journal of American History, 51 (1964), 
476-481. 
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Second, the section is not arguing, however, that international law was the sole influence on 
British policy in making this settlement, but, rather, that it had an important impact on policy 
and how that agreement was reached.   Wider British and American interests, of course, 
affected the relative weighting given by Britain and the United States, respectively, to the 
points in the dispute.   This does not diminish law’s role, but rather simply reflects the way 
that facts and circumstances always impact on legal issues.   Indeed, it is important to 
acknowledge the significance of these other interests as they, too, help to explain the 
construction of the terms of the 1842 treaty.    From Britain’s perspective, therefore, the 156
key concern was clearly the military one of ensuring that its forces were able to continue to 
use the existing overland route connecting Halifax with Quebec.   Indeed, as put by 157
Ashburton, without that requirement, Britain may well not have persevered with its claim, 
however just it may have been.    A secondary British concern was the possession of the 158
highlands immediately south-east of Quebec.    The 1842 border, in fact, met both these 159
points, as Britain kept its use of the military route and not all of the the highlands were 
conceded.   For the United States, the main problem was the placing of part of the border in 
the 1783 Treaty on the 45th parallel.  The parallel had been wrongly-positioned on the 
ground, however, with the practical result that, if it was now changed to its correct position, 
many individuals and the military base of Rouse’s Point (near Lake Champlain) would have 
 As well as these wider interests, Campbell also noted that the discovery of a map from the time of 156
the 1783 Treaty may have affected the outcome of the negotiations. There is, however, no clear 
answer as to whether or not the map referred to by Campbell, or other maps, affected the dispute’s 
resolution.  Peel suggested in parliament that such maps were not particularly useful, but other 
contemporary notes indicate the British may have thought different privately: see generally, Campbell, 
HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 661; Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252;  Aberdeen to 
Peel, 17 January 1843, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40453, fols. 337-338; and a note by Harriet de Burgh, 
wife of Clanricarde, Ashburton Negotiations Memorandum, February, 1843, Palmerston Papers, GC/
CL/91-97.  
 The American claim threatened this route.157
 Ashburton to Webster, 13 June 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 194.  For the background to the 158
British concern, see Aberdeen to Ashburton, 8 February 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 164; 
Aberdeen to Ashburton, 31 March 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 165; Aberdeen to Ashburton, 1 
April 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 166; Ashburton to Aberdeen, 25 April 1842, British 
Documents, Vol. 1, 175; Aberdeen to Ashburton, 26 May 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1,183; and 
Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, p. 49.
 See, in particular, Aberdeen to Ashburton, 26 May 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 183.159
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been put into British North America.    Again, this point, as seen, was secured to the 160
American advantage in 1842. 
Furthermore, international law also partly overlapped, in any event, with British interests, 
reducing the scope of the apparent dichotomy.  Apart from the above military considerations, 
the other main interest for Britain in the dispute was the overarching one of maintaining 
‘honour’.  Peel, for example, put the question of ‘honour’ at the forefront of the Canadian 
question as a whole when commenting on Aberdeen’s instructions to Ashburton in 1842.      
‘Why’, he asked, should Britain ‘contract the tremendous obligation of having to defend, on 
a point of honour, this territory against American aggression?’    As seen in chapter 2, 161
however, ‘honour’ was to some extent linked to the upholding of British rights under 
international law.   The matter of  ‘honour’, as associated with legal rights, was, thus, 
inevitably going to be involved in the Northeastern boundary, given that the dispute 
concerned both Britain’s rights under the 1783 Treaty and the principle of the ‘preservation’ 
of its possessions.   Palmerston, for one, felt there was a link between between ‘honour’, 
‘law’ and the boundary.  As he put it in the parliamentary debate on the 1842 settlement: ‘we 
threw away concessions which ought to have been employed to procure for us better terms’, 
and ‘the interests, rights, and dignity of the country have been unnecessarily sacrificed’.         162
Recognising the significance of ‘honour’, thus, not only helps for the understanding of the 
dispute, but also  provides some further tangential evidence of the wider influence of 
international law.       
      
Third, in appreciating the role of international law in the dispute, it is important to 
understand that there was a material strand of continuity in British policy.  Too much 
emphasis has traditionally been placed on the negotiations for the 1842 Treaty as being the 
decisive element in resolving the issues concerned.   The current historiography rightly 
draws attention to the level of regional stability gained from the settlement of the dispute in 
1842.    It also, however, tends to focus on the 1842 agreement itself, playing on the 163
 On the perceived importance of Rouse’s Point to the United States, see Bourne, Britain and the 160
Balance of Power, pp. 106-109.
 Peel to Aberdeen, 16 May 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43062, fols. 48-54.161
 Palmerston, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1162-1218.162
 See, for example, Lambert, Winning without Fighting, p.177.  See also, Bourne, Britain and the 163
Balance of Power, p. 119. 
 143
apparent contrast between Peel and Aberdeen’s quick deal, and Palmerston’s previous 
constant haggling over the 1783 Treaty.   What is lost, therefore, is the theme of British 
policy throughout the period that, ultimately, a new agreement or arbitration would be 
needed.   Palmerston certainly aimed, from 1837, to reach agreement for a new commission 
‘of exploration and survey’ to try again to ‘trace out a boundary according to the letter of the 
Treaty’.   Privately, however, he believed that any such commission would fail, leaving a 164
‘conventional’ boundary as the then realistic option.    Furthermore, the proposal for a new 165
commission then itself developed into one which also included provision for a new 
arbitration.    The 1842 negotiations for a ‘conventional’ line were, thus, within the scope 166
of long term British policy: nobody seriously thought the 1783 Treaty line would be upheld.        
Recognition of this ‘continuity’ matters because it then, in turn, allows the role and 
significance of international law to be better identified.   As will be seen, law guided the 
process, arguments and aims adopted throughout this protracted period, and, as a 
consequence, also affected what settlement could, in practice, be achieved.  British policy, 
thus, needs to be seen more as a long-term operation within the constraints of a legal dispute 
than a free contest over the boundary in which 1842 was decisive in setting the terms.   
Lastly, fourth, the course of the dispute also needs need to be appreciated as being affected 
by the so-called ‘Aroostook War’ of 1838-39.   There had been border skirmishes in the 
disputed area affecting Maine before, but this was a more serious event as it involved 
sustained and widespread activities.   It began when the Maine land agent and an armed 
group entered the Aroostook valley in late 1838 to remove individuals, who from their 
perspective, were trespassers cutting timber.    The authorities in New Brunswick saw 167
 Fox to Forsyth, 10 January 1838, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1423.164
 As Palmerston wrote to Fox when proposing a new commission in 1837, his view at that time was 165
that: ‘it is geographically impossible to draw a line that shall be consistent with the words of the 
Treaty ... .  The probability is that the dispute never will be settled in any other way than by an equal 
division of the disputed territory between the two parties’, Palmerston to Fox, Private, 19 November 
1837, FO 5/313, fols. 73-80.  Britain was also sceptical of the outcome of any new commission to the 
United States: Fox to Forsyth, 10 January 1838, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1423. 
 No agreement for a new commission had, however, been reached by the time Palmerston left office 166
in 1841. See generally, on the negotiations for a new commission: Forsyth to Fox, 29 July 1839, 
Diplomatic Correspondence, 1240; Fox to Forsyth, 28 July 1840, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1522; 
Forsyth to Fox, 13 August 1840, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1258; and Palmerston to Fox, 24 
August 1841, No. 23, FO 5/358, fols. 78-98.
 Forsyth to Fox, 25 February 1839, as contained in Fox to Palmerston, No. 8, 7 March 1839, FO 167
5/331, fols. 103-186. The Aroostook valley was in the part of the disputed territory south of the river 
St. John.
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instead, however, simply an ‘armed body of men from the State of Maine’ in the disputed 
territory and responded by sending in troops.    The ‘war‘ was, thus, the consequence of the 168
respective actions of locals, all of whom were seeking to protect the competing territorial 
claims of their respective states.   The immediate result was that the land agents of Maine 
and New Brunswick were seized and held in each other’s territory respectively, albeit that 
both were later released.    Understandably, however, the situation remained tense, as it 169
potentially involved armed ‘forces’ from both Britain and the United States.   The situation 
was also made more worrying, from the British perspective, by the fact that it coincided with 
continuing unrest in Canada, with the consequence that any military conflict in the disputed 
territory could have had wider consequences.  Whilst, as will be seen, a joint British-
American response brought the situation under immediate control, the ‘war’, therefore, 
reinforced the need for a permanent agreement.  
Against this background, the first of the ways, then, in which international law influenced the 
conduct of the dispute was through the effects resulting from the operation of the legal 
framework established in the relevant treaties.   Britain and the United States worked within 
a prescribed legal process to a greater extent than is often appreciated, and the consequences 
of this made a significant impact on the course of the dispute.   Chapter 3 set out the 
structures established by the Jay Treaty, 1794 and the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 for dealing with 
the outstanding issues concerning the Northeastern boundary.   Crucially, the commission 
provided for by the Jay Treaty, 1794 determined that the source of the river St. Croix (as 
referred to in the 1783 Treaty) was more easterly than Britain contended.    This mattered 170
hugely as it governed the starting point under the 1783 Treaty for the northern line to the 
‘highlands’ of the treaty, with consequential implications for the future identification of those 
‘highlands’.  The British claim would undoubtedly have been better supported by a more 
westerly source of the river St. Croix.   Britain nevertheless accepted the decision of the 
Commissioners about the source of the St. Croix in 1798, despite later believing it to be 
incorrect.  As Palmerston noted in 1843:   
 Proclamation of New Brunswick, 13 February 1839, as contained in Fox to Palmerston, No. 7, 23 168
February 1839, FO 5/331, fols. 79-100.
 Fairfield to the Senate and House of Reps of Maine, 18 February 1839, and to House of Reps, 21 169
February 1839, as contained in Fox to Palmerston, No. 8, 7/3/39, FO 5/331, fols. 103-186.
 The decision of the Commissioners was on 25 October 1798, British Documents, Vol. 1, 170
Northeastern Memorandum, p. 36.
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This decision was clearly wrong, and has been the cause of much inconvenience since; 
but the British government of the day formally acquiesced in it; and the faith of the 
country having been pledged, there was no possibility of retracting the acquiescence thus 
given.  171
The process of international law in this case, thus, changed the future of the dispute, and 
Palmerston’s approach shows the respect given by the British government to decisions 
emanating from it. 
The process provided by the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 resulted in a more complex factual 
position.   The Commissioners, appointed under the treaty to determine the boundary, 
stopped in 1822, having failed to reach an agreement.   Britain and the United States, as a 172
result, then used the further provision in the treaty allowing for an arbitration, and agreed the 
King of the Netherlands as arbitrator in 1827.    The King’s 1831 decision - a proposed 173
compromise - was, however, in turn, rejected by the United States.    Following this, the 174
main alternative possibility of then moving straight to agree a new ‘conventional’ line was 
also not adopted, with British and American suggestions for such a boundary being 
rejected.    The dispute itself, thus, ultimately fell back, by the late 1830s, into a discussion 175
of what the terms may be for a new commission to try and determine the 1783 Treaty 
boundary.   A further arbitration was also regarded as a possibility in the negotiations for 176
such a commission, as noted above.   This is, broadly, where the matter stood, in point of 177
process, when the McLeod matter superseded it in importance in the winter of 1840-41.  The 
 Palmerston, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1162-1218.171
 Northeastern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 1, p. 37.172
 The terms of the arbitration were agreed in a Convention made in London on 29 September 1827: 173
Northeastern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 1, p. 45. 
 Northeastern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 1, p. 58. The United States considered that 174
the King of the Netherlands had to decide between the claims put to him by the United States and 
Britain respectively, and not suggest a compromise.
 Forsyth, for example, suggested the river St John as the boundary from source to mouth, which 175
was rejected by Britain, and the United States rejected Britain’s proposal for the disputed territory to 
be ‘equally divided’: Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No.14, 19 November 1837, FO 5/313, fols. 38-55.
 Palmerston suggested in November, 1837 that the ‘only plan left now’ was to agree a new 176
Commission to find the treaty line: Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No. 14, 19 November 1837, FO 5/313, 
fols. 38-55. 
 See footnote 166 and the associated main text.177
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Peel government, though, as seen, did favour trying to agree a ‘conventional’ line, and this is 
what was agreed in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 1842.   
Although the eventual agreement of a ‘conventional’ line may suggest otherwise, the legal 
framework from the Treaty of Ghent nevertheless made two significant contributions to the 
way Britain was able to conduct the dispute up to its settlement in 1842.  Its main effect was 
to reduce tension through an expectation of ongoing process, in that failure to settle the 
matter was seen only as a precursor of further steps, such as new negotiations or arbitration.        
Palmerston’s tactics in the 1830s, as seen, relied on this.   The sense of process even seems to 
have worked during the 1842 negotiations for a separate ‘conventional’ agreement outside 
the defined treaty structure.   Webster was, surely, reflecting this when expressing his 
concern to Everett that, if Ashburton did not have appropriate instructions, then this ‘tedious 
matter must go again to arbitration’.    The other was in the creation of an informal 178
precedent in the form of the failed arbitration of the King of the Netherlands, which had a 
lingering effect through the 1842 negotiations.   The King’s 1831 compromise line was 179
certainly viewed by Britain as a base position from which any new ‘conventional’ agreement 
was to be assessed.   Indeed, Aberdeen's initial instructions had the King’s award, broadly, as 
its last option, stating that ‘beyond this, Her Majesty's Government would not be prepared 
under any circumstances to concede’.   Furthermore, Ashburton relied on the award of the 180
King of the Netherlands as a justification, telling Webster on one occasion that he ‘need not 
observe to you that this would give to Great Britain less than the award of the Arbiter, while 
at the same time she would be called upon to give up what the Arbiter awarded to her’.    181
Conversely, however, from the perspective of the United States, the extent of the failed 
arbitration award served as a limiting factor on the British claim.  As Ashburton succinctly 
commented, the ‘prevailing idea is, that the Netherlands' Boundary was the utmost possible 
pretension on our part’.    In the end, though, the 1831 ‘precedent’ also acted as an 182
 Webster to Everett, 31 May 1842, Diplomatic Correspondence,1288.178
 An article in the Quarterly Review, for example, commented that: ‘it appears to us to possess a 179
certain degree of moral force which ought not to be without its effect on the minds of both parties’: 
Quarterly Review, ‘North American Boundary Question’, p. 507.
 Aberdeen to Ashburton, 8 February 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1,164.  180
 Ashburton to Webster, 11 July 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 203.181
 Ashburton to Aberdeen, 28 July 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 207.182
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encouragement for the states of Maine and Massachusetts to accept a ‘conventional’ line, on 
the basis that they were, at least, thereby in control.      183
International law also influenced the conduct of the dispute through the use of legal 
argument to support British policy aims.  The main way this can be observed is in the 
approach of Palmerston, who relied on points of treaty interpretation to continue rebutting 
the claim of the United States.   Palmerston’s overall expectation, as seen, was that it would 
be established that the 1783 Treaty definition was unworkable, and that a new division of the 
disputed territory (which would better suit British interests) would then be made in an 
arbitration or by a ‘conventional’ agreement.  Legal argument on the so-called ‘river 
question’ and the meaning of ‘highlands’ were the mainstay of his rejection of the American 
claim.   Palmerston also placed great emphasis on the related point of ensuring that the 
British view on these points could be maintained in the proceedings of any new commission.        
Importantly, though, legal argument was, in addition, also deployed by Aberdeen and 
Ashburton in the 1842 negotiations for a new ‘conventional’ line, with a view to emphasising 
British negotiating strength in the original dispute and defining the parameters of the 
proposed settlement.  Whilst, thus, Palmerston’s approach had been changed by Aberdeen in 
the move to a ‘conventional’ line, international law provided an important strand of 
continuity to British policy. 
The main legal argument used in British policy under Palmerston against the claim of the 
United States concerned the ‘ river question’.  This was entirely a point of treaty 
interpretation around the matter of how the words in the relevant provision applied to the 
river St John.  The relevant part of the definition in Article 2 of the 1783 Treaty, as 
mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, provided that the boundary was to go [emphasis added]: 
from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn 
due north from the source of the St. Croix River to the highlands; along the said 
highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St. 
 See Lawrence, Mills and Allen, Commissioners for Massachusetts, to Webster, 20 July 1842, 183
Diplomatic Correspondence, 1591; Kavanagh, Kent, Otis, and Preble, Commissioners for Maine, to 
Webster, 22 July 1842, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1592.  Maine and Massachusetts were involved 
in the 1842 negotiations because it was a negotiation for a ‘conventional’ line and, therefore, any 
agreement required their consent if it involved the ceding of territory: see, for example, the Report of 
a joint committee of the Senate and House of Reps of Maine, on 2 February 1837, as contained in, Fox 
to Palmerston, No. 21, 24 November 1837, FO 5/314, fols. 340-345.  Conversely, if agreement had 
ever been reached on the line of the 1783 Treaty, this would not have required the consent of the states 
affected as it would merely have been confirming what had already been agreed.
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Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northwestern most 
head of Connecticut River.  184
The ‘river question’ was, then, whether or not, in applying this definition, the river St. John 
was one of the rivers ‘which fall into the Atlantic Ocean’.  The Map can be used to show 
why this mattered.   Britain’s position was that the St. John was not an ‘Atlantic’ river 
because it fell, instead, into the Bay of Fundy, which, it maintained, was not the same as the 
Atlantic Ocean.  In the British view, therefore, to find ‘highlands’ conforming to the 
description in the treaty (as dividing ‘St. Lawrence’ and ‘Atlantic’ rivers), the St. John had to 
be excluded from consideration.   The critical effect of this was that, for Britain, ‘highlands’ 
matching the description could only be found west of the source of the river St. John.  
Conversely, the United States treated the St. John as an ‘Atlantic’ river, which meant that the 
‘highlands’ of the treaty could be found to the east of its source, and also north of the river 
itself.  On the British legal analysis, the American claim - as shown on the Map - was, thus, 
clearly invalid as it involved a boundary north of the river St. John.  Palmerston, accordingly, 
maintained that Britain was ‘decidedly right’ on the ‘river question’, and even argued that 
this had also been the view of the King of the Netherlands in his arbitration.  185
The key point, for present purposes, however, is not whether or not Palmerston’s legal 
argument on the 1783 Treaty was actually correct, but, rather, the fact that, for him, it was 
the argument on which the dispute revolved.  The sheer centrality of this question to 
Palmerston is shown by a comment he made to Fox in 1837: 
For the truth is that this point is the key of the whole question; and the whole dispute 
turns upon it.  If the Bay of Fundy is, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be considered as 
the Atlantic Ocean, then the line claimed by the United States is the line of the Treaty.  If 
the Bay of Fundy is not the Atlantic Ocean for the purposes of the Treaty, then the 
dividing highlands must be westward of the sources of the St. John, because it is not till 
you get clear of the St. John that you can find a ridge from whence the waters will flow to 
the St. Lawrence one way and to the Atlantic the other way.  186
 Article 2, 1783 Treaty.184
 Palmerston to Fox, Private, 19 November 1837, FO 5/313, fols. 73-80.  The United States, 185
however, contested the British view of the decision of the King of the Netherlands on this point.  See, 
for example, Forsyth to Fox, 6 February 1838, as contained in Fox to Palmerston, No. 18, 5 April 
1838, FO 5/323, fols. 1-41, on the question of whether the decision of the King implied that the river 
St John was an Atlantic River, as a separate species of  ‘indirectly’ falling rivers (cf. the other species 
of ‘directly’ falling rivers), within a broader ‘genus’ of Atlantic rivers.
 Palmerston to Fox, Private, 19 November 1837, FO 5/313, fols. 73-80.186
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In this period, the practical manifestation of the British view can be best observed in the 
careful attention Palmerston paid to the terms of the draft proposed convention for setting up 
a new commission of ‘exploration and survey’ aimed at determining the boundary as set out 
in the 1783 Treaty.   Palmerston’s aim was to ensure that the commission could only ‘look 
for highlands, upon the character of which both parties should be agreed’, which, then, 
effectively gave Britain a veto on the ‘river question’.    Wording to such effect was, 187
accordingly, included in the first draft sent to the United States in 1839, with Palmerston 
commenting, for example, that the provision covering the line north from the St.Croix ‘has 
been worded with much care’ to make sure that it could only join such agreed ‘highlands’.         188
Whilst the proposal for a commission was, as seen earlier, later expanded into one that also 
included arbitration, the principle that the commissioners needed to be agreed on the nature 
of the highlands was maintained.  189
Palmerston’s other main legal argument was that the claim of the United States was invalid 
in any event, irrespective of the ‘river question’, because the ‘highlands’ it identified as the 
‘highlands’ of the treaty could not be such ‘highlands’ on a proper construction of that term.        
This contention developed in earnest following receipt of a report from the British ground 
survey, as conducted by Featherstonhaugh and Mudge in the summer of 1839.   190
Importantly, Palmerston understood their work to indicate that the ‘highlands’ in the 
American claim could not be the ‘highlands’ specified in the 1783 Treaty because they did 
not run to the source of the river Connecticut, and were also ‘non-existent’ at the point where 
the due north line from the St Croix would have intersected them.   As Palmerston was, 191
however, at the time negotiating the terms for a new commission to determine the 1783 
boundary, these points were not made to the United States in formal diplomatic exchanges.       
Instead, Palmerston’s approach was to make sure that they, and the other findings in the 
 Palmerston to Fox, Private, 19 November 1837, FO 5/313, fols. 73-80.  See also, Fox to 187
Palmerston, Confidential, 4 May 38, FO 5/323, fols. 101-109.
 Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No. 9, 6 April 1839, FO 5/330, fols. 20-83. 188
 See: Forsyth to Fox, 29 July 1839, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1240; Fox to Forsyth, 28 July 189
1840, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1522; Forsyth to Fox, 13 August 1840, Diplomatic 
Correspondence, 1258; and Palmerston to Fox, 24 August 1841, No. 23, FO 5/358, fols. 78-98.
 Featherstonhaugh and Mudge had been appointed to conduct a survey in 1839. Palmerston 190
received their full report in spring 1840: British Documents, Vol. 1, pp. 207-210, and Palmerston to 
Fox, Draft, No. 15, 30 April 1840, FO 5/347, fols. 53-56.
 Palmerston, HC, 2 May 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 1225-1238.  See also Sydenham to Palmerston, 22 191
October 1839, TH/18, Palmerston Papers.
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report, were known in the United States by having the report distributed in America.   It 192
probably also helped Palmerston’s purpose, in seeking to spread such knowledge, that the 
Edinburgh Review announced confidently in 1840 that Featherstonhaugh and Mudge ‘will 
negative most conclusively the American line’ as consisting of the ‘highlands’ of the 
treaty!   The invigoration of this argument was, however, important for British policy.       193
Later comments of Palmerston allow the inference that the newly perceived strength of this 
argument may have played an instrumental part in his decision in 1840 to accept arbitration 
in the event the new commission failed to reach agreement.  194
  
Aberdeen and Peel, too, also used legal argument on the 1783 Treaty as part of their 
approach, albeit that they decided to negotiate straight away for a ‘conventional’ line.   Most 
significantly, Britain referred to the merits of the British claim under the 1783 Treaty during 
the 1842 negotiations.   Ashburton, for example, told Webster that, whilst past claims were 
not to be dealt with, it was nevertheless his ‘settled conviction’ from the papers that the 
parties to the 1783 Treaty meant ‘to leave to Great Britain, by their description of  
boundaries, the whole of the waters of the river St. John’.   This was also consistent with 195
the tone of Aberdeen’s instructions, in which he had commented that the respective claims 
were ‘so confidently maintained on either side’.    Furthermore, Aberdeen also mentioned 196
that that recent scientific material and ‘important documents connected with the negotiations 
for the peace of 1783’ were such as should assist with British arguments for the new 
 The Report was received in April, 1840 and a total of 25 copies were sent to the United States: 192
Palmerston to Fox, Drafts, Nos. 15, 18, and 19, 30 April 1840, 3 June 1840, and 3 June 1840, FO 
5/347, fols. 53-56, 61-74 and 75-80.
 Edinburgh Review, ‘Foreign Policy of the Government’, p. 591. 193
 Palmerston indicated in parliament that the position had changed following the report of Mudge 194
and Featherstonaugh, and he specifically mentioned the alleged invalidity of the American highlands 
as an important point: Palmerston, HC, 2 May 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 1225-1238.  The link to his 
approach to arbitration is suggested by his note to Melbourne in May, 1840, which explained that he 
been waiting for the report of Mudge and Featherstonaugh before replying to the American response 
to his draft of a convention for a new commission (and which response had proposed arbitration as a 
fallback): MM/US/5/2, Palmerston Papers.  Britain accepted arbitration as a fallback, in principle, in 
July, 1840: Fox to Forsyth, 28 July 1840, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1522. 
 Ashburton to Webster, British Documents, Vol. 1, 21 June 1842, 196. 195
 Aberdeen to Ashburton, British Documents, Vol. 1, 8 February 1842, 164.  For the perceived 196
strength of feeling in the United States, see Ashburton to Aberdeen, 25 April 1842, British Documents, 
Vol. 1, 175.  
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conventional line.    This use of arguments on the 1783 Treaty certainly provided some 197
continuity in policy with Palmerston’s work.   A further effect of legal argument in the 1842 
negotiations was that Aberdeen and Ashburton worked within the limits of the respective 
claims from the 1783 Treaty, even though they were negotiating a new ‘conventional’ line.   
In other words, for them, the new border to be agreed was to be within the parameters set by 
the terms of the dispute on the 1783 Treaty.   Aberdeen’s response to a suggestion of Webster 
during the 1842 negotiations shows this clearly.  Webster had suggested, as a way forward, 
that Britain should give up a small slice of its territory around the river St. John (which was 
outside the previous American claim on the 1783 Treaty) on the basis that there ‘must be 
mutual cessions’, commenting that the ‘importance’ to Britain of such land was ‘nothing.’        198
Aberdeen, however, nevertheless flatly refused to countenance such a proposition on the 
grounds that he was not prepared to ‘concede’ something for which the United States had no 
‘right or title to expect’.  199
The final effect of international law on British policy in the dispute was through the 
influence of the principles associated with sovereignty and the ‘actual occupation’ of 
‘unoccupied’ territory, both of which were within British practice as seen in chapter 2.  
Britain maintained strongly that it was entitled to the jurisdiction and possession of the 
disputed territory until a final agreement was reached.  This followed from the British view 
that the 1783 Treaty was a treaty of cession and that Britain, therefore, retained the 
sovereignty of, (and, thereby, the jurisdiction over), the disputed territory until a final 
agreement was reached, as set out above in chapter 3.   Britain was, however, also concerned 
by acts of ‘occupation’ by American citizens within the disputed territory.  Whilst the land 
was not strictly ‘unoccupied’ under international law, the principle of ‘actual occupation’ was 
nevertheless referred to in this context.  The British fear was that the United States could use 
any evidence of jurisdiction and occupation to support its claim in a future negotiation or 
arbitration.    Palmerston, accordingly, ensured that British policy was to resist all acts 200
within the disputed territory which were felt to assert jurisdiction or extend American 
 Aberdeen to Ashburton, British Documents, Vol. 1, 31 March 1842, 165.197
 Webster to Everett, 14 June 1842, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1289.198
 Aberdeen to Ashburton, 26 May 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 183.199
 See, for example, the concern over the reported encroachments in the valley of the river Aroostook 200
as early as 1822: Northeastern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 1, p. 39.  Sir Howard Douglas, 
a former Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick, made the wider point in parliament in 1843: Sir H. 
Douglas, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1267-1285.
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occupation.   He was not always successful in this, however, particularly following the 
‘Aroostook War’ of 1838.   Peel, conversely, appears to have been more cautious, and his 
fear that the growing American ‘occupation’ posed an active threat to British possession 
certainly appears to have influenced his decision to seek to agree a ‘conventional’ line 
quickly.            
Four examples can be given of policy under Palmerston being influenced by concerns on 
jurisdiction and occupation.   The first three, from before 1838, reflect the pure argument that 
Britain retained the sovereignty and possession of the disputed territory pending a final 
agreement.   In the first, a spat started by British arrests in Indian Stream village - which was 
in a disputed area of land between Lower Canada and New Hampshire - Gosford argued that 
the territory in question, ‘until it shall be formally adjudged to be part of the U.S. under the 
Treaty of 1783, must be considered as still undetached from the original possession of Great 
Britain - and its inhabitants consequently within the protection of her Govt.’.    Similarly, 201
when Greely, an American citizen, was arrested for taking a census in Madawaska in 1837,  
Fox referred Forsyth to Aberdeen’s letter to Lawrence of August, 1828 ‘upon the question of 
jurisdiction over the disputed territory’ pending a final settlement.   Lastly, when Forsyth 202
complained about a proposed railroad from Quebec to St. Andrews in 1837, Palmerston 
again defended Britain’s continuing right of possession on the grounds that ‘as the British 
Crown was the original possessor of the whole country, all the territory which cannot be 
proved to have been ceded by the Treaty of 1783 must prima facie be considered as still 
belonging to Great Britain’.  203
The fourth example concerns the so-called ‘Aroostook War’ of 1838-39, and illustrates the 
way in which British policy was influenced by both the principles of ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘occupation’.   The ‘war’ resulted, as noted, in armed ‘forces’ from Maine and New 
Brunswick becoming active within the disputed territory around the river Aroostook.  To 
prevent further escalation, therefore, Britain and the United States entered a ‘holding’ 
agreement in March, 1839, under which, broadly, Maine was to retain the temporary 
 Gosford to Bankhead, 6 February 1836, Diplomatic Correspondence, Note 4 to 1397. 201
 Fox to Palmerston, No. 21, 24 November 1837, FO 5/314, fols. 301-353 at fols. 317-318. This 202
followed an instruction from Palmerston: Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No. 13, 31 August 1837, FO 
5/313, fols. 30-33.
 Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No. 10, 5 July 1837, FO 5/313, fols. 21-24.  203
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possession of the valley of the river Aroostook, and Britain, that of the St. John.    In 204
theory, therefore, British sovereignty was protected by the fact that the agreement was only 
temporary, with the existing respective British and American claims being preserved.   In 205
practice, however, Britain was faced with the concern that British sovereignty would be 
eroded by the ongoing American occupation of a part of the disputed territory and any 
associated specific acts of jurisdiction.    Palmerston certainly feared the wider implications 206
of any evidence of jurisdiction being exercised, commenting, for example, in a case 
concerning ‘assessments’ near Madawaska, that the ‘acquiescence of the British authorities 
in such proceedings on the part of the Americans would materially weaken the case of Gr Bn 
in any future reference to Arbitration’.        207
British policy, as a result, was to resist against the United States both any occupation beyond 
that permitted by the 1839 ‘holding’ agreement, and any acts which could be construed as the 
exercise of jurisdiction.   Palmerston, for example, therefore, advised against the payment of 
a timber duty demanded by Maine in the Aroostook valley as it would be an 
‘acknowledgment of jurisdiction and sovereignty’.    Importantly, however, whilst the 208
British intention to oppose the United States was clear, some proposed interventions were 
difficult to implement on the ground due to the American presence.  The main battleground 
for this problem was over the establishment of a block house by the Americans in the 
disputed territory at the point where the Fish River joined the St John, just above Madawaska 
 Fox to Palmerston, No. 13, 31 March 1839, FO 5/331, fols. 237-241.  This followed a previous 204
informal agreement between Fox and Forsyth in February, 1839: Fox to Palmerston, No. 8, 7 March 
1839, FO 5/331, fols. 103-186.  The holding agreement was summarised by Fox in Fox to Forsyth, 17 
August 1840, as contained in Fox to Palmerston, 8 August 1841, No. 73, FO 5/362, fols. 14-44.
 Fox to Palmerston, No. 13, 31 March 1839, FO 5/331, fols. 237-241.  The preservation of existing 205
rights was referred to the Webster informal memorandum to Fox, 5 June 1841, as contained in Fox to 
Palmerston, 8 August 1841, No. 73, FO 5/362, fols. 14-44. 
 Wellington, for example, commented in parliament that the area around the Aroostook valley had 206
been ‘seized by the state of Maine, and he was not sure that it was not now in its possession’: 
Wellington, HL, 18 July 1839, Vol. LIX, 871-874. 
 Palmerston note 23 July 1841, FO 5/373, fols. 210-211.207
 Palmerston note, 23 July 1841, FO 5/373, fol. 242.208
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- as shown on the Map.   As this block house was in the St. John valley, Britain considered 209
that the United States was in breach of the 1839 agreement.   Nevertheless, the block house 210
remained in American hands, and Palmerston’s general concerns over the potential effects of 
American occupation were then borne out.    British jurisdiction was resisted in 1841 in the 
area around the block house when local authorities tried to impose assessments.    211
Furthermore, the law officers of New Brunswick cautioned over whether successful 
prosecutions could be made against people attending a meeting at the block house called by 
the state of Maine.  In language which struck at the heart of the issue, they asserted that the 
problem was that the individuals would have a ‘plausible defence’ that the alleged offences 
were committed in a ‘place’ that was ‘in the possession and actual occupation of a Foreign 
Power, ... which claims and exercises Jurisdiction thereon by the tacit assent of the British 
Government, to the exclusion of Jurisdiction by the Provincial Authorities’.  212
The fear of American ‘occupation’ gradually eroding British sovereignty certainly appears to 
have been one of the main influences acting upon Peel and Aberdeen when, in contrast to 
Palmerston, they decided to move for a quick settlement to the dispute through a 
‘conventional’ line.    Peel made reasoning along such lines clear in an important passage 213
of as his later defence of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, where he referred to ‘a contest for 
actual possession’ [emphasis added]: 
 The initial establishment of the Fish River block house is referred to in Fox to Palmerston, No. 29, 209
10 August 1839, FO 5/332, fols. 109-170.  At first, it was occupied by a civil ‘posse’ from Maine, but 
this was replaced by regular American troops in 1841 (which Britain opposed as a proposal, but 
effectively acquiesced in when implemented unilaterally by Webster): Fox to Palmerston, 8 August 
1841, No. 73,  FO 5/362, fols. 14-44; and Fox to Palmerston, 12 September 1841, No. 83, FO 5/362, 
fols. 213-264.
 See, for example: Fox to Palmerston, No. 5, 17 March 1840, FO 5/348, fols. 90-367; Palmerston to 210
Fox, Drafts, Nos. 7, 8, 10, all of 19 February 1840, FO 5/347, fols. 13-18, fols. 19-22, and fols. 25-26; 
and Fox to Palmerston, No. 10, 7 May 1840, FO 5/349, fols. 10-37.  The British position was, though, 
complicated by the fact that the United States similarly viewed the presence of British troops in 
Madawaska as being in breach of relevant agreements: Fairfield to Harvey, Copy, 15 October 1840,  
FO 5/373, fols. 234-237.
 MacLachlan to Colebrooke, 19 June 1841, FO 5/373, fol. 229.  Colebrooke had earlier warned 211
Sydenham that the United States, or the state of Maine, would try to assert a right of jurisdiction on 
the south bank of the St. John around this Fish River block house: Colebrooke to Sydenham, 10 May 
1841, FO 5/373, fols. 104-111. 
 Opinion of the Law Officers of New Brunswick, 6 September 1841, FO 5/374, fols. 284-289.212
 Peel was also concerned about the risk of renewed disturbances in Canada and wanted a settlement 213
of the boundary matter on a basis ‘as far as we safely can go’: Peel to Aberdeen, 16 May 1842, 
Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43062, fols. 48-54.
 155
Every month that passed was undermining our dominion over that continent ... the vast 
tide of population - that rapid and restless tide which knows no ebb - presses on from day 
to day, and each month that passed saw our territory further encroached on - the 
dominion we had in 1838 we retained not in 1840; and had we postponed the 
settlement for another five years, the question would have settled itself by a contest 
for actual possession.  214
It is difficult to assess the extent to which Peel was adopting a legal or ‘physical power’ 
analysis.  Most probably, it was a combination of the two, reflecting concern over both the 
difficulty of actually removing Americans from land they occupied, as well as the potential 
effect their presence would have on any further legal process.   Palmerston, too, had seen 
these dangers, commenting of the Americans that ‘they mean practically to determine the 
matter their own way, if we are supine enough to allow them to did so, by forcibly occupying 
... the territory in dispute’ .    Peel, it seems, was just not as prepared as Palmerston to take 215
the practical risk of trying to resist for anything more than the short term. 
International law was also central to the way in which Britain dealt with the issue of 
American fishing rights.  Law’s role will be illustrated, for present purposes, by using the 
example of American fishing off the coast of Nova Scotia, as this was the most prominent 
problem area in the period.   In this case, the dispute involved questions of interpretation on 
the terms of the 1818 Convention, which, amongst other matters, had implemented an 
important new three mile coastal exclusion for American fishermen, as set out in chapter 3.       
The resulting tensions were mainly related to the impact of this limit, but they were not 
derived from any fundamental objection to its principle, which merely accorded with the 
general principles of international law.   Instead, they resulted, rather, from the general 
contrast between the 1818 Convention, as a whole, and the earlier 1783 provision.  Under the 
1783 Treaty, American fisherman had previously enjoyed a ‘liberty’ to ‘take fish’ on the 
‘coasts, bays and creeks’ of Nova Scotia.    This ‘liberty‘ was, however, then renounced 216
‘for ever’ in the 1818 Convention for a distance of up to ‘three marine miles of any of the 
coasts, bays, creeks or harbours’, subject to some significant exceptions for shelter and 
 Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252.214
 Palmerston to Russell, 19 January 1841, PRO 30/22/4A, fols. 63-66.  Palmerston made similar 215
comments in Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No. 22, 17 September 1839, FO 5/321, fols. 119-120.  See also 
Palmerston to Fox, Drafts, Nos. 24 and 26, 14 October 1839 and 2 November 1839, FO 5/321, fols. 
123-124 and fols. 127-128. 
 Article 3, 1783 Treaty.216
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supplies.   As a result, the United States, therefore, sought a wide interpretation of the 1818 217
Convention, which took into account the earlier position under the 1783 Treaty.   Legal 
argument was, therefore, at the core of the dispute.  The key point, for present purposes, 
however, is that British policy responded to the American arguments by taking and 
respecting legal advice.   The dispute provides, therefore, a further example of a potentially 
troublesome problem in British-American relations that was handled within a legal 
framework, albeit that the wider contest on fishing rights continued until well after the 
period. 
The role of international law in guiding the course of the dispute in this way is illustrated by 
two issues related to the 1818 limit, with the first being decided in favour of Britain, and, the 
other, the United States.   The former concerned the question of whether or not the three mile 
territorial limit for fishing applied within the ‘bays’ off the coast of Nova Scotia.   The claim 
of the United States was that it did, so that American fisherman could, for example, fish 
within large bays (such as the Bay of Fundy) provided they were at least three miles from the 
shore.  Conversely, Britain argued that the whole of the ‘bays’ were excluded as the three 
mile limit was to be measured from a line taken from headland to headland at the entrance to 
the bay.   The question materialised when Palmerston raised the issue with Fox in October, 218
1838 as part of a request for an overall agreement to be reached with the United States on the 
question of American fishing rights.    Nothing was, however, evidently agreed at that time, 219
and the question came up again in 1841 in the form of a case stated from Nova Scotia.         220
Falkland, the Governor of Nova Scotia, though, notably placed international law at the heart 
of the matter, commenting that he ‘cannot but conceive that that construction must be 
ascertained, not by negotiation, but in the Courts of Law’, and that whatever the outcome 
‘Her Majesty’s subjects in this province will willingly abide by it’.    He did, however, add 221
that the law officer of Nova Scotia considered that ‘bays’ were the ‘exclusive’ British 
 Article 1, 1818 Convention.217
 See, for example, Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No. 16, 6 October 1838, FO 5/321, fols. 38-43.218
 Palmerston to Fox, Draft, No. 16, 6 October 1838, FO 5/321, fols. 38-43.  Palmerston attached two 219
reports from the Queen’s Advocate dated 31 October 1837 and 10 March 1838. 
 The case stated from Nova Scotia asked seven questions relating to the interpretation of the 1818 220
Convention: Falkland to Russell, 28 April 1841, as contained in Stephen to Backhouse, 25 May 1841, 
FO 5/372, fols. 202-220.
 Falkland to Russell, 8 May 1841, as contained in Stephen to Backhouse, 18 June 1841, FO 5/373, 221
fols. 14-61.
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territory, and that the three mile limit was taken from a line drawn across headland to 
headland!  222
British policy was to follow the legal advice subsequently received on the point.   Dodson 
and Wilde supported the stated British view, and advised later in 1841 that American citizens 
were ‘excluded from any right of fishing within three miles of the coast of British America, 
and that the prescribed distance of three miles, is to be measured from the headlands’.        223
Nevertheless, it appears that this advice was not initially, at least, passed on to the United 
States, with the result that Everett wrote a further letter on the matter requesting a response 
to previous American notes from 1840 and 1841.    This time, Everett contended that the 224
British construction of the three mile limit was not in accordance with the ‘words’ or the 
‘spirit’ of the 1818 Convention.    Aberdeen, however, replied in a form consistent with the 225
1841 legal advice, saying simply that the words of the treaty were that the limit was ‘within 
three marine miles of, any of the Coasts, bays, creeks, or Harbours’.   This legal 226
construction, he continued, was confirmed both by the express use of the word ‘bay’ as well 
as ‘coast’, and the fact that the subsequent exception allowed admission to the ‘Bays or 
Harbours for the purposes of Shelter’.   Britain, therefore, maintained its legal 227
interpretation of the 1818 Convention.  
Two additional points are, however, worthy of note from the way the issue was handled.       
Most importantly, the matter provides a good further example of the operation of the shared 
legal framework.   Britain and the United States clearly treated the matter as a legal dispute 
 Falkland to Russell, 8 May 1841, as contained in Stephen to Backhouse, 18 June 1841, FO 5/373, 222
fols. 14-61. 
 Dodson and Wilde to Palmerston, 30 August 1841, FO 83/2207, fols. 181-186. The advice was sent 223
by the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office in September, 1841: Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 
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the response of the law officers of the Crown in March, 1843: Livingston, American Consul, Halifax, 
to Webster, 17 March 1843, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1613. 
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over the meaning of a rule, in this case treaty law, which was applicable to them both.       
Legal argument was, thus, a key influence on both British and American policy.   Britain 
relied, as seen, on legal advice to maintain its position.   The legal approach adopted by the 
United States can, alternatively, be illustrated by the way it adapted its argument to cope with 
what it privately recognised was a strong British case.   Everett, for example, told Calhoun 
that ‘the letter of the convention favours the British view’, and that the American argument 
was on the basis of the ‘spirit and intent’ of the 1818 Convention.    Crucially, he also 228
observed, however, that the United States should not make its claims based on the general 
principles of international law - as these principles provided that ‘bays’ were the territory of 
the relevant coastal power.    Instead, for Everett, the American case was based around a 229
contention that the 1818 Convention was a  ‘specific’ treaty arrangement designed to deal 
with the local difficulties.    Everett, thus, put forward a legal argument for a favourable 230
construction using the fact that the 1818 Convention involved a tightening of the rules from 
the 1783 Treaty.   British policy, of course, followed legal advice in rejecting this, but, for 
present purposes, what matters is the wider point that both Britain and the United States 
based their policies around what was legally arguable.      
The other is to acknowledge that Britain did nevertheless later ‘relax’ its interpretation of the 
strict legal position as regards the Bay of Fundy being a ‘bay’ under the 1818 Convention, in 
response to further American arguments.    This was an important policy change, as it 231
meant that Americans could fish within the Bay, subject to the three mile limit.   Everett had 
previously specifically argued against Britain’s construction of the ‘Bay of Fundy’ being a 
‘bay’ within the meaning of the 1818 Convention on the various grounds that it was a ‘broad 
arm of the sea’ which did not ‘in reality’ have ‘all the characters usually implied by the term 
“bay” ’, the 1783 Treaty had been more lenient, and American fisherman ‘would be shut out 
 Everett to Calhoun, 26 April 1844, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1673.228
 Everett noted that the United States relied on this, for example, in the case of Long Island Sound, 229
Delaware and Chesapeake Bays: Everett to Calhoun, 26 April 1844, Diplomatic Correspondence, 
1673.
 Everett to Calhoun, 26 April 1844, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1673.230
 Aberdeen to Everett, 10 March 1845, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1711.231
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from waters distant not three but thirty miles’ from the coast.    Britain’s case had, however, 232
been supported by clear legal advice from the law officers to the effect that the Bay of Fundy 
was a ‘bay’ within the meaning of the 1818 Convention.   Aberdeen’s concession of the 233
point must, therefore, be seen simply as a political move to remove ‘a fertile source of 
disagreement‘.    Importantly, however, Aberdeen’s action was also expressly limited in 234
scope, with it being made clear that the point was not being conceded in respect of the other 
‘great bays’.   International law, thus, remained at the heart of the dispute despite this 235
compromise. 
The second issue, decided in favour of the United States, concerned, broadly, the question of 
the right of American fisherman to get shelter and supplies from the bays and harbours on 
the coast of Nova Scotia as set out the 1818 Convention.   This, too, was resolved after 
Britain received the advice of the law officers of the Crown, although this time their report 
was in favour of the American position.  The relevant part of Article I of the 1818 
Convention provided that the three mile limit was subject to the proviso: 
that the American Fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or harbours for the 
purposes of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of 
obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever.   But they shall be under such 
restrictions as may be necessary to prevent their taking, drying, or curing fish therein, or 
in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them.  236
The issue arose from the query of Nova Scotia, as to whether or not the right in the proviso 
for American fishermen to enter the bays or harbours of Nova Scotia to buy wood and get 
water etc., was limited to cases of distress or when their ‘usual’ supply was ’exhausted and 
destroyed’, as opposed to it also being applicable in circumstances where these supplies had 
 Everett to Aberdeen, 25 May 1844, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1672. Everett added that the 232
proviso in the treaty concerning the right to ‘shelter’, also supported the American interpretation, as 
the ‘shelter’ was not in the Bay of Fundy itself, but rather in the bays (‘properly so called’) within it 
which ‘indent the coast’.
 The legal advice on the Bay of Fundy was contained in Dodson, Pollock, and Follett to Aberdeen, 233
9 April 1844, Parry, Law Officers’  Opinions, Vol. 4, pp. 222-225.
 Aberdeen to Everett, 10 March 1845, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1711.234
 Aberdeen to Everett, 21 April 1845, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1725; Everett to Aberdeen, 23 235
April 1845, Diplomatic Correspondence, 1726.
 Article I, 1818 Convention.236
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not been originally taken from the United States.    Nova Scotia, it seems, was clearly 237
attempting to limit the visits of American fishermen to its coast by drawing on the full 
context of the provision.   This point was, however, simply resolved in favour of the United 
States.   Dodson and Wilde jointly advised that the relevant ‘liberty’ was ‘unrestricted by any 
condition expressed or implied’, and ‘that no such condition can be attached to the 
enjoyment of the liberty.’    Legal principles again determined the advice, albeit that this 238
time it was to the disadvantage of Britain. 
Conclusion 
International law, therefore, helped to guide British foreign policy towards the United States 
through the major challenges presented by Canada and the Northeast in the period.   Border 
populations getting involved with insurgent activity in Canada, and pushing territorial rights 
in Maine and Nova Scotia, created serious tensions in the British-American relationship.  A 
shared framework of legal principles and treaty law provided a structure through which the 
issues between Britain and the United States could generally be successfully handled.   
Events and circumstances were approached from a common British-American standpoint, 
and solutions understood against a joint structure of rules.  Principles associated with 
sovereignty and self-preservation, thus, helped Britain and the United States work together 
during the Canadian revolts by providing justifications for both the British defence of 
Canada and the American security cooperation.   The shared framework of law was the 
foundation upon which Britain and the United States were able to move on in McLeod and 
the Caroline affairs, leaving the facts behind them.   Legal process and argument were a 
significant part of the means by which Britain dealt with the legal disputes over the 
Northeastern boundary and fishing rights.   Agreement on the law, if not always on its 
application, was, thus, fundamental to the way the British-American relationship operated in 
relation to the pressures arising from the northeastern frontier.  
 Falkland to Russell, Copy, 28 April 1841, as contained in Stephen to Backhouse, 25 May 1841, FO 237
5/372, fols. 202-220.
 Dodson, Wilde to Palmerston, 30 August 1841, FO 83/2207, fols. 181-186.238
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5.   American Expansion and the tensions over Oregon, California, and Texas 
On the face of it, it is curious that Britain cared more about the fate of Oregon than that of 
Texas or California.   All three were fundamental to ‘manifest destiny’, a narrative of the 
story of the United States that saw as natural its growth from the Atlantic to the Pacific.        
Indeed, title to the land of both Texas and Oregon was presented in America by many 
expansionists as part of a wider conflict between Britain and the United States for strategic 
control of the continent.   Furthermore, Texas and California were both handsomely regarded 
in Britain, with widely-acknowledged potential.   Oregon, by comparison, was viewed as 
being of no real value, a wilderness suitable only for a mediocre fur trade bringing moderate 
profits.  Yet, it was Oregon that was to become the subject of a sustained dispute between 
Britain and the United States, even threatening war at its peak in 1845 and 1846.         
Conversely, in Texas and California, whilst there were some serious diplomatic tensions, 
peace was never at risk as they joined the United States.  This chapter aims to set British 
policy to American expansion within the extremes of being prepared to fight over Oregon, 
and accepting of the loss of Texas and California.  It seeks to explains how international law 
can aid the understanding of why Oregon, but not Texas or California, caused Britain the 
most concern, albeit that here, too, much territory was gained by the United States.  The 
chapter also examines how international law can help to provide a better appreciation of 
British policy in the serious disputes that nevertheless developed in the British-American 
relationship concerning Oregon and Texas.    
The chapter argues that international law made an impact on British policy in two main 
ways.   Primarily, treaty law and legal principles shaped policy objectives so that they were 
permissive of American expansion and favoured peace.  This can clearly be seen in the 
overall British approach to Oregon, California and Texas, which was always accepting of the 
principle of American growth.  Furthermore, even within that overriding policy stance, 
international law also guided the specific British policy objectives.  Oregon was more of a 
British priority than Texas or California because Britain possessed legal rights there, which it 
wanted to be seen to uphold as a matter of honour and power.   By contrast, in Texas, Britain 
respected the principle of sovereignty and the right of Texas to determine its own future 
despite aiming for continued Texan independence.   The second section then considers the 
tensions that nevertheless arose with the United States over Oregon and Texas, and argues 
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that Britain handled these within a framework of international law that was, in large degree, 
shared by the United States.   Most importantly, application of a series of joint principles 
influenced both the time and nature of the settlement of the Oregon question.  The legal 
principles of ‘non-interference’ and neutrality also guided British policy away from 
confrontation in Texas over slavery and the alleged sale of armed ships to Mexico.   
  
The chapter also qualifies specific historiographical interpretations.   Historians have 
explained British policy to Oregon, California and Texas as being primarily motivated by a 
desire to preserve peace and maintain honour.     Bourne and Roeckell have also pointed to 1
the influence of British concerns over Mexico in Texas.    Traditional themes within the 2
historiography, however, also include arguments that British policy towards American 
expansion promoted containment of the United States, was weak in its opposition to the 
United States, or was pacific due to the personal role of Aberdeen.    Examples of these 3
contentions can be found in work relating to Texas and Oregon in this period.   Silbey 
contends that Texas ‘was one more chance’ for Britain to pursue its ‘intention to contain the 
United States’.    Galbraith and Merk both consider Aberdeen as having been instrumental in 4
a British policy to Oregon that resulted in a settlement that was, for them, respectively, a 
 This is consistent with the main historiographical approaches to British policy to the United States in 1
the period as discussed in the Introduction.  Historians noting the objective of peace, honour, and the 
role of Aberdeen in Oregon include: J . S. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1907), p. 263; J. S. Galbraith, The Hudson's Bay Company as an 
Imperial Factor, 1821-1869 (Berkeley: California University Press, 1957), pp. 248-249, F. Merk, The 
Oregon Question, Essays 7, 8, and 9; Chamberlain, Pax Britannica, p. 87; and D. A. Rakestraw, For 
honour or destiny: the Anglo-American crisis over the Oregon Territory (New York: P. Lang, 1995), p. 
2.  Peace and a lack of interest in new colonies are recognised as the main British priorities in 
California. See, for example E. D. Adams, 'English Interest in the Annexation of California’, 
Addendum to E. D. Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846 (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins Press, 1910), p. 264; Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, p. 136; Jones, Lord 
Aberdeen and the Americas, p. 70; and Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, pp. 52-53.  
Similarly, in Texas, historians point to peace, Aberdeen, and Aberdeen’s ‘entente’ with France as 
explanations for policy. See, for example: Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, p. 194; 
Chamberlain, Pax Britannica, p. 86, and Lord Aberdeen, p. 334; Jones, Lord Aberdeen and the 
Americas, p. 31. 
 Bourne considers that Britain’s chief concerns were the position of Mexico and slavery, and that it 2
did not pursue Texan independence strongly overall: Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian 
England, p. 53, and The Balance of Power, pp.76-78.  Roeckell argues that British policy to Texas has 
been analysed too much in the context of the United States as opposed to Mexico: Roeckell, 'Bonds 
over Bondage: British Opposition to the Annexation of Texas’, Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 19, 
(1999), pp. 257-278.
 These are discussed in the Introduction. 3
  J. H. Silbey, Storm over Texas: The Annexation Controversy and the Road to Civil War (New York: 4
Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 37-38.
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‘surrender’ and a ‘capitulation’.    This chapter aims to show that these notions have been 5
overstated by providing a deeper appreciation of the role of international law.   Crucially, as 
noted, it argues that treaty law and legal principles were important in guiding Britain to 
accept the growth of the United States, and that they influenced the nuances which can be 
seen in British policy towards Oregon, California and Texas respectively.   It then also 
demonstrates how it was the shared framework of legal principles that set the criterion for 
the handling of the tensions in relation to Oregon and Texas.   In doing so, the chapter, 
thereby, suggests that British policy was not ‘weak’, or, as alleged in some instances, a 
‘surrender’ or a ‘capitulation’, or even solely the result of Aberdeen’s character, but, rather, 
was part of a consistent, long term trajectory guided by international law.   Indeed, Britain 
was simply reacting to American expansion in a way that was consistent with the prevailing 
structure of international law.   
  
International Law and the shaping of British policy to American Expansion 
International law shaped the direction of British foreign policy towards the expansion of the 
United States in the period.  Most importantly, treaty law and legal principles pushed Britain 
towards a policy that was tolerant of American growth westwards on the North American 
continent.  The nature of Britain’s treaty agreements with the United States meant that 
British policy aims were unlikely to have been to firmly oppose American enlargement, as 
argued in chapter 3.   To reiterate briefly, Britain had conceded the ‘territorial rights’ of the 
thirteen states, accepted a boundary for the ‘United States’ that was larger than that of the 
existing thirteen states, and agreed a joint occupation for Oregon pending a final settlement.  
The principle of the United States spreading westwards was, thus, built into the treaties.  
Moreover, legal principles were also influential in making peace a key British objective, 
again as seen in chapter 3.  A policy aimed at the maintenance of peace naturally further 
softened Britain’s approach, given that it meant that the threat of military intervention to 
resist the United States was effectively lowered.         
British policy in relation to Oregon, California and Texas, accordingly, consistently worked 
on the basis that the United States might well expand into these territories, as can be shown 
 Galbraith, Hudson's Bay, pp. 248-249; Merk implies that the settlement of 1846 was a ‘capitulation’ 5
for Britain: Merk, The Oregon Question, p. 281.
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by brief review of the main events concerning them in the period.   The Oregon question 
concerned the fate of the land west of the Rocky Mountains between latitude 54° 40' to the 
north, and that of 42° to the south.    Britain and the United States both considered that they 6
had valid claims to the territory, and participated in negotiations to agree a compromise in 
1818, 1824, 1826, 1842, 1844, and 1845.   The basic disagreement was that the British 
wanted a boundary based on the river Columbia, whereas the United States sought one 
instead on the 49th parallel of latitude.  In the absence of a settlement, however, a ten year 
joint occupation of the whole area was agreed in 1818, and then renewed indefinitely in 
1827, as set out in chapter 3.  Ultimately, the Oregon question was only resolved in 1846, 
with the agreed boundary then following the 49th parallel to the sea, before veering south, so 
that the whole of Vancouver Island was left to Britain.   Any notion, however, that Britain 7
saw Oregon as part of a strategy to contain the expansion of the United States has limited 
validity.  There is no evidence of such an aim in the diplomatic despatches from the period.   
Furthermore, Britain was clearly prepared to - and did - compromise Oregon on a basis that 
gave much territory, and access to the Pacific, to the United States.   Importantly, there is, 8
additionally, little evidence that Britain was interested in promoting an independent Oregon 
state, despite that idea having some traction in the United States.             9
Britain also appeared indifferent to the receipt of information indicating that the United 
States was interested in California.   California formally became a part of the United States 
after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1848, which was the peace treaty ending the U.S./
Mexican War of 1846 to 1848.    Britain, however, was aware of possible American interest 10
in California from at least the early 1840s.   Webster, for example, made known to Britain the 
American interest in obtaining the port of San Francisco during the negotiations for the 
 For present purposes, these can simply be regarded as the agreed limits of the then Russian and 6
Mexican interests respectively. 
 Treaty of 1846, ‘in Regard to Limits Westwards of the Rocky Mountains’, accessed through Project 7
Avalon, Yale Law School, 8/2/17 at c.7.24pm.
 See, for example, the British offers in the negotiations of the 1820s as discussed below.  Galbraith 8
comments that, from 1821, the Hudson Bay Company believed that, at the least, the area south of the 
river Columbia would be given to the United States in any settlement: Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay, p. 82. 
 See, for example, Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 112, 29 October 1845, FO 5/429, fols. 38-49, where 9
Pakenham notes his rejection of an approach by the Oregon Emigration Society in Massachusetts.
 Article V, Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1848, accessed through Project Avalon, Yale Law School, 10
on 5/12/17 at c4.45pm.  California and other previous Mexican territory, such as New Mexico, passed 
to the United States from Mexico under this treaty through the definition of a new boundary. 
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Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.   Britain’s immediate response, however, raised no 
objection, in principle, to an American presence in California, with Ashburton merely 
commenting to Aberdeen that ‘we should make no objection to any arrangement of the kind, 
provided the cession by Mexico were voluntary’.    The most sustained period of warning 11
about the future of California, though, came when the annexation of Texas was being pushed 
forward in the United States in 1844 and 1845.   Pakenham, for example, voiced his concern 
that California would separate from Mexico, highlighting especially the role of American 
settlers in ‘the scheme of encroachment next to be put in practice by the democracy of this 
country - the appropriation of the Californias.’     Similarly, Elliot, too, told Aberdeen that 12
‘the true point to be watched, and placed on a safe footing at once ... is Upper California’.   13
Ultimately, though, despite appearing very briefly to have considered some joint action with 
France in 1845, Britain appeared unwilling to get involved with the future of California.    14
Moreover, as Adams identifies, and as will be discussed below, it also refused several 
opportunities to acquire a legal interest in it.    Unsurprisingly then, in the light of this 15
approach, Britain also did not get involved in the U.S./Mexican War when it began in 1846.  
Consistently too, there was also no diplomatic friction between Britain and the United States 
over California.    
Lastly, British policy similarly worked routinely on the premise that the United States may 
one day expand into Texas.  Texas had emerged as an important international question when 
it declared independence from Mexico in March, 1836.    Mexico had, however, refused to 16
accept the breakaway, and a struggle between Texas and Mexico over the former’s 
‘independence’ ensued throughout the period.   The process by which Texas then came to be 
 Ashburton to Aberdeen, 25 April 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 174.11
 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 67, 12 June 1845, FO 5/426, fols. 89-103. 12
 Elliot to Aberdeen, No. 19, 3 July 1845, FO 75/13, fols. 155-167. 13
 Aberdeen to Peel, 23 September 1845, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43064, fols. 353-356; Aberdeen 14
to Peel, 25 September 1845, Add. MS 43064, fols. 362-363; and Aberdeen to Peel, 3 October 1845, 
Add. MS 43065, fols. 7-8.
 See generally, Adams, ‘English Interest in the Annexation of California ‘.15
 The ‘Delegates of The People of Texas’ proclaimed to the world that: ‘our political connection with 16
the Mexican nation has forever ended, and that the people of Texas do now constitute a free, 
sovereign, and independent republic, and are fully invested with all the rights and attributes which 
properly belong to independent nations’, as referred to in D. R. Armitage, The Declaration of 
Independence: A Global History, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 216.
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annexed by the United States is outside the scope of this thesis, but, from the British 
perspective, there were two key periods.   Initially, the United States recognised Texas as an 17
independent state, but refused to accept it into the Union when offered the chance in 1837.   18
From 1843, however, the United States then, conversely, worked to annex Texas, with 
Congress finally approving this in February, 1845 and the formal admission of Texas as a 
state taking place on the 29th December, 1845.   Crucially, however, the main orientation of 19
British policy remained the same throughout both stages, namely Britain was prepared to 
accept Texas as part of the United States.   Palmerston certainly quickly acknowledged the 
notion of annexation in 1836, commenting, of Texas, that ‘having freed itself from Mexico, it 
might choose to attach itself to the United States’.    He also wrote to Spring Rice in 1837 20
with an air of indifference over the fate of Texas.    Similarly, Aberdeen told Bankhead, the 21
British minister in Mexico, in 1844 that, for Britain, it ‘was of a comparatively minor 
consequence in the abstract ... whether Texas be independent or whether she be annexed to 
the United States’.   Again, in 1845,  Aberdeen commented that he did ‘not conceive that 22
any material or direct British interest is involved in the independence of Texas’.    Both the 23
 For a recent account of the annexation of Texas in American politics, see Silbey, Storm over Texas.17
 On the American recognition of Texas, see Reeves, American Diplomacy, p. 79. Britain did not 18
object to the recognition of Texas by the United States in March, 1837: Fox to Palmerston, No. 8, 12 
March 1837, FO 5/314, fols. 165-180.  Britain also approved of the formal rejection given by the 
United States later in 1837 to the chance offered to it then to annex Texas: see, for example, Fox to 
Palmerston, No. 23, 24 November 1837, FO 5/314, fols. 363-376 at 364-365.
 A treaty for Texan annexation was signed in spring, 1844, albeit that it was rejected by the U.S. 19
Senate in June, 1844.  A different process for Texan annexation by resolution of Congress, and 
subsequent Presidential approval, was then adopted.  On the ultimate approval of the United States to 
Texan annexation in 1845, see the Protest of Almonte, of Mexico, to Calhoun 6 March 1845, British 
Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 455-457. 
 Palmerston, HC, 5 August 1836, Vol. XXXV, 934-941.20
 Palmerston wrote: ‘We cannot pretend to exert much influence on the destiny of Texas; and have 21
little to do, but to watch the course of events’: Palmerston to Spring Rice, 9 October 1837, Palmerston 
Papers, MO/129. 
 Aberdeen to Bankhead, No. 49, 31 December 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, p373-376 at 374.22
 Aberdeen to Elliot, Draft, No. 10, 3 July 1845, FO 75/12, fols. 45-50. 23
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Melbourne and Peel governments also showed no inclination to get involved in Texas 
militarily.  24
Importantly, however, international law also helps to explain the different respective 
directions British policy nevertheless took in relation to Oregon, California, and Texas.   
Most significantly, Britain took a much greater interest in Oregon than it did in California or 
Texas, with the key determining factor being the question of whether or not Britain perceived 
itself as having a legal interest in the territory concerned.   This point mattered because the 
upholding of British rights and obligations under international law was itself an important 
influence on foreign policy, being linked to British ‘honour’, as argued in chapter 2.  
Crucially, Britain considered that it possessed legal rights to the ownership of the territory of 
Oregon.  By contrast, however, Britain had no such claims over California or Texas.  The 
other distinct approach within British policy was the secondary aim of trying to keep Texas 
as an independent state.  This was a ‘secondary’ objective because it was subservient to the 
overriding British position of accepting that Texas might become part of the United States.   
Britain nevertheless saw some advantages in continued Texan independence, as will be seen.   
Again, however, international law affected Britain, as the legal principles associated with 
sovereignty guided British policy and ensured that the right of Texas to determine its own 
future was respected.          
Before turning to consider these points in the context of Britain’s actions concerning Oregon, 
California and Texas more closely, however, it is helpful, first, to rule out the other main 
possible alternative explanation for the specific directions of British policy, namely that it 
was based on the perceived high value or otherwise of the relevant territory.  This can be 
done easily because, in fact, the opposite was actually the case, and there was an inverse 
relationship between the overall value or worth each territory was perceived as having in 
Britain and the level of the British policy interest.   Britain, thus, was most involved with 
Oregon, and yet there was a generally consistent negative view taken by British ministers 
and politicians in this period as to its intrinsic value.  Aberdeen, for example, described 
 Palmerston, for example, refused to countenance any British military intervention in parliament in 24
March, 1837: Palmerston, HC, 9 March 1837, Vol. XXXVII, 194-197.  Peel intimated a reluctance to 
‘intervene’ in Texas (at the height of the tensions in 1845) in the event even of a forcible American 
annexation: Peel to Aberdeen, Secret, 23 January 1845, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43064, fols. 
178-181. 
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Oregon as ‘an object of no immediate or pressing national interest or importance’.        25
Similarly, Clarendon, leading for the Whigs in a debate on Oregon in the House of Lords, 
called it ‘an unoccupied territory, the whole fee-simple of which is well known to be of such 
insignificant value as not to compensate the losses and miseries that one single month of war 
must produce’.   Conversely, British politicians were certainly aware of the potential 26
importance of Texas in terms of agriculture, mining, and trade, and raised concerns about the 
risk of it being acquired by the United States.   Peel noted too the valuable strategic 27
geographical position of Texas.   Brougham even declared that: ‘The importance of Texas 28
could not be underrated’.   As to California, Pakenham, as noted by Adams, wrote of the 29
‘magnificent territory of Upper California’.    30
Even if Britain considered Oregon to be of little value overall as a territory, however, it is 
nevertheless still possible that factors other than legal rights and honour were the main 
drivers of British policy towards it in the period.   The starting point in assessing the central 
British motivation to Oregon, therefore, has to be an analysis of why Britain was there in the 
first place, and here the work, in particular, of Galbraith, Merk, and Rakestraw is especially 
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 8, 3 March 1845, FO 5/423, fols. 21-24.  See also Ashburton, 25
who referred to Oregon dispute as a ‘question worthless in itself’: Ashburton, HL, 17 March 1846, 
Vol. LXXXIV, 1119-1120. 
 Clarendon, HL, 17 March 1846, Vol. LXXXIV, 1114-1115.  This broad perception was also 26
reflected in the article on Oregon in the Edinburgh Review in 1845, which sardonically commented 
that ‘the great error of all the parties has been the importance attached to Oregon’: ‘Oregon’, 
Edinburgh Review, Vol. LXXXII, Article VIII, (1845), pp. 238-265 at p. 261.  This view was not, 
however, a universal Whig view. Russell mentioned, in a speech in 1845 arguing for the maintenance 
of British rights, that he also thought Oregon was of value, referring to the fur trade, the river 
Columbia, and the possibility of trade with China: Russell, HC, 4 April 1845, Vol. LXXIX, 190.
 See, for example, Barlow Hoy, HC, 5 August 1836, Vol. XXXV, 928-931, and Ward, HC, 5 August 27
1836, Vol. XXXV, 931-934.
 Peel referred Aberdeen in 1845 to a speech of Huskisson from 1830 on the aim of the United States 28
to control the Gulf of Mexico: Peel to Aberdeen, Sunday, [(March/April?), 1845], Aberdeen Papers, 
Add. MS 43064, fols. 203-204.
 Brougham, HL, 18 August 1843, Vol. LXXI, 915-918.29
 Pakenham to Palmerston, 30 August 1841, as referred to in Adams, E., ‘English Interest in the 30
Annexation of California’, p. 237.  Similarly, Pelly referred Russell to the ‘many very fine harbours’ 
in the Bay of San Francisco, and Simpson referred to the fact that it needed ‘no illusive descriptions, 
but plain naked truth to recommend its [California’s] value and importance’: Pelly to Russell, 6 
February 1841, FO 5/370, fols. 142-145 at 143, and A. Simpson, ‘The Oregon Territory: Claims 
Thereto of England and America; Its Condition and Prospects’ (London: R. Bentley, 1846), p. 57.
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helpful.     None of the reasons identified in these and other works seem realistically 31
capable, however, of being the key concern of British policy towards Oregon in the period.   
Out of these, it is important to take account, initially, of the fur trade, which was, 
undoubtedly, the original British enterprise in Oregon, with both the North West Company, 
and, then, the Hudson’s Bay Company, operating in the region.    Indeed, as Galbraith has 32
observed, fur was the reason why Britain was involved in Oregon at all.    Furthermore, as 33
Galbraith also highlights, this trade, in turn, then led to the Hudson’s Bay Company and 
Canning seeing the area between the river Columbia and the 49th parallel as ‘essential to the 
protection of the fur trade’, which does partly explain the British negotiating objectives until 
the settlement of 1846.   Nevertheless, in the context of the British empire, the size and 34
importance of this trade was very small.  By itself, it is surely not reasonable to suppose that 
its future was the main influence affecting British policy on Oregon.  Indeed, Galbraith 
himself effectively underlines this point when he argues that the interests of the Hudson’s 
Bay Company were ‘sacrificed’ by Aberdeen in the 1846 settlement.  35
Other factors have also been considered as being responsible for British policy in Oregon.        
Merk, for example, sets out several ‘forces shaping Oregon policy’ in the period around the 
1826 negotiations, which included, trade, imperial ‘pride’, policy continuity, and fears over 
American progress.    The perceived potential importance of the river Columbia and Oregon 36
for British trade, in particular, has also been picked out by other historians.  Galbraith, for 
example, notes that the Hudson's Bay Company told the British government that the river 
Columbia was a vital link between the ‘northern posts and the coast’.   Similarly, Bourne 37
 Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay; Merk, The Oregon Question; Rakestraw, For Honor or Destiny. 31
 The Hudson’s Bay Company and the North-West Company merged in 1821: Northwestern 32
Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, p. 39. 
 Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay, p. 110.33
 Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay, p. 180.  Galbraith further identifies that the Hudson’s Bay Company was 34
behind the formation of the Puget Sound Agricultural Company in 1838, with the aim of strengthening 
the British claim to the area north of the river Columbia, albeit that he considers that this project 
failed: Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay, p. 199, p. 217.
 Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay, pp. 248-249.35
 Merk, The Oregon Question, pp. 139-153.36
 Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay, p. 180.  Pakenham seems to have been stressing such use of the river 37
Columbia when he argued that the British claim for a boundary based on its course was maintained 
from  ‘considerations of utility, not to say necessity’: Pakenham reply to Calhoun, as contained in 
Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 103, 12 September 1844, FO 5/408, fols. 19-64 at fols. 61-63.
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observes the ‘implications’ of Oregon ‘for the trade of the Pacific’.   As Schafer highlights, 38
Canning, too, certainly saw a possibility of Oregon providing a trading link for the British 
empire to China.    Nevertheless, as with the fur trade, it is not realistic, however, to suppose 39
that this was Britain's central motivation in this period.   Crucially, British opinion did not, 
on the whole, consider Oregon a valuable territory, as argued above.   As for trade 
specifically, the reality was that the river Columbia was increasingly known to be a difficult 
river, with a sand bar at its mouth, and navigation of it had been in any event been offered as 
part of the American offer in 1826.    Further, Britain had not taken up possession of the 40
Sandwich Islands - modern day Hawaii - when it had the chance in 1843, there was a 
potential alternative trading route to China through Central America (albeit not yet wholly on 
water), and, in terms of any trade coming from Oregon itself, that was entirely for the 
future.  41
What it seems Britain did care about, though, was how it was seen to deal with its perceived 
legal rights in Oregon, both domestically, in the United States, and the wider world.  
Crucially, British governments in the period considered that Britain had a strong claim in 
Oregon, and certainly one that matched the United States.  Furthermore, that belief was 
publicly shared by others outside government.   The British claim was built on the grounds 
that Britain possessed a right (jointly with other nations) to occupy vacant areas of Oregon, 
and that Britain’s discoveries and settlements in the region were the equivalent, on the facts, 
to those of the United States.   Britain also contended that its right of occupancy in Oregon 
was confirmed by the Nootka Sound Convention, agreed between Britain and Spain in 
 Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, p. 51.38
 See J. Schafer, ‘The British Attitude toward the Oregon Question, 1815-1846’, AHR, (1911), pp. 39
273-299 at p. 291, note 53, referring to Canning to Liverpool, 7 July 1826 in E. Stapleton, (ed.) 
Correspondence of Canning, II, 71-75.
 Galbraith, for example, refers to the three week delay caused to Simpson by the bar of the river 40
Columbia in 1842: Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay, p. 222.  The American offer in 1826 was on the basis that 
the river Columbia crossed the 49th parallel ‘at a navigable point’.  For the 1826 negotiations 
generally, see Northwestern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 73-76. 
 For the decision on the Sandwich Islands, see Aberdeen to Fox, No. 23, Draft, 3 June 1843, FO 41
5/390, fols. 61-64.  Britain became more formally involved with United States for a rail or canal link 
across Central America in 1849: see, for example: Palmerston to Abbott, 13 November 1849, British 
Documents, Vol. 4, pp. 6-7.
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1790.    As against the United States, specifically then, Britain claimed discovery based on 42
the voyages of Sir Francis Drake, Captain Cook, Captain Meares, and Captain Vancouver 
between 1578 and 1795, and, most crucially, occupation and settlement from the trading 
posts of the North West Company and the Hudson’s Bay Company.    Whilst there was no 43
absolute clarity, Britain certainly considered that these claims were strong enough to resist 
the corresponding demands by the United States for the ‘whole valley of the Columbia’.         44
Under those American claims, the United States, conversely, asserted discovery based, 
instead, on the voyages in the river Columbia of Gray in 1792, and Lewis and Clarke in 
1805.    It then, alternatively, claimed settlement through Astoria, a trading post which had 45
been officially retaken by the United States following the War of 1812.        46
Importantly, Britain also dismissed entirely the other two main American grounds of claim, 
presumably further affirming its belief in its own interest.   In the first of these, the United 
States argued that it was entitled to Oregon as a result of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.  
 Article III, Nootka Sound Convention, as contained in T. Twiss, The Oregon Question Examined in 42
respect to Facts and the Law of Nations (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1846), p. 
115; Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 106, 28 September 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 145-147; 
Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 95, 13 September 1845, FO 5/428, fols. 18-131 at fols. 22-27.  For the 
significance of Nootka in resisting the Spanish claim to have the sole right to occupy Oregon as 
against Britain, and confirming that ‘occupation, or actual possession, was ... the only test between the 
two crowns ... of territorial title’, see Twiss, Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
 For discovery, see Northwestern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 10-37; and Reply of 43
Pakenham, 29 July 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 173-184 at pp. 180-181.  For settlement, see 
Northwestern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 38-39, and pp. 41-42, where reference is 
made to R. Greenhow, The History of Oregon and California and the other territories of the 
Northwest coast of North America (first published 1844) as stating that, in 1844, the Hudson’s Bay 
Company had 22 ‘forts or establishments west of the Rocky Mountains’; and Reply of Pakenham, 29 
July 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 173-184, at pp. 180-181. 
 Pakenham to Buchanan, 29 July 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 173-184 at p. 184.44
 Northwestern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 53-55; Calhoun Statement, as contained 45
in Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 103, 12 September 1844, FO 5/408, fols. 19-64; Reply of Pakenham, 
29 July 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 173-184, at pp. 181-183. 
 Northwestern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 56-61; Calhoun Statement, as contained 46
in Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 103, 12 September 1844, FO 5/408, fols. 19-64; and Pakenham to 
Aberdeen, No. 106, 28 September 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 145-147.  Astoria had been 
established by the Pacific Fur Company in 1811 on the south bank of the river Columbia, sold to the 
North West Company in 1813 during the War of 1812, and then retaken by the United States in 1818, 
ostensibly as the return of property taken in war pursuant to Article 1 of the Treaty of Ghent, 1814.  
Britain accepted the retaking of Astoria, but ‘without, however, admitting the right of that Government 
[the United States] to the possession in question’, although Merk contends that British ‘errors of 
procedure’ added to the strength of the American claim: Northwestern Memorandum, British 
Documents, Ibid., and Merk, The Oregon Question, pp. 25-26, p. 29.
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There appears to have been two elements to this contention, at least as it was put by Calhoun 
in 1844.   These were the claim to Oregon from the possession of Louisiana itself, and, then, 
the case for Oregon under the alleged principle of  ‘continuity’.    Pakenham, was, however, 47
scathing, calling the argument, from the Louisiana Purchase, a position ‘so very far-fetched, 
not to say absurd, as scarcely to require serious notice’.   The other American claim was 48
derived from the American-Spanish treaty of 1819, by which the United States inherited 
Spanish rights in relation to Oregon.    The American case, in this instance, was that it was 49
entitled to the title of the whole of Oregon, as a result of the combination of the original 
Spanish right of discovery over the whole north-west coast with subsequent American acts of 
discovery and settlement.    This claim, however, also depended on the further argument 50
that the Nootka Convention was now either invalid or ineffective.   Britain naturally 51
rejected this contention, arguing that Nootka was in force and confirmed a British right of 
occupancy.  52
Britain was also operating in circumstances where the merits of its rights over Oregon were 
widely acknowledged in public.  It was, in particular, significant that some of those who had 
been prominently involved with the previous Oregon negotiations in the United States at the 
very least recognised British claims.   For example, John Quincy Adams explained in 1845 
his willingness to compromise, as U.S. Secretary of State back in 1818, on that basis that:  
‘we did think there was some substance in the claim of the British government, and that it 
 For the American claim on ‘continuity’, see Calhoun Statement, in Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 103, 47
12 September 1844, FO 5/408, fols. 19-64, and Calhoun to Pakenham, 20 September 1844, as 
contained in Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 106, 28 September 1844, FO 5/408, fols. 74-99.  Calhoun 
argued that the rights of the original colonies to westward extension had been restored by the 
Louisiana Purchase, 1803, as that removed the effect of the Treaty of Paris, 1763, which had, in turn, 
given up those rights west of the river Mississippi.
 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 106, 28/9/44, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 145-147.48
 Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States of America and His Catholic 49
Majesty, 1819, accessed through Project Avalon, on 23/5/16 c. 11.38am. 
 Buchanan to Pakenham, 30 August 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 184-210.50
 Buchanan argued that the Nootka Convention was much more limited in its effect than contended 51
by Britain, being, broadly, concerned with ‘merely trading with the Indians whilst the country should 
remain unsettled’, together with the making of settlements for that trading purpose only, rather than 
the purpose of ‘ultimate sovereignty’.  Buchanan also argued that Nootka had, in any event, been 
invalidated by war between Britain and Spain: Buchanan Statement, 12 July 1845, British Documents, 
Vol. 2, pp. 162-173 at pp. 163-164.
 Reply of Pakenham, 29 July 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, p173-184. 52
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was a fair and honourable proposition to them to compromise’.   Similarly, Pakenham 53
highlighted to Aberdeen that Albert Gallatin, an American negotiator over Oregon in London 
in 1826, had contended, in a four part series of letters published in the United States in early 
1846, that ‘neither party has an absolute and indisputable title to the whole of the contested 
territory’.   This seemed to reflect Gallatin's thinking back in 1826, when he had observed 54
that the British had been told that the offering of a boundary ‘was a sufficient proof that we 
admitted that she also had claims which deserved, and to which we paid due 
consideration’.    More recently, Webster had also respected British rights in Oregon, 55
commenting in 1846 in the Senate that: ‘it is not to be doubted that the United States 
Government has admitted, through a long series of years, that England has rights in the 
northwestern parts of this continent which are entitled to be respected’.  56
Furthermore, British rights were also supported by a flurry of publications in Britain  
commenting on the position of the dispute under international law.   Most notable was 
Travers Twiss's 1846 book on the Oregon question.    Twiss was an expert in international 57
law, and a future Queen's Advocate.   Through 18 chapters and nearly 400 pages, he 58
meticulously examined the basis of the American case and the previous negotiations between 
Britain and the United States.  His motivation was clearly stated in the preface to his book:  
‘He could not resist the conviction, on reading several able treatises on the subject, that the 
case of the United States had been overstated by her writers and negotiators’.    Other 59
publications supportive to Britain from 1845 and 1846 included, for example,  G.F. Ruxton's 
'A Glance at the Claims of Great Britain and the United States to the Territory in Dispute’, 
 Adams, Congress, 1845, Congressional Globe, as contained in Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 11, 4 53
February 1845, FO 5/424, fols. 70-106. 
 Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 10, 29 January 1846, FO 5/446, fols. 59-70 at fols. 59-60.54
 Gallatin to the U.S. Secretary of State, during the negotiations of 1826, as referred to in the  55
Northwestern Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, p. 90.
 Webster, Senate, 30 March 1846, as contained in Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 36, 30 March 1846, 56
FO 5/447, fols. 181-184.
 Twiss, The Oregon Question.57
 Twiss was admitted to the College of Advocates in 1841, and became Queen’s Advocate in 1867: 58
DNB (Oxford, 2004), pp. 736-739.
 Twiss, The Oregon Question, p. 2.  Twiss's work was sent by the Foreign Office to the British 59
Minister in Washington in March, 1846, and 1,000 copies were republished in the United States 
following an intervention by the the British consul in New York: Addington to Pakenham, 3 March 
1846, FO 5/445, fol. 20; Barclay to Addington, 28 April 1846, FO 5/452, fol. 237.
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Edward Wallace's 'The Oregon Question Determined by the Rules of International Law’, and 
TF's 'The Oregon Question’ in The Westminster Review.    The Edinburgh Review and The 60
Quarterly Review also published articles broadly favourable to the British government’s 
position in 1845 and 1846 respectively, albeit that Merk has argued that these resulted from 
involvement by Aberdeen and Everett.   There were, of course, contrary publications in the 61
United States, but the presence of these British commentaries provides further evidence for 
the view that the British government was not alone, either in its analysis of the merits of its 
Oregon claims, or its perception of the importance of being seen to uphold them.  62
International law was able to make an impact on British policy in relation to Oregon from 
this position because ministers and politicians cared about the link made between these, 
widely perceived as strong, legal rights and British honour.   Many historians have, of 
course, already noted the role played by ‘honour’ in British policy to Oregon.   Indeed, 
Donald Rakestraw called his book on Oregon: ‘For Honor or Destiny’.   Similarly, Bourne 63
comments that Aberdeen wanted to ‘to secure for public opinion ... what could be 
presented ... as an honourable compromise’.    The additional point being argued here, 64
however, is that it was a notion of ‘justice’ for British rights in Oregon that was an express 
rationale for both the sustained British interest, and the wider issue as to why power or 
honour were at stake.   Three examples from the parliamentary debate following Polk's claim 
in 1845 that the American title to the whole of Oregon was ‘clear and unquestionable’ 
illustrate this point. (emphases added).    Lord John Russell, leading for the Whigs in the 65
Commons called for the two governments to ‘settle every question of difference between 
 G. F. A. Ruxton, ‘The Oregon Question: A Glance at the Claims of Great Britain and the United 60
States to the Territory in Dispute’, (London: John Oliver, 1846); E.  J. Wallace, ‘The Oregon Question 
Determined by the Rules of International Law’, (London: Maxwell & Son, 1846); ‘The Oregon 
Question’, The Westminster Review, Vol. 45, No 2 (1846), Article VI, pp. 418-454.
 The Edinburgh Review favoured arbitration and suggested the arbitrator should decide on a 61
boundary of the 49th parallel to the sea, with Vancouver Island left to Britain: Edinburgh Review, 
‘Oregon’. See also: ‘The Oregon Question’, Quarterly Review, Vol. 77, (1846), No. CLIV, pp. 
563-610, and, on the involvement of Aberdeen and Everett, Merk, The Oregon Question, Essay 10.
 An example of one such American work, referred to frequently by Twiss, was Greenhow, The 62
History of Oregon and California.
 Rakestraw, For Honor or Destiny.63
 Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, p. 52.64
 Polk’s statement was a significant moment in the dispute, as will be discussed further in the second 65
section. 
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them, on the one hand with regard to national honour and dignity, and with regard, on the 
other, to the preservation of the rights of the subjects under their rule’.    For him, thus: 66
It cannot be a matter of indifference, that a large territory to which we have a better and 
juster title, should be yielded to what I must call a blustering announcement on the part 
of the President of the United States.     67
Similarly, the Earl of Clarendon, leading for the Whigs in the House of Lords, also linked 
British rights in Oregon to honour, in saying that he was ‘sure that the people of this country 
will be determined not to yield their own undeniable rights to encroachment, clamour, or 
menace’, and adding that he hoped the government would ‘not shrink from adapting that 
course which may become necessary for vindicating the national honour and protecting 
the national interests’.    Lastly, Aberdeen himself, responding as Foreign Secretary, also 68
made the same connection between honour and rights when arguing that British ‘honour is a 
substantial property that we can certainly never neglect’, and that Britain was ‘fully prepared 
to maintain’ its ‘clear and unquestionable’ ‘rights’ if a settlement was not achieved.  69
It was also this perceived need to achieve justice for rights, for the sake of British power and 
honour, that pushed Britain into repeatedly suggesting arbitration as a means of settling the 
dispute, especially in the period from 1844 to 1846.    What was important about arbitration 70
for Britain in the case of Oregon was not the result, but that it was a process in which 
‘justice’ could be seen to be done by the world.  For Aberdeen, the offer of arbitration was, 
accordingly, evidence of  ‘a spirit of moderation and fairness, of which the world will judge’, 
‘proof of our confidence in the justice of our own claims’, and ‘proof also of our readiness to 
 Russell, HC, 4 April 1845, Vol. LXXIX, 179-193.66
 Russell, HC, 4 April 1845, Vol. LXXIX, 192-193.67
 Clarendon, HL, 4 April 1845, Vol. LXXIX, 120.  See also Clarendon, HL, 17 March 1846, Vol. 68
LXXXIV, 1112-1113, in which he wanted action to prevent ‘the suspicion, on the part of any other 
country, that we would submit to a peace purchased by concessions which are incompatible with 
national honour’. 
 Aberdeen, HL, 4 April 1845, Vol. LXXIX, 123.  See also Peel on the resolve to ‘maintain’ British 69
rights: HC, 4 April 1845, Vol. LXXIX, 198-199.
 See, for example: Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 45, 1 November 1844, FO 5/403, fols. 70
111-114; Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 10, 29 January 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, p. 155; 
Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 8, 3 March 1845, FO 5/423, fols. 21-24; Pakenham to Aberdeen, 
No. 40, 29 March 1845, FO 5/425, fols. 102-106; Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 72, 28 November 
1845, FO 5/423, fols. 168-175; and Pakenham to Buchanan, 16 January 1846, as contained in 
Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 11, 29 January 1846, FO 5/446, fols. 71-82.
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incur the risk of a great sacrifice’.   Furthermore, Aberdeen made clear that it was the 71
concept of British honour that was at stake when he asserted later that Oregon was ‘a case 
peculiarly fitted and calling for that mode of settlement’ because its ‘possession’ was ‘an 
object of no immediate or pressing national interest or importance’.    Pakenham, too, made 72
clear that arbitration was desired because ‘honour’ would be preserved ‘whatever might be 
the result’.    The suggestion of arbitration also obtained cross-party support from the 73
Whigs, with Clarendon calling it the ‘best proof to the world’ that Britain believed in the 
justice of its claim.    From the British perspective, thus, arbitration was a legal solution to 74
what was, at heart, a policy shaped by a legal problem.   This can be contrasted with the 
position of the United States, where the Polk administration refused arbitration because it 
wanted ‘control’ in relation to the ‘invaluable’ Oregon.  75
The importance of legal rights for the shaping of British policy can also be seen in the way 
that the possibility of Britain acquiring a legal interest in California was approached.  
Britain, as seen, appeared willing to accept American expansion into California, and this is 
consistent with what Adams describes as Britain’s ‘lack of interest’ in it.    What is 76
significant then about British policy is not that Britain refused to take some type of interest 
in California, but rather that it appears to have been perceived that such a legal interest 
would be necessary or helpful to any change in British policy.  In other words, those wanting 
a more active British position on California were, therefore, striving to put Britain into a 
position whereby it could possibly intervene there within the ambit of international law - and 
possibly have an obligation to do so.   Conversely, in line with its overall position on 
California, the British government was careful not to take on any interest which may have 
given it a legal obligation to protect the territory, or, as in Oregon, a perceived duty to uphold 
a claim.  Three examples from the period up to to 1844 illustrate these points.   In the first 
instance, Pelly, of the Hudson’s Bay Company, wrote to Russell in 1841 suggesting that Fort 
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, 28 November 1845, No. 72, FO 5/423, fols. 168-175 at 174. 71
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, 3 March 1845, No. 8, FO 5/423, fols. 21-24.72
 Pakenham to Aberdeen, 28 March 1844, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43123, fols. 235-238.73
 Clarendon, HL, 17 March 1846, Vol. LXXXIV, 1114.  See also Russell to Everett, February, 1846, 74
S. Walpole, The Life of Lord John Russell, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1889), Vol. 1, p. 421.
 Buchanan to Pakenham, 4 February 1846, as contained in Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 12, 5 75
February 1846, FO 5/446, fols. 85-93.
 Adams, ‘English Interest in the Annexation of California’, p. 264.76
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Ross be purchased from Russia ‘with the view that on the purchase and possession of that 
establishment some territorial claim may hereafter be founded’.   Russell, however, Bourne 77
notes, was not interested.    In a similar vein, Adams refers to the fact that Pakenham ‘gave 78
details in 1841 to show that it would be easy to form a company in England “for the 
establishment of an English colony in California” ’.    Again, as Adams shows, Britain did 79
not pursue the idea, with the rejection this time coming from Stanley, who commented that 
he was ‘not anxious for the formation of new and distant Colonies, all of which involve 
heavy direct and still heavier indirect expenditure’.    Finally, again as Adams identifies, 80
Barron and Forbes made a ‘definite proposal’ in 1844 for a form of ‘protection’ for 
California, and this, too, was rejected by Aberdeen as being ‘entirely out of the question’ in 
the light of Britain’s relationship with Mexico.  81
Similarly, Britain also rejected two later proposals for acquiring an interest in California, 
which on these occasions came from Mexico itself.   Again, the proposals aimed to give 
Britain legal justification for potential interference in California.   The most important of 
these was when the Mexican minister in London approached Aberdeen in 1845 with a view 
to making ‘some arrangement by which it should be our interest to protect California from 
the invasion of the U. States’.    As Aberdeen commented to Peel, what was being 82
considered was ‘such an English interest to be constituted in California, as would give us a 
right to protect the province’, or, as he also referred to it, ‘our Protectorate’.    As with the 83
earlier British sourced proposals, however, nothing resulted from this offer, with Peel taking 
 Pelly to Russell, 6 February 1841, FO 5/370, fols. 142-145. Fort Ross is near San Francisco. 77
 Bourne, The Balance of Power, pp. 121-122.78
 Pakenham to Palmerston, 30 August 1841, as referred to in Adams, E., ‘English Interest in the 79
Annexation of California’, p. 238.
Adams, E., ‘English Interest in the Annexation of California’, pp. 239-240 as referring to F.O. 80
Mexico, 143, No. 13, Aberdeen to Pakenham, 15 December 1841, and F.O. Mexico 151, Dom Var., 
Hope to Canning, 23 November 1841.  Bourne notes, however, that Stanley also said that he and 
Aberdeen might have considered a cession of territory to the Crown: Bourne, The Balance of Power, 
pp. 121-122, and Note 1, p. 122.  Whilst it is difficult to assess how serious a comment this was by 
Stanley, some guide that it was not an indication of real British intent may be taken from the fact that, 
as will be seen, more adventurous schemes were later rejected. 
  Adams, E., ‘English Interest in the Annexation of California’, p. 242, and pp. 247-248, referring to 81
Aberdeen to Barron, 31 December 1844, FO Mexico, 179. 
 Aberdeen to Peel, 23 September 1845, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43064, fols. 353-356.82
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the view that it was ‘too late’ to establish such an interest, and that any attempt to do so 
‘would give a selfish character to our interference’.    Mexico’s second proposal came at 84
around the time that the U.S.-Mexican war broke out in 1846, with the future of California 
known to be at stake.   Adams notes that Mexico then proposed ‘to transfer California to 
England as security for a loan’, but that, again, nothing came of it.    Indeed, Aberdeen had, 85
in June, 1846, merely informed Pakenham that he had offered ‘mediation’ after being told 
that a state of war existed.        86
In contrast to the positions in Oregon and California, the main problem for British-American 
relations presented by Texas was the question of Britain’s support for Texan independence.  
Britain, as argued above, was not opposed, in principle, to the annexation of Texas to the 
United States, and, unlike in Oregon, it possessed no legal interest over the territory of Texas 
itself.   This ensured that British policy aims were, therefore, limited by the constraints 
resulting from that position, such as, for example, the lack of any desire for military 
intervention.   Subject to that, however, Britain nevertheless still favoured the maintenance 
of an independent Texas if it could be achieved peacefully.  Such a policy, Aberdeen 
explained, was consistent with the treaties entered into with Texas, helped protect Mexico 
from the United States, and assisted Britain by reducing the chances of a challenge to the 
‘internal peace’ of the United States from expansion into Texas.    International law made 87
two main contributions as to how British policy related to the United States concerning this 
objective.  Initially, the legal consequences from Britain’s recognition of the independence of 
Texas, and the taking on of the rights and obligations of three treaties, brought the Texan 
issue squarely into the scope of British-American relations.   The key impact, however, was 
from the principle of sovereignty, which Britain accepted gave Texas the right to determine 
its own future.   Crucially, this not only aligned Britain with the United States on the 
 Peel to Aberdeen, 24 September 1845, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43064, fols. 357-360.84
Adams, E., ‘English Interest in the Annexation of California’, pp. 262-263, as referring to Bankhead 85
to Aberdeen, 30 May 1846, FO Mexico 197, No. 73, and Palmerston, 15 August 1846, FO Mexico 
197, No. 4. 
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 28, 18 June 1846, FO 5/445, fols. 65-68.  Palmerston showed no 86
inclination to change Aberdeen’s policy of offering mediation on taking over in 1846: Palmerston, 
HC, 24 August 1846, Vol. LXXXVIII, 984-987.
 Aberdeen to Elliot, Draft, No. 10, 3 July 1845, FO 75/12, fols. 45-50.  The point by Aberdeen on 87
American expansion was not that he was concerned by American expansion in itself, but, rather, that 
expansion could ‘eventually excite discord’ in the United States itself, which could ‘scarcely fail to act 
injuriously upon British interests’, which he identified with capital and commerce.
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principle of Texas’s right to choose, but also meant that British policy focused on diplomacy 
with Texas itself rather than the United States.  In the end, respect for the ‘will’ of the Texan 
people resulted in British policy giving up on an independent Texas, but the fact that the 
issue had, in the process, been largely kept away from the diplomatic exchanges with United 
States allowed the British-American relationship to emerge relatively unscathed.           
The initial impact from international law on the direction of British policy came, then, from 
Britain’s decision to recognise Texas as an independent state in October, 1840.    Britain 88
entered into three treaties with Texas as part of this process, concerning Texan debt, the slave 
trade, and commerce.    Whilst no immediate issue arose from any of the treaties, each one 89
nevertheless had the potential to bring Texas into British-American relations.  The most 
immediately significant treaty was that concerning Texan debt.  Under this, broadly, Texas 
was to assume £1 million of the pre-1835 Mexican debt if British mediation led to an 
unlimited Truce, and, thereafter, a Treaty of Peace was agreed between Texas and Mexico.    90
Britain, as a result, became procedurally involved with the future of Texas, and from then on 
adopted Mexican recognition as its main method of assisting Texan independence.   For 
obvious reasons, this was to become more of a problem in British-American relations when 
the United States came to favour Texan annexation.  The other two treaties also had 
important ramifications for the United States.  The slave trade treaty introduced a mutual 
‘right of search’ and commenced a British-Texan relationship over the issue of slavery, 
which, as will be seen in the next section, was to become a cause of much distrust in the 
 See Hamilton to Palmerston, 14 October 1840, FO 75/1, fols. 8-11, and Palmerston to Hamilton,, 88
Draft, 18 October 1840, FO 75/1, fols. 12-18. Hamilton was the Texan representative in London. 
McNair makes the point that the decision whether to grant ‘recognition’ was ‘mainly’ a ‘policy’ 
matter, with the legal questions being concerned with ‘what constitutes recognition’ and the 
consequent ‘effects’: McNair, International Law Opinions, Vol. 1, p. 131.
 The dates the three treaties were signed were as follows: Commerce, 13 November 1840, Debt, 14 89
November 1840, Slave Trade, 15 November 1840, FO 75/2, fol. 9.  For the background to the treaties, 
see Palmerston to Hamilton, Draft, 18 October 1840, FO 75/1, fols. 12-18. The treaties were ratified in 
August, 1842.
 Convention between Texas and Britain, 14 November, 1840, relating to Debt and British mediation: 90
H. Gammel, The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, Volume 2, (book, 1898, Austin, Texas), p. 887, 
(texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth6727/m1/891/:accessed September 21, 2018), University of 
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United States.   The abolition of slavery in Texas was not, however, made a condition of 91
British recognition in this or the other treaties.    Finally, Britain’s commercial treaty with 92
Texas was similarly of potential interest to the United States, given the extent of British-
American trade and the perceived potential of Texas.   Indeed, it is noteworthy that, as 
highlighted by Adams, Britain turned down a Texan offer for an improved commercial 
agreement in 1841 in return for a British guarantee of debt, at least partly, it appears, because 
of fears of the American reaction.     93
The most significant impact of international law on the direction of British policy in relation 
to Texas, however, was in the respect given to the principle that independent states possessed 
the right to decide their own future.    British policy objectives throughout the period 
certainly respected Texan sovereignty.   Sovereignty, as seen in chapter 2, was a fundamental 
principle within British practice.   Britain’s recognition of the independence of Texas, 
thereby, meant that, under British practice, Texas possessed the normal rights associated with 
sovereignty.   The significance of this was increased by the fact that Britain can be 
reasonably presumed to have accepted that ‘settlers’ were able to participate in the exercise 
of that sovereignty within Texas.   There is certainly no evidence to suggest that Britain 94
considered that international law provided any means to exclude ‘settlers’ from any decision 
making process in newly-independent states.  The point mattered because, overall, it 
probably favoured the aims of the United States in Texas, given that most settlers were 
 Palmerston’s sensitivity towards the influence of the United States can be seen in his letter to 91
Hamilton explaining the draft slave trade treaty, where he expressly sought to distinguish the ‘right of 
search which the people of the United States have objected to’ from the right in slave trade treaties: 
Palmerston to Hamilton, Draft, 18 October 1840, FO 75/1, fols. 12-18 at 14-15.
 Indeed, The Westminster Review criticised Palmerston for not making the abolition of slavery a 92
condition of Texan recognition in 1840: ‘Review of W. Kennedy, Texas; It’s Rise, Progress and 
Prospects’, The Westminster Review, Vol. 36, (1841), pp. 270-272; cf. an article in The Edinburgh 
Review, which, however, took a contrary position: ‘The Republic of Texas and its Recognition’, 
Edinburgh Review, Vol. LXXIII, (1841), Article X, pp. 241-271 at p. 270.  
 Aberdeen to Hamilton, 4 October 1841, FO 75/2, fols. 73-74; Goulburn to Aberdeen, 1 October 93
1841, quoted by Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, pp. 69-72. 
 There is no evidence of Britain questioning the right of settlers to participate in the process of 94
government in Texas, and this was the case in circumstances where Aberdeen believed that ‘the loss of 
Texas was in fact ascribable to her contiguity to the United States, which alone gave rise to the 
gradual encroachment of lawless United States' citizens’ [i.e. ‘settlers’]: Aberdeen to Bankhead, No. 
30, 30 September 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 332-334.
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American.   The centrality of sovereignty to British policy was also further confirmed by 95
advice from the Queen’s Advocate.  The Foreign Office had questioned both the right of 
Texas to give up its newly-acquired independence and the potential effect this would have on 
the British-Texan treaties.  Dodson’s key report in May, 1844, however, was to the effect that 
Texas possessed a right to join the United States: 
I am of opinion that a State which has been acknowledged by other States as independent 
has a right to divest itself by treaty of its independence, and annex itself to a foreign 
power notwithstanding it may heretofore have entered into treaties with other states, 
provided that the treaties into which it has so entered contain no stipulation to the 
contrary.  96
Importantly, Britain would also have been aware of the fact that a similar view was held by 
the United States.  As Tyler stated simply of Texas’s ability to join the Union, in his Message 
to the Senate in April, 1844: ‘As an independent sovereignty, her right to do this is 
unquestionable’.         97
The main impact from this acknowledgment of Texan sovereignty on British policy was that 
Britain focused the direction of its policy objectives on Texas and Mexico, and kept the issue 
away from its relations with the United States.   Britain, after all, had no grounds, under 
international law, to protest to the United States if Texas was merely exercising its 
sovereignty.   Britain’s key objective, thus, became a reinvigorated attempt to secure the 
recognition of Texan independence by Mexico.   This followed from the fact that Aberdeen 
had been told that there was support for independence in Texas, but annexation to the United 
States was preferred to reconquest by Mexico or ongoing war.    Whilst the details of the 98
resulting British policy in Texas are outside the scope if this thesis, two aspects are, however, 
 Indeed, Calhoun, in the context of Texas, implicitly linked settlers to expansion, and then 95
annexation: ‘It is our policy to increase by growing and spreading out into unoccupied regions 
assimilating all we incorporate.  In a word, to increase by accretion, and not through, conquest... .  No 
system can be more unsuited to the latter process, or better adapted to the former than our admirable 
Federal system’: Calhoun to King, (U. S. Minister, Paris), 12 August 1844, enclosed in Pakenham to 
Aberdeen, No. 130, 12 December 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 360-366.
 Report of Dodson on Texan Independence, 15 May 1844, FO 83/2382, fols. 64-67.96
 Message of Tyler to the Senate, 22 April 1844, as contained in Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 56, 9 97
June 1844, FO 5/406, fols. 3-73 at fols. 7-9. 
 Fox to Aberdeen, No. 33, 8 March 1843, FO 5/391, fols. 185-190; Fox to Aberdeen, No. 130, 27 98
November 1843, FO 5/393, fols. 270-277 at 274-276. See also: Elliot to Aberdeen, Secret, 31 October 
1843, FO 75/6  fols. 272-281 at f278.
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important to understanding the role of international law in Britain’s relations with the United 
States.   Crucially, Britain maintained throughout its respect for the sovereign right of Texas 
to decide its own future, which manifested itself, in practice, in Aberdeen’s concern for the 
perceived levels of popular support in Texas for independence.    This mattered because, in 99
the event, respect for the Texan will served to restrain British ambitions, which, in turn, 
reduced the risk of an unintended clash with the United States.  The other aspect was that 
Britain did not protest directly to the United States about its policy of seeking to annex 
Texas.   This was crucial because it meant that the Texan issue did not have the effect of 
souring British-American relations more widely.         
There are two main instances from the course of British policy in Texas which illustrate the 
respect Aberdeen gave to Texan sovereignty whilst trying to get Mexico to recognise Texas.   
The most important was in June, 1844, and concerned the idea of ‘a formal guarantee’ to be 
‘given to Mexico by Great Britain and France for the permanency of that [Texan] 
independence’.    Aberdeen considered that such a guarantee was important because it 100
would mean that ‘the United States would scarcely venture to seek thenceforward to 
appropriate Texas to themselves at the almost certain hazard of a rupture with Great Britain, 
France, and Mexico’.    In the end, however, the proposal did not proceed.  Pakenham had 101
been initially cautious as to the response of the United States, and suggested a deferral in 
taking the idea forward to avoid any impression being given of foreign interference in the 
1844 American Presidential election.    The proposal had then been withdrawn, in any 102
 Whilst there was clearly no express principle of international law requiring such reference to public 99
opinion, it nevertheless amounted to a self-imposed requirement that respected the concept of national 
sovereignty.  It was also consistent with the concept of sovereignty that impliedly lay behind the 
formation of Texas by the ‘people of Texas’, as cited in footnote 16 above.  Elliot also made the 
related point that Britain had to be sure there was a feeling for true independence, as opposed to an 
independence merely as a prelude to annexation to the United States, if it was to encourage Mexico to 
recognise Texas: Elliot to Aberdeen, Secret, 28 December 1844, FO 75/9, fols. 166-170 at 168-169.
 Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 162, 31 May 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 282-283, and 100
Aberdeen to Pakenham,  No. 24, 3 June 1844, Confidential, FO 5/403, fol. 63.
 Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 162, 31 May 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 282-283. 101
 Pakenham’s main aim was to assist Clay against Polk: Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 76, 27 June 102
1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 311-313.
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event, in October, 1844, after Mexico failed to respond positively.   The key feature of the 103
idea, for present purposes, however, was Aberdeen’s requirement that the ‘public feeling’ of 
the people of Texas needed to be ascertained before any formal proposition was put to 
Mexico.   Aberdeen’s words on this point in his despatch to Bankhead setting out the 
initiative are important because they place respect for popular support, and thereby Texan 
sovereignty, at the centre of the British idea:  
Should France assent to that proposal, Her Majesty's Government proposed to send out 
forthwith a fit person to Texas, ... who would be instructed to ascertain, as accurately as 
he might be able, the state of public opinion and feeling with respect to the projected 
annexation of Texas to the United States, under the security of the joint guarantee above 
described.    If, as Her Majesty's Government were led to believe, the public feeling, 
under such a security for the future peace of the country, should be in favour of 
independence, they would then take measures forthwith for operating directly and 
officially upon the Mexican Government, which they should hope to find amenable to 
their views, as eminently advantageous to that Republic.  104
The proposal was, thus, conditional in some loose sense on ‘the state of public opinion’, and 
that ‘public feeling’ being ‘in favour of independence’.   Huge questions can naturally be 
raised as to what was meant by ‘public feeling’, and how it was to be assessed, but this 
nevertheless illustrates that British policy was responsive to the notion that Texas itself was 
in charge of its future.   In the end, however, public opinion was not assessed because, as 
seen, the idea was dropped for other reasons.        
British policy then contained no new significant proposals in the immediate aftermath of the 
failure of this initiative, with Britain appearing to perceive itself as being constrained by the 
state of Texan public feeling.   Aberdeen instructed Elliot not to commit himself to any 105
‘line of active policy’ in December, 1844, citing ‘public feeling’ in Texas (as well as the 
 Aberdeen to Bankhead, No. 34, 23 October 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 338-339. The 103
despatch noted Santa Anna’s intention of ‘persevering in his attempt to reconquer Texas’.  Adams also 
refers to Pakenham’s despatch of 27 June 1844 (see footnote 102) as being important to Aberdeen’s 
decision in that it revealed the scale of ‘American feeling’: Adams, British Interests and Activities in 
Texas, pp. 180-181.
 Aberdeen to Bankhead, No. 16, Confidential, 3 June 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 283-286.104
 On the British understanding of the state of Texan public feeling at this time, see, for example, 105
Elliot to Aberdeen, Secret, 28 December 1844, FO 75/9, fols. 166-170, in which Elliot reported that 
the view of Jones (President of Texas) was ‘that it ought to be no matter of surprise that there should 
be a very general feeling in favour of annexation‘ given the failure to secure Mexican recognition.
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‘obstinacy’ of  Mexico).    Similarly, Elliot told Jones that it ‘seemed very unlikely’ Britain 106
would act ‘decisively ... till they should be effectively certified that they were really acting in 
behalf of the Government and people of a durable and bona fide nation of Texas’.     107
Furthermore, no substantive new British policy came from Aberdeen’s receiving news, in 
January, 1845, of a belated conditional proposal from Santa Anna to recognise Mexico, but 
Santa Anna had fallen from power by the time that Aberdeen wrote to Elliot in any event.    108
Significantly, Aberdeen would also have been aware at this time that the Texan Congress was 
likely to favour annexation.    The unanimous report of the Committee on Foreign 109
Relations of the Texan Senate of 22nd January, 1845 was certainly consistent with the view 
that annexation commanded popular support in Texas, as illustrated in the following extract 
emphasising the role of a ‘free, sovereign and independent people’:  
The annexation of Texas to the United States, already emphatically willed by the people 
of both countries, will, when consummated, be among the most interesting events 
recorded in the annals of history ... this will be the first instance where a free, sovereign 
and independent people will have merged their government in another by their own free 
will and consent!  110
The ongoing British respect for that Texan sovereignty can also be seen in Aberdeen’s 
observation to Wellington in March, 1845 that should Texas ‘freely determine to join the 
American Union’, it would ‘be difficult for any other state to prevent it, or to make it a cause 
of quarrel’.  111
    
The second example of Britain respecting Texan sovereignty is in the way that it then 
pursued a further plan for Mexican recognition only after it received information concerning 
 Aberdeen to Elliot, No. 13, 31 December 1844, FO 75/9, fols. 32-33.106
 Elliot to Aberdeen, Secret, 28 December 1844, FO 75/9, fols. 166-170 at 168-169.107
 Aberdeen discovered in January, 1845 that, Santa Anna facing rebellion, had finally proposed 108
recognition of Texas, subject to certain conditions: Bankhead to Aberdeen, No. 102, 29 November 
1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 379-382.  Aberdeen merely told Elliot to offer Texas British and 
French mediation to ‘improve’ the terms of the proposal, but (unbeknown to him) Santa Anna was, by 
then, out of power: Aberdeen to Elliot, Draft, No. 1, 23 January 1845, FO 75/12, fols, 1-10.
 Aberdeen reported to Peel that the new Texan chargé d’affaires considered that, whilst the 109
government of Texas was against annexation, ‘he fears that their Congress may be of a different 
opinion’: Aberdeen to Peel, 21 January 1845, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40454, fols. 394-395. 
 As contained in Elliot to Aberdeen, No. 6, 8 February 1845, FO 75/13, fols. 45-56.110
 Aberdeen to Wellington, 2 March 1845, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40455, fols. 3-6.111
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a possible move in ‘public feeling’ in Texas in the spring of 1845.  This followed on from 
Congress in the United States approving the annexation of Texas through a joint resolution in 
the spring of 1845, with the aim, thereby, of circumventing the defeat of the treaty of 
annexation in the American Senate back in June 1844.    The terms of annexation were, 112
however, now different from 1844, and Pakenham reported that they ‘were viewed with 
disfavour by the Texian people’.    Further, Elliot had also commented earlier, after meeting 113
Smith, that ‘the temper of this people is changing, and that if terms of independence are 
speedily offered by Mexico, they will be very generally acceptable, and steadfastly 
maintained’.    In these circumstances, Britain then moved to make a renewed offer of 114
mediation to Mexico and Texas in early May, 1845, supported this time by the ‘moral 
influence’ of Britain and France rather than any guarantee or other right.    In the event, the 115
renewed British proposal was too late, however, to have any effect.  Contrary to his and 
Pakenham’s hopes, Elliot told Aberdeen in late May, 1845 that: 
the friends of annexation have succeeded in exciting a hot, and apparently general feeling 
in favour of that project, and it is no doubt to be feared that the concessions of the 
Mexican government will have come too late to act successfully upon the people of the 
country.  116
In this, Elliot was right: Texas’s decision to approve annexation was confirmed at a Special 
Convention in Texas on the 4th July, 1845.     117
The respect for Texan sovereignty in the direction of British policy did, however, mean that 
annexation of Texas did not become a source of direct diplomatic confrontation between 
Britain and the United States.  Whilst the United States, of course, knew that Britain was 
 Aberdeen was kept informed of the expected approval by Congress: Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 112
21, 28 February 1845, FO 5/424, fols. 144-147.
 As reported by Aberdeen in Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 46, 15 April 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, 113
p457-460.  
 Elliot to Aberdeen, No. 10, 6 March 1845, FO 75/13, fols. 77-83.114
 Aberdeen to Cowley, No. 46, 15 April 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 457-460; Aberdeen to 115
Bankhead, No. 15, 1 May 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 464-467; and Aberdeen to Elliot, No. 
6, 3 May 1845, Draft, FO 75/12, fols. 25-30.  Aberdeen’s initiative was distinct from Elliot’s secret 
mission to Mexico in April, 1845, which he only received news of in May, 1845: Elliot to Aberdeen, 
Secret, 2 April 1845 (received 9 May 1845), FO 75/13, fols. 112-127. 
 Elliot to Aberdeen, No 16, 30 May 1845, FO 75/13, fols. 135-136.116
 Adams, E., British Interests and Activities in Texas,, p. 222.117
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working to try to keep Texas independent, Britain did not formally protest to the United 
States against annexation.   Texas was the focus for British diplomacy on this matter, and, 
given its view on Texan sovereignty, Britain had no grounds under international law to 
complain to the United States in any event.   Aberdeen did, initially, give an informal 
expression of ‘dissatisfaction’ to the United States on reports of the proposed treaty of 
annexation in 1844, and this was followed by a ‘holding’ statement on its actual 
announcement.    Thereafter, however, it appears that Britain tried to keep its Texan policy 118
largely separate from the United States.   Aberdeen’s important despatch of 3rd June, 1844 to 
Pakenham, containing copies of his despatches to Bankhead and Cowley with his major new 
Texan ‘guarantee’ policy, as discussed above, was marked ‘confidential’, and Pakenham 
confirmed later that he would not make the details known in the United States before the 
Presidential election.    Similarly, Aberdeen wanted his main 1845 proposal concerning 119
Mexico and Texas, again as discussed above, to be kept from the United States.   Respect 120
for Texan sovereignty, thereby, effectively separated British policy in Texas from relations 
with the United States.         
British Policy and the Shared Framework in the Disputes over Oregon and Texas 
International law affected the way Britain handled its actual disputes with the United States 
in relation to Oregon and Texas because the issues concerned were defined, argued, and 
resolved using legal principles within the shared framework discussed in chapter 3.    121
Britain was, thereby, able, in practice, to manage the disputes over Oregon and Texas, using 
a common structure of rules.   The most important dispute involved Oregon, where policy, as 
seen, aimed to uphold Britain’s legal rights.   In this case, Britain conducted and, ultimately, 
settled its claim on a compromise basis within the terms of the shared framework.  The use 
Aberdeen to Pakenham, Draft, No. 7, 4 March 1844, FO 5/403, fols. 14-15; Pakenham to Aberdeen, 118
14/4/44, No. 22, FO 5/404, fols. 157-176.
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Confidential, No. 24, 3 June 1844, FO 5/403, fol. 63; Pakenham to 119
Aberdeen, No. 76, 27 June 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 311-313.  This was the official 
poistion; Pakenham reported in July, 1844 that the proposed scheme seemed to be known about in the 
United States in any event: Pakenham to Aberdeen, No. 81, 13 July 1844, British Documents, Vol. 2, 
pp. 317-320.
 Aberdeen to Pakenham, Confidential, No. 28, 3 May 1845, FO 5/423, fol. 71.120
 California is not included here as there was no significant dispute between Britain and the United 121
States concerning it in the period. 
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of the shared principles, though, importantly, also explains why the final stages of the dispute 
in the 1840s became so tense before then being resolved.   Changing facts on the ground 
meant that there were strengthening arguments for an agreement on the ownership of Oregon 
from a legal perspective.   The problem then came when the United States seemed 
temporarily to move away from the framework on the accession of Polk to the U.S. 
Presidency.  By contrast, in Texas, the situation was less acute.   Britain, as seen, possessed 
no claim to the territory, and accepted that Texas may in the end join the United States.   
Legal principles concerning ‘non-interference’ and neutrality nevertheless still influenced the 
way British policy handled the two main problems that did arise involving the United States 
directly, over slavery and Texan arms.   
British policy towards Oregon worked, then, within a legal framework that was respected in 
both Britain and the United States, as the competing claims for title based on discovery and 
settlement, for example, make clear.   The most important principles within this structure 
were that Britain and the United States agreed that land could be taken from indigenous 
peoples, and that the ownership of unoccupied land was, ultimately, based on ‘actual 
occupation’, as was noted in chapter 3.    A joint reverence for treaties also ensured that the 122
ownership of territories and rights passed by treaty law was respected.    In practice, 123
however, two further specific legal principles were also involved in the tensions over Oregon 
in the period.   The most significant was that disputes between states over unoccupied land 
should be settled by compromise and ‘equitable partition’.   The other was that a state 124
could only validly grant land to settlers if it owned the title to the land concerned under 
international law.   As will be seen, this was to become particularly salient in Oregon in the 125
 The importance of this principle concerning indigenous peoples can be seen by the fact that in 122
Oregon, by the mid-1840s, there were estimated to be 30,000 such inhabitants in approximately 
twenty tribes: Quarterly Review, ‘The Oregon Question’, p. 599.  Rakestraw estimates the number of 
American settlers by the end of 1845 as 5,000: Rakestraw, For Honor or Destiny, p. 114. 
 Twiss, for example, refers to ownership from cessions of territory as derivative title: Twiss, The 123
Oregon Question, chapter X.  The United States had acquired vast territories, and rights relating to 
territories, in this way under, for example, the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and the 1819 Treaty with 
Spain.
 This is reflected in Vattel, Law of Nations, Book II, S95.  As set out by Vattel: ‘If at the same time 124
two or more nations discover and take possession of an island or any other desert land without an 
owner, they ought to agree between themselves, and make an equitable partition’.
 This was because the ability to grant rights over land was perceived as connected to the right of 125
command, or sovereignty, of a state over land.  See, for example, Vattel, Law of Nations, Book I, 
S204, S205, S244.
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1840s, when it was considered that the granting of land to a new settler, without the 
confirmed title to do so, constituted an unwarranted act of sovereignty.        
    
The primary effect of the shared framework was to provide a structure and mechanism by 
which the dispute over Oregon could be handled and resolved.  The principles within it not 
only defined the basis of the claims, but also provided the arguments used in the 
negotiations, as well as the obligation to seek a compromise.   Indeed, as Buchanan put it, his 
argument for American title in Oregon relied on the ‘force’ of ‘the principles consecrated by 
the practice of civilised nations ever since the discovery of the New World’, and which, he 
continued, ‘were necessary to preserve the peace of the world’.   The 1846 settlement was, 126
accordingly, reached, as will be seen, by applying its principles.  This ‘structural’ facilitating 
role is also underlined by the fact that, in the absence of any deciding authority, there was, of 
course, no one ‘right’ answer to the Oregon question from international law, but rather a 
series of possible solutions.  The various offers of compromise in 1818, 1824, 1826, 1842, 
1844, 1845, and the final settlement in 1846, could all undoubtedly be explained as being 
within a range of expected outcomes.   This flexibility does not make the role of 127
international law meaningless, however, for, as will be seen, law also played a role in the 
timing, as well as the form, of the settlement.   This flexibility, too, was also important in 
allowing Britain to defend the 1846 settlement as being an ‘equitable compromise’.   The use 
of the shared framework in the dispute also influenced the nature of British policy to Oregon.  
Britain was certainly defending its claim, but it was doing so within a structure that, 
effectively, ensured that some American expansion would be built into the final settlement.   
This was, of course, consistent with the overall direction of the British policy objective in 
 Buchanan Statement, 12 July 1845, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 162-173, at p. 170.126
 The negotiations from 1844 onwards will be considered further below, but an outline of the earlier 127
ones demonstrates the point. For 1818, 1824 and 1826, the details are from the Northwestern 
Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, pp. 61-62, and pp. 71-76.  In 1818, the United States 
proposed the 49th parallel west from the Rocky Mountains.  In 1824, the United States initially 
proposed the 51st parallel west from the Rocky Mountains, before reverting again to the 49th parallel, 
whilst Britain, conversely, offered the 49th parallel from the Rocky Mountains to where it met the 
river Columbia, and then down the river Columbia. In 1826, the United States proposed the 49th 
parallel west from the Rocky Mountains plus free navigation of the Columbia, whilst Britain 
ultimately offered the same as in 1824 together, broadly, with a pocket of land around the south of De 
Fuca’s Inlet, and free navigation of the river Columbia.  Aberdeen’s final offer in 1842 was for the 
49th parallel until it met the river Columbia, and then the river Columbia until the coast: Aberdeen to 
Ashburton, 8 February 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 164. Merk also notes an informal American 
suggestion from 1818 to leave the watershed of the Gulf of Georgia to Britain, after the 49th parallel 
had crossed the river Columbia, albeit this was rejected by Britain: Merk, The Oregon Question, 
chapters 2 and 3. 
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Oregon described in the first section, but it also provides a further reason as to why Oregon 
was not, from the British perspective, about American expansion. 
 An appreciation of the principles within the shared framework also allow a better 
understanding of why it was the case that there was a ‘dispute’ took so long to resolve by 
compromise, and yet the matter became so acute in the 1840s.  As mentioned earlier, the 
central practical issue in Oregon was the battle between the claim of the United States for a 
boundary based around the 49th parallel of latitude, and that of Britain, for one centred on 
the river Columbia.   Both of these claims were defensible as matters of law, though 
naturally the respective states tended to talk up their own legal cases.  The crucial point, 
however, is that, until the late 1830s to early 1840s, there was no urgent reason for either 
party, in the absence of any specific agreement on this matter, to move further to a final 
partition.   The main British activity was centred around the fur trade, which, as Galbraith 
has noted, preferred a 'wilderness’ environment, whilst American pursuits until then were 
merely sporadic.    The two states were satisfied, therefore, to reach an interim legal 128
compromise in the 1818 and 1827 Conventions, which was, as seen, a holding position of a 
'joint occupation’ with no prejudice to their underlying claims - in other words, a kind of stay 
of proceedings.   Indeed, as the British plenipotentiaries said in 1818, they ‘hoped’ that they 
had ‘substantially secured to Great Britain every present advantage which could have flowed 
from its actual possession’.  129
This situation changed, however, in the late 1830s because of the increasing numbers of 
American settlers coming to Oregon.   Both the United States and Britain now had more 
reason to need the Oregon question decided because of the way in which the numbers of new 
emigrants interplayed with the applicable legal principles.   The presence of more emigrants 
in Oregon resulted in political pressure in the United States for ‘land’ and ‘government’ for 
the new arrivals.    The United States needed ‘ownership’ in Oregon to meet either of these 130
demands, because, as referred to earlier, the right to grant land was tied to ownership and 
 See, for example, Galbraith, Hudson’s Bay, pp. 215-216.128
 British Plenipotentiaries to the Secretary of State, 20 October 1818, as referred to in the 129
Memorandum, British Documents, Vol. 2, p. 63. 
 For example, Fox reported to Aberdeen on a Convention on the Oregon question, with delegates 130
from six Mississippi valley states, held between the 3rd and 5th July, 1843 ‘for the purpose of taking 
into consideration the best means of securing the possession of the Oregon Territory to the United 
States’: Fox to Aberdeen, No. 97, 28 July 1843, FO 5/392, fols. 329-332. 
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sovereignty.   It is significant, therefore, that this was the main context for how the Oregon 
question came before Congress in the 1840s.    For example, Linn’s bill in the Senate in 1843 
was described by Fox as ‘authorising more complete acts of sovereignty on the part of the 
United States, by formal and authentic grants of land to American settlers within the 
Territory claimed by Great Britain’.    The significance of the change this represented in the 131
tempo of the dispute can be seen by Aberdeen’s description of the bill as an ‘emergency’, 
albeit that it was not ultimately passed into law.    Similarly, Atchison's bills in the Senate 132
in 1843 and 1844 concerned territorial organisation for Oregon.    A bill for territorial 133
government in Oregon also passed the House of Representatives in early February, 1845, 
despite concerns being expressed over international law.    None of these bills became 134
effective, but they expressed a growing demand for change.       135
Britain was also aware that growing numbers of American settlers could, at some point, 
change the balance of the legal analysis on who had the ‘actual occupation’ of Oregon in a 
manner detrimental to its interests.  Indeed, this risk was all the more important because, as 
Galbraith has argued, the pace of British arrivals had been held back because of the Hudson 
Bay Company’s ‘conviction’ that settlement was the antithesis of the fur trade.   Peel, in 136
particular, had been concerned in August, 1842 by the failure to agree terms on Oregon as 
part of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, for, as reported by Everett, he had said that ‘now was 
the time to adjust it, before the settlement of the country increased the difficulty of an 
 Fox to Aberdeen, No. 9, 29 January 1843, FO 5/391, fols. 50-55.131
 Aberdeen to Fox, Draft, No. 5, 3 February 1843, FO 5/390, fols. 13-16. The bill passed the Senate 132
on 3 February 1843, but was not passed into law: Fox to Aberdeen, 11 February 1843, FO, 5/391, No. 
15, fols. 85-89, and Fox to Aberdeen, 4 March 1843, No. 26, FO 5/391, fols. 143-144.
 Fox to Aberdeen, 28 December 1843, No. 136, FO 5/393, fols. 314-325; Pakenham to Aberdeen, 133
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arrangement’.   Significantly, and consistently, Peel had also justified the agreement over 137
the Northeastern boundary dispute in language referring to the pressures from ’occupation’, 
as seen in Chapter 4.   In contrast, Aberdeen seems, on occasion, to have been more 138
relaxed on this point, as he still considered that a ‘delay’ in reaching a settlement may not 
have been ‘unfavourable’ to Britain in late 1844 when suggesting the possibility of a further 
ten year treaty extension.    Pakenham, however, warned against such a view from 139
mid-1844, noting both the numbers of settlers alleged to be moving to Oregon, and the 
approach, taken by Calhoun and others, that the passage of time would favour the United 
States.    In practice, a treaty extension was not discussed, and Aberdeen formally cancelled 140
the instruction to consider it in April, 1845 following Polk's accession.    141
By 1844, the principles of the shared framework were, therefore, influencing British policy 
towards settlement, as would have been expected in the new, more urgent, situation.   With 
their respective motivations pointing towards the need for a resolution, Britain and the 
United States, accordingly, came together during 1844 on a nascent compromise, albeit that 
this was done behind their respective official, traditional positions.    Aberdeen, thus, 142
importantly, stated, in March, 1844, that he was prepared for a settlement based on a 
partition, broadly, in a form as it was finally agreed in 1846.   His private instructions to 
Pakenham as to what to do in the event of the United States refusing the British first formal 
offer makes this clear.   He said: 
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you will endeavour, without committing yourself or your Govt, to draw from the 
American negotiator a proposal to make the 49th degree of latitude the boundary, with the 
proviso that all ports to the south of that parallel to the Columbia inclusive, shall be free 
Ports to Gt Britain. 
The navigation of the River Columbia should be common to both; and care should be 
taken that the 49th degree of latitude, as a boundary, is to extend only to the sea, and not 
to apply to Vancouver's Island. 
I confess that I do not think the arrangement I have now suggested, would be an 
unreasonable compromise.  It is essential, however, that the Cabinet should be enabled to 
deliberate fully upon it, if proposed.  143
Aberdeen's private correspondence with Pakenham also reveals that by the summer of 1844, 
Calhoun was coming towards such a basis of agreement.    Even Buchanan, the new 144
Secretary of State under Polk, was reported by Pakenham in March, 1845 as having referred 
to ‘the principle of giving and taking’, leading him to speculate that ‘his intention may be to 
propose the parallel of 49 to the sea, as a boundary, leaving to Great Britain the entire 
possession of Van Couver's Island, with an agreement for the free navigation of the 
Columbia River.’    Peel remained cautious on such a basis of settlement at this point, but, 145
overall, these developments are evidence of the shared framework operating.  146
The importance of the shared framework to British policy was then shown by the response of 
British politicians to Polk's inaugural Presidential address in March, 1845, which was the 
crucial circumstance that interrupted the process of compromise and gave the Oregon 
question its image as a matter that might have led to war.  Polk claimed that the American 
title to the whole of Oregon was 'clear and unquestionable’, and this was now more than a 
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mere election slogan from 1844.    By doing so, Polk appeared in Britain to be 147
undermining all prior British and American negotiation offers, and the tentative new 
compromise, all of which had implicitly recognised each state's respective rights.    The 148
content of the address and its timing - during a still ongoing negotiation - seemed to 
challenge directly the principles of the shared framework.  Peel, Aberdeen, and Russell 
criticised Polk’s approach, respectively, for being ‘contrary to all usage’, ‘so different’ and 
‘entirely new’.    British power and honour, thus, became directly, publicly involved, 149
because, from a British perspective, they were, as argued earlier, linked to the perceived 
strength of British claims and a process of obtaining justice.   A policy by the United States 
which, on its face, appeared entirely to disregard British rights was, thus, unacceptable to 
Britain.   As Aberdeen put it, ‘from the language of Mr Polk’, Britain ‘must expect that the 
American Govt will renounce the Treaty without delay’, which carried the risk of ‘a local 
collision’ or ‘war itself’ without a quick settlement.    The importance of being seen to 150
defend legal rights was also emphasised by Aberdeen, who, whilst being ‘still ready to 
adhere to the principle of an equitable compromise’, was notwithstanding ‘perfectly 
determined to concede nothing to force or menace’, and ‘fully prepared to maintain’ British 
‘rights’.  151
The final settlement was nevertheless achieved out of this period of hostility through a 
gradual return to the principle of compromise within the shared framework.  Aberdeen's 
crucial move in mindset had come, as seen, before Polk's election, and he already had in 
mind an ultimate form of settlement.  Officially, in the immediate aftermath of Polk’s 
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address, no progress was made in the negotiations, with Aberdeen suggesting waiting for a 
further offer from the United States.   Furthermore, Buchanan’s proposal, when it came in 152
July, 1845, did not signal any meaningful move, being, broadly, for a boundary along the 
49th parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean (i.e. not the sea).   The key 153
point, however, is that Aberdeen continued separately to push his tentative settlement.  Thus, 
Aberdeen also told Pakenham, in April, 1845, that an offer from Buchanan for ‘an extension 
of the 49th parallel to the sea as the line of boundary, leaving us in the possession of the 
whole of Van Couver’s Island, and the free entrance into the straits of Juan de Fuca’ would 
not be ‘perfectly inadmissible’, albeit that its acceptance currently, even with ‘some 
modification’, was possible but unlikely.   There were also signs that Buchanan was edging 154
closer to the compromise ultimately agreed in 1846, for, as Rakestraw notes, he privately 
authorised McLane, ‘if necessary’, to make clear to Aberdeen that the United States would 
also concede the ‘southern tip’ of Vancouver Island.   Against this background, it was 155
probably a tactical mistake, then, for Pakenham to reject Buchanan’s formal July offer 
outright without referring back to London, which led, in turn, to its withdrawal by the United 
States.    This undoubtedly delayed matters, but, seen in the light of Aberdeen and Peel’s 156
view that Pakenham had made an error, the episode is not, however, evidence of a British 
retreat from seeking to work within the shared framework.   Moreover, even Pakenham’s 157
refusal arguably worked towards the final settlement by referring expressly to Vancouver 
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having ‘circumnavigated’ Vancouver Island in 1792, and commenting that Britain had ‘the 
strongest possible claim to exclusive possession of that island’.   158
Despite the setback following on from Pakenham’s refusal of the July offer, British policy 
thereafter remained consistent and firm in its pursuit of a compromise.   Aberdeen again 
informed Peel of his broad outline settlement in October, 1845, adding also that it should 
include free navigation of the river Columbia, and that ‘all the ports between the Columbia 
and the 49th parallel ... should be declared free ports’.    Such an agreement, Aberdeen told 159
Peel, ‘would give us everything really worth contending for’ in Oregon.   At the same time, 160
he also observed that it ‘would seem to coincide with the notions of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company’, who had ‘lately’ moved their main settlement from Fort Vancouver on the river 
Columbia to Vancouver Island.    Merk views news of this move of the Hudson’s Bay 161
Company (which he notes was received in London in 1845) as an important development in 
persuading the British government as a whole to accept Aberdeen’s proposal.     Whilst this 162
cannot be ruled out, the more important point, though, is surely the consistency in 
Aberdeen’s approach from 1844.   He remained confident that the United States, even under 
Polk, would ultimately be obliged to reach a compromise.   Crucially, his reasoning was 163
grounded in the force of an assumed American desire to be seen as acting within the 
principles of international law.   Britain had, as noted earlier, also continued to offer 
arbitration as an alternative during the period.   Thus, he told Peel in August, 1845 that the 
American people would not ‘approve’ of the negotiations ending with a British offer of 
arbitration, and the ‘rest of the world could not hesitate to think us right’ in that event.    164
Similarly, in December, 1845, he commented to Pakenham that, if the United States refused 
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arbitration and negotiation, ‘they will be so manifestly in the wrong, that I greatly doubt their 
receiving the necessary support’.  165
In the United States, the Senate became the key due to the requirement for its approval on 
treaty matters by a two-thirds majority.   Although there was a fierce debate, the majority 
view there came squarely behind a policy of compromise, and away from one for 'the whole 
of Oregon’.   Polk himself maintained the pressure, with his Presidential message to 
Congress in December, 1845 calling for a termination of the 1827 Convention.  
Nevertheless, importantly, he also did this in a manner which indicated respect for 
international law.   Polk emphasised the importance of keeping to the terms of the 1827 
Convention during the twelve month notice period, commenting that the ‘faith of treaties, in 
their letter and spirit, has ever been, and I trust, will ever be, scrupulously observed by the 
United States’.   Further, he was evidently also concerned with wider opinion, asserting 166
that the ‘civilised world will see in these proceedings a spirit of liberal concession on the part 
of the United States’.    The key point, however, is that the Senate were moving away from 167
the extremes associated with Polk’s policy.    Pakenham was able to tell London in 168
December, 1845 that he had received ‘overtures’ for a partition, on the basis suggested by 
Aberdeen in March, 1844, from a significant group, including Senators Archer and 
Benton.    Then, crucially, by February, 1846, he reported that ‘upon the very best 169
authority... there is a certain majority in the Senate in favour of an accommodation of the 
Oregon question on the principle of equitable partition and compromise’.  170
The final agreement came, as noted by Rakestraw, after Buchanan let it be known to Britain 
that Polk would allow the Senate to decide whether to accept an offer similar to that in the 
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previous nascent compromise from 1844.    Significantly, Bourne does not consider that 171
McLane’s report of potential British military ‘preparations’ was ‘particularly important’ in 
this American policy decision.    Rather, for him, it was ‘likely’ that Polk was ‘bluffing’ on 172
the threat of war over Oregon, with ‘no real sign that the news of the supposed British 
preparations called that bluff’.    This is consistent with the argument that the ultimate 173
force defining the problem and guiding the solution were the principles within the shared 
framework.   Gallatin's four letters on the Oregon question, when published in January, 1846, 
again highlighted for Americans that the claims of the United States to Oregon were not 
unchallengeable.    They also accorded with the view of those in the Senate in favour of 174
reaching a compromise.  When, therefore, Congress finally voted to end the 'joint occupancy’ 
of the 1827 Convention in April, 1846, it was done with a view to reaching a settlement, and 
was understood this way in Britain.   Aberdeen finally, then, made a formal offer in May, 175
1846, which was based on his private suggestion for a compromise from 1844.  In this, 
Britain offered the 49th parallel as the boundary to the sea, together with British possession 
of Vancouver Island and free navigation of the river Columbia for the Hudson’s Bay 
Company.    Aberdeen expected that these terms would be accepted by the required two-176
thirds majority in the Senate, and they were by 38 votes to 12.  177
Legal principles within the shared framework also guided the way in which British policy 
responded to the two main areas of direct tension with the United States over Texas.   The 
most important of these was the question of what was perceived by the United States to be 
Britain’s alleged attempt to achieve the abolition of slavery in Texas.   This arose within the 
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context of the British policy aimed at the maintenance of  Texan independence, as described 
in the first section, but it mattered to the United States as well because of a  perception there 
that abolition in Texas would also damage it.   The principle of ‘non-interference’ became 
involved in the issue from 1843, when the United States considered that Britain was 
‘interfering’ in the domestic affairs of Texas with its then policy of encouraging Mexico to 
make the abolition of Texan slavery a condition of any peace deal.    Britain responded 
within the terms of the principle of non-interference, arguing, effectively, that only 
‘improper’ interference was prohibited and that its actions in Texas did not amount to this.  
Unsurprisingly, this position was rejected by the United States, with the American 
government also maintaining that Britain was interfering in its domestic affairs as well 
through its policy in Texas.  In the end, the differing British and American contentions on 
what constituted ‘interference’ remained formally unresolved, but, importantly, Britain 
modified its policy towards Texas away from one seeking abolition.   
The role of definitions of ‘non-interference’ in these tensions over the abolition of slavery 
developed from a Mexican proposal to give elements of self-government to Texas in the 
spring of 1843.  Britain was interested because of its wider objective of keeping Texas 
independent, but was cautious about the plan because formally Texas would still be ‘required 
to acknowledge the sovereignty of Mexico’.    Aberdeen, as Adams notes, then put forward 178
the suggestion that Mexico insist on the ‘abolition of slavery instead of sovereignty over 
Texas as a condition’ for Texan independence.    Crucially, however, this was then followed 179
by a public exchange on the subject of slavery and Texas in parliament in August, 1843.   180
Brougham, in the context of asking about Texas and Mexico, said that he was ‘irresistibly 
anxious for the abolition of slavery in Texas’ because that ‘must ultimately end in the 
abolition of slavery in America’, to which Aberdeen replied by commenting that ‘no one was 
more anxious than himself to see the abolition of slavery in Texas’.    This gave credibility 181
 Aberdeen to Elliot, FO 75/6, 3 June 1843, fols. 13-18.178
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to American concerns over the scope of British aims.    Indeed, Upshur wrote in 182
September, 1843 to Everett in London asking him to investigate Britain’s position with 
Aberdeen, referring to the August exchange.    What was crucial, however, for present 183
purposes, was that the principle of ‘non-interference’ was used to justify the concern over 
British policy.  Tyler, for example, was perceived to have been referring to Britain in his 
December, 1843 message to Congress complaining of ‘interference on the part of stronger 
and more powerful nations’ in Texas.    There was also domestic criticism from Russell, 184
who as Reeves points out, was alleged to have said said that the Whigs would go for ‘non-
interference in the domestic policy of other nations’, and that ‘the attempt to emancipate the 
slaves of ... the States and Texas’ was ‘illegal and unwise interference’.  185
               
Britain was certainly sensitive to the issue of whether its policy in Texas amounted to 
interference in the affairs of another sovereign state, but, in practice, failed to assuage the 
fears of the United States.  The initial American concerns, as seen, were not expressed in a 
particularly strong form, and indeed the United States soon became bound up in Upshur’s 
subsequent proposal for a new treaty of annexation with Texas in October, 1843.   It is, 186
therefore, especially significant that Aberdeen nevertheless took the time to write a detailed 
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defence of British policy for the benefit of the United States in December, 1843.   As put by 
Aberdeen, whilst he wanted to see ‘slavery abolished in Texas’, as well as ‘elsewhere’, 
Britain ‘shall not interfere unduly, or with an improper assumption of authority ... in order to 
ensure the adoption of such a course’.   Indeed, on the contrary, Aberdeen continued, Texas 187
would be free to make its own decision, provided that ‘other states act with equal 
forbearance’.    Britain also refuted the notion that it was trying to ‘act’ on the United 188
States ‘in a political sense’ ‘through Texas’.    The  United States was, however, 189
unpersuaded.   Instead, Calhoun gave Aberdeen a powerful defence of the principles of 
national sovereignty and the right to govern free from foreign interference within 
international law, even making an appeal to the ‘decision of the civilised world’: 
Whether Great Britain has the right, according to the principles of international law, to 
interfere with the domestic institutions of either Country, be her motives or means what 
they may; or whether the avowal of such a policy and the exertions she has made to 
consummate it in Texas do not justify both countries in adopting the most effective 
measures to prevent it, are questions, which the United States willingly leave to the 
decision of the civilised world.      They confidently rest the appeal on the solid 
foundation, that every Country is the rightful and exclusive judge, as to what should be 
the relations, social, civil, and political, between those who compose its population; and 
that no other Country, under the plea of humanity or other motive, has any right whatever 
to interfere with its decision. On this foundation rest the peace and the harmony of the 
world.  190
  
The issue over British interference in Texas was, thereafter, to remain formally unresolved, 
but it is hard nonetheless to avoid the conclusion that the American pressure did not have 
some effect on British policy.   Aberdeen certainly took the time to reiterate his earlier 
distinction between ‘interference’ and ‘improper interference’, telling Pakenham in June, 
1844, that Britain would ‘not improperly interfere with the internal concerns of other nations 
whose views and positions in respect of domestic slavery may differ from their own’.    191
Britain, Aberdeen argued, was, though, still entitled to offer ‘friendly counsel’ to foreign 
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states on slavery or other matters, whilst nevertheless ‘religiously’ respecting their rights.     192
Notwithstanding this, Britain does, though, also appear to have modified its policy in Texas 
in line with the concerns raised.  The question of abolition in Texas seemingly dropped down 
the agenda of the British government, and Aberdeen sought to place future British policy 
within the context of Britain’s treaty obligations to Texas.   Britain, Aberdeen told Pakenham 
in June, 1844, had ‘no intention to press at this time the abolition of domestic slavery’ on 
Texas, given that Britain's treaties with Texas were ‘concluded in 1840 without any 
stipulation for that object’.    Whilst the principles of sovereignty and ‘non-interference’ 193
were absent as explanations for this change, it is, however, still reasonable to infer that they 
were influential.   Law, crucially, had formed the main basis of the challenge from the United 
States and others, and, thus, constituted the main justification for the concerns.  Furthermore, 
it is clear from Aberdeen’s responses that Britain took the complaints seriously.  Britain 
ostensibly appears to have felt the need to be seen to be working in a manner consistent with 
international law. 
There was, lastly, one further issue in the period up to 1843, which touched upon the role of 
international law in British-American relations in the context of Texas.   This concerned the 
minor dispute between Texas and Britain in 1842 over two ships bound for Mexico, the 
Guadalupe and the Montezuma.   Although, as will be seen, Britain and the United States 
were on opposite sides, the matter’s main significance is instead in the further evidence it 
provides of the successful working of the shared framework in the period, in this case around 
the principles of neutrality.   The problem originated in Texan complaints that the provision 
by Britain of the Guadalupe was ‘inconsistent’ with British-Texan friendly relations, and, 
that of the Montezuma, a breach of both the Foreign Enlistment Act 1819 and 
‘impartiality’.    Smith, the Texan representative in London, accordingly, protested to 194
Aberdeen about the Guadalupe in June, 1842, commenting that it was due to sail armed from 
a British port, manned by ‘Europeans’, ‘commanded by a British officer’, and ‘with the 
known purpose of proceeding to Mexico to be employed against Texas’.   He then made 195
further attacks, first in July, 1842, about both the Guadalupe and the Montezuma, describing 
 Aberdeen to Pakenham,  No. 25, 3 June 1844, FO 5/403 fols. 65-70.192
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each as a ‘war steamer’, and then again in September, 1842 over the Montezuma.          196
Aberdeen, however, rejected the Texan challenges, stressing British neutrality and arguing 
that the Foreign Enlistment Act had not been breached.   Indeed, for Britain, on the advice 197
of the Queen’s Advocate in the context of the Montezuma, the Foreign Enlistment Act simply 
gave the British government ‘the power of controlling, if it sees fit, the acts of its own 
subjects in regard to Foreign Powers’.   198
The ongoing tensions over the Guadalupe and Montezuma nevertheless show how both 
Britain and the United States placed importance on the principles of neutrality.   In his 
subsequent letter of the 10th October, 1842, Smith had widened the Texan attack on Britain 
to one alleging breaches of neutrality, asserting that the Guadalupe case involved an 
‘infringement of its [Britain's] neutrality agreeably to the Law of Nations’, and that of the 
Montezuma a ‘violation’ of ‘an accurate interpretation of the obligations of neutrality’.    199
Importantly, however, there is also evidence that Texas received assistance from the United 
States in building its case.   Most significantly, Adams argues that a ‘perusal of ... [Smith's 
letter of 10/10/42] ... reveals a familiarity with documents in the American embassy’.    In 200
that letter, Smith had appealed, in particular, to the precedent of the American acceptance of 
the British complaints against the United States in 1793 for ‘arming and equipping’ French 
ships, and referred to the the fact the government of the United States considered this 
inconsistent with a ‘ “faithful neutrality” ’.  In a further link to the 1790s, he had also 201
expressly reserved the right to make claims for damages arising from the alleged breaches of 
international law, following the precedent adopted by Britain and the United States in the Jay 
Treaty, 1794.    The other assistance from the United States consisted of the material 202
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evidence supporting Texans claims which was provided by the American consul in Bristol 
(Francis Ogden).   As reported by Ogden, in an affidavit copied by Smith to Aberdeen, the 
builder of the Guadalupe, John Laird, had informed him that the vessel was ‘armed to the 
teeth’ on its departure from Liverpool.  203
Britain’s response brings out the importance it, too, attached to the principles of neutrality, 
particularly with relevance to its relationship with the United States.   Whilst Aberdeen 
began his reply by refusing ‘to enter into a lengthened and intricate argument on the rights of 
neutrality as established by the laws of nations’, he nevertheless highlighted the ‘Facts’ as he 
saw them which demonstrated the British position of neutrality and ‘the most friendly and 
liberal spirit towards Texas’.     More importantly, however, Aberdeen also took the time to 204
argue that the views of the United States now on neutrality were not the same as in the 
1790s, and quoted two comments of Webster in relation to American conduct in the Mexico-
Texas conflict which he perceived as being similar to, and, thereby, supportive of, the British 
position in the Guadalupe and Montezuma:  
If it be true that citizens of the United States have been engaged in a commerce by which 
Texas an enemy of Mexico has been supplied with arms and munitions of war, the 
Government of the United States nevertheless was not bound to prevent it - could not 
have prevented it, without a manifest departure from the principles of neutrality. 
[Re a complaint by Texas against two ships alleged to be acquired from the United States 
for Mexican use in the war with Texas]:  It appeared to be a case of great doubt; but 
Mexico was allowed the benefit of that doubt; and the Vessels left the United States with 
a whole or part of their armament actually on board.  205
The implicit message to the United States in this letter to Texas was clear: the rules of 
neutrality mattered to Britain and she was, in turn, observing the actions of the United States. 
Beyond reaffirming the way in which the British-American relationship worked within the 
shared framework, it is unlikely, however, that there was any wider impact on policy towards 
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the United States in relation to Texas from this dispute over neutrality.  Adams indicates that 
Aberdeen may initially have hesitated over adopting a policy of neutrality when he took 
office in 1841, and then suggests that Smith's protests and calls for treaty ratification in 1842 
may have played some part in pushing Aberdeen towards ‘the policy of neutrality’.     As 206
the subsequent increased British involvement with Texas over Mexican recognition and the 
abolition of slavery came, as seen, to affect British-American relations from 1843, this is a 
potentially significant point.  Whilst, however, the tensions over the Guadalupe and the 
Montezuma cannot be ruled out as a factor in affecting wider British policy aims, there are 
reasons to suggest that their importance in this respect was secondary in nature.  Crucially, 
Peel indicated in parliament in April and June, 1842 that ratification of the Texan treaties was 
intended.   This was before the main period of the dispute over the Guadalupe and the 207
Montezuma.  Furthermore, Adams also contends that Aberdeen’s policy towards Texas was 
influenced by his knowledge, from the beginning of June, that Ashburton was not going to be 
able to secure agreement with the United States on all the disputed points in the 1842 
negotiations.    This, he continues, meant that Aberdeen then came to favour more ‘the idea 208
of an independent Texas as a necessary barrier to American expansion’  in the absence of  
‘extreme friendship’ with the United States.    An issue of international law was, thus, 209
unlikely in this case to have caused a major turn in British policy. 
Conclusion 
International law made a major impact on the way that Britain approached the growth of the 
United States on the North American continent in the period.  Treaty law and legal principles 
shaped British policy into a direction under which its objectives were, broadly, accepting of 
American expansion into Oregon, California and Texas.  Moreover the different turns then 
taken by British policy were also influenced by how Britain perceived its legal position.  
Most importantly, Britain pursued its perceived good historic legal rights to Oregon in order 
 Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, pp. 92-93206
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to maintain its honour.   In contrast, it accepted Texas’s sovereign right to decide its own 
future, and thereby accepted its annexation to the United States.  In all cases, however, 
British aims in relation to Oregon, California, and Texas were not about preventing the 
United States getting land for its own sake.   British policy, in this respect, was, thus, neither 
a ‘surrender’ to the United States, nor the equivalent of a weathervane changing direction on 
the whims of Palmerston or Aberdeen.   Furthermore, a shared framework of legal principles 
guided policy in the issues and tensions that did actually arise directly with the United States 
in relation to Oregon and Texas.  This was especially significant in the case of Oregon, 
where it was a return to this framework that allowed a compromise, eventually, to be reached 
in 1846.   What this suggests is that the British-American relationship needs to be 
conceptualised as one based more in the structure of international law, and with a greater 
degree of strategic and practical cooperation, than has generally been appreciated.   The use 
of common principles in these instances also underlines, again, that the relations of Britain 
and the United States worked within a high level of underlying political agreement contained 
in the law.  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6    The Slave Trade and the Creole  
In May, 1841, Palmerston argued that treaties with many nations, allowing a ‘right of 
search’, had ‘enabled’ Britain to ‘establish’ the ‘maritime police’ of the West African 
Squadron, whose ‘vigilance and activity’ helped to effect the suppression of the slave trade.   1
If further negotiations succeeded, he observed, the United States, would then be the ‘single 
exception’ from ‘every state in Christendom which has a flag that sails on the ocean’ in 
having such a treaty, albeit that it was not his belief that the ‘American people ... will long 
stand aloof’.    Keeping American ships detached from foreign interference was, however, 2
fundamental to the approach of the United States to the slave trade in the period.   There was 
no slave trade treaty between Britain and the United States.   Indeed, a treaty ‘right of search’ 
had been perceived in the United States as an attack on the ‘freedom of the sea’, with the act 
itself viewed as ‘analogous to that of searching the dwelling houses of individuals on land’.   3
British action against American ships was, accordingly, resisted by the United States when it 
was felt to amount to a ‘right of search’.  A similar defence of American aloofness was also 
in issue in the Creole, an American ship which arrived in the Bahamas in 1841 after a mutiny 
by the slaves on board.  Here, Webster felt it was ‘in vain’ for Britain to defend the failure to 
assist the master and crew regain control ‘by appealing to general principles of humanity’.   4
For Webster, Britain should simply have accepted that the American law on slavery still 
prevailed on the Creole.   What united these problems, though, was not only the demand that 
the position of American ships as, effectively, part of the independent United States be 
respected, but also the use of international law to make that claim.   British policy was then 
faced with needing to deal with the United States in a way that conformed to the principles 
of the ‘freedom of the seas’ and the ‘comity of nations’, whilst maintaining its efforts to 
restrict the slave trade and the efficacy of its abolition of slavery.   
 Palmerston, HC, 18 May 1841, Vol. LVIII, 648-649, as referred to from the quotation in 1
Chamberlain, British Foreign Policy in the age of Palmerston, p. 117. 
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International law, though, was not just an American stick used to fend off British threats.        
What this chapter aims to establish is that Britain too worked within what was a shared 
framework of principles to reach solutions with the United States on the slave trade and the 
Creole in the period that were not incompatible with its wider policies.  British governments, 
accordingly, made no claim for a ‘right of search’ against suspected American slave ships, 
because they accepted that Britain possessed no such right in peace except where it was 
given by treaty.  Instead, the question of the ‘right of search’ only arose because, faced with 
the fraudulent use of the American flag, Britain pursued what became known as a ‘right of 
visit’ to ascertain the nationality of a ship.   Action taken under this, as well as a separate 
short-lived informal agreement between local British and U.S. naval commanders, produced 
a dispute over what was alleged by the United States to be, effectively, a ‘right of search’ by 
another name.  The ‘right of visit’, however, was not an abrogation of international law.        
On the contrary, it was an attempt by Britain to use the law to solve the practical problem of 
checking whether suspected slave ships really were American without deploying a ‘right of 
search’, and it was supported by consistent legal advice.  Indeed, it was this basis in law that 
ensured it was successful.  When British policy was properly explained to the United States 
from 1841, the differences narrowed, and a largely agreed joint legal position resulted.       
Furthermore, far from the provisions for joint cruising in the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
being an alternative way of settling the issue of the ‘right of search’, the shared framework 
on the ‘right of visit’ was, in fact, crucial to the making and operation of that agreement.        
Similarly, in the case of the Creole, Britain used legal principles to produce a compromise 
that defended its abolition of slavery in the Empire, whilst also reassuring the United States.    
Ashburton and Webster accepted that the ‘comity of nations’ meant that Britain would not 
‘interfere’ with American ships forced into British ports in the future, but acknowledged that 
Britain could declare ‘slaves’ to be free within the Empire under imperial law. 
In making these arguments, the chapter, therefore, aims to demonstrate, again, how central 
international law was to the British-American relationship.  In the cases of the slave trade 
and the Creole, this is, of course, self-evident on one level in that both problems were 
defined by legal concepts.  The point, however, goes much deeper than this.  In both 
instances, it was agreement on legal principles that allowed workable solutions to be 
reached.  The shared framework of law meant that British policy was able to handle these 
problems with the United States in a generic way, separated from the facts of particular 
events.  Agreements for the future were more easily reached in the abstract.  International 
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law could not, of course, resolve the fundamental underlying policy differences that lay 
beneath much of the tensions on the slave trade and the Creole, such as the American 
approach to the ‘right of search’ and slavery.  It was, however, a framework in which 
common ground could be found.  Again, therefore, the problems over the slave trade and the 
Creole, paradoxically, also bring out that there was much underlying agreement in the 
British-American relationship.  They were, after all, not just disputes, but legal disputes 
around shared rules. 
The slave trade 
Britain and the United States were not, on the face of it, in dispute over whether or not action 
should be taken to suppress the slave trade.   In Britain, the Act for the Abolition of the Slave 
Trade, 1807 declared the African slave trade unlawful and introduced penalties for British 
subjects, and residents in British territory, that were participating in it.   Britain had also then 5
gone further than these imperial restrictions, and attacked the ships of foreign states involved 
in the slave trade, as evidenced by the actions over many years of the West African squadron.       
In the United States too, the Act Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves, 1807 made it illegal 
to import slaves into the United States from a foreign state or place.   Furthermore, as 6
Martinez observes, the United States had supplemented this by extra legislation restricting 
Americans from the activities of the ‘fitting out of slave ships in American ports’ for use in 
the foreign slave trade, or having an interest in, or serving on, slave ships involved with that 
business.    In addition, as she continues, the U.S. Navy, was also permitted to stop American 7
slave ships, and slave trading was treated as ‘piracy’ in American domestic law.    Rather, the 8
issue between them in the period was over what the United States perceived as an 
infringement of the ‘freedom of the seas’ by British interference with suspected American 
slave ships.  This mattered, for, as Stevenson argued, the preservation of the ‘rights of 
neutrality and the liberty of the seas’ were the ‘consistent and persevering’ policy of the 
 Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, 1807, accessed through the very helpful website of Peter 5
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United States, and the basis, on which British-American relations ‘can alone be expected to 
continue’.   9
British policy to the United States, though, worked within international law, and, in 
particular, did not attempt to use a peacetime ‘right of search’ against American ships.  As set 
out in chapter 3, the main restriction affecting British policy was that there was no general 
right, in peace, for ships of one state to search the ships of another, even when they were 
suspected of being involved in the slave trade.  Indeed, it was the very acceptance of the 
restriction on the ‘right of search’ in peacetime that encouraged Britain to develop a policy of 
entering slave trade treaties with other states.   These treaties worked by creating 10
conventional mutual ‘rights of search’ over suspected slave ships to make up for the lack of 
one under the general principles of international law.   British policy was, thus, to enter into 11
such treaties with as many states as possible.   No agreement had been reached with the 12
United States, but, by 1840, Britain did have treaties with Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, 
Sweden-Norway, France, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Ecuador.   The so-called 13
Quintuple Treaty between France, Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria was also then signed 
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in 1841, although France refused to ratify the treaty in 1842.   The lack of a treaty with the 14
United States did not, however, mean that Britain thereby claimed a ‘right of search’ against 
it.  On the contrary, Britain always worked on the fallback basis that it possessed no ‘right of 
search’ in peace against American ships.    Palmerston and Aberdeen both expressly 15
accepted this point in correspondence with the United States.   Peel argued it publicly, and 16
strongly, in parliament, saying that: ‘The right of search, with respect to American vessels, 
we entirely and utterly disclaim’.   In doing so, they were all also following the clear and 17
consistent legal advice given to the Foreign Office by the law officers of the Crown.    18
Moreover, the failure to get a slave trade treaty with the United States was not connected to 
any British argument that challenged the broad common understanding around  the ‘freedom 
of the seas’.  On the contrary, Britain’s acceptance that it had no legal rights over suspected 
American slave ships in peace is consistent with its attempts to get such a treaty.  The drive 
for a treaty originated in the article in the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 providing for both states to 
‘use their best endeavours’ to achieve the ‘entire abolition’ of the slave trade.   Negotiations 19
were, accordingly, undertaken, but they failed to produce a successful result.  The United 
States, as Wheaton observed, objected in 1818 to the system of mixed courts inherent in a 
slave trade treaty - on the grounds that it had no colonies in which to locate such a tribunal, 
and because of possible constitutional objections to the involvement of foreigners in 
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American justice.   More fundamentally, Wheaton identified that there was also also a 20
‘universal repugnance’ in the United States to the idea of extending the ‘right of search’ in 
peace.   Soulsby too concludes that the opposition was based, at this time, on a general 21
reluctance to ‘increase the naval power of Great Britain and interfere with the freedom of 
American shipping’, and mentions a fear over the use of impressment as an additional 
factor.   Similar concerns then appear to have also prevented a treaty from being agreed in 22
1823.   The situation was, however, somewhat different in 1824.  Soulsby highlights that the 23
deeming of the slave trade as ‘piracy’ was suggested by the United States as a way of 
overcoming its objection to extending the ‘right of search’, on the basis that there was 
already a right to capture pirates in peace under international law.    Britain and the United 24
States were, thus, able to sign a treaty at that time, but, in the end, it too did not proceed as 
Britain refused to accept an exemption for the American coast that was made on ratification 
by the Senate.   Thereafter, no further attempt at an agreement was made before the period, 25
and, as Soulsby notes, the American position became more hostile after British abolition in 
1833.        26
British acceptance of the principle that it possessed no ‘right of search’ over American ships 
was also consistent with Britain’s wider public acknowledgement that its policy on the slave 
trade overall needed to work within international law.  British practice, as seen in chapters 2 
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and 3, operated in this area on the basis of legal principles, but ministers also spoke about the 
necessity of following the law for Britain to achieve its aims.  Aberdeen explained the 
constraints on British policy as ones that were necessary for Britain to achieve its ambitions: 
If it were possible to suppose that this country alone could effect the abolition of the slave 
trade by its single exertions, we might deal with these questions more easily, but it is an 
undoubted fact that our only chance of effecting the abolition of that traffic is by the 
assistance of other countries. It is therefore, necessary, that in the execution of this duty 
we should do nothing to injure the rights of independent nations, or to violate public 
justice.  27
Similar comments were also made by Peel, and even Palmerston argued that Britain should 
not ‘violate the law of nations, or do anything which the treaties did not warrant’.          28
Aberdeen’s intentions for the unofficial commission appointed in 1842 to review the 
instructions to naval officers concerning the slave trade also make the role of international 
law clear.    The aim, he specified, was to produce a ‘Code of Instructions which shall be 29
compatible with the law of nations, with the specific engagements of treaty, and with the 
municipal law of England’.   Similarly, Britain accepted that its general obligation to act 30
within the law was unaffected by its motivation regarding slavery, and it agreed to pay 
compensation in specific cases, some of which involved the United States.  31
Of course, the extent to which Britain always conformed to this stated intention to work 
within international law, in practice, is open to fair challenge.  Certainly, British legality has 
been widely questioned by historians, although, crucially, this work does not in itself cast 
specific doubt on the law’s impact in the case of the British-American relationship.  
 Aberdeen, HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 654-661.27
 Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252; Palmerston, HC, 16 May 1845, Vol. LXXX, 28
490.
 This ‘commission’ consisted of Lushington, Rothery, Bandinel and Captain Denman: Aberdeen to 29
Peel, 21 November 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43062, fols. 200-202. 
 Aberdeen to Peel, 21 November 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43062, fols. 200-202.30
 For example, Dodson advised that ’an eminent good should not be obtained otherwise than by 31
lawful means’ in the context of action against the slave trade: Dodson to Aberdeen, 8 April 1842, as 
contained in Palmerston Papers, SLT/18.  On compensation generally, Aberdeen told Peel that: ‘there 
are some cases in which compensation is manifestly due, and under the authority of our law officers, I 
have acknowledged’: Aberdeen to Peel, 21 November 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43062, fols. 
200-202.  For one example involving compensation and the United States, see the case of the Tigris, 
where Aberdeen stated ‘the act of the officer ... was not justifiable upon any principle of international 
law, or by any existing treaty’: Aberdeen to Everett, 17 March 1842, PP, 1843 LIX, No. 140. 
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Drescher, however, must be generally right that ‘the six-decade British campaign for the 
suppression of the slave trade entailed “imperialist” methods by mixtures of coercion and 
intimidation, stretching and breaching international law’.   Others, such as, for example, 32
Semmel, Ryan, Lambert, and Law rightly point to the action taken against Portugal and 
Brazil in the mid-nineteenth century as evidence that Britain was prepared to act in a way 
that was, at best, legally debatable.   This work, though, whilst revealing in the context of 33
wider slave trade policy, does not, however, mean that British policy did not work within 
international law in its dealings with the United States.  Specifically, as seen in chapters 2 
and 3, Britain and the United States accepted that international law was applicable in their 
relationship.  Furthermore, there was a real question over whether the United States would 
be treated in the same way as some other states.  As Huzzey observes, the fact that Britain 
felt able to act in such a way against Brazil did not mean it could do so with impunity against 
the United States.    Furthermore, despite these instances, Britain was, at least in the period, 34
still ostensibly striving not to ‘procure an eminent good, by means that are unlawful’.   New 35
slave trade treaties were sought.  The early 1840s saw, as Law points out, ‘subsequent doubts 
and disputes over the legality of’ attacks on the West African coast.   Macaulay’s desire, to 36
 S. Drescher, ‘Emperors of the World’, in D. R. Peterson, (ed.), Abolition and Imperialism in Britain, 32
Africa, and the Atlantic (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010), chapter 5, p. 143.
 See, for example: Ryan, ‘The Price of Legitimacy’, pp. 231-256; Semmel, Liberalism and Naval 33
Strategy, p. 39; A. Lambert, ‘Slavery, Free Trade and Naval Strategy, 1840-1860’, in K. Hamilton and 
P. Salmon, (eds.), Slavery, Diplomacy and Empire: Britain and the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 
1807-1875 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), chapter 3, p. 71; and R., Law, ‘Abolition and 
Imperialism: International Law and the British Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade’, in D. R. 
Peterson, Abolition and Imperialism in Britain, Africa, and the Atlantic (Athens, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 2010), chapter 6, pp. 150-151.
 Huzzey comments on the treatment of Brazil in 1845 in relation to the United States: ‘Britain knew 34
from experience that a similar violation of American sovereignty would have led to a bloody nose’: R. 
Huzzey, Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2012), p. 59.  Semmel also refers to a possible distinction in Britain’s approach to France and 
the United States, as compared to Portugal and Brazil: Liberalism and Naval Strategy, p. 39
 The words referred to were those of Lord Stowell, who said that: ‘in short, to procure an eminent 35
good, by means that are unlawful, is as little consonant to private morality as to public justice’, 
Stowell, referred to in The Westminster Review, ‘The African Slave Trade’, pp. 153-154, and quoted in 
that article from the British and Foreign Review, October, (1839), p. 502.  These words also appear to 
have been reflected in Dodson’s advice, as referred to in footnote 31.
 Law, in fact, suggests that 1851-52 was a more significant point in terms of Britain turning away 36
from international legality: ‘Abolition and Imperialism’, p. 169.
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stop the slave trade by taking the ‘law in our own hands, ... to break down, in fact, all 
barriers to international law’, was criticised.                   37
The question then arises as to why there was nevertheless still an issue in British-American 
relations over the ‘right of search’ if, as stated, Britain accepted that its policy was restricted 
by international law.   Indeed, the need for an explanation is only increased by the regularity 
and sharpness of the American complaints.  This can be seen in the whole series of protests 
of the United States from 1839 onwards about British cruisers ‘interfering’ with American 
vessels around the West African coast, whether by ‘visiting’, ‘searching’, or ‘detaining’.    38
Stevenson, for example, complained to Palmerston about British actions concerning the 
Douglas, the Mary, the Iago, the Hero, the Tigris, the Seamew, the Jones, and the William 
and Francis in the period between November, 1840 and April, 1841 alone.   British actions 39
in these incidents, he alleged, were contrary to international law, and inflicting unnecessary 
commercial damage on lawful American trade.   In the case of the Douglas, by way of 40
illustration, there was, he maintained, ‘evidence of another unwarrantable search, detention, 
and ill-usage of an American vessel and her crew’.   Similarly, after dealing with the Iago 41
and the Hero, Stevenson reiterated that ‘there is no shadow of pretence for excusing, much 
less justifying, the exercise of’ the right of search or detention.   Overall, a flavour of the 42
strength of feeling on the American side can be gauged from Stevenson’s analysis that these 
‘continued and unprovoked aggressions ..., so contrary to every principle of common justice 
 The Westminster Review, ‘The African Slave Trade’, pp. 152-154.37
 See, for example, Stevenson to Palmerston, 14 August 1840, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 241, Stevenson to 38
Palmerston, 27 February 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 246, and Stevenson to Palmerston, 16 April 1841, 
PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 254.
 Stevenson to Palmerston, 13 November 1840, PP, 1841 XXX, No. 114 re the Douglas (between 39
October 1839 and February 1840) and the Mary (in August 1839); Stevenson to Palmerston, 27 
February 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 246 re the Iago and the Hero; Stevenson to Palmerston, 16 April 
1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 254 re the Tigris, the Seamew, the Jones, and the William and Francis.
 As a general matter, the United States asserted that it had an expanding lawful trade with West 40
Africa: see, for example, Upshur to Commander Perry, 15 March 1843, PP, 1844 XLVIII, Enclosure in 
No. 29.  The principle that loss could arise from stopping a ship does not appear to have been 
generally challenged in Britain.  See, for example, the comment of Wellington (in this context) that: 
‘There can be no doubt that to detain a ship at sea at all, even to enquire from her her latitude and 
longitude, and whether she requires the assistance of waters, may be injurious.   The detention may 
affect her arrival at her destination, her insurance, demurrage’: Wellington Memorandum, 7 February 
1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43123, fols. 23-31. 
 Stevenson to Palmerston, 13 November 1840, PP, 1841 XXX, No. 114.41
 Stevenson to Palmerston, 27 February 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 246.42
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and right, and in violation of all the principles of public law’, put at risk ‘the amicable 
relations’ of Britain and the United States.   In saying this, furthermore, he was only 43
reflecting comment in the United States, such as that, for example, of Pickens, who Fox 
reported as having stated in Congress that Britain: 
has recently seized our vessels and exercised a power involving the right of search, under 
the pretext of suppressing the foreign slave trade, which, if persevered in, will sweep our 
commerce from the coast of Africa, and which is incompatible with our rights as a 
maritime power.  44
The answer to this problem lies in the nature of the twofold British response to what was 
perceived as being the relatively new issue of ships falsely flying the American flag, rather 
than in any fundamental disregard of the ‘freedom of the seas’.   Britain asserted that many 45
ships belonging to treaty states were seeking to protect themselves from being searched by 
the Royal Navy by raising American colours to which they were not entitled.    Indeed, the 46
practice appears to have reached such a level that, by mid-1839, Palmerston was sufficiently 
concerned to instruct Fox formally to tell the American government of the evidence that ‘the 
flag of the United States is now resorted to by slave traders as a protection’.    As 47
Palmerston himself put it in the case of the Lark, a ship condemned at Sierra Leone: ‘The 
Captain of this vessel attempted to take advantage of the flag of the United States, in order to 
hide the fact, that the “Lark” was a Spanish vessel, engaged in the Spanish slave trade’.  48
 Stevenson to Palmerston, 16 April 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 254.43
 Pickens, House of Representatives, February, 1841, when discussing the Report of the Committee 44
on Foreign Relations, as reported in the National Intelligencer, in Fox to Palmerston, No. 12, 17 
February 1841, FO 5/359, fols. 112-127.
 Fox noted to Forsyth in late 1839 that the issue had only become material in the prior 2-3 years: Fox 45
to Forsyth, 29 October 1839, PP, 1840, XLVII, First Enclosure to No. 159.
 The aim of these ships was evidently to avoid search by British cruisers as an ‘American’ ship on 46
the basis that there was no treaty for mutual search between Britain and the United States.  Such ships 
were, of course, liable to being searched by the American Navy, but this was, presumably, perceived 
as carrying a much lower risk. 
 Palmerston to Fox, 25 June 1839, PP, 1840, XLVII, No. 135.  Fox duly complied and sent Forsyth a 47
letter (running to 13 typed pages, excluding the enclosures) detailing ‘the surprising and deplorable 
extent’ to which slave ships were using the American flag to protect themselves: Fox to Forsyth, 29 
October 1839, PP, 1840, XLVII, First Enclosure to No. 159. 
 Palmerston to Fox, 22 August 1840, PP, 1841 XXX, No. 105.48
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Part of the cause of the dispute, undoubtedly, was that, for a brief period until February, 
1841, Britain tried to tackle the problem by pursuing a policy akin to a ‘right of search’ under 
an 1840 arrangement made ‘on the ground’ on the West African coast with the United 
States.    Under this, Commander Tucker of the Wolverene and Lieutenant Payne of the 49
Grampus reached an agreement for the purposes of ‘mutual co-operation and assistance for 
the suppression of the slave trade’.   The key part of this arrangement consisted of a mutual 50
agreement ‘to detain all vessels under American colours, found to be fully equipped for, and 
engaged in, the Slave Trade’.   In other words, Britain appeared to have obtained what was, 51
in practice, a peacetime ‘right of search’ over American ships.  Palmerston certainly later 
used the arrangement as an excuse in some instances, and he also deployed it as an 
explanation for British actions in a parliamentary debate in 1843.   The crucial point, for 52
present purposes, however, is that Stevenson seems to have been unaware of its existence  
until told about it by Palmerston in August, 1841.   This must have clouded the issue to 53
some extent, making it appear to him, at least, that Britain was unilaterally operating a ‘right 
of search’. 
The other cause of the dispute, however, was the British practice of what was referred to 
later as a ‘right of visit’.  This involved the boarding by the Royal Navy of a suspected slave 
ship flying an American flag in order to check its nationality status from its papers.  Thus, in 
the context of the false flags problem, Britain was in this way seeking to confirm that 
suspected slave ships showing American colours were truly ‘American’, as opposed to ones 
belonging to other states.   The United States was not, however, given any proper 
explanation of the practice until August, 1841, and, when Britain did then comment, it did so 
in such a way that the policy was initially perceived by the Americans simply as a disguised 
 The arrangement seems to have ended in February, 1841 when the Admiralty were told to issue 49
instructions to the Royal Navy to ‘abstain from capturing United States’ vessels engaged in the slave 
trade’: Canning to Barrow, 27 November 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, Enclosure to No. 278. 
 Palmerston to Fox, 17 June 1840, PP, 1841 XXX, No. 89.50
 Fifth Enclosure, Palmerston to Fox, 17 June 1840, PP, 1841 XXX, No. 8951
 Re the Iago and the Hero, Palmerston argued that the actions were in line with the 1840 52
arrangement, but that ‘such cases... cannot happen again, because positive orders were sent by the 
Admiralty ... not again to detain or meddle with United States’ vessels’: Palmerston to Stevenson, 5 
August 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 264.  Re the parliamentary debate, see Palmerston, HC, 2 May 
1843, Vol. LXVIII, 1225-1238. 
 Stevenson to Palmerston, 9 August 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 266.53
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‘right of search’.    From this point, therefore, the question of ‘visit’, thereby, became the 54
main subject of the ongoing British-American tensions over the ‘right of search’.  Stevenson 
contended that ‘a right is now asserted ...  over the vessels and flag of the United States, 
involving high questions of national honour and interest, of public law, and individual 
rights’.   Indeed, for him, Britain’s distinction between the ‘power’ claimed and ‘search’ 55
was ‘wholly fictitious’, for they were ‘essentially the same’.   The point mattered, he 56
declared, because the United States possessed a duty ‘of guarding the rights of neutrality 
from every species of violation’ - and in that duty was ‘the best means’ of keeping the peace 
and ‘giving security to weaker communities under the shadow of impartial justice’.  57
Of course, if correct, the American view that ‘visit’ meant ‘search’ would certainly have 
justified this anger, but the reality was more prosaic.  Rather than being a blatant venture to 
introduce such a backdoor ‘right of search’ in disregard of legal rules, the ‘right of visit’ was 
instead a British attempt to deal with the issue of fraudulent flags on ‘American’ ships by 
using existing international law.   Indeed, a hint of this can be seen in the way that, for some 
time, the term ‘right of visit’ itself was not used.   Crucially, Britain’s key contention was 58
for a right to check the nationality status of suspected slave ships that were flying American 
colours, but which it believed really belonged to states with which it already had a treaty 
‘right of search’.  Thus, the ‘right’ claimed was grounded in existing treaty rights.  Moreover, 
the presence throughout of legal advice is also consistent with British intentions to work 
within the law.  The real problem with the United States came from the fact that the legal 
position of a British ‘visit’ to a ship that turned out to be truly ‘American’ was initially left 
obscure.  There are indications that some in Britain believed that there was a wider general 
‘right of visit’ to check the nationality of ships under international law, which would have 
covered ‘true’ and ‘false’American ships.  This was not, however, the basis for British policy, 
nor the legal advice which guided it, which looked to existing treaty rights - a point which 
 Stevenson to Aberdeen, 10 September 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 272. Soulsby notes that 54
Palmerston had made an ‘intimation’ of the British position at a meeting with Stevenson in May, 
1841: Soulsby, The Right of Search, p. 59.
 Stevenson to Aberdeen, 10 September 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 272.55
 Stevenson to Aberdeen, 10 September 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 272.56
 Stevenson to Aberdeen, 10 September 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 272.57
 See, for example: Palmerston to Stevenson, 27 August 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 268; Stevenson to 58
Aberdeen, 10 September 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 272; and Aberdeen to Everett, 20 December 
1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 281. 
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was finally clarified by the British acceptance that compensation would be due for any loss 
in cases where truly ‘American’ ships were visited in error.  Ultimately too, it was the basis 
of the policy in the existing law that ensured its ultimate use and success.  As these points 
gradually came to be set out for the United States, the differences narrowed, and the dispute 
subsided.  An updated broad shared framework then emerged, and this served as the 
understanding beneath the making and operation of the joint cruising agreement made in the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 1842. 
The British attempt to handle the practical problem of false American flags through the use 
of existing legal rights is particularly evident from the close relationship between the advice 
received from the law officers of the Crown and the subsequent implementation of the ‘right 
of visit’ policy.  Dodson gave relevant legal advice to Palmerston in 1839, and his opinions 
made three key points.   First, Britain had no right of ‘visitation and search’ in peace over 59
what were ‘in appearance and in fact’ American ships.  Second, if the American flag has been 
used falsely by a ship ‘found engaged in the slave trade’, then if that ship was ‘in fact the 
property of the subjects’ of a treaty state, it could be ‘detained’ and sent for adjudication to 
the relevant mixed commission under the treaty concerned.  Furthermore, the ‘result would 
justify the capture’ in a case where a British cruiser seized an ‘American’ ship, sent it for 
adjudication to a mixed commission, and it was proved there that it belonged to a treaty state 
and was involved in the slave trade.    This was a crucial point, as it gave legal cover for 60
‘detaining’ a suspected ‘American’ ship, but, equally importantly, it did so by relying on the 
existing treaty right of search.   Lastly, third, that, as there was no ‘right of search’ in peace, 61
except by treaty, the ‘utmost caution’, or ‘great caution’, should be used in ‘visiting or 
detaining’, or in the ‘search or detention’ of, any ships which were not ‘under the flag’ of a 
treaty state.  Indeed, cruisers which seized such a ship on ‘a suspicion which turned out to be 
 All references to Dodson’s advice in this paragraph are to the following reports: Dodson to 59
Palmerston, 22 June 1839, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 71, pp. 370-372, Dodson to Palmerston, 
19 August 1839, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 71, pp. 385-388, and Dodson to Palmerston, 19 
August 1839, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 71, pp. 392-394.
 Dodson’s advice was given in the context of an example where the suspicion was that both the ‘flag 60
and papers’ of a ship were fraudulent. This was important as the question leading to the advice was 
presumably designed to get an opinion which would permit ships to be sent for adjudication when 
suspicion remained even after its papers ostensibly supported the use of the American flag.
 Indeed, Martinez refers to the mixed commission in Sierra Leone condemning ‘American-flagged 61
ships on the grounds that they could be treated as Spanish under the law of nations’ in the period of 
the ‘late 1830s and early 1840s’: Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human 
Rights Law, p. 86; see also her note 119, p. 213. 
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unfounded would thereby incur a serious responsibility’. Thus Dodson did not appear to be 
relying on any ‘right’ to visit what were truly ‘American’ ships, and, indeed, with his 
reference to ‘serious responsibility’ after a seizure, can be seen as suggesting that Britain 
would then be in the wrong.  From the beginning, thus, no general ‘right’ that would cover 
true ‘American’ ships was being asserted in the legal advice.  The dispute was really caused 
by the failure to grasp this point in the early despatches sent to the United States explaining 
British policy.                      
Nevertheless, the new instructions issued by Palmerston to the Admiralty in May, 1841 did 
take on board the main elements of Dodson’s advice.  Whilst the reason for the delay from 
1839 is not apparent, it was probably, largely, to do with the intervening 1840 informal 
arrangement with the United States.  Fresh clarity would have been needed following 
Palmerston’s blanket order in 1841 to ‘abstain from capturing American vessels engaged in 
the slave trade’, which ended that ‘agreement’.   Overall, the perceived legal sensitivity of 62
the new instructions is indicated by the fact that there was a specific reference to the 
approval of the Queen’s Advocate.    The instructions then provided that suspicious 63
‘American’ ships could be stopped, but, significantly, made no mention that this this was 
pursuant to a ‘right’: 
where there is good reason to suspect that a vessel ... may not be American, and may be 
engaged in Slave Trade, the mere fact that she hoists an American flag ought not to 
protect such vessel from being boarded for the purpose of examining her papers.  64
The instructions then, effectively, restated the tenor of the ‘result would justify the capture’ 
advice from 1839.  If, they went on, the stopped ship was found to have ‘irregular and 
imperfect’ American papers, or papers of a treaty state, it could be searched.  Then, they 
continued, if, on that search, the ship was found to be engaged in the slave trade, it could be 
detained and dealt with, either by relevant treaty powers, or under the Act for the 
 Leveson to Sir John Barrow, 18 May 1841, enclosure in Palmerston to Fox, 24 May 1841, PP, 1842, 62
XLIV, No. 259. 
 Dodson’s reports of 26 April 1841 and 8 May 1841 gave the approval that the draft instructions 63
were ‘correct and proper’: Dodson to Palmerston, 26 April 1841, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 
72, pp. 54-56; Dodson to Palmerston, 8 May 1841, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72, pp. 61-62.
 Leveson to Sir John Barrow, 18 May 1841, enclosure in Palmerston to Fox, 24 May 1841, PP, 1842, 64
XLIV, No. 259. 
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Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1839 if it did not have papers ‘sufficiently regular’ to entitle 
it to the protection of a flag.    65
The United States understandably, however, failed initially to appreciate the legal reasoning 
within the British position as it was not fully explained for them.  As a result, the diplomatic 
exchanges give the impression that international law was at the heart of a dispute over the 
‘right of search’.   Palmerston’s letter in August, 1841 to Stevenson simply made a 
distinction between ‘searching a vessel’ and ‘examining her papers to see whether she is 
legally provided with documents entitling her to the protection of any country’.   He then 66
expressed himself strongly in asserting that British cruisers would examine the papers of 
suspicious vessels to check their flag status.  As he put it:‘this examination of the papers ... is 
a proceeding which it is absolutely necessary that British cruisers should continue to practise 
...The cruisers ... must ascertain, by inspection of papers, the nationality of vessels’[under 
suspicion].   Whilst Palmerston did then confirm that any ship, whose papers proved she 67
was truly American, would be allowed to ‘pass on, free and unexamined’, he made no 
argument as to the legal basis for the initial examination.    Nor, did he refer in any way to 68
any responsibility for Britain in such a situation.   Unsurprisingly, therefore, Stevenson took 
the view that Britain was claiming a type of general ‘power’ of examination against all ships, 
and categorically denied that any such right existed under international law.  For him, this 
was because, by the ‘public law’ and the ‘usage of nations’: 
it is expressly declared, that the vessels of all nations in time of peace, navigating the 
ocean, shall be exempt from every species and purpose of interruption and detention, 
 Leveson to Sir John Barrow, 18 May 1841, enclosure in Palmerston to Fox, 24 May 1841, PP, 1842, 65
XLIV, No. 259.  The Act for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1839, as relevant here, broadly, 
permitted slave ships, not ‘justly entitled to claim the protection of the flag of any state or nation’ to be 
dealt with by British courts.  The Act’s main purpose was to deal with the slave ships of Portugal in 
the dispute referred to earlier.  The Act for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 1839 was accessed 
through the very helpful website of Peter Davis on William Loney, RN, www.pdavis.nl, 
‘Background’.
 Palmerston to Stevenson, 27 August 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 268.66
 Palmerston to Stevenson, 27 August 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 268.67
 Palmerston to Stevenson, 27 August 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 268.68
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unless engaged in some traffic contrary to the law of nations, or expressly provided for by 
treaty.  69
Despite these sharp exchanges, Britain nevertheless worked within the ambit of international 
law in seeking to handle the resulting tensions with the United States.  Faced with this 
dispute on coming into office, Aberdeen took the step of confirming the legal position with 
Dodson.  Importantly, though, the key points of Dodson’s previous opinions remained the 
same.  Dodson advised that it ‘cannot be maintained that Her Majesty’s Cruisers would be 
justified, in boarding and detaining American vessels’.    Similarly, he again made clear that 70
the act of ‘visitation and search’ was linked to an existing ‘right’ of ‘visitation and search’, 
this time referring to ships of treaty states or British vessels: 
It should, therefore, seem to follow, that where there is just ground to believe that the 
American flag is used for colourable purposes only, and the vessel is in reality the 
property of subjects of Her Majesty, or of any state that has conceded the right of 
visitation and search, the act of visitation and search is justifiable.  71
Lastly, Dodson reiterated the tenor of the previous ‘result would justify the capture’ advice: 
‘As, however, the visitation and search can only be fully justified by the result, very great 
caution should be used, in order that the right may on no occasion be used on light or 
insufficient grounds’.     72
Dodson’s use of the words ‘seem to follow‘ in the first of the above extracts suggest, on first 
glance, that he might here also have been saying that a British ‘visit’, in those circumstances, 
to what turned out to be a truly ‘American’ ship, would be ‘justifiable’.  If that was the case, 
then this may have represented a significant change in Dodson’s thinking as he could have 
been envisaging a wider right encompassing ‘American’ ships.  Whilst it is difficult to be 
certain, the better view, however, is that he did not mean this.  Dodson refers in these extracts 
to ‘visitation and search’, which links the act concerned to a full right of ‘visitation and 
search’ over the ships of treaty states or British vessels - i.e. he does not appear to have been 
 Stevenson to Aberdeen, 10 September 1841, PP, 1842, XLIV, No. 272.  Stevenson’s main argument 69
was on principle.  He did, however, also contend that the claimed ‘power’ was not practical, asking, 
for example, what would be the ‘restrictions’ and ‘limitations’, what tribunal would judge the ‘degree 
of suspicion’ and ‘national character’, and what evidential ‘security’ would there be for Americans.
 Dodson to Aberdeen, 2 October 1841, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72, pp. 152-155.70
 Dodson to Aberdeen, 2 October 1841, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72,  pp. 152-155.71
 Dodson to Aberdeen, 2 October 1841, Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72, pp. 152-155. 72
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referring to just a self-standing ‘right of visit’.   Furthermore, the use of the word ‘fully’ in 
the second extract indicates that, if the result, say, went the wrong way, the action would be 
only partially justified.  In other words, under international law, it would be partially 
unjustified and a wrong would have been committed.  As will be seen, Aberdeen’s 
subsequent letters to the United States are consistent with this interpretation.  
The legal implications of British policy were also at the heart of Peel’s intervention into the 
dispute around this time in October, 1841.  Peel clearly considered that the law was 
uncertain, describing the ‘right of visit’ as one which ‘might be according to the law of 
nations’, or, one that was ‘according to what ought to be in this special case the law of 
nations’.    In this, he was speculating, but crucially, he still considered the issue within the 73
conceptual framework of international law.  Thus, he saw some force in the American case, 
describing Stevenson’s latest letter as being ‘good ...upon the whole’, and commenting that, 
whilst the ‘right’ was necessary to British efforts to curtail the slave trade, he also thought it 
‘liable to abuse, and entailing vexation and possibly injustice’.    Crucially, Peel also 74
recognised the consequences of the legal uncertainty as being the ones that would properly 
follow within a system of law.   Whether Britain was right or wrong, the major issue for Peel, 
accordingly, was the practical one of the complaints which would arise from the United 
States irrespective from the ‘very general stoppage of American vessels on the high seas for 
the purpose of visit’.   The risk, he told Aberdeen, was then that the resulting incidents 75
would, ‘if not clearly defensible by the recognised law of nations soon involve us in a war’, 
with the ensuing question being as to ‘which party has the public law on its side?’    Peel’s 76
approach, thus, was to acknowledge the legal risk on whether there was a ‘right’ to visit 
American ships, and try to deal with the potential consequences of British action within the 
system of international law.  In this, he was, therefore, clearly still seeking to handle the 
dispute within the established legal framework. 
 Peel to Croker, 29 October 1841, Confidential, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 313-316.73
 Peel to Aberdeen, 25 October 1841, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 297-301. Whilst it is 74
not specified, the timing suggests that Peel was referring to Stevenson’s letter of 21 October 1841 
(referred to below).
 Peel to Croker, 29 October 1841, Confidential, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 313-316. 75
 Peel to Aberdeen, 25 October 1841, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 297-301.76
 223
Peel’s concern over these practical issues manifested itself in yet further instructions being 
given to the Admiralty, and, from there, to the British cruisers on the West African coast.    77
The aim of such instructions, Peel told Aberdeen, would be to reduce the risk of any further 
tensions arising over specific incidents involving American ships by preventing the ‘abuse of 
discretionary power’, and showing that Britain ‘had voluntarily taken whatever precautions 
could be taken, against the abuse of rights of which we cannot forgo the exercise’.    The 78
weakness in the British position under international law - and the policy itself - was also 
recognised in his acknowledgment that the United States would have complaints.   Thus, a 
further objective for the guidelines, he continued, was ‘to narrow as far as possible the 
grounds of American complaint, and to do our best, to reconcile the exercise of our own 
rights - with deference to the rights of friendly nations’.   Fundamentally, however, even 79
with this gloss, the new instructions, effectively, just followed the previous instructions from 
Palmerston and the legal advice of 1839.   American ships involved in the slave trade were 
not be stopped or visited, they maintained, but, if there was ‘good reason’ to suspect the 
fraudulent use of the American flag, then the ship concerned could be checked by ‘visit or 
otherwise’.   Furthermore, they continued, if the suspicion was confirmed, then that the ship 80
could be dealt with according to the relevant ‘law and .... Treaties’, but, if it was not (that is, 
the ship was instead accepted as truly ‘American’), a full report was to be made to London 
‘at the earliest opportunity’.  81
The contention that British policy was working within international law is also supported, 
indirectly, by the nature of the most prominent of the publications on the subject around this 
time.   Whilst some were more favourable than others to the notion of the ‘right of visit’, the 
 FO to Admiralty, 27 November 1841, enclosed in Aberdeen to Fox, 30 November 1841, PP, 1842 77
XLIV, No. 278; Sir John Barrow to the Commanders, 7 December 1841, enclosed in Aberdeen to Fox, 
11 December 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 280.
 Peel to Aberdeen, Private, 1 November 1841, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 317-320.78
 Peel to Aberdeen, Private, 1 November 1841, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 317-320. 79
Again, presumably with the object of assisting with complaints, Peel also wanted a report of every 
‘visit’, both in the ship’s log and by ‘separate letter’, and which gave details such as the ‘grounds of 
suspicion’, the ‘length of detention’, and whether the right was ‘exercised’ ‘by examination of papers 
or otherwise’.
 FO to Admiralty, 27 November 1841, enclosed in Aberdeen to Fox, 30 November 1841, PP, 1842 80
XLIV, No. 278.
 FO to Admiralty, 27 November 1841, enclosed in Aberdeen to Fox, 30 November 1841, PP, 1842 81
XLIV, No. 278.
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key point is that all addressed their arguments to the current legal position.  In other words, 
there appears to have been an understanding that the conceptual framework for the dispute 
was existing international law, even if there was a debate about what that law was on the 
point in question.  This was not a case, then, of assertions being made to the effect that 
Britain should trample over international law.  By far, the best argued legal case was in 
Wheaton’s 1842 work.   In this, Wheaton began by placing the issue firmly within the wider 82
context of the ‘free navigation of the seas, and the general balance of maritime power’.    83
He then made three key points.  First, there was no distinction in international law between 
visit and search.    Second, there was no right in peacetime for ‘visitation and search’ under 84
international law.    Lastly, Aberdeen’s justification for a ‘right of visit’, namely that it was 85
only to examine ships suspected of being British, belonging to a treaty state, or holding 
pirates, could be resisted.   Of those potentially more supportive of the British position, the 86
most interesting was Robert Phillimore, who covered the issue briefly in a pamphlet 
published in 1842.    In this, Phillimore distinguished the ‘right of search’ from a right to 87
‘verify’ nationality, and argued for the latter on the basis that ‘according to every principle of 
reason, ... a party interested in the observance of a law, should have the means of 
ascertaining the fact of its violation’.    This echoed Peel, but he nevertheless gave no 88
authority in support of the proposition that such a right was an existing part of international 
law.  There was also an angry denunciation of Cass in a pamphlet entitled  ‘Reply to an 
 Wheaton, Enquiry. 82
 Wheaton, Enquiry, p. 5.83
 Wheaton, Enquiry, p. 122.  Wheaton said that ‘the ‘right of visitation and search’ is the appropriate 84
technical term always used by British civilians’, and that visit without search was ‘an empty 
mockery’.
 Wheaton, Enquiry, p. 125.  For Wheaton, thus, the American ‘merchant and navigator’: ‘has, as we 85
maintain, a perfect right to be exempt upon the high seas in time of peace, from visitation and search, 
and seizure and detention for trial, by foreign officers and foreign courts of justice’.
 Wheaton, Enquiry, pp. 132-144.  In substance, Wheaton’s third point was about whether or not there 86
was a ‘right of visit’ against suspected ‘American’ slave ships that were subsequently found to be truly 
American. As will be seen, however, Britain effectively conceded this point, in any event, by offering 
compensation for any losses in such circumstances.
 Phillimore, A Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Ashburton.87
 Phillimore, A Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Ashburton, pp. 46-47.88
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American’s Examination of the “Right of Search” by an Englishmen’.    This work asserted 89
that the right claimed by Britain to ‘examine a suspicious vessel’ was a ‘self-evident 
necessity’ and that the American position was ‘inadmissible’, but its arguments lacked legal 
substance.    Finally, Moylan’s 1843 ‘The Right of Search’ provided a good summary of the 90
dispute, but added little that was new on the central point in issue.  91
The combination of Britain’s legal approach with the fact that the challenge from the United 
States was, self-evidently, based on law meant, however, that the circumstances were 
favourable to a solution once the British position was fully explained.  The terms of the 
dispute were gradually narrowed in the diplomatic exchanges, and ultimately a workable 
compromise was reached, giving rise to an updated broad shared framework on the issue.  
On taking over from Palmerston in 1841, Aberdeen argued the British position on the basis 
of the necessity for ‘visit’ given the ‘fraudulent use of the American flag’, which, he said, 
gave the ‘reasonable ground of suspicion which the law of nations requires’.   Quite which 92
part of the ‘law of nations’ he was referring to here is unclear, but the point is rendered 
superfluous by his then further explanations of British policy.  Britain, he maintained, 
renounced any claim ‘to visit and search American vessels in time of peace’.   Instead, he 93
continued, the suspicious ships were visited, not as ‘American’ ships, but rather as ‘British 
vessels engaged in unlawful traffic’, ships of treaty states, or as the ships of ‘piratical 
outlaws’.   This was an application of Dodson’s advice, which grounded the ‘visit’ 94
concerned in an existing ‘right’ related to the ultimate nature, or nationality, of the ship 
concerned.  Whilst maintaining his previous objections, Stevenson’s response, importantly, 
also revealed common points of legal analysis.  The United States, he argued, was objecting 
solely to interference with ships that were ‘bona fide American’, and was not ‘denying’ the 
 ‘Reply to an American’s Examination of the “Right of Search” by an Englishman’ (April, 1842); the 89
author was named as W. Ousely in the catalogue of the University Library, Cambridge.  Cass had 
produced his own pamphlet on the issue, to which this was a reply.
 ‘Reply to an American’s Examination of the ‘Right of Search’ ’, p. 12.  Furthermore, the work 90
contended that the then government of the United States must be ‘regarded as out of the pale of the 
law of nations’, and that only ‘force’ was ‘respected by North Americans’, pp. 62-64. 
 D. C. Moylan, The Right of Search as between France, America and Great Britain (London: H. 91
[Butterworth], 1843).
 Aberdeen to Stevenson, 13 October 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 273.92
 Aberdeen to Stevenson, 13 October 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 273.93
 Aberdeen to Stevenson, 13 October 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 273.94
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right of Britain to act in the case of ships not ‘bona fide American’, provided that ‘it should 
be done without violating the principles of public law or the rights of other nations’.   In 95
practice, this meant that the dispute, by late October, 1841, clearly only concerned the 
question of a British ‘visit’ to the subset of suspected American slave ships that turned out to 
be truly ‘American’, as opposed to also covering those that were falsely flying the American 
flag. 
Britain then made the decisive final move in effectively resolving the tensions within the 
period when it accepted the reality of the legal advice from 1839, for the cases of ‘visit’ to 
genuine American ships, in Aberdeen’s renowned letter of the 20th December, 1841.    In 96
this, Aberdeen followed the substance of both the new Admiralty instructions, and his earlier 
letters, in setting out when suspected ships would be stopped.   Crucially, however, Aberdeen 
also made clear that Britain would accept responsibility for inadvertently stopping what 
turned out to be truly American ships.  As he put it: ‘if, in spite of the utmost caution, an 
error should be committed, and any American vessel should suffer loss or injury, it would be 
followed by prompt and ample reparation’.   In other words, Britain was accepting liability 97
for a wrong under international law in those circumstances.  This, of course, reflected the 
substance of the advice already given to the British government (for example, Dodson’s 
‘serious responsibility’ in 1839), but it had not until now been officially passed on to the 
United States.  The letter, thus, removed the sore at the centre of the dispute with the United 
States.    As will be seen, the technical issue of whether or not a British ‘visit’, to what 98
turned out to be truly an ‘American’ ship, could nevertheless properly be said to have been 
 Stevenson to Aberdeen, 21 October 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 274. Aberdeen later used Stevenson’s 95
reference to ‘bona fide’ American vessels to help his case, questioning how this was to be proved: 
Aberdeen to Everett, 20 December 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 281.
Aberdeen to Everett, 20 December 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 281. This letter was often used as a 96
reference point in political discourse on the subject; see, for example, the comment of Lansdowne, 
who said that it ‘contains a sound, clear, and dispassionate exposition of international law on this 
subject’: Lansdowne, HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 642-654.
 Aberdeen to Everett, 20 December 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 281.97
 Interestingly, the letter also followed what, according to Cass, Guizot appears to have outlined as 98
the respective positions of Britain and the United States.  Cass wrote that Guizot felt that the 
‘American government does not advance the pretension that the mere hoisting of their flag, protects 
every vessel from examination, whether such vessel be American or foreign’, and that he (Guizot) 
considered that the safeguards in the British position should be ‘precise instructions’ that the 
‘strongest suspicion amounting almost to conviction that [a ship] was not American’ was needed 
before boarding, together with ‘satisfaction’ if a mistake was made: Cass to Webster, Copy, 12 March 
1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43123, fols. 97-105.
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under some sort of a ‘right’ did still remain.  This, however, was more apparent than real.  
Liability had been conceded.  Some British politicians may have continued to call it a ‘right’ 
in some circumstances within the period, probably for presentational reasons, but what they 
were actually, loosely, referring to in real British practice was a ‘right’ asserted against 
British, treaty state, and pirate, ships.  That this was the case can also be seen in the broad 
agreement of the United States to the legal principles in Aberdeen’s letter, which can be 
reasonably inferred from the significant fact that, as Peel later noted, Aberdeen’s despatch 
was formally unanswered.   99
Thereafter, the legal analysis on the ‘right of visit’ represented by Aberdeen’s December, 
1841 letter formed the main understanding between Britain and the United States that lay 
behind the subsequent agreement for ‘joint cruising’ in the 1842 Treaty.  Both Britain and the 
United States wanted to reduce the chances of serious American complaints in the future, and 
the question of further action to suppress the slave trade was one of the matters covered in 
the 1842 negotiations.   Ideally, Britain had again wanted to solve the issue by agreeing a 
new slave trade treaty with the United States providing for a mutual ‘right of search’.    100
Webster, though, soon ruled this out, and instead considered joint cruising as a way of 
dealing with what he viewed as one of the two issues of the ‘most commanding interest and 
highest importance’ in British-American relations.   This was undoubtedly a political 101
compromise between the British desire for a treaty providing for a mutual ‘right of search’, 
and the American wish for their ships to be left entirely alone by British cruisers.   Britain 
reluctantly agreed after accepting that the United States would not, at such time, ‘become a 
party to any convention conferring a mutual right of search’.   Overall, the British approach 102
was probably fairly summed up by Peel, who later described joint cruising as ‘a step in 
 Peel, HC, 2 February 1843, Vol. LXVI, 86-91. In practice, Britain also noted, and presumably took 99
comfort from, the fact that the United States was felt to be pursuing a similar policy of confirming 
nationality in the Gulf of Mexico: Aberdeen to Everett, 20 December 1841, PP, 1842 XLIV, No. 281, 
and Peel to Aberdeen, 31 October 1841, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 308-310,
 Aberdeen to Ashburton, No. 2, 8 February 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 164; Peel also said he 100
wanted to ‘try again mutual right of search’, and another ‘arrangement’ if that failed: Peel to 
Aberdeen, 25 October 1841, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43061, fols. 297-301.
 Webster to Everett, 20 November 1841, Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. III, 1278 (the Caroline 101
was the other main issue referred to by Webster); Ashburton to Aberdeen, 25 April 1842, PP, 1843 
LIX, No.149.  Generally, Ashburton feared the influence of Cass and Wheaton on the issues related to 
the slave trade: Ashburton to Aberdeen, 10 February 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43123, fols. 
34-35.
 Aberdeen to Ashburton, 26 May 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 184. 102
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advance’, presumably because it did put more obligations onto the United States.   The 103
central aim of the joint cruising nevertheless was, simply, the practical one of lowering the 
risk associated with British policy by reducing the frequency with which ‘American’ flagged 
ships would be stopped by the Royal Navy through the presence of an American force.   In 
Webster’s words (as reported by Fox), it ‘was adopted with the hope of rendering all further 
discussion of the subject unnecessary’.    Ashburton too thought that ‘the vexed question of 104
the right of visit will settle itself under this arrangement’.  105
The December, 1841 framework nevertheless helped the process of agreeing joint cruising 
because it meant that there was an acknowledgment of the legal principles which Britain and 
the United States could both accept as being applicable to their operations.  This mattered 
because the 1842 Treaty settlement, although for joint cruising, also envisaged separate 
activities where British ‘visits’ to American ships were still possible in some circumstances.  
Under its terms, Britain and the United States were each to maintain a separate ‘naval force’ 
off the African coast ‘to enforce, separately and respectively, the laws rights and obligations 
of each of the two countries, for the suppression of the Slave Trade’.   The ‘joint’ element 106
was, however, then catered for in the further requirement that each was also to ensure that 
the orders to their forces, whilst being ‘independent’, allowed some level of cooperation, 
with copies of the orders to the respective commanding officers to be exchanged.   The 107
agreed legal principles were fundamental to these orders.  Indeed, it is difficult to see that 
they could have been mutually acceptable if, for example, it had not been clear that Britain 
accepted liability for losses caused by wrongfully ‘visiting’ American ships.   From the 
British side, the relevance of the legal principles was also expressly declared.   Peel told 
Aberdeen that he wanted not the ‘slightest compromise of the principles we have maintained 
 Peel, HC, 2 February 1843, Vol. LXVI, 86-91.103
 Fox to Aberdeen, No. 19, 24 February 1843, FO 5/391, fols. 99-106.104
 Ashburton to Aberdeen, 25 April 1842, PP, 1843 LIX, No. 149.105
 Article VIII, 1842 Treaty, accessed through Project Avalon, Yale Law School, on 27/10/17, and all 106
references to this treaty are to this version.  There was no maximum size for the respective ‘forces’, 
but they were required to have a minimum of eighty guns, and to be ‘sufficient and adequate’. The 
agreement on joint cruising was for five years from ratification, after which it could be terminated by 
notice by either Britain or the United States: Article XI, 1842 Treaty.
 Article VIII, 1842 Treaty. Britain was sent a copy of the American orders on 26 April 1843: Everett 107
to Aberdeen, 26 April 1843, PP, 1844 XLVIII, No. 29 and enclosure.  Britain sent a copy of the British 
orders on 29 December 1843: Aberdeen to Pakenham, 29 December 1843, PP, 1844, XLVIII, No. 50.
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in respect to the right of visit’ in the Instructions.   He also argued, later in 1844, that the 108
Instructions ‘maintained the principles for which this country had always contended’, and 
were ‘in substance the same’ as those that had been issued previously.  109
Three key points in the instructions sent to the respective fleets following the 1842 Treaty 
make clear just how central, in fact, the agreed legal principles were to the making, and 
successful operation, of these provisions for joint cruising.    First, both sets of instructions 110
reiterated that there was no peacetime ‘right of search’ over American ships.   The British 
instructions specified to British cruisers that it was ‘no part of their duty to capture, or visit, 
or in any way interfere with’ American ships.   Similarly, the American ones said that the 
United States did ‘not acknowledge a right in any other nation to visit and detain’ American 
ships.  Second, both acknowledged the ‘right’ of Britain to stop ships falsely flying the 
American flag.  Thus, the British instructions noted that the American government were ‘far 
from claiming that the flag of the Union should give immunity to those who have no right to 
bear it’.  Again, similarly, the American ones stated that the American ‘claim’ of protection 
for their ships ‘presupposes that that the vessel visited is really American’.   Finally, and 
crucially, the instructions restated the workable compromise on ‘visit’.  The British 
instructions provided that, in limited circumstances where there was reasonable suspicion of 
the American flag being used falsely, a British officer ‘is’ to visit it for the purposes of 
inquiry.    There was not, however, any mention of there being a ‘right’ to make such a 111
visit.  The American ones then dealt with the consequences of such action.  They observed 
that, whilst suspicious ships may be visited by American cruisers, ‘this privilege does not 
 Peel to Aberdeen, 16 August 1843, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43062, fols. 365-367.108
 Peel, HC, 5 February 1844, Vol. LXII, 276.109
 The references to the respective instructions in this paragraph are to: Instructions to British 110
Cruisers, 12 December 1843, PP, 1844 XLVIII, First Enclosure in No. 50; and Instructions to 
American Navy, 15 March 1843, PP, 1844 XLVIII, Enclosure in No. 29.
 The British Instructions are slightly unclear on this, but they do seem to have envisaged separate 111
visits where it was the only option.  This seems to be the case from the following words before a 
description of the procedure of ‘visit’ to be followed by the Officer in command: ‘In carrying this part 
of his instructions into execution, he will do right to leave the Commander of the United States cruiser 
to take the first step of visiting the vessel, and ascertaining whether she is entitled to bear the flag of 
his country, provided that in doing so no such delay is incurred as may enable her to escape altogether 
unvisited ...; and that most assuredly Great Britain never will allow vessels of other nations to escape 
visit and examination by merely hoisting an United States flag’.  Peel also gave an example of a 
British visit alone to an American ship after the 1842 Treaty when answering a question in parliament 
on the visiting of American ships since the 1842 Treaty: Peel, HC, 8 July 1845, Vol. LXXXII, 
140-142.  
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extend to cruisers of any other nation; that is it cannot be conceded to them as a right’.  The 
key result from this was the acceptance of liability for any resulting losses.   As the 
instructions continued, thus, ‘whenever ... a cruiser of any other nation, shall venture to 
board a vessel under the flag of the United States, she will do it upon the responsibility for 
all consequences’.   Significantly, they then added that ‘these principles are believed to be 
well understood and settled’.    
The continuing importance of the December, 1841 framework was also brought out in the 
debate in Britain about the effect of the treaty in the wake of Tyler’s Presidential Message of 
December, 1842.   British hackles were raised by the combined effect of Tyler’s various 
comments on the nature of the joint cruising agreement.   The United States, he asserted, had 
maintained its opposition to the British claim to ‘visit and inquire’, adding that by the 1842 
Treaty ‘all pretence’ had been ‘removed’ for foreign ‘interference with our commerce for any 
purpose whatsoever’.    Most importantly, he argued that the joint cruising settlement 112
showed that the slave trade could be reduced ‘without the interpolation of any new principle 
into the maritime code’, which implied that the British position on the ‘right of visit’ was an 
attempt to make new international law’.   Tyler was, thus, appearing to add himself firmly 113
to those in American politics who had sought to justify the joint cruising compromise by 
hinting that Britain had given up on its legal claims.   Rives, for example, when explaining 
the decision of the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations to approve the treaty, contended 
that the ‘right to board and detain vessels sailing under the American flag‘ was a ‘pretension 
of alarming extent, and which we have resisted, and must ever resist, as wholly unsustainable 
upon any just principle of public law’.    Fox later commented that Webster too had 114
‘pretended to have obtained concessions from Great Britain’.    The combination of Tyler’s 115
message with these wider circumstances clearly increased the concern in Britain.  
 John Tyler: ‘Second Annual Message’, 6 December 1842, Online by Gerard Peters and John T. 112
Woolley, The American Presidency Project: Http.//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29484, 
accessed on 24/2/18 at c10am.
 John Tyler: ‘Second Annual Message’, 6 December 1842, Online by Gerard Peters and John T. 113
Woolley, The American Presidency Project: Http.//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29484, 
accessed on 24/2/18 at c10am.
 Rives, Speech in Senate, 17-19 August 1842, FO 5/384, fols. 57-64.114
 Fox commented that the controversy in the United States was caused by Webster having ‘pretended 115
to have obtained concessions from Great Britain which they now find have not been obtained’: Fox to 
Aberdeen, No. 19, 24 February 1843, FO 5/391, fols. 99-106; Fox to Aberdeen, No. 20, 24 February 
1843, FO 5/391, fols. 107-113. 
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Campbell’s comment to Palmerston following the President’s message illustrates the anxiety.      
He was, he said, worried by the risk of further restriction on British maritime rights, such as 
an argument that, ‘by our concession’, search in war would also be seen as ‘an interpolation 
in the maritime code’.  116
British policy was, as a result, restated in the immediate diplomatic exchanges and 
forthcoming parliamentary debates.   Aberdeen intended it to be passed on to the United 
States that he would not ‘recede’ from the position set out in his his letter of 20th December, 
1841.    He then gave Fox a summary of his position, which succinctly captured the 117
consistent elements of British policy traced back to Dodson’s 1839 advice.   Britain was not, 
Aberdeen reiterated, exercising a right to stop American ships, but, rather, ships suspected of 
belonging to treaty states, and damages would be paid if a mistake was made.  The full text 
makes clear how strongly this was maintained:        
The President may be assured, that Great Britain will always respect the just claims of the 
United States.  We make no pretension to interfere in any manner whatever, either by 
detention, visit, or search, with vessels of the United States, known or believed to be 
such.      But we still maintain, and will exercise, when necessary, our right to ascertain 
the genuineness of any flag which a suspected vessel may bear ....  If in the exercise of 
this right, either from involuntary error, or in spite of every precaution, loss or injury 
should be sustained, a prompt reparation will be afforded.     118
Aberdeen made similar pronouncements in parliament.   Again, he maintained the key points 
of British policy, namely the right concerned was a right to check the nationality of ships 
suspected of belonging to treaty states, not American ships, and, if American ships were 
stopped, liability was accepted.    Indeed, in a key passage, Aberdeen, again, made clear 119
that the British right was based on existing treaty rights, noting that: 
It is not such a right as all nations have in capturing pirates, but it is a right, the exercise 
of which is accorded by treaty.  And it is because we have reason to believe, that a vessel 
 Campbell to Palmerston, 27 December 1842, Palmerston Papers, GC/CA/32/1-2.  From the rest of 116
the letter, Campbell seemingly was concerned that Britain really had conceded ground on international 
law (albeit that this was not, he accepted, apparent from the face of the 1842 Treaty), and that the 
Presidential Message was a way of publishing this.
 Aberdeen to Fox, 18 January 1843, PP, 1844 XLVIII, No. 22.117
 Aberdeen to Fox, 18 January 1843, PP, 1844 XLVIII, No. 22.118
 Aberdeen, HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 654-661. 119
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belongs to a country with which we have a treaty, that we have any ground for visiting 
her with the view of ascertaining her nationality.     120
Peel too described the British position overall as not having given a ‘concession’ on the 
‘right of visit’, and maintained that the claim to the ‘right of visitation’ made in Aberdeen’ 
letter of 20th December, 1841 had not been ‘relinquished’.    Peel and Aberdeen’s position 121
was then supported by Tyler’s supplemental special message of February, 1843, which 
clarified that the United States had neither ‘yielded’ in their view, nor ‘demanded’ Britain 
give up their ‘pretension’.   Instead, in Tyler’s words, there had been ‘a practical settlement 122
of the question’.            123
The one substantive issue that remained, of course, from Aberdeen’s letter of the 20th, 
December, 1841 was that of whether or not Britain was exercising a ‘right’ when making a 
‘visit’ to what turned out to be truly American ships.   As argued above, this was more a 
point of presentation than substance, as Britain acknowledged that, in such circumstances, it 
would meet any losses.   It does not affect, therefore, either the argument that Britain was 
handling the question of the ‘right of visit’ within international law, or that broadly agreed 
principles were important to the agreement for joint cruising.   Two related points are, 
however, briefly worthy of note.  The first is to acknowledge that one of the reasons for the 
issue remaining live was, of course, that there was a political discourse in Britain which 
argued that a ‘right of visit’ was a ‘right’ within international law separate from a ‘right of 
search’.  Peel, for one, as mentioned above, appears to have been sympathetic to this 
 Aberdeen, HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 654-661.  See also as a further example, Aberdeen’s 120
statement of his views in the letter to the ‘commission’ on producing a general Code of Instructions 
for British cruisers involved in suppressing the slave trade: Aberdeen to Lushington, Bandinel, 
Denman, Rothery, 14 December 1842, Peel Papers, Add. MS 40453, fols. 277-290.
 Peel, HC, 2 February 1843, Vol. LXVI, 86-91.121
 Fox to Aberdeen, No. 25, 4 March 1843, FO 5/391, fols. 131-142 referring to Tyler’s Message of 122
28 February 1843.
 Fox to Aberdeen, No. 25, 4 March 1843, FO 5/391, fols. 131-142 referring to Tyler’s Message of 123
28 February 1843. This was also reflected in The Westminster Review, which commented that the 
question had been ‘put aside for the present with no alteration of the position taken by either party in 
the controversy’: ‘Lord Ashburton and the American Treaty’, The Westminster Review, Vol. 39, 
(1843), Article VIII, p. 198.
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argument, but in this he was merely reflecting a wider public debate.   This meant that the 124
question was often confounded by a lack of clarity on whether what was being discussed on 
a particular occasion was a ‘right’, as claimed by Aberdeen, against treaty states etc., or a 
wider ‘right’ of visit to confirm nationality as contemplated by Peel and others.   The other 
point, with that in mind, is that it is nevertheless still clear that British policy in the period 
proceeded in line with Aberdeen’s understanding.   Aberdeen made the key statements of 
policy, and even Peel, as seen, referred to Aberdeen’s letter of 20th December, 1841 as the 
one containing the British claim that had not been ‘relinquished’.  Furthermore, the 
instructions to the naval forces were also consistent with Aberdeen’s position.   Lastly, it is 
also significant that Aberdeen accepted Webster’s reply to his restatement of the British 
position after Tyler’s 1842 message.   After an an extensive recounting of the positions held 
by Britain and the United States respectively, Webster argued that Britain had no ‘right’ to 
detain American vessels, that any detention of an American ship was ‘therefore, a wrong, a 
trespass’, and that compensation ‘implies, at least in its general interpretation, the 
commission of some wrongful act’.    Crucially, as Soulsby observes, Aberdeen apparently 125
believed that letter to be ‘excellent’, and ‘that he did not know that he would wish to alter a 
word.’  126
Finally, there is also one related further point that is suggestive of an influential role for 
international law in policy towards the United States on the slave trade, and which, thereby, 
indirectly supports the argument of the chapter that British policy worked within a shared 
 See, for example, the following three instances. First, Campbell, who considered that the ‘right of 124
visit’ was a ‘perfect right’ under the law of nations, and that the ‘object of this right of visit was simply 
to ascertain the genuineness of the flag, and whether the ship was entitled to carry the colours she 
hoisted’.  For Campbell: ‘This was an indispensable right, and it existed as much in time of peace as 
the right to search for arms etc., existed in time of war... .  There was not the slightest ground for 
denying that right, or for asserting that it was not a perfect right’: Campbell, HL, 7 April 1843, Vol. 
LXVIII, 661 et seq. .  Second, in 1841-42, Quarterly Review, ‘Letters of John Adams to his wife, ed. 
by C. F. Adams’, p. 275: ‘England says... that under the ancient and necessary common law of the sea, 
and according to the ordinary rules of common sense, we are entitled to satisfy ourselves that the ship 
which hoists those colours is really entitled to hoist them’.  Third, in 1843, Edinburgh Review, 
‘History of the Progress of the Law of Nations’, pp. 370-372: this argued that the right of visit was 
derived from ‘necessity’ and ‘arose as soon as slave-trading was declared a crime, and the Christian 
world agreed to suppress it’, and said that Wheaton’s ‘error’ was ‘occasionally confounding’ the right 
of search for ‘detention’ with that for ‘inquiry’, and then assuming that Britain only pursued it by 
treaty.
 Webster to Everett, 28 March 1843, PP, 1844 XLVIII, No. 30.125
 Everett to Webster, Private, 27 April 1843, noted in Soulsby, The Right of Search, p. 103, note 55, 126
referring to G. Curtis, Life of Daniel Webster, II, 165.
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framework of legal principles.   This  concerns the relationship between the policies of 
Palmerston and Aberdeen.  Soulsby considers that ‘Aberdeen also appeared to believe that 
the government had considerably modified the policy of its predecessor’, referring to 
speeches of Aberdeen in parliament in 1843.    He then argues that, in fact, the claims of 127
Palmerston and Aberdeen ‘amounted to the same thing’, and that Aberdeen’s ‘renunciation of 
the right of visit was, in short, a diplomatic fiction’.    Whilst Aberdeen did not, as seen, 128
purport to reject Palmerston’s ‘right of visit’ in the way suggested, Soulsby’s wider point is 
nevertheless interesting and correct: there was a continuity in British policy.   Palmerston and 
Aberdeen were both arguing for a similar policy of ‘visit’, with the main difference being, as 
noted, that it was Aberdeen that explained it properly to the United States.  This consistency 
is less surprising, though, when it is put into the context that both Palmerston and Aberdeen 
were relying on, effectively, the same legal advice.   Of course, there were differences in 
quite how each individual used that advice, as there always is, but Dodson’s interpretation of 
the law on the ‘right of visitation and search’ ensured that the instructions to British cruisers 
changed little once the 1840 informal arrangement had been abandoned in February, 1841. 
  
The Creole  
The Creole incident gave rise to further issues that placed international law at the centre of 
British-American relations.   The case concerned the fate of American ‘slaves’ on board a 
ship, the Creole, following a mutiny and their subsequent arrival in the Bahamas in 
November, 1841.    The United States argued that, given that the Creole was in British 129
territory, Britain had been under an obligation to assist with the regaining of control over the 
ship and its ‘slaves’.  This contention was based on the ‘comity of nations’, which it asserted 
meant that American jurisdiction and laws (in particular, those on slavery) should have been 
respected on the Creole in the Bahamas.    The Creole, thus, touched the wider question of 
how far international law could operate to protect a state’s jurisdiction over a ship when it 
was in foreign territorial waters.   As with the ‘right of search’, the United States was, thus, 
seeking to keep its ships as detached as possible from foreign intervention.  Britain, however, 
 Soulsby, The Right of Search, pp. 64-65.127
 Soulsby, The Right of Search, pp. 64-65.128
 The word ‘slaves’ will be placed in inverted commas in this section, as the status of the individuals 129
concerned as freemen or not was at the heart of the dispute.
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rejected the American claim.  The British position, instead, was that the ‘slaves’ on the 
Creole were free in the Empire, and that the ‘comity of nations’ did not require assistance to 
be given.   In the end, the main ongoing impact of the Creole in British-American relations 
was not the particular case itself, but the wider question of how similar instances would be 
dealt with in the future.   The United States wanted assurances over the position of slaves on 
board American ships that were forced into British harbours.   The purpose of this section is 
to show how the ‘comity of nations’ was central to British policy in relation to the 
compromise that was reached.  It argues that Britain did not contest the principle of ‘comity’ 
itself, but, rather, its application where slavery was involved.  British policy, as a result, was 
able to handle the issue within a broad framework of law shared with the United States, and 
find sufficient flexibility within the principle for a workable settlement to be found.        
    
The main facts concerning the Creole can be summarised relatively briefly.   The Creole 130
itself was an American ship intending to carry passengers, tobacco and ‘slaves’ from 
Richmond in Virginia to New Orleans as part of the lawful domestic coastal slave trade of 
the United States.   During the voyage, however, some of the ‘slaves’ rebelled, took control 
of the ship, and forced it to go to the British possession of the Bahamas.   One passenger was 
killed and several others were injured during the incident.  The British authorities became 
involved at the request of the local American Consul, following the arrival of the Creole in 
the port of Nassau, and took nineteen ‘slaves’ believed to have been involved in the ‘murder 
and assault’ into custody.  In relation to the nineteen, it is also important, as Webster 
observes, that their ‘surrender’ to the United States at this time was ‘refused’ on the basis that 
instructions were to be requested first from London.    In the view of the British 131
government, the remaining hundred or so ‘slaves’ were, however, free from restraint by the 
British authorities, and the vast majority of them then left the Creole and did not return.  The 
circumstances of these ‘slaves’ were, however, a key point of contention with the United 
States.   Webster saw British agency in the facts of this crucial stage as being rather more 
positive, commenting that it was ‘through the interference of the colonial authorities’ that 
these ‘slaves’ were ‘liberated, and encouraged to go beyond the power of the master of the 
 The summary in this paragraph is, except where indicated by separate footnote, taken from 130
Aberdeen to Everett, 18 April 1842, PP, 1843 LIX, No. 146.  Further details are available in A. 
Downey, The Creole Affair, (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), E. Jervey, and H., Huber, ‘The 
Creole Affair’, Journal of Negro History, 65 (1980), pp. 196-211, and H., Jones, ‘The Peculiar 
Institution and National Honor: The Case of the Creole Slave Revolt’, Civil War History, XXI, (1975), 
pp. 28-50.
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.131
 236
vessel, or the American Consul, by proceedings which neither of them could control’.    132
Finally, the nineteen ‘slaves’ in custody were held then until a subsequent court hearing in 
April, 1842, following which, for the reasons to be set out below, they were released.              133
The Creole gave rise to a dispute with Britain because it was perceived by many in the 
United States that the British actions damaged American interests.   There was the obvious 134
precedent for slave rebellion.   More importantly, however, there was also a practical 135
concern, emphasised by Ashburton, over the risk of American ships being forced in the 
future into the harbours of the Bahamas, and the question of what then would happen to any 
slaves that were being carried by such ships.    Some Americans argued too that the case 136
damaged the national honour of the United States.    The main subject in the dispute was 137
the implication for the future of the actions of the British authorities towards the ‘slaves’ on 
the Creole.  In short, the United States contended that it had been the ‘plain and obvious 
duty’ of Britain to ‘assist’ the American Consul to achieve the return of the ‘slaves’ to the 
United States under the ‘duties imposed by that part of the code regulating the intercourse of 
friendly nations, which is generally called the comity of Nations’.   This would then have 138
allowed the relevant ‘slaves’ to be tried for their alleged crimes in the United States.  The 
United States, therefore, wanted some agreement with Britain as to what would be done in 
future similar cases.  There was, in addition, one further aspect to the problem.  For a period 
after they had been taken into British custody, there was the specific issue of whether the 
nineteen detained ‘slaves’ would, in fact, be sent to the United States.  In the end, Britain 
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.132
 Darling, American Consul, Nassau to Webster, 16 April 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 188.133
 There is a full discussion of the varying reactions in the United States in Downey, The Creole 134
Affair, chapter 5, and Jones, ‘The Peculiar Institution’, pp. 28-50.
 Jones, ‘The Peculiar Institution’, p. 36.135
 Ashburton told Aberdeen that the United States wanted clarification on the future position of ships 136
forced into British ports, for example, by bad weather, and that a settlement was needed for the sake of 
the ‘interests of the great southern coasting trade’: Ashburton to Aberdeen, No. 2, 25 April 1842, 
British Documents, Vol. 1, 174, and Ashburton to Aberdeen, No. 20, 9 August 1842, British 
Documents, 215.
 Jones,‘The Peculiar Institution’, pp. 33-37.137
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.  The American case was stated 138
directly in Everett to Aberdeen, 1 March 1842, PP, 1843 LIX, No. 139.  That letter relied for the 
substance of its arguments on the contents of Webster to Everett, Ibid..
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decided that they would not, but this matter was not the central focus of the dispute, which, 
as noted, was directed towards the future.         139
The striking nature of the main American argument in the Creole can be lost in the detail.      
The United States was contending that Britain was obliged under the ‘comity of nations’ to 
assist it in the maintenance of American laws, even within British territory, and in the context 
of slavery.   The necessity giving rise to the presence of the Creole in the Bahamas was also 
an important factor in Webster’s reasoning.    The core argument, thus, struck right at the 140
heart of British jurisdiction in one of its own possessions.   As it was argued by Webster, the 
British authorities in Nassau should have helped the American Consul to retake the Creole 
for the master and crew, ‘and to take the mutineers and murderers to their country to answer 
for their crimes before the proper tribunal’.    Webster’s premise was that the Creole, whilst 141
in the Bahamas, was nevertheless still within American jurisdiction for purposes related to 
the ownership of the ‘slaves’, and the alleged mutiny.   As he put it: 142
We know of no ground on which it is just to say that these coloured people had come 
within, and were within, British territory, in such sense as the laws of England affecting 
and regulating the conditions of persons could properly act upon them.  143
Indeed, for him, it would have been ‘no more than just’ for Britain to have treated the Creole 
as still ‘on her voyage, and entitled to the succour due to other cases of distress whether 
 In addition, there was also a claim for compensation to be given to the owners of the ‘slaves’ on the 139
basis that they had been deprived of their ‘property’ by the actions of the British authorities - a claim 
which was finally settled in 1855.  This is not covered here, however, as the section is considering, 
instead, the way the issue between the British and American governments was dealt with in the period. 
For further details of the property claim, see Jones.,‘The Peculiar Institution’, p. 47, and Downey, The 
Creole Affair, chapter 8; Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185. 
 As put by Webster, the people on board were, except for the ‘mutineers’, ‘not there voluntarily’: 140
Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185. Webster also said later that: ‘The 
presumption [as to the applicability of the comity of nations] is stronger... in regard to vessels driven 
into foreign ports by necessity, and seeking only a temporary refuge’: Webster to Ashburton, 1 August 
1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 216.
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.141
 Webster also gave an important fuller explanation of his understanding of the impact of the ‘comity 142
of nations’ in this context later in 1842: ‘A merchant vessel enters the port of a friendly State, and 
enjoys whilst there the protection of her own laws, and is under the jurisdiction of her own 
Government, not in derogation of the sovereignty of the place, but by the presumed allowance or 
permission of that sovereignty.   This permission or allowance is founded on the comity of nations’: 
Webster to Ashburton, 1 August 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 216. 
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.143
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arising from accident or outrage’.     The ‘persons on board the “Creole” ’, he continued, 144
‘could only have been regarded as Americans’, and to give an ‘English character’ or ‘English 
privileges’ to them, was not ‘justified’.    In other words, British policy needed to respect 145
the fact that British laws did not prevail in all circumstances within British jurisdiction.  Put 
bluntly, this meant that the British abolition of slavery should not have been the pretext for 
the ‘slaves’ on the Creole obtaining their freedom. 
The American argument relied, as seen, on the principle of the ‘comity of nations’.    For 146
Webster, ‘comity’ involved the duties and obligations involved with the notions of 
‘hospitality’, ‘assistance’, and certainly ‘no unfriendly interference’ between friendly 
nations.    It was, he considered, a ‘doctrine’ derived from the ‘laws and usages of nations’, 147
and was ‘a part, and a most important and valuable part, of the law of nations, to which all 
nations are presumed to assent, until they make their dissent known’.    This presumption 148
of consent was important in that, whilst Webster accepted that nations could refuse to accept 
the obligations from ‘comity’, he considered a ‘positive’ measure was needed to opt out.    149
For him, thus, Britain had the obligation to assist the return of the ‘slaves’ in the Creole 
because it had not rejected ‘comity’, and it was not possible to ‘conceive how any other 
course could be justly adopted, or how the duties imposed by that part of the code regulating 
the intercourse of friendly States, which is generally called the comity of nations, can 
otherwise be fulfilled’.   It was certainly this notion of the ‘comity of nations’ that made the 150
American case even arguable.   Without it, there could have been no issue as to whether 
Britain should assist in its own territory with the enforcement of American law.   In this 
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.144
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.145
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185; Webster to Ashburton, 1 146
August 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 216. 
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.147
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185, and Webster to Ashburton, 1 148
August 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 216.  For Webster, it was ‘upon’ the comity of nations ‘as its 
solid basis, that the intercourse of civilised States is maintained’: Webster to Ashburton, 1 August 
1842, Ibid..  
 Webster to Ashburton, 1 August 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 216.  Story also referred to the 149
fact that a nation was ‘at liberty to concede or refuse’ matters of ‘comity’: Story to Webster, 26 March 
1842, re the Creole, Webster Papers, pp. 525-527 (Story was a member of the U.S. Supreme Court).
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185.150
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direct sense, then, British policy was being forced to respond to an issue that was created by 
international law.         
The dispute with Britain arising from the Creole was not, however, about whether the 
‘comity of nations’ existed, but, instead, about what it entailed in such circumstances.     
‘Comity’ as a principle was undoubtedly recognised by Aberdeen in his main letter on the 
subject to Everett of 18th April, 1842, and by Denman, the then Lord Chief Justice, in a 
parliamentary debate on the Creole.    Britain, however, took the view that the ‘comity of 151
nations’ nevertheless did not require it to assist in circumstances such as the Creole in the 
way demanded by the United States.   Aberdeen appeared to restrict the obligation required 
to that of not taking any positive action.    Denman and Phillimore, alternatively, brought in 152
notions of ‘justice’, ‘benefit’, and ‘injury’, with Phillimore noting in his pamphlet on the 
Creole that it was an ‘imperfect’, not a ‘perfect’ obligation.    Indeed, for Phillimore, 153
rejection of slavery was so entrenched within British policy that ‘comity’ was simply not 
pertinent.    Interestingly, this view on the ‘comity of nations’ also received support from 154
an American pamphlet, which gained some prominence in Britain, by William Channing.   
Channing’s ‘The Duty of Free States or Remarks Suggested by the Case of the Creole’ 
contended that ‘comity’ was a ‘vague, unsettled law’, which ‘ought’ not to apply to Britain in 
this case when ‘lives and liberties are at stake’.  155
These differences in the understanding of ‘comity’ did not, however, matter to the making of 
British policy on the immediate question for London from the Creole concerning the fate of 
the nineteen ‘slaves’.  This was because the action of taking the ‘slaves’ into custody had 
already taken place, and the remaining issue was whether to deliver them from there to the 
 Aberdeen to Everett, 18 April 1842, PP, 1843 LIX, No. 146; Denman, HL, 14 February 1842, Vol. 151
LX, 321-324.
 Aberdeen to Everett, 18 April 1842, PP, 1843 LIX, No. 146.152
 Denman considered that the ‘comity of nations’ could only be applicable on the ‘supposition that 153
the laws of all nations should be reasonable and just’: Denman, HL, 14 February 1842, Vol. LX, 
321-324.  Phillimore commented, of ‘comity’, that: ‘you lie under an imperfect, if not a perfect, 
obligation to give effect to his laws within your dominions, when, by so doing, you would benefit his 
subjects, and could not injure your own’: R. Phillimore, ‘The Case of the Creole Considered in a 
Second Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Ashburton’, (London: J. Hatchard, 1842), pp. 8-9.
 Phillimore, R. ’The Case of the Creole’, p. 12, pp. 20-21, p. 30, p. 37.154
 W. E. Channing, The Duty of Free States or Remarks Suggested by the Case of the Creole, 155
(London: J. Green, 1842), p. 26.
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United States.    Dodson, Follett, and Pollock, the then three law officers of the Crown, 156
provided a clear opinion that the nineteen ‘slaves’ could not be returned to the United 
States.   They advised that there was no principle of international law or treaty which 157
required Britain to ‘give up’ (i.e. extradite) persons wanted by foreign states in respect of 
alleged offences.   Nor, they continued, would it be lawful for the British government to 158
voluntarily ‘deliver up’ the nineteen ‘slaves’ then held in custody.    Similar opinions were 159
also expressed in a debate in the House of Lords, and by Phillimore in a pamphlet published 
in 1842.     Aberdeen undoubtedly felt constrained by the unity of legal opinion in 160
parliament in favour of the view that the ‘delivery’ of the ‘accused persons’ to the United 
States would be ‘contrary to law’, commenting to Ashburton that there was no choice ‘as to 
the course of the government’.    He, therefore, accordingly, followed both the advice of 161
the law officers, and the opinions in the House of Lords, when replying formally on the 
Creole to the United States on the 18th April, 1842.  The ‘slaves’ concerned became ‘free’ on 
arrival in Nassau, he asserted, and could neither be tried for offences committed outside 
British jurisdiction nor extradited to the United States.  162
 Indeed, the key opinion from the law officers of the Crown had been given by the time Everett’s 156
letter setting out the American position was received in March, 1842.
 Dodson, Follett, and Pollock to Stanley, 29 January 1842,  Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72, 157
pp. 172-194.  The law officers also advised, broadly, that the nineteen could not be tried in the 
Bahamas on the grounds that no alleged offences had been committed either by British subjects or 
within British jurisdiction, and that ‘piracy’ was not involved as the ‘intent’ and ‘object’ of the ‘slaves’ 
was to gain their ‘freedom’.  The law officers also expressed the view that the authorities in the 
Bahamas had acted correctly, on the facts as explained to them, both by reference to international and 
domestic law.  On this point, it should be observed, though, that a key factual assumption made 
elsewhere in their opinion, which may have been relevant to this advice, was that the ‘slaves were not 
liberated by the British authorities nor does it appear that any control was exercised by them, in this 
respect, over the crew’ - such a factual assumption was, as noted above, contradicted by Webster’s 
description of the incident.
 Dodson, Follett, and Pollock to Stanley, 29 January 1842,  Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72, 158
pp. 172-194 at pp. 184-185.
 Dodson, Follett, and Pollock to Stanley, 29 January 1842,  Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72, 159
pp. 172-194 at pp. 187-194.
 Brougham, HL, 3 February 1842, Vol. LX, 27-30, and HL, 14 February 1842, Vol. LX, 317-320, 160
Denman, HL, 14 February 1842, Vol. LX, 321-324, Campbell, HL, 14 February 1842, Vol. LX, 
324-326, and Aberdeen, HL, 14 February 1842, Vol. LX, 320-321; Phillimore, R.‘The Case of the 
Creole’.
 Aberdeen to Ashburton, 3 March 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. MS 43123, fols. 59-62.161
 Aberdeen to Everett, 18 April 1842, PP, 1843 LIX, No. 146.162
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Conversely, the various strands of opinion on what ‘comity’ entailed did provide the key 
flexibility for an agreement to be reached around the main part of the dispute, namely that 
concerning future situations similar to the Creole.   This general subject had been added to 
Ashburton’s brief for the negotiations around the 1842 Treaty because Britain recognised the 
seriousness with which the United States viewed the issues involved.    British policy, thus, 163
was to try to calm the tensions by providing some security to the United States, whilst 
nevertheless preserving, to the greatest extent possible, the vital principle, from Britain’s 
perspective, that slaves became free when on British territory.   The solution ultimately 
adopted was to deploy the common strand of opinion, in the respective conceptions of 
‘comity’ of Britain and the United States, that emphasised the duty of not acting positively 
towards, or ‘interfering’ with, American ships forced into British ports.  This benefitted the 
United States as it reduced the practical risk of slaves on board American ships in British 
territory gaining their freedom through official action.   It also worked for Britain in that it 
meant that no positive action was required from it to keep individuals in slavery.  In this way, 
British policy was, thus, using a shared legal principle as the basis of the compromise 
necessary to produce a settlement.   Furthermore, the use of an abstract legal principle must 
surely also have facilitated the process of resolving the tensions by allowing Britain and the 
United States to move away from the actual facts of the controversy that had caused the 
problem in the first place. 
The principle of ‘no interference’ was able to form the basis of a solution because it was 
present in both the British and American conceptions of what was meant by ‘comity’ in the 
Creole.   The opinion of the law officers, Webster’s letter of the 29th January, 1842, and 
Aberdeen’s letter of 18th April, 1842 are all key documents for understanding how ‘no 
interference’ came to be a shared principle in this case.  From Britain’s perspective, the basis 
for the compromise was an opinion of the law officers permitting ‘no interference’ under 
British law.   The officers were asked whether the relevant British authorities had a duty in 
the Creole to check whether the ‘slaves’ were ‘about so to return to the United States of their 
 Aberdeen told Ashburton that ‘we must do the best we can to put the matter on a right footing and 163
to obviate irritation and resentment’: Aberdeen to Ashburton, 3 March 1842, Aberdeen Papers, Add. 
MS 43123, fols. 59-62.  See also, Ashburton to Aberdeen, 28 April 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 
179.
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own free and unbiased will’, given that they knew that ‘slaves’ were on board.   Crucially, 164
whilst not based on ‘comity’, the law officers advised that there was no such duty: 
We think that the Officers of the Customs might lawfully grant a clearance to the ‘Creole’ 
to return to the United States and that it was no part of the duty of the Officers of the 
Customs to ascertain whether, the slaves were returning to America, of their own free will 
or otherwise.  165
  
This was important as it meant that a policy of ‘no interference’ was legally possible as a 
matter of British law.  Webster’s letter then makes clear that, whilst the United States had 
high expectations for positive action, ‘no interference’ was also embraced within one of the 
two main parts it saw in ‘comity’: 
It appears to this Government, that not only is no unfriendly interference by the local 
authorities to be allowed, but that aid and succour should be extended in these as in other 
cases which may arise affecting the rights and interests of citizens of friendly states.  166
This reference to ‘no unfriendly interference’ provided the key common theme with 
Aberdeen’s letter.   For Aberdeen had commented on when an ‘appeal’ to the ‘comity and 
usages of nations’ might have had ‘good reason’, whilst rejecting it on the facts of the Creole 
itself.      It was important in the Creole, he argued, that the ‘slaves’ had received no 
‘encouragement’ or ‘invitation’ from Britain to ‘capture’ the ship.   Indeed, in rejecting 
Everett’s analysis on the ‘slaves’ not taken into custody, he also saw it as important that the 
British authorities had been ‘passive’, commenting that they had been ‘merely left in the 
exercise of the freedom they had obtained, and were consequently not prevented from going 
on shore’.   In other words, for Aberdeen, ‘comity’ could be satisfied by ‘no interference’.   167
 The full question asked of the law officers was: ‘Whether the officers of Customs at the Port of 164
Nassau could lawfully grant to the ‘Creole’ a clearance, and the ship’s papers necessary to enable her 
to leave that port on her return to the United States; she having on board slaves, or persons who in the 
United States would be regarded and dealt with as slaves, and if so, whether it would or would not be 
the duty of such officers of Customs to ascertain whether such slaves were about so to return to the 
United States of their own free and unbiased will’: Dodson, Follett, and Pollock to Stanley, 29 January 
1842,  Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72, pp. 172-194 at pp. 178-179.
 Dodson, Follett, and Pollock to Stanley, 29 January 1842,  Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions, Vol. 72, 165
pp. 172-194 at p.187.
 Webster to Everett, 29 January 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 177-185 at p. 181.  See also Webster to 166
Everett, 1 August 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 658-665 at p. 665, where a similar distinction is 
maintained, although, as will be seen, by this point, ‘no interference’ appears to have been already 
decided upon as a solution given the draft texts working on it in June, 1842.
 Aberdeen to Everett, 18 April 1842, PP, 1843 LIX, No. 146. 167
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This provided the link with Webster as ‘no interference’ also necessarily met the ‘no 
unfriendly interference’ test.  168
The practical importance of the common acceptance of ‘no interference’ within the ‘comity 
of nations’ can then be seen in the final arrangement made by Ashburton and Webster in 
1842.    Ashburton suggested wording in June that Britain would ‘abstain from any 169
interference’ with American laws (meaning here those concerning slavery) established in the 
United States, and that governors in British colonies would be ‘instructed... to take care that 
no provocation or excitement, which they may be able legally to prevent shall be suffered 
with relation to condition of the coloured population’.     In response, Webster then made 170
explicit the link to international law (implicit in Ashburton’s text) by arguing that Britain 
should not interfere with American law for its citizens wherever the United States ‘has 
jurisdiction, according to the laws of nations’ (meaning here the ‘comity of nations’).    For 171
him, thus, the British authorities should undertake that: 
no interference be made or suffered, which can be legally prevented in relation to the 
condition of coloured persons within the limits of the two countries respectively, not 
subjects of Her Majesty, and not found within British jurisdiction as aforesaid [meaning 
here ‘exclusive’ British jurisdiction].     172
The principle of ‘no interference’, as present here, was then carried through into the final 
text.   Ashburton placed his letter within the context of the joint interest of Britain and the 
United States in ‘maintaining sound and pure principles of international law’, given that they 
 ‘No interference’ also dealt for the future with Webster’s contention that, on the facts in the Creole, 168
Britain had assisted the slaves gain their freedom, albeit that this was a key point of factual dispute 
with Aberdeen in the Creole itself (as noted above).
 Although, as Downey and Jones point out, Ashburton lacked specific instructions on the Creole 169
settlement, the common principle of ‘no interference’ did, however, give him sufficient authority to 
act given that, as shown, it was present in Aberdeen’s letter of April, 1842 (which Ashburton had seen 
- Ashburton to Aberdeen, No. 6, 12 May, 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 185): Downey, The Creole 
Affair, p. 121, and Jones, ‘The Peculiar Institution’, pp. 42-44. 
 Ashburton Draft Text, British Documents, Vol. 1, 199; as contained in Ashburton to Aberdeen, No. 170
12, 29 June 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 198.
 Webster, Draft Text, British Documents, Vol. 1, 200; as contained in Ashburton to Aberdeen, No. 171
12, 29 June 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 198. 
 Webster, Draft Text, British Documents, Vol. 1, 200; as contained in Ashburton to Aberdeen, No. 172
12, 29 June 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 198. 
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were ‘covering all the seas of the world with their commerce’.    Whilst London would 173
need to be involved in any further arrangement given the legal principles involved, there 
was, in his words, to be ‘no officious interference with American vessels driven by accident 
or by unlawful violence’ into British ports.   Instead, ‘the laws and duties of hospitality shall 
be executed’, and these did not ‘require’ or ‘justify’ any enquiry by British officials ‘into the 
state of persons or things on board’ other than ‘may be indispensable to enforce the 
observance of the municipal law of the Colony, and the proper regulation of its harbours and 
waters’.   As no doubt was expected, Webster then, accordingly, accepted this means of 
resolving the matter on  behalf of the United States.                 174
British policy had then achieved a settlement of the main dispute following the Creole on the 
basis of a compromise on what the ‘comity of nations’ would entail in similar future 
circumstances.   The political reaction in Britain to the arrangement indicates that it was 
widely perceived that a solution within the law had been reached .   The Quarterly Review 
believed that Webster’s doctrine in the Creole was right and said that Ashburton ‘seems’ to 
have agreed.     Similarly, The Westminster Review also indicated a compromise had been 175
reached, calling the arrangement ‘the reasonable way of leaving the question’.    More 176
importantly, it also became apparent that, whilst Britain had successfully rejected the attempt 
for it to assist the United States directly with the enforcement of slavery, it had also accepted 
that the strict position that a slave was free in British territory was modified by its obligation 
under ‘comity’ not to interfere.   Palmerston and Campbell both questioned the British 
approach in the parliamentary debate on the 1842 Treaty, with Palmerston seeking to confirm 
that slaves on board American ships could still be released on a writ of habeas corpus.   In 177
response, Peel maintained that Britain had kept the ‘principle that the slave coming upon 
 Ashburton to Webster, 6 August 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 666-669.  All subsequent quotations in 173
the remainder of this paragraph from Ashburton are from this letter.  Ashburton’s letter followed a 
long note from Webster, dated 1 August 1842, which set out a full statement on the ‘comity of nations’ 
in the context of the dispute (as noted above), and which formally introduced the idea for Ashburton to 
‘engage that instructions shall be given to the local authorities in the islands’: Webster to Everett, 1 
August 1842, Webster Papers, pp. 658-665. 
 Webster to Ashburton, 8 August 1842, British Documents, Vol. 1, 218. Webster did, however, note 174
that the President wished for ‘further stipulations, by treaty or otherwise’.
 ‘The Washington Treaty’, Quarterly Review, Vol. 71, (1843), Article VII, pp. 560-595 at pp. 175
590-591.
 The Westminster Review, ‘Lord Ashburton’, p. 200.176
 Palmerston, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1162-1218.177
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British soil is free’, and Stanley insisted that no new instructions had been given to British 
governors.    Indeed, Stanley confirmed that those instructions were: 178
that in case any complaint was made to the British governor, upon credible testimony, that 
any persons in a British port were detained against their will, it was the duty of the 
governor, upon verifying the statement so set forth, to afford such persons relief and 
protection.  179
Peel and Stanley were, however, making technical defences.  In the light of the terms of the 
arrangement, Peel seemed to be side-stepping the consequence of the new British approach 
for the checking for slavery on American ships, and Stanley’s requirement for a ‘complaint’ 
and ‘credible evidence’ seemed less likely to occur.  Rives, arguing in favour of the 1842 
Treaty in the Senate, perceived the situation more accurately, when he commented that the 
‘declarations’ and ‘engagements’ ‘go far towards giving us the practical security we have so 
long sought’.     Working within international law, thus, resulted, effectively, in some 180
restrictions on Britain’s freedom to act, albeit that it also allowed the dispute from the Creole 
to be resolved peacefully. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to show how British policy worked within the principles of 
international law in order to reach solutions in two disputes with the United States over the 
extent to which American ships suspected of carrying slaves were immune from interference.   
The tensions over the false American flags problem were ultimately resolved through the 
application of a shared framework of legal principles for the checking of the nationality of 
American ships suspected of being involved in the slave trade.   Indeed, the joint cruising 
agreed in 1842 relied on this common understanding.   Whilst the long term efficacy of joint 
cruising in tackling the slave trade can be rightly questioned, there is little doubt, however, 
that it, and the framework upon which it was built, were successful in resolving peacefully 
the problem in British-American relations over the ‘right of search’, both in the immediate 
 Peel, HC, 21 March 1843, Vol. LXVII, 1218-1252; Stanley, HC, 10 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 178
747-749.
 Stanley, HC, 10 April 1843, Vol. LXVIII, 747-749.179
 Rives, Speech in Senate, 17-19 August 1842, FO 5/384, fols. 57-64. 180
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sense in 1841-42, and for the remainder of the period under consideration.    Similarly, in 181
the Creole, it was the use of the common legal principle of ‘no interference’ within the 
‘comity of nations’ that allowed Britain to make an arrangement with the United States that 
did just enough to defuse the issue of whether it needed to assist directly with the keeping of 
individuals in slavery.   Britain, thus, emerged from both disputes with peace intact and 
workable settlements that allowed it, respectively, to tackle the slave trade better than before, 
and maintain the notion that a slave was free on entering the British Empire.   Britain’s 
handling of these problems through legal principles again also brings out that the British-
American relationship needs to be understood within a context greater than the immediate 
tensions around the controversies involved.   Slavery, of course, was a fundamental political 
difference that international law could not remove.   Beyond that, however, legal principles 
allowed common ground to be found on the related problems caused by the slave trade and 
the impact of British abolition on American ships.   This level of underlying agreement 
contained in the law means that British policy to the United States is best appreciated as 
based on cooperation as well as conflict.    
 On the question of the long term success of American efforts to curtail the slave trade, Lambert 181
comments: ‘Suitably embarrassed by British seizures of such fraudulent “American ships” an 
American anti-slavery patrol was set up in 1842, but it was never intended to be effective, to avoid 
upsetting sectional interest, and only became effective after slavers openly landed slaves in Georgia in 
1858’: Lambert, ‘Slavery, Free Trade and Naval Strategy’, p. 66, and referring in note 3 to D. Cannes, 
Africa Squadron: the U.S, Navy and the Slave Trade, 1842-61 (2006).  Peel, at least, however, felt that 
joint cruising was operating successfully, at least up to 1845: Peel, HC, 8 July 1845, Vol. LXXXII, 
140-142.  
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7.  Epilogue 
British policy to the United States in the period was concerned mainly with the tensions 
caused by the desire to protect Canada, the claim to Oregon, and the action to suppress the 
slave trade.  Why then did international law play such a large part in the debates?  This thesis 
has shown that ministers and the wider political class worked on the basis that Britain had 
international obligations imposed not just by treaties but by shared legal principles.  The 
Foreign Secretary took expert legal advice from the Queen’s Advocate.  British practice 
deferred to treaty law and legal principles.  Thus British objectives towards the United States 
developed in a way that took account of international law.  Territorial settlements in treaties, 
and the principle of self-preservation, justified the ongoing aspiration to retain Canada and 
the Maritime Provinces.   Principles associated with sovereignty bolstered Britain’s wish to 
keep the United States out of Canadian affairs after the rebellion in 1837.  Disputed 
boundary definitions forced British attention to be directed towards the Northeastern border.  
Britain’s aims beyond Canada were affected too.  Historic legal rights, and the perceived 
need to uphold them for the sake of British honour, meant a greater interest in Oregon than 
Texas.  The commercial treaty between Britain and the United States defined trading rights 
and obligations.  Rules restricting what could be lawfully traded in war incentivised the 
maintenance of peace.  Maritime rights influenced how Britain could pursue the Atlantic 
slave trade. 
Moreover, treaty law and legal principles provided a means for regulating the actual disputes 
in the British-American relationship of the period.  Respect from the United States created 
the engagement that allowed international law to operate as a bilateral system of rules within 
what was effectively a shared framework.  Indeed, for Phillimore, the ‘rise of  independent 
states on the other side of the Atlantic’ was one of the reasons for the greatly increased status 
of international law, for ‘to no people can the maintenance of International Law ... be of 
nearer interest or greater importance’.   Thus common principles relating to sovereignty and 1
neutrality encouraged security cooperation along the Canadian border.  Mutual 
acknowledgement of legal principles facilitated practical resolutions to the Caroline and 
McLeod incidents.  Legal process and arguments guided the way Britain dealt with the 
Northeastern boundary dispute and the problem of fishing rights off Nova Scotia.  The 
shared framework extended too to issues outside the purview of Britain’s existing 
 Phillimore, A Letter to the Right Hon. Lord Ashburton, pp. 5-61
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possessions.  Jointly held principles based on the concept of unoccupied land facilitated the 
ultimate partition of the Oregon territory.  The rule against interference influenced the nature 
of the American pressure against perceived attempts to abolish slavery in Texas - and 
Britain’s response.  Existing law guided the development of a practical framework for 
Britain and the United States to respond to the problem of suspected slave ships falsely 
flying American flags.  Frequently too, legal principles assisted with the easing of tensions 
by providing an escape from the facts of contentious events.  In the Caroline and the Creole 
affairs, for instance, it was agreements on the principles themselves that formed the 
settlements.  
Thus the thesis also establishes that ‘international law’ was not just a set of moral aspirations 
but operated on policy with the real force of law.  Britain and the United States clearly 
agreed that treaties, rules, and principles governed their conduct towards each other, albeit if 
they disputed some interpretations.  Their shared framework was, therefore, as Manning 
considered the wider ‘law of nations’, ‘law’ in the ‘sense of Hooker’, being ‘ “any kind of 
rule or canon whereby actions are framed” ’.   Nor was the international law which 2
influenced Britain a mere vehicle for protecting existing British state interests.  Certainly, 
Britain used tailored legal arguments to promote its aims, along with other traditional 
methods such as diplomatic and consular representation, and military threats.  International 
law, though, also shaped and regulated British policy towards the United States in a manner 
that bore no necessary correlation to Britain’s ongoing interests over time.  Agreements in 
prior treaties, for example, undoubtedly cast a long shadow by converting past policy into 
future law.  Thus, political choices made in earlier treaties guided, as law, policy decisions in 
the 1830s and 1840s, such as on the issue of containment.  American legal arguments too 
regularly defended the national interests of the United States, and ensured that some 
compromise was inevitable.  Britain adapted its policies on problems such as, for example, 
the Canadian border and the slave trade.  
What implications then does this role for international law have for the wider position of 
Britain in the nineteenth century?  Most importantly, the thesis confirms that the influence of 
international law is a serious factor to be considered across the range of British foreign 
policy.  This is particularly significant in the light of the work covering alleged breaches of 
 Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations, Book I, p. 5, citing Hooker, Eccles. Pol. I. 3 (1676 2
edn), p. 72.
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legal principles by Britain associated with the slave trade, as discussed in chapter 6.  Perhaps 
most relevantly to the thesis, assessments of British relations with European states would be 
helped by a greater understanding of whether or not international law influenced objectives, 
or resolved disputes, in these instances as it did with the United States.  There is, at first 
glance, good reason to suppose that international law may have had such a role.  The fact 
that Parry’s edited version of the opinions of the law officers’ of the Crown classifies the 
reports largely by country over ninety-five volumes is a simple illustration of the fact that 
law affected British policy towards many states.   There is, of course, also the argument 3
referred to in the Introduction that there was a wider European trend towards the increased 
use of international law following the Napoleonic Wars.  Key issues that could be considered 
in this context include whether or not the impact from international law was consistent 
across British policy to all other European states, and the extent to which the nature and 
intensity of the legal questions thrown up by independence made the relationship between 
Britain and the United States unique.  New light may then be shed on British strategic 
objectives in both Europe and the Americas in the nineteenth century.   A better analysis 
could also be made of the actual role played by international law in Schroeder’s 
‘transformation’, or Lev’s ‘interstate sphere’.     4
Moreover, the thesis indicates that criticism, as per Schmitt, that international law merely 
acted as a ‘cover’ for the pursuit of state interests in foreign policy is too simplistic in 
Britain’s case.   Undoubtedly, contemporary British arguments that were based on the 5
prevailing system of international law are, in one sense, always vulnerable to the accusation 
that they merely represented an efficient means of pursuing Britain’s ‘interests’.   The 6
Introduction refers to works highlighting the increasing role for international law in 
preserving peace in Europe and in achieving ‘order’ within the British empire.   International 7
law promoted too British property and commercial interests globally through legal principles 
 Parry, Law Officers’ Opinions. Indeed, the research for the thesis itself shows how, for example, 3
Guizot made comments affecting Britain in the context of the slave trade: see chapter 6, footnote 98.
 See: Schroeder, The Transformation, and Lev, 'The transformation of international law’.4
 See the reference to Schmitt and associated discussion in the ‘International Law’ section of the 5
Introduction.
  In this sense, adopting Hull’s words, in the context of her argument as to the centrality of law to the 6
First World War: ‘interests and law are not anti-thetical; they are joined’: Hull,  A Scrap of Paper, p. 
49.
 The key references are Schroeder, The Transformation, and Benton and Ford, The Rage for Order.7
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associated, for example, with territory, the freedom of the seas, and trade.   Furthermore, the 8
use of law when possible would usually have been much cheaper than the main alternative of 
military power.  Yet, this does not also mean that there was no role for international law in 
British policy as a set of properly functioning rules.  The thesis clearly demonstrates how 
international law guided the nature and implementation of British objectives towards the 
United States - as distinct from being just a means for implementing them.  The thesis shows 
too how international law was able to operate as a regulatory system with real meaning for 
Britain and the United States, which signals that it could have done so in other 
circumstances.  What was key was the British and American political support for the use of 
the shared framework - and evident acceptance that specific points could be lost in the 
management of disputes without damage to overall state interests.   Thus, what the thesis 9
suggests is that international law coexisted as both a protector of Britain’s interests in a wider 
global context, and as a guide-cum-regulator in certain relationships - but not that it is to be 
simply equated with British interests.     10
The thesis is also relevant to analysis of the general role of law in early- to mid- nineteenth-
century Britain.   Most importantly, the thesis brings out just how far international law was 
embedded within the institutions and practice of British foreign policy.  Experts were 
regularly consulted, and diplomatic despatches deployed legal argument.  British practice, at 
least in the case of the United States, was also shaped around ‘cornerstone’ legal principles.  
The historiographical bounds of the concept of legality within British politics need, 
therefore, to embrace the workings of the Foreign Office and the making of British foreign 
policy.  Moreover, the thesis simultaneously reinforces too the notion that law and legality 
were central features of British politics.  Applying what Craig and Thompson identify as 
 Indeed, as one example, Pagden observes the importance of the debates on the ‘legitimacy’ of the 8
Spanish ‘conquest of the Americas’ for the future role of international law: A. Pagden, ‘Conquest and 
the Just War: The “School of Salamanca” and the “Affair of the Indies” ‘, in S. Muthu (ed.), Empire 
and Modern Political Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 30-60, at p. 34. 
 Furthermore, the making of opposing legal arguments in the context of the same problems, as 9
illustrated in the thesis by Britain and the United States, does not of itself relegate international law to 
being just a proxy for state interests either - any more than similar contentions would impair the status 
of domestic law.
 This dual role for international law makes sense too if what might be thought of as a ‘realist’ 10
framework for international relations is applied - in that international law can be used by states within 
that system.  Indeed, Holsti observes that what he then termed ‘modern realists’ had ‘turned their 
attention from human behaviour to the structure of the international system to explain state 
behaviour’: O. Holsti, ‘Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy’, Diplomatic History, 13, 
(1989), pp. 15-43 at p. 19.
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Skinner’s request ‘ “to ask what’ [a person] ‘may be doing when he appeals to the language 
of ... particular traditions” ’, legality was, thus, impliedly being invoked when international 
law was appealed to in political debate, such as on the issue of intervention.    Furthermore, 11
the ‘public’ sphere of international law raises the additional question of whether ‘legality’ 
itself may have been a particular concern in foreign policy.  British respect for international 
law may clearly have counted for more in a context where legality was both valued generally 
and a matter of interest for world and public opinion.   For, as Parry observes, ‘one of the 
major themes of nineteenth-century elite politics was the image of itself that Britain should 
project’ , including ‘on the diplomatic stage’.  12
The thesis builds too on Benton and Ford’s main contention that the British ‘rage for order’ 
‘shaped the very idea of legal order on a global scale’ by showing how the British use of law 
within the empire also affected issues of policy - and ‘order’ - concerning a foreign 
‘civilised’ state, such as the United States.   Chapter 6, for example, demonstrates how 13
Britain’s response to the dispute with the United States on the slave trade was influenced by 
the nature of what Benton and Ford describe as wider British ‘attempts to order oceans’ 
using a variety of available, practical legal methods.   Similarly, in the case of the Canadian 14
rebellions, the thesis argues that the use of ‘protection’ within British politics gave reasons 
within international law for the United States not to interfere.  Whilst, as chapter 4 notes, the 
way ‘protection’ was deployed in this case can be partly distinguished from Benton and 
Ford’s analysis, it was nevertheless still an example of what they term the ‘adoption of 
discourses of protection to fit shifting schemes of imperial administration’.   Furthermore, 15
the thesis illustrates additional ways in which the imperial and foreign ‘orders’ came together 
by showing how ‘traditional’ international law was fed into the process of British governance 
from a foreign policy context.  The Creole, for example, provides an instance of how 
international law arguments from a foreign power - in the form of the comity of nations as 
 D. Craig, and J. Thompson, Languages of Politics in Nineteenth-Century Britain, (Basingstoke: 11
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 5, citing Q. Skinner, ‘Some Problems in the Analysis of Political 
Thought and Action’ in J. Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p.107.
 Parry, The Politics, pp. 1-2.12
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, p. 27.13
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, p. 119.14
 Benton and Ford, Rage for Order, p. 88.15
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put forward by the United States - could affect the nature of British rule.   The research 16
from the thesis makes clear too that comments on legal matters were occasionally passed 
between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, and among diplomats posted overseas 
and local imperial officials.   There is undoubtedly scope for further exploration of these 17
forms of connection.  
Finally, returning to the British-American relationship itself, the thesis indicates that the role 
of international law needs to be taken into account more seriously as an important factor in 
the development of the closer connection between Britain and the United States over the 
remainder of the nineteenth century.  The shared framework and the process of arbitration 
clearly continued to provide mechanisms through which British-American disputes could be 
resolved peacefully.  Whilst the 1850s contained issues over such matters as military 
recruitment during the Crimean War, fishing rights, and the slave trade, undoubtedly the 
most significant cases of law’s impact occurred during the American Civil War.  Here, two 
major incidents caused by alleged breaches of international law were ultimately settled using 
legal argument and procedure, with the ‘independent’ nature of international law being 
underlined by the fact that the matters went for and against Britain respectively.  Thus, in 
1861, Britain demanded the release of two Confederate diplomats seized by the North from 
the Trent, a British ship.   The men were let go, and as Dunning comments: ‘There were a 18
few cool heads in the North that believed [the] action unwise and unjustifiable by the law of 
nations’.   Then, famously, the North contended to Britain that the cruiser, the Alabama, 19
should not have been released to the South from Liverpool in 1862.   Consequently, the 20
United States claimed damages for the losses it alleged were subsequently caused to the 
 See the section on the Creole in chapter 6.16
 See, for example: Stephen (Colonial Office) to Backhouse (Foreign Office) , 17 February 1838, FO 17
5/328A, fols. 19-23, and Arthur (Canada) to Fox, 12 January 1841, FO 5/370, fols. 174-176 in the 
context of the Caroline; the comments of Palmerston on a draft of a letter from the Colonial Office to 
Stevenson of the United States concerning New Zealand: Draft letter to Stephen, 26 February 1841, 
FO 5/371, fols. 85-102; and a letter from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office relating to an 
alleged discriminatory tonnage duty on American vessels in Honduras in breach of the commercial 
treaty with the United States, 21 May 1842, FO 5/387, fols. 240-253.
 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, pp. 210-215.18
 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, p. 211.19
 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, p.219. 20
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commerce of the North during the war.   After a protracted legal dispute, arbitration 21
provisions were ultimately agreed in the Treaty of Washington 1871, and Britain was ordered 
to pay $15.5 million in compensation.  22
The alignment anchored in the treaties and shared framework - most importantly, on 
territory, sovereignty, commerce, and the freedom of the seas -  must also certainly have 
served to enhance political relations between Britain and the United States over the long 
term.  The circumstances of other issues were, of course, significant too in this process.  It is 
no coincidence, for example, that the British-American relationship developed more after the 
problems from slavery and the Civil War fell away in the latter part of the nineteenth century.  
But what international law provided to Britain and the United States was a durable, joint 
conceptual framework through which they could each independently address their respective 
global interests.  Crucially, this, in turn, then made it more likely that Britain and the United 
States would react in like manne to international affairs as and when those interests 
converged.  Mazower, for example, observes how Britain and the United States responded 
similarly in the ‘diplomatic rift’ with Europe over ‘interventionism and its limits’ in the 
1820s - with the implications of the period for British-American relations, for him, spanning 
far into the future.   In a different context, Britain and the United States can also be seen to 23
have adapted correspondingly to some of the ongoing challenges of trading globally from 
their shared background of international law.     Furthermore, beyond the immediacy of 24
such events, it may be questioned too whether the shared legal concepts around ‘sovereignty’ 
or the ‘civilised’ may also have reinforced indirectly the cultural connections considered 
important for British-American diplomatic rapprochement in the later nineteenth-century, 
such as the ‘ “notions” of an “Anglo-Saxon” racial or cultural affinity’ pointed to by Otte, or 
 Parry, The Politics, pp. 294-295.21
 Parry, The Politics, pp. 294-295.22
 As Mazower comments: ‘Canning in particular anticipated the fundamental development of the 23
twentieth century - the rise of Anglo-American hegemony’: Mazower, Governing the World, pp. 8-9. 
 Britain and the United States, for example, both entered trade treaties with China in the 1840s, with 24
Cushing, the then American diplomat in China, referring to being ‘informed’ through Everett of ‘the 
just and liberal views of the British government in regard to the intercourse of other nations with 
China’: Cushing to Everett, Copy, 8/3/44, FO 5/416, fols. 120-121.  On the position of the United 
States generally, and with reference to its future cooperation with the British in relation to Korea and 
Japan, see: R. Tamar Van, ‘Cents and Sensibilities: Fairness and Free Trade in the Early Nineteenth 
Century’, Diplomatic History, 42, (2018), pp. 72-89. 
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the ‘diplomatic sub-structure’ of ‘writers’ and ‘clergy’ of Hall and Goldstein.   Thus it seems 25
too narrow to restrict the wider impact of international law in the British-American 
relationship to the realm of disputes.  Grotius observed that ‘it is most true that everything 
loses its certainty at once, if we give up the belief in rights’.   By acting in the law together, 26
Britain and the United States showed that they ‘believed’ in the same international law.  
Perhaps in doing so they sought too the similar ongoing ‘certainty’ of their then respective 
positions on the North American continent and globally.  If it was, then, the legacy of 
independence that provided Britain and the United States with a common need for 
international law, it was nevertheless international law that helped to build the new 
relationship between them in the nineteenth century. 
 Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 404, and M. Hall and E. Goldstein, ‘Writers, the Clergy, and the 25
“Diplomatisation of Culture”: Sub-structures of Anglo-American Diplomacy, 1820-1914’, in Fisher 
and Best (eds.), On the Fringes of Diplomacy, pp. 127-154.  ‘Sovereignty’ is considered here for the 
sense of ‘confidence’ that may have arisen from secure international status.
 H. Grotius, Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace: An Abridged Version, Whewell, W., (ed), 26
(Cambridge: University Press, 1853), Preliminary Remarks, pp. xxix-xxx.
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Appendix: Map 
Source: Quarterly Review, ‘North American Boundary Question’, Vol. 67, March 1841, 
No. CXXXIV, pp. 501-540 at p. 504. 
(The blue and pink colours have been added to lines on the original for the purposes of 
clarity.  Points 1 and 2 have been added to the original.  See the key below.) 
 
Key: Blue line - American claim 
         Pink line - British claim 
         Point 1    - Fish River block house 
         Point 2.   - Madawaska 
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